


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


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The  Times

HISTORY
OF
THE WAR

VOL. XIX.



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CHAPTER CCLXXV.

ITALY, 1917—1918: AUSTRIA'S LAST OFFENSIVE.

FALL OF BOSELLI GOVERNMENT. OCTOBER, 1917—THE ORLANDO MINISTRY—POLITICAL SITUATION AND ITALIAN "MORAL"—AUSTRIA, THE CHIEF ENEMY—ANXIETY ABOUT ALLIED POLICY—SITUATION IN SPRING OF 1918—THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN ITALY AND THE YUGOSLAVS—THE LONDON AGREEMENT AND ITALIAN CLAIMS—THE PACT OF CORFU—THE PACT OF ROME AND ITS MEANING—MILITARY SITUATION AT END OF 1917—SOME MINOR SUCCESSES—BOMBS ON VENICE AND PADUA—AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE IN JUNE, 1918—FAILURE IN THE NORTH—AUSTRIANS CROSS THE PIAVE AND ARE DEFEATED—IMPORTANCE OF THE ITALIAN VICTORY

WHEN the Italian Parliament resumed its labours, on October 16, 1917, the situation of the Boselli Cabinet was very uncertain. It had barely weathered a crisis four months previously (the details have been given in Vol. XV, Chapter CCXXXIII), and in the interval events had occurred which had weakened its position still further. It had very few real friends, for there was a general feeling that it had failed in energy and foresight. There was still some reluctance to upset "the National Ministry," which stood for as much unity as could be expected in a country where political passion had run very high, both before and after the entry into the war. This reluctance, together with the known wish of Baron Sonnino that things should continue as they were, had saved the Government in June. When Parliament met there was a chance that the same feeling might prevail. But there were new elements in the situation. Or perhaps it ought to be said that some of the old difficulties had become accentuated. Keen debate was expected over the question of the food supply and the policy of the Ministry of the Interior. The two questions were closely connected, for lack of food was a powerful assistant to the arguments of

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the Official Socialists, who, like a few of their brethren in England, and more in France, seemed at first sight to have only one war aim—peace, immediate peace, peace at almost any cost. The Official Socialist Party had given a warm welcome to the Papal Note of the previous August, claiming that Benedict XV. "spoke the language of Kienthal," and they had adopted as their slogan the declaration of one of their leaders, Signor Claudio Treves: "This winter no one must be in the trenches."

It was said again, as it was said four months earlier, that Signor Orlando had not shown sufficient firmness in dealing with "defeatist propaganda," and critics could point to various disquieting symptoms in support of their contention, notably to General Cadorna's renewed protests, and to the serious riots which had taken place in Turin towards the end of August,—riots which seemed directly traceable to the incitement of the Official Socialists. It seemed certain that the Minister of the Interior would have to meet a stronger attack than before.

But if there was discontent with the work of individual Ministers, the feeling was still stronger against the Cabinet as a whole. The Government seemed to be afflicted with inertia, vagueness, lack of cohesion; and the fault was

laid by many at the door of the aged Premier, who was considered to be unequal to the task of leading the Ministry and the Chamber. It was felt by those who made this criticism that new methods were wanted, new blood and a new leader, if the organ of government was to fulfil its duty to the country. But criticism took another form. It had long been alleged by the Government's enemies, and also by some of its



SIGNOR NITTI.

In control of the Treasury in the Orlando Government, 1918.

supporters, that the Cabinet was not sufficiently in contact with Parliament and the country. This complaint had been made of the Salandra Government, and it was now said that its successor pursued the same lines. On the eve of the re-opening of the Chamber a group of 47 deputies was formed, which declared its intention of pressing for a fuller recognition of the right of Parliament to be informed of, and to help with, the problems of government. The group rapidly secured many more adherents and rose to a strength of over 100.

In view of the various currents which were setting against it the Government had just one chance of safety, the fear of "something worse" which had saved it in June. It began badly. The Chamber took umbrage over a matter of form in regard to which it considered that the Premier had failed to pay due respect to the rights of Parliament. The attitude of the Government would have caused no offence under normal conditions, the more so as the protagonist in the attacking movement was Signor Modigliani, one of the extreme Socialist leaders. Yet, though the Government obtained

a large majority, its fall was practically certain from this moment. The atmosphere of the Chamber altered. Instead of being hesitating and uncertain, it became definitely hostile. It still adopted a waiting attitude, but its mind was made up. It waited in order to hear the declarations of various political leaders. For though the Government was doomed, the right of succession seemed still uncertain. One fresh name, however, was already assured as a pillar of the new Government. Signor Nitti, who had been Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry in the last Giolitti Government, had taken no part in the polemic regarding Italy's intervention in the war; but he had often been classed among the "Neutralists," together with all the old Giolittian supporters, save those who, like Signor Orlando, had become openly and definitely identified with the war. Signor Nitti had remained silent till the autumn of 1916, when he delivered to his constituents in Basilicata the fullest and most reasoned statement of the necessity and justice of Italy's intervention in the world-war that had yet been pronounced by any Italian politician. It displayed at once a wide view and a practical mind. This speech signified Signor Nitti's return to the political arena, and a few months later he was appointed a member of the special mission which was sent by the Italian Government to the United States. On his return he immedi-



BARON SONNINO AND A BRITISH GENERAL.

ately found a place in politics ready for him. He could probably have overturned the Government in June, but he preferred to wait. It was certain, however, that the delay would not be long, and that his ideas and energy would ensure him one of the chief posts in the Government which should succeed that of Signor

Boselli. When Signor Nitti declared that he and his friends would vote for the Ministry on this occasion, but that they considered that the Government had put the Chamber in a humiliating position, it was generally felt that he now meant to assert himself.

The crisis came slowly. The policy of the Ministry of the Interior was discussed at length, and if there were those who accused Signor Orlando of weakness in his general policy, he was furiously attacked by the Official Socialists

When Signor Orlando rose to defend himself against his critics, a week after the opening of the Chamber, it was generally felt that he had a difficult task. On the one hand, he had to show that he would not tolerate the attempts to undermine the national resistance, and on the other hand he had to make it clear that maintenance of order did not mean reaction. His speech was a very able parliamentary effort. He admitted frankly that the Turin riots were in a sense the result of his libera-



[From a German photograph.]

GERMAN CAVALRY RESTING IN A PASS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT.

for the stern methods adopted in Turin to quell the riots there. These attacks gave rise to two declarations from prominent members of the Ministry. Signor Bissolati, the Reformist Socialist leader, turned upon his old comrades as they carped and complained, and cried: "To defend the Army from stabs in the back, I myself would fire upon you." Signor Bissolati knew the harm done by the insidious propaganda of the extreme pacifists, whose programme, while it seemed to be peace, was in reality revolution. The Socialists protested violently, and their protests were renewed when Signor Orlando, in answer to a taunt from the Extreme Left, sprang to his feet, and said that he, too, would adopt the hypothesis of Signor Bissolati. The Socialists made an uproar, but the bulk of the Chamber applauded loudly.

policy, but he scored an undoubted point when he asked whether any other policy would have ensured so great a freedom from internal troubles. He claimed with truth that the people of Italy had shown a remarkable degree of patience and self-discipline, and at the same time he pointed out that the repression of the Turin riots and the measures taken subsequently showed that he did not shrink from the use of force when it was necessary. He did not think that it was wise to abandon his policy of conciliation. He stood by both sides of his policy. He would use all the necessary force to uphold the State, but he would not infringe constitutional liberties.

Signor Orlando's speech was very well received, and it was felt that he had strengthened his claim to be Signor Boselli's successor.



AN ITALIAN NIGHT PATROL ON THE PIAVE.

Two days later the Government fell, after Signor Boselli and Baron Sonnino had both received the hearty cheers of the Chamber, and the Minister of War, General Giardino, had also been warmly applauded when he made the announcement that the expected enemy offensive had begun, and that the High Command were confident of the result. The applause which greeted Signor Boselli's valedictory statement was in the nature of a personal tribute to the veteran who had surrendered his ease to fill a post which at the moment none but he could have filled so well. He had played his part, and now he was to go, but it was felt that he had deserved the thanks of Parliament and the country. Baron Sonnino's account of his stewardship met with the applause which signified agreement with his policy and support for himself. One passage only of his speech was to meet with opposition and keen criticism (except of course, from the Official Socialists, who criticized everything). This was his downright language in regard to certain passages in the Papal Note. He spoke very strongly regarding the manner in which the Note merely included Belgium among "the possible exceptions" to the general principle of mutual condonation and renunciation of indemnities and put the martyred country on a level with all other cases of invaded and occupied territory. He claimed that the case of Belgium was totally different from any other, and said plainly that the Pope's treatment of the question seemed to suggest "German inspiration." Baron Sonnino's manner of dealing with the Note was strongly resented by the Catholics, both in the Chamber and in the country, and it seemed as though they might take a definite stand against the Foreign Minister and so narrow the basis of the future Government. For it was already clear that Baron Sonnino would continue to hold his position, unless he gave it up voluntarily.

The Boselli Cabinet fell on October 25, 1917, and next day came the news of the reverse at Caporetto. Each of the following days brought worse news from the front, and under the shock of disaster party differences and party feelings faded for the time. Signor Orlando was entrusted with the duty of forming a Government, and his list of Ministers was published on October 29. The new Cabinet was as follows:—

Signor Orlando, Premier and Interior.
 Baron Sonnino, Foreign Affairs.
 Signor Nitti, Treasury.
 Signor Bissolati, Civil Assistance and Pensions.

Signor Meda, Finance.
 Signor Pera, Posts and Telegraphs.
 Signor Sacchi, Justice.
 Signor Berenini, Public Instruction.
 Signor Dari, Public Works.
 Signor Miliani, Agriculture.
 Signor Riccardo Bianchi, Transport.
 Signor Colosimo, Colonies.
 Signor Cinfelli, Commerce and Industry.
 General Alfieri, War.
 Admiral Del Bono, Marine.
 General Dall'Olio, Arms and Munitions.

The new President of the Council took up the reins of government at a very critical moment. The front had been broken and the Italian armies were in full retreat upon a defensive line which meant the abandonment of a wide tract of Italian soil. The grave problems which had loomed large a week before were all forgotten for the moment, save one only—the question of the policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior. Signor Orlando had defended himself successfully in the Chamber, and practically established his claim to the premiership. And then disaster came, for which many people held his methods of administration largely responsible. There was a very strong feeling indeed against the premiership among many who had worked hardest for Italy's intervention and for a vigorous war policy. In Milan especially the criticisms of Signor Orlando and resentment at his succession to Signor Boselli found wide expression, in conversation at least; the Press realized the necessity of showing a united front.

Signor Orlando's first move was to appeal for the support of all parties and groups, and the answers which he received showed the mettle of Italy. Only the Official Socialists held aloof, as a party, though several of their leaders showed that the doctrines of the International had not completely overridden the instincts of patriotism. There were some who felt themselves Italians still, and at the moment of crisis worked for Italy.

The country as a whole was magnificent. For many months Italy had been beset by every kind of insinuation, to which no adequate answers had been given. Pacifist propaganda of every kind had been spread through the country, and it had given rise to many questionings. Now, under the shock of disaster, Italy put her questionings aside and answered the call of the tragic moment. From north to south, from Piedmont to Sicily, the same voice spoke. In political circles the little differences that seemed great differences were for a time forgotten, and the mass of the people, who

were suffering from severely straitened circumstances and had shown signs of war-weariness, tightened their belts and stiffened their backs, determined to resist. The Austro-German offensive no doubt had for its main object the



GENERAL ALFIERI,
Minister of War.

crushing of Italy's moral resistance. The spies and agents of the Central Empires had reported that the spirit of the people was unsatisfactory, and that defeat would lead to an utter breakdown. The military success of the great offensive certainly surpassed all expectations. Its failure as a solvent of Italian *moral* was complete. Instead of riot and revolution the enemy victories brought only a hardening of resolve, an increase of the will to sacrifice. There were some, of course, in Italy, as in all the countries at war, who were found wanting under the trial, who lost their nerve and would have accepted the results of present defeat through fear of worse disaster to come. But on the essentially sound organism of Italy the shock and the threat worked like cold water on a healthy body. There was a great reaction to the stimulus.

During the first weeks of the new Government party passion did not show itself, but when the military situation improved, when it was clear, moreover, that all parties except only the Official Socialists stood for resistance, the strife in Parliament revived. The

movement in favour of closer cooperation between the Government and Parliament, which had been set on foot before the fall of the Boselli Ministry, was quickly resumed. At first it seemed to meet with wide approval, but when it became evident that to press the matter would lead to a conflict with Baron Sonnino, the situation changed. The movement had taken the form of a demand for the institution of parliamentary commissions on the French model, and the innovation was urged for foreign affairs in particular. It should have been obvious that Baron Sonnino's habit of mind would not accept such a change in the method of conducting foreign policy. He had often been accused, with justice, of keeping his ministerial colleagues in the dark. It was not likely that he would admit the "interference" of a commission of senators and deputies. The promoters of the movement had foreseen this, and hoped that Baron Sonnino's refusal might end in his defeat and retirement. Some of the later adherents may have hoped that he would



GENERAL ALFREDO DALL'OLIO
Minister of Arms and Munitions.

yield to the pressure of opinion. But Baron Sonnino was inflexible, and he carried his Cabinet colleagues with him. It followed that those who pressed the movement declared themselves as an Opposition, and, in fact, the Parliamentary Union, as the group was now called, came to be regarded as the real Opposition, though it did not always insist on opposing. Its enemies said that it was biding

its time, and that it included too many of the "old majority"—i.e., Giolitti's majority—for its actions to be above suspicion. This accusation was probably unfair, but it was natural that the Giolittians should remain under suspicion, the more so as their old leader had made little response to Signor Orlando's appeal for unity of effort. He had left his tent, indeed, and spoken in the Chamber, but he seemed still to hold aloof, and some of those who were closest to him used language that

which followed as the *Fascio*. Its aim was to counter the manœuvres of the Parliamentary Union by open fighting and hard hitting, and a curious situation arose.

The new group was composed of deputies from nearly every quarter of the Chamber, from the Extreme Right to the Reformist Socialists. It stood for a stronger internal policy and the closest cooperation with the Allies, in every field. Included among its number were those who had been most outspoken in their criticism



[Italian official photograph.]

ITALIANS STRENGTHENING A TRENCH ON THE PIAVE.

appeared to confirm the hopelessness of expecting his real cooperation.

The Parliamentary Union was the nucleus of a strong Opposition, and it could always count upon the Official Socialists to support it in any vote against the Government. Signor Orlando and his Ministers, on the other hand, had no marshalled array of followers, though they were assured of strong support. A more definite backing seemed to be required, and the opening days of the December Session—Parliament had adjourned after one sitting in November—saw the formation of another new group, the Group of National Defence, *Fascio di Difesa Nazionale*, which was known throughout the months

of Signor Orlando's régime at the Ministry of the Interior, and it seemed strange that these should join together for the express purpose of supporting his Cabinet. Yet the reason was simple enough. They believed that Signor Orlando would take a much stronger line if he were assured of this definite backing than if he had to secure parliamentary support by a policy of bargaining and arrangement. The new group was pledged to vote according to the decisions of its "directorate," and this meant a nucleus of some 150 votes, which was certain to attract to itself a large number of other deputies who preferred not to commit themselves definitely. The *Fascio* offered its

solid support to Signor Orlando, conditioned only by his adoption of an uncompromising "war policy." And Signor Orlando desired nothing better.

This did not mean that he abandoned his policy of conciliation, or the hope of maintaining a large degree of national concord. But it did mean that he had greater freedom of action, that he was much less hampered by "parliamentary exigencies." After some anxious moments and some very turbulent sittings, the December debates closed with the Government firmly in the saddle. Nor did the *Fascio* confine



ADMIRAL ALBERTO DEL BONO,
Minister of Marine.

its efforts to parliamentary circles. Branches were established all over the country, and an attempt was made to reach the people and provide some antidote to the Socialist propaganda which had hitherto been left almost unanswered. The end of the year, which saw the battle-line held firm in the mountains and along the Piave, found also a stronger garrison and better leadership upon the home front.

Throughout the winter of 1917-1918 there was a continuance of the peace-talk which had been begun by the German proposals of a year before. Fortunately, German action belied German words, and Brest-Litovsk illumined many minds which otherwise might have continued to suffer from the illusions that were evident in many countries. Many people refused even to learn from Brest-Litovsk, but on the whole, expressions of belief in Germany's good faith were confined to those who had lost their nerve and those who dreaded a German

defeat. What Germany stood for was clear to all who could and would look facts in the face. Illusions in regard to Austria-Hungary persisted a little longer.

In Italy, of course, there were no such illusions, except in a very limited circle. For Italy, Austria-Hungary was the immediate enemy, as Germany was for England and France. But Italy realized, what her Allies were very slow to understand, that Austria-Hungary was bound hand and foot to Germany, and that the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire was a necessary preliminary to the establishment of a just peace that should have a chance of enduring. It was long before this point of view commended itself to Italy's Allies. On various occasions the apparent *tendresse* of Britain or France for Austria-Hungary had caused uneasiness in Italy, and this uneasiness was greatly increased by the statements of "war aims" made by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George early in January, 1918. Both of these statements seemed to confirm the old impression that Britain and the United States had different standards of enmity towards Germany and Austria-Hungary, and were considering the possibility of coming to terms with the lesser enemy. Such a programme could not commend itself to Italy, and Italian political circles were gravely preoccupied by the apparent tendency of the declarations made on behalf of Britain and the United States. Two quotations from newspapers representing very different shades of political opinion, and linked only by the fact that from the first they had urged the path of war, are sufficient to indicate the uneasiness which prevailed. The *Corriere della Sera*, after observing that the only modification of the Allied pro-war policy which appeared from the speeches of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George was a tendency to show greater favour towards Austria-Hungary, explained this tendency by showing that "the material and ideal interests of America, France, and England depend in great part on the result of the war with Germany rather than of that with Austria." "It may be permitted to us, therefore," the *Corriere* continued, "to add that Italy and the Balkan Allies represent an element of equilibrium in the crisis of European distribution. their material and ideal interests depending more on the result of the war with Austria than of that with Germany. An anti-German programme



[French official photograph.]

ITALIANS CONSTRUCTING A MILITARY RAILWAY.

which restores Alsace-Lorraine to France, and to the Polish State Posen, whose borders are so near the German capital, we perfectly understand and have loyally accepted. We, therefore, count on the good will and sense of justice of Allied public opinion when we request greater consideration for the anti-Austrian programme." Here was a reasoned, serious plea that put the Italian case, and that of Serbia and Rumania, with sufficient clearness, and so went to the root of the matter far more than most other comments, which were in the main on the lines of the brief but pertinent complaint in the Socialist *Popolo d'Italia*, which found inexplicable "the silence or reticence of some of our Allies, who, whenever they have to touch matters concerning Italy and Austria, seem preoccupied by one idea only—not to be excessively hard upon Austria-Hungary."

Italian opinion was both anxious and puzzled. Some blamed the Government for its apparent inability to sustain Italy's cause with her Allies; some criticized the Allies; some did both. The worst of the situation was that the British and American references to Italy seemed to confine recognition of her claims to something not greatly different from what was proposed by Prince Bülow to Signor Giolitti before Italy's entry into the war. The old supporters of neutrality were not slow to point this out,

and Signor Orlando's position was made very difficult. His programme, and that of his newly-pledged supporters, was that of a firm war policy and close cooperation with the Allies. Yet within a few days of his victory in the Chamber two of Italy's Allies took a step which seemed to moderate the demands upon Italy's chief enemy, and showed that there was still a remarkable lack of cooperation and coordination of ideas upon the political front. There were many questioning minds in Italy during the first weeks of 1918, and it will be admitted that the speeches of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were hardly calculated to strengthen Italian opinion against a peace offensive. But Count Hertling and Count Czernin were sufficiently uncompromising in their declarations to do away with any hope of influencing "moderate" opinion in Italy or elsewhere. There was a good deal of discussion in the Italian Press regarding the apparent difference in tone between the utterances of the German and Austrian spokesmen, but the general impression was that the difference was superficial, and only the Clerical newspapers found in the speeches any sort of basis for a discussion that might lead towards peace. It was felt by most people that Count Czernin's milder language was induced by the hope of confirming, for the time at least, that



[Italian Naval official photograph.]

TRANSPORTING ITALIAN NAVAL GUNS.

comparatively benevolent attitude towards Austria-Hungary which had seemingly been indicated both by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. The comments of the *Epoca*, a newly established Roman daily which was in close touch with Signor Orlando, may be quoted as giving not only the official view but the general public opinion of Italy. The *Epoca* thought that the speeches gave "a new example of compact unity," and said that the attitude of the two speakers was substantially the same, in spite of Count Czernin's less defiant tone. It emphasized the definite "No" given to all suggestions which did not fit in with the aims of the Central Powers, and concluded by saying :

This dangerous conversation on the subject of peace, which helps no one but the Central Powers, must absolutely be cut short. But not before the Allies have replied in a Note which we ask shall be collective, and would like to be definitive and simple, so as not to lend itself to doubtful interpretations ; a Note that we should like to see free from any relic of the old diplomatic policy.

There was keen anxiety in Italy for a collective statement on behalf of the Entente Powers, for clear evidence of the closest possible union among them. It was felt rightly that any appearance of divergence was so much encouragement to the enemy. Italy had already suffered from the absence of close and continuous cooperation in military matters. She felt it hard that Fate had made the way to Versailles lie through Caporetto, and it was not yet evident that the further road to complete unity

of command had to pass through St. Quentin. She had paid more heavily than anyone else, so far, for the long failure to realize the idea of the single front in its literal sense. It seemed to her now that her interests were further threatened by an equal failure to establish and maintain the single front in its political sense. The breakdown of Russia had not only affected the situation on the Italian Front. It had changed the political position. It meant that for a time at least the Hapsburg Monarchy had only one inevitable enemy in the ranks of its opponents instead of two. Both in France and England there was an influential body of opinion which still believed in the necessity of "a strong Austria," and hoped that the offer of "reasonable terms" might detach Austria from her association with the chief criminal. Though Italy agreed that Germany was the chief criminal—popular opinion had no doubt at all in the matter—it was impossible for Italy's leaders to overlook the more immediate menace from Italy's neighbour. Italians, moreover, were firmly convinced that Austria-Hungary, or at least the Hapsburg Empire, could only exist as an instrument of Germanism, that the game of using the Hapsburgs against the Hohenzollerns and what they stood for had long ago become impossible. Even assuming, however, that Austria might be detached from Germany, Italy could hardly welcome the prospect. To detach Austria meant offering

the Hapsburgs terms that were worth taking, meant therefore the survival of a strong Hapsburg Monarchy which would of necessity be hostile to Italy. For a strong Hapsburg Monarchy could hardly avoid looking with a revengeful eye upon an Italian Trieste and an Italian Pola, however it might be reconciled to the loss of the Trentino.

Italian opinion had moved a long way since the spring of 1915, when the idea which animated Italy's leaders, and almost all those who attempted to provide for the future, was the necessity of facing a beaten but still powerful Austria-Hungary, which would remain in close alliance with a beaten but still more powerful German Empire. Even at that date there were men in Italy, as in England and France, though few enough in any of the three countries, who saw farther and clearer, who saw that the aims of the Liberal Powers should be the re-fashioning of Europe, the liberation of the oppressed peoples, that from the great evil of the German aggression this great good might come. They were few who saw in the early days that the war was not only a war for this or that national victory, but a true revolution, a struggle between two moralities. A "drawn war" might have come easily in 1915, but for

the fatal *visus* of Germany and Austria. But as the tale of suffering lengthened, and the list of crimes, the resolve grew and hardened and spread among the Allied Powers that nothing less than the remaking of Europe would serve as reward for victory.

In Italy, as elsewhere, there was reluctance to accept the wider vision. In Italy, as elsewhere, there were those who urged the necessity of being practical, and of adapting ends to the means in sight. It was maintained, among other practical arguments, that Italy, the weakest and the poorest of the four great European Allies, could not take the lead in advocating an extreme programme which the others might not follow. That seemed a sound position for Italy's rulers to adopt, the more so as they feared accepting commitments which might impose too great a strain upon Italian resources. But the force of ideals gained ground. Once more the truth was to be proved, that the real "movers and shakers" are the "dreamers of dreams."

The spring of 1918, which was so critical a period for the Western Powers, and which had begun with an apparent weakening of the will to complete victory (a weakening clearly hinted by the British and American attitude towards



BRITISH BILLETED IN AN ITALIAN HOUSEHOLD.

Austria), which saw moreover the final downfall of Austria's greater enemy, was marked also by a new gathering of anti-Austrian forces, and by the uncompromising declaration of the formula: *Delenda Austria*. The movement was not new. From the beginning of the war disruptive forces had been at work within the Monarchy, and if the Governments of the Entente Powers had seen farther, success would have come sooner. But the wider vision was denied. Or, if they saw, they could not agree on common action. Or they feared too great commitments. Or they clung overmuch to the well-established idea of checks and balances. Whatever the motive of his speech, it was after three years of war that Mr. Balfour could decline to state the aims of the Allies in regard to "that ancient monarchy" Austria-Hungary. Nearly six months later Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George seemed to hold out no greater hope to those who asked for a pledge that would strengthen their efforts after freedom; and later still, Mr. Lloyd George sent General Smuts to Switzerland, to talk with Count Albert Mensdorff, formerly Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. Official France had given no clearer lead. In France, indeed, there was a very strong party which planned to strengthen

the Hapsburgs at the expense of the Hohenzollerns, to pit Catholic Germans against Protestants, South against North—to lop off some of the ancient Empire, indeed, but to avoid the break-up that the subject-peoples and the cause of freedom demanded. Russia, while she existed under the Tsar and had a voice in the councils of the Allies, supported the Southern Slavs, though not to the full extent of their efforts towards unity, but her attitude to the Polish question was a definite bar to common effort on the part of the Poles. The Italian Government followed exactly in the footsteps of Italy's more powerful Allies.

So it was that Poland, unhappiest of all the oppressed nations—for the enemies to her freedom were in both rival groups, so that brother fought against brother, and all her lands were laid waste by the marchings and counter-marchings of contending armies—had little enough inducement or opportunity to combine her forces for liberty. So it was that the Southern Slav leaders who worked for unity and complete independence of Austria were hampered in their efforts, while the Rumanian movement was long retarded. Only Bohemia, stronger than the Southern Slavs by reason of her history as an independent nation, stronger



Official photograph.

WITH THE BRITISH IN ITALY: A DUG-OUT IN THE ROCKS.



[Official photograph.]

BRITISH HUTMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT.

than Poland by the fact of her actual unity under one crown, sure, moreover, that at least she had no opponents among the Entente Powers, planned and organized her revolution, and showed the way to the other subject-peoples. In the sense that has been indicated, Bohemia's task was easier than that of Poles or Rumanes or Southern Slavs, but in another sense it was far more difficult. The Czechs and Slovaks were completely surrounded by enemies. Between Germany and Austria they lay as between the upper and nether millstones.

The Entente Governments hesitated to commit themselves, but in each country there were groups of men who worked for the larger programme. In Italy, from the first, there were some who did not hesitate to proclaim the necessity of accepting the greater commitments and of taking a different view of Italian interests than that which was strictly limited by the claims of naval and military "exigencies." The main point of difference between them and those who held what was often called the practical view lay in their attitude to the Southern Slavs.

When Italy entered the war, her Government and most of her leading men had two main practical objects in view: the "redemption"

of those Italians who remained under Austrian rule, and the acquisition of satisfactory defensive frontiers. It was unfortunate that the full realization of both these aims was in clear opposition to the interests of one of Austria-Hungary's subject-peoples, the Southern Slavs. On the eastern side of the old Austro-Italian frontier, from Gorizia to Fiume, the distribution of Italian and Slav populations was such that the tracing of a new frontier on a racial basis was quite impossible, while in Dalmatia there was a similar conflict of interests. On the purely racial basis Italy's claims to Dalmatian territory were slight. Taking an extreme estimate, the Italian population formed no more than 8 per cent. of the whole. This population, moreover, was scattered along the coast and in the islands, forming everywhere except in the town of Zara small isolated minorities in the midst of a compact Slav population. These Italian communities were described by Mazzini as "the remnants of our colonies," and this they were in fact, the remnants left of the Italian centres of administration and culture and trade which had flourished during the long occupation of Dalmatia by the Venetian Republic. Even in Mazzini's day they could be described as "remnants," and since that time they had fought a gallant but losing fight



[From a German photograph.]

AUSTRIANS REMOVING THEIR WOUNDED ACROSS THE PIAVE.

against the natural encroachment of the Slav and the deliberately anti-Italian policy of the Austrian Government. This anti-Italian policy was of comparatively recent date, and the numbers of the Italian population had greatly decreased since 1880. At that time no doubt the official figures of the "Italian" population included a greater proportion of Italianized Slavs than they did 35 years later, but there were other reasons for the great diminution. There was little chance of a career in Dalmatia for an Italian who held fast by his nationality. The easier way was to go with the tide, or to leave home for the parent country, or for the Americas, North and South. It says much for the attachment of the Italian elements to their culture and traditions that they were able to survive at all.

Italian claims in Dalmatia had a basis in history and in sentiment, but it is obvious that the controlling factor in deciding the actual programme put forward by the Italian Government and accepted by Great Britain, France and Russia in the London Agreement of April, 1915, was the argument of strategic necessity. This is not the place to discuss the terms of the Agreement at length. It is enough to say that, while in some slight degree it was a compromise on the question of the racial difficulty, for Fiume was not included in the Italian claim, or the small communities in Southern Dalmatia and certain of the islands, between half and three-quarters of a million Slavs—Slovenes, Serbs and Croats—were included within the boundary traced for the enlarged Italy. The claim to the northern part of the



ITALIAN TROOPS ARRIVING AT ANCONA.

Dalmatian mainland and to the numerous islands which fell to her under the terms of the Agreement was based on the necessity of improving the Italian naval position in the Adriatic. It has often been said that the two keys to the Adriatic are Pola and Valona, but Italy's security would not be guaranteed by the possession of these two bases, important though they are. They are too far apart, and the fact of the distance is emphasized by the nature of the waters and the coasts that lie between them. The western, or Italian, shore of the Adriatic is without an adequate harbour all the way from Venice to the Straits of Otranto, while the Dalmatian coast and islands form a continuous series of harbours and channels that makes Dalmatia one great potential naval base. And the narrowness of the Adriatic makes it impossible to protect the open Italian shore by forces based upon Pola and Taranto. This was the argument which doubtless determined the extent of the Italian claims in Dalmatia.

Again, this is not the place to discuss whether it was necessary to demand such an extensive area in Dalmatia, though the necessity was contested by many naval authorities, and the wisdom of the step was naturally criticized from the military point of view. For the increased length of land frontier meant a large increase in military commitments, the more so as it included a large population of the same race as those beyond it.

This new boundary was chosen for strategical reasons, with the prospect in view of the old enemy lying in wait beyond the frontier, brooding revenge. But from the first, or as soon as its general terms became known, the Agreement gave rise to a keen polemic. On the one side were those who believed in the possibility of breaking up Austria-Hungary, the creation of a Yugoslav State, and the establishment of a cordial agreement between Italy and the new State. On the other side were those who doubted or deprecated the break-up of Austria-Hungary, and argued that in any case Italy could not reduce her demands, which were justified by reasons of history, sentiment, and strategical necessity; for there was no guarantee, or even probability, that the successors of Austria-Hungary on the eastern frontier and in the Adriatic would be any more friendly to Italy than the Monarchy itself had been. It was urged that the "Croatian," the traditional instrument of oppression

in Northern Italy during the Austrian occupation, and the bitter opponent of the Italians in Fiume and Dalmatia, could not change his spots.

In this way a vicious circle appeared to be established. The Italian demands were backed by the contention that the Yugoslavs were essentially, or at least potentially, hostile. The Yugoslavs certainly displayed hostility to Italy, but their leaders and their friends in Allied countries maintained that this hostility



DALMATIAN FISHERMEN.

was due to Italy's demands. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Italian extremists had their counterpart among the Slavs. If the extreme Italian programme included between 600,000 and 700,000 Slavs within the boundaries of an enlarged Italy, the Slav extremists were insistent upon the inclusion of more than 400,000 Italians within the borders of Yugoslavia. The British and French champions of the Yugoslav cause long maintained that Yugoslav "imperialism" was



[Italian Naval official photograph.]

ITALIANS UNLOADING STORES AT VALONA.

an Italian invention, arising from the wish to justify Italy's demands. But the utterances of various Yugoslav leaders disproved this contention.

A further complication was the long difference of opinion among the Yugoslav leaders themselves—Slovenes, Croats, Serbs of the Monarchy, Montenegrins, and Serbians. Each section naturally had its own ideas as to the future State, its constitution, its boundaries, its general programme. This was most natural. Each branch of the race had its own particular interests to consider, and cared much less about those of the other branches; and it must be remembered that the various branches had never been united in history. The constitution of Yugoslavia was a matter of keen discussion, and the question of its boundaries did not command agreement, especially in view of Italy's undoubted claims. The Slovenes, for example, claimed Trieste, Istria, and all the lands east of the Isonzo, as essential parts of Yugoslav territory, and cared comparatively little about the Middle Adriatic. For the Croats the important points were Fiume and Dalmatia. They did not press the question of Trieste—no doubt they realized that the Yugoslav claim to Trieste had just as much and just as little justification as the German claim to Antwerp—and it was a Dalmatian-Croat suggestion, made in the summer of 1917, that a surrender of Italian claims in Dalmatia could be compensated by the Bocche di Cattaro.

To the Serbs and Serbians, who seemed to care relatively little about Trieste and not very much more about parts of Dalmatia, the Bocche di Cattaro were as the Ark of the Covenant.

These difficulties and differences were in the nature of things, and when it is remembered how recently the bitter struggle between Serbs and Croats in the Monarchy had died down, the unification of sentiment which had been accomplished must be regarded as very remarkable. On the other hand, these difficulties and differences did certainly give a large measure of justification to the many Italians who were honestly sceptical regarding the force and unity of the Yugoslav movement. It was all but three years from the outbreak of the war when the Yugoslav leaders finally came to an agreement regarding their programme, and proclaimed it to the world in the Pact of Corfu.

The Pact of Corfu, which was published on July 20, 1917, was signed by representatives of the Serbian Government and Parliament and of the Yugoslav Committee, which had authority to speak for the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy. It was signed by M. Pashitch for the Serbian Government, and by Dr. Trumbitch for the Committee. This published declaration proclaimed a new State, which should be called "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." In this new State the various branches of the Yugoslav race were to be

united under the Karageorgovitch dynasty. Italian opinion responded immediately to this indication of Yugoslav determination and Yugoslav unity. Many people still doubted whether the Yugoslav Committee really represented the opinion of the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy, for it must be remembered that the Yugoslavs had practically cut themselves off from Italy since Italy's entry into the war. With some reason, it must be admitted, but none the less most unfortunately, their representatives looked upon Italy as definitely hostile, and took up their quarters in London and Paris. Italians were very inadequately informed regarding the progress of the movement within the Monarchy, but many had worked steadily on the principle that an agreement was necessary, and the proclamation

of the Pact of Corfu at once gave a spur to their efforts and point to their arguments.

Five days after the proclamation of the Pact of Corfu, on July 25, the *Corriere della Sera* published the first of a remarkable series of articles advocating an agreement with the Southern Slavs, and the other great Milanese newspaper, the *Secolo*, which had always shown itself favourable to an agreement, took the same line. A month later, during the sittings of an Entente Socialist Congress in London, the representatives of the Italian Reformist Socialists, headed by Signor Beronini, Minister of Public Instruction, were put in touch with the Yugoslav Committee and heard their opinions as to the territorial question. From an exchange of views it seemed as though a compromise might be possible without doing



A CROATIAN MARKET-PLACE AND CROATIAN PEASANTS.

violence to the interests of either side, and the movement in Italy thus gained further definite adherents. In the meantime discussions were going on in Switzerland between a number of Yugoslav exiles and a group of Italians, whose idea it was to form two committees, Slav and Italian, to prepare the way for agreement and compromise, and for an actual congress. The



SIGNOR AGOSTINO BERENINI,
Minister of Public Instruction.

deliberations progressed very slowly, and at the end of October came the disaster of Caporetto.

It was often said that the Italian movement towards agreement dated only from the hour of Italy's ill-fortune. The facts given above are sufficient disproof of the allegation. In point of fact, the Caporetto disaster retarded the movement for a time. There were many Italians who felt that Italy could not make renunciations in the hour of misfortune which she had not considered when her arms were successful. It is not too much to say that it was the other side to the controversy which first realized that agreement was more urgent than ever. The Yugoslavs knew very well that the complete and final defeat of Austria-Hungary was much more necessary to them than to Italy. For Italy it was immensely important. For them it was a question of life or death. The defeat at Caporetto, following upon the collapse of Russia, opened the eyes of many Yugoslavs to the imperious necessity of composing their differences with Italy.

But an agreement with the Yugoslavs was only a part of the programme that was now prepared. The situation clearly demanded the close alliance of all anti-Austrian forces and the

adoption of all anti-Austrian weapons, within and without the Monarchy. An Italo-Czech Committee had existed for some time. The Polish Committee in Rome had established cordial relations with influential circles, though the policy of the Consulta was not encouraging in this case any more than in those of the other subject-races. Italian sympathy with Rumania was traditional.

Various groups in Italy worked to prepare the way for agreement and cooperation, but the actual arrangements were carried out by an Italian Committee which was formed on February 15. This Committee, which was entitled "Committee for the Entente between the nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary," consisted of a number of influential politicians and journalists. An Executive Committee was appointed, consisting of Senator Ruffini, an



SENATOR FRANCESCO RUFFINI,
Of the Committee for the entente between the
Nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary.

ex-minister and the great authority on the life of Cavour, the deputies Signori Torre, Barzilai and Arcà, Signor Maraviglia of the *Idea Nazionale*, and Signor Amendola, Rome correspondent of the *Corriere della Sera*.

Immediately after the formation of the committee Signor Torre left Rome for Paris and London as the delegate of this committee, charged with the duty of entering into negotiations with the representatives of the various subject-races, and especially with the Yugo-

slavs. Meanwhile the Italian "Interventionist" Socialists had formed themselves into a group known as the Italian Socialist Union. The representatives of this group at the Entente Socialist Congress held in London in February (20-24) proposed to the Congress that its statement of war aims should include the "dismemberment" of Austria-Hungary. The Congress found the proposal too blunt, and took refuge in a formula which declared that "the rights of independence claimed by Czechs and Yugoslavs could not be considered as questions of autonomy within the Dual Monarchy."

More important, however, than these efforts, for it gave an official sanction to the movement for an agreement between Italians and Southern Slavs, was an interview between Signor Orlando and Dr. Ante Trumbitch, President of the Yugoslav Committee, which took place in London at the end of January. The interview was cordial, and seemed to serve as a foundation for the work of the next few weeks. However, when Signor Torre arrived in London and endeavoured to trace a formula for agreement with Dr. Trumbitch, it was found with difficulty.

The crowning manifestation of all these efforts was the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome, in the Capitol, on April 8, 9 and 10, 1918. The Italian delegation, in addition to the members of the Executive Committee mentioned above, included representatives sent by the Italian Committee for an Italo-Yugoslav Entente, which had grown out of the negotiations in Switzerland, by the Italo-Czech Committee, and by various groups which had interested themselves in the work of forming the specifically anti-Austrian Alliance, among them several of the best-known Nationalists.

The Congress was closed after three days' discussion among the various committees into which the delegations were divided, by a plenary sitting, in which declarations were made by M. Lupu and Senator Draghicescu on behalf of the Rumanians, M. Benes for the Czecho-Slovaks, Dr. Trumbitch for the Yugoslavs, and M. Zamorski for the Poles. Speeches were also made by M. Franklin-Bouillon, Mr. Wickham Steed, M. Albert Thomas, Signor Barzilai and Senator Ruffini. The work of the Congress was embodied and proclaimed in a declaration read by the Vice-President, Signor

Torre, which included three separate documents; a series of three resolutions unanimously voted by the Congress; a special agreement between the Italian and Yugoslav delegates, which was a re-affirmation of the terms agreed on between Signor Torre and Dr. Trumbitch in London, and a separate resolution put forward by the Polish delegates, who, while adhering to the general declaration of the Congress, wished to place on record their expression of the fact that the Polish



SIGNOR ANDREA TORRE,
Delegate to Paris of the Committee for the entente between the Nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary.

problem was not confined to Austria-Hungary
The general proclamation ran as follows :

The representatives of the nationalities subject wholly or in part to the dominion of Austria-Hungary, Italians, Poles, Rumanians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, agree in affirming as follows the principles that shall inform their common action :

1. Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own nationality and State unity or to complete it, and to attain full independence, political and economic ;
2. Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument of Germanic domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realization of its aspirations and its rights ;
3. This assembly recognizes meanwhile the necessity of a common struggle against the common oppressors, so that each people may win complete liberation and complete national unity in a free State unity."

The Italo-Yugoslav Agreement was in these terms :

1. In the relations between the Italian nation and the nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes known also under the name of the Yugoslav nation, the representatives of the two peoples recognize that the unity and independence of the Yugoslav nation is a vital Italian interest, as the completion of Italy's national unity is a vital interest of the Yugoslav nation ;
2. They affirm that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea



THE CONGRESS OF THE OPPRESSED NATIONALITIES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AT ROME, APRIL 1918: RUMANIAN AND SERBIAN DELEGATES.

and its defence against every enemy, present or future, is a vital interest of the two peoples ;

3. They pledge themselves to settle in an amicable manner, in the interest of future friendly and sincere relations between the two peoples, all particular territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and the right of peoples to decide their own lot, in such manner as not to injure vital interests of the two nations, which shall be defined at the moment of peace.

4. To those nuclei of the people which should have to be included within the frontiers of the other shall be recognized and guaranteed the right that their language, their culture and their moral and economic interests shall be respected.

The Polish declaration was as follows :

The Polish nation, which in the struggle for its unity and independence desires to liberate the Polish territories actually in possession of Austria, considers Germany as the principal enemy of Poland. The future of Poland, therefore, depends entirely upon the result of the struggle against Germany because the principal aim of German policy is to prevent the unification of Poland and the creation of a powerful Polish State which would be an opponent of German domination over the whole of Eastern Europe.

The Poles, associating themselves with the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in their struggle for national unity and independence, see in the free action of all the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe one of the principal conditions of their independence of Germany.

The labours of the Congress were finished, and its proclamation made to the world, on April 10. Two days later the delegates were received by Signor Orlando, and his speech to them put the official seal upon the resolutions proclaimed from the Capitol. The Italian

Premier was able to quote various utterances of his own to show that both he and the Government of which he was head were at one with the spirit which had animated the Congress. Specially noteworthy were his references to the differences between Italians and Southern Slavs. He claimed that it was "the traditional cunning" of Austria which had "unchained the racial passions of the oppressed nationalities, inciting the one against the other in order to dominate them the more easily." He urged that each race should think rather of the common sufferings and common aims of both, and that they should "examine loyally and sincerely the respective conditions that must govern the existence of each race and the reciprocal sacrifices which would have to be made in the case of certain national groups existing in those 'gray zones' near the frontiers." There was no real cause for discord if such an examination were made, and if "just guarantees were given to those foreign elements which the mutual necessities of existence would inevitably allot to one or other of the two different political entities."

The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and its solemn declaration, which came to be known as the Pact of Rome, consecrated the alliance of Austria-Hungary's irreconcilable enemies, and laid down a basis for their common action.

It did not, however, resolve the acute differences between Italians and Yugoslavs. It deliberately put on one side the practical difficulty of a territorial settlement. The fact was stated with the utmost clearness in Dr. Trumbitch's speech at the last plenary sitting. The President of the Yugoslav Committee said:

We are agreed that all the controversies between our two peoples (Italian and Slav) must be resolved on the basis of principles determined by us, in the conviction that the practical solution of these controversies lies outside our competence to-day and must await the moment of its ripening, and in the conviction, more particularly, that to-day the chief preoccupation of all—a preoccupation which surpasses all other interests—is that of obtaining victory over the common enemy.

Although private conversations seemed to indicate that an accord would not be difficult, given good will on both sides, many of those who had followed the whole movement realized that the terms of the Agreement left plenty of room for misunderstanding. The Italian Nationalists did not give up their hopes of "redeeming" some part of Dalmatia. How the Pact was regarded by one section of the Yugoslavs may be proved by the utterances of Father Koroshetz, President of the Yugoslav National Council, and Dr. Wilfan, leader of the Yugoslavs

of Trieste (both Slovenes), on May 30, 1918, seven weeks after the proclamation of the Pact of Rome. Dr. Wilfan claimed for the Yugoslavs all territory east of the Isonzo, without exception. Father Koroshetz claimed that both Trieste and Fiume were necessary to Yugoslavia, and addressed an eloquent apostrophe to the city of Trieste, which, he said, "sits throned as Queen in our thoughts."


It was evident thus early that the Pact of Rome was an unsure foundation for a settlement of the territorial question.

While the political world was busily occupied during the winter months, there was breathing space upon the Italian front. It was on Christmas Day, 1917, that the Austrians finally ceased their efforts to break through the mountain line, and it was nearly six months before any further action on a large scale took place. During this time however, there were various local actions of considerable importance. The first of these was a brilliant attack by the French troops who had taken over the Monte Tomba sector (see Vol. XV, Chap. CCXXXIII). After a whirlwind artillery preparation, which



THE CONGRESS OF THE OPPRESSED NATIONALITIES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AT ROME, APRIL 1918.

Representatives of various countries, including Great Britain and France.



THE BATTLE OF THE PIAVE.

was opened on the morning of December 30, that part of the Monte Tomba-Monfenera ridge which was still held by the enemy was stormed with great dash and very little loss, the defending troops being for the most part completely dazed by the extreme violence of the artillery fire, in which both British and Italian batteries joined those of the French. This action was admirably carried out, and nearly 1,500 prisoners were taken, while the losses on the French side were very slight indeed. It had a

siderable success. The first was little more than a raid on a large scale. Down by the course of the Old Piave, among the lagoons and marshes, the Italians made a surprise attack to the east of Capo Sile, rushing a system of trenches and taking 50 prisoners. The enemy reacted quickly and energetically but could not recover his lost positions, and only added largely to his casualty list. On the mountain front, between the Brenta and the Piave, the operation undertaken was



French official photograph.

PRISONERS OF WAR TAKEN BY THE ITALIANS ON MONTE TOMBA.

sequel, too, for a few days later the enemy withdrew from the northern slope of the Tomba ridge, abandoning all the ground between the ridge and the Ornè torrent.

The year finished well, and the new year began well. On January 1, 1918, the Austrians who had crossed the Piave at the Zenson bend in November, and held, although they could not enlarge, this useful bridgehead, were driven back across the river as the result of steady pressure which had been going on for some days. Nor was there long delay before further proof was given that the Italian Army, so lately tried to the uttermost, could do more than act on the defensive. On January 14 two attacks were launched, in two different sectors of the front, and both met with con-

much more ambitious. An attempt was made to retake Monte Asolone, which had been captured four weeks before, and was the farthest point reached by the enemy in his attempt to arrive at the plain by this route. The Italian effort was not entirely successful. Monte Asolone was stormed by a very fine infantry attack, though the men had to go through deep snow to the enemy trenches. But the summit was not held under the storm of shell which was concentrated upon it. Trenches to the right and left, however, were maintained against repeated counter-attacks, and some 400 prisoners, including a colonel, were captured.

The Third Army, on the Piave, had shown its offensive spirit. The Fourth Army had



ITALIANS ON THE SUMMIT OF COL D'EICHELE.

tested and punished the Austrians in the Grappa sector. It was now the turn of the First Army to take a hand, and win a very notable success. The scene of the fight was that where Marshal Conrad's offensive had been finally checked on Christmas Day, the heights of Col del Rosso and Monte di Val Bella; west of the upper Val Frenzela. An attack was launched against the line which ran from Monte Sisemol across the Frenzela Valley, but the main objectives were Col del Rosso and Val Bella. As a result of the first day's fighting (January 27) Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele were both captured and held, while on the other side of the Val Frenzela, in the Sasso Rosso sector, the enemy line was breached in various places, and a number of prisoners were taken. After a lull at night, the fight was resumed the next day by a furious Italian attack on Val Bella, which was entirely successful. The way had been paved by the first day's fighting, when the Italians had broken clean through between Monte Sisemol and Val Bella, and had also outflanked the latter height from the east. More than 1,500 prisoners remained in Italian hands at the end of the first day, and next morning, when the attackers swarmed up three sides of the Monte di Val Bella and finally took the summit,

more than a thousand Austrians were captured. The enemy did not acknowledge defeat readily. A very heavy artillery fire was directed against the captured positions, and repeated counter-attacks were made, which failed with heavy loss. Two enemy divisions, the 21st Schützen and the 106th Landsturm, were so roughly handled that their remnants had to be withdrawn from the line, and two others suffered very heavily. In these divisions were three specially trained mountain brigades, which were hit specially hard, among them the First Kaiserjäger. Such troops are not easily replaceable, and the Austrian losses meant more than their mere numbers would signify. Six guns fell into Italian hands, many trench-mortars, a hundred machine-guns and several thousand rifles.

It was a very useful victory. Important positions were taken, which improved the rather cramped situation of the Italians, and the enemy suffered serious loss. But more important still was the proof that the Italian Army could not only resist—that had been shown by the wonderful stand after the long retreat—but could already hit back hard and retake from the enemy very strong positions, which had been in his hands for over a month. The recovery from the long trial was very

quick; and it was of special significance that the brigade which took Col del Rosso and held it against all the furious counter-attacks of the Austrians was the Sassari Brigade,* which had belonged to the Second Army and come through the worst of the great retreat. All its old offensive spirit and all its old tenacity were shown again, and there were other units with similar experiences which now showed themselves refreshed and undaunted, eager only to win back something of what had been lost. Among these was the Fifth Ber-

* See Vol. XV, Chapter CCXXXIII.

saglieri Regiment, which, with two of the recently formed assault detachments, the Fourth Bersaglieri Brigade, and, of course, several Alpini battalions, won special honours in this mountain fight.

Early in February the weather broke and snow came in considerable quantity, though the fall for the season, which had begun so late, remained well below the average. There was much mist and heavy cloud, and visibility was poor throughout the spring. Though this seemed to have little effect upon the air service which was very active on both sides, there were



A BRITISH NIGHT RAID ACROSS THE PIAVE.

no infantry operations of any importance until the summer. There were infantry raids, in which British units on the Piave distinguished themselves, and air raids and artillery demonstrations, but both sides were waiting, preparing for the serious trial of strength which everyone knew would come with the long days and the dry weather. Throughout the winter and spring there was more airwork than there had hitherto been on the Italian front. Both sides were reinforced, the Italians by British flying men and a few French, the Austrians by German bombing squadrons, which soon showed that they had two main objectives, Padua and Venice. The first raid on Padua came at nine o'clock on the night of December 29, and the raid was repeated the two following nights. On the first occasion 13 people were killed and 60 wounded, but no buildings of importance were hit. On the second visit of the German planes, although more than 20 bombs were dropped and great destruction was caused to a number of buildings, there were only three killed and three wounded. The Church of San Valentino was hit by an incendiary bomb and set on fire, and the tower of the Carmine Church was partly destroyed. The third raid lasted six hours in all, from 9 p.m. on December 30 till 3 a.m. on December 31. Again there were only a few casualties, five wounded, but the damage done to buildings was serious. The façade of the cathedral was partly destroyed, and the basilica of St. Antony, the famous church of "Il Santo," suffered considerably. It was curious that out of the comparatively small number of casualties there should have been three women of Austrian birth.

During the following weeks Venice and Padua and the little towns of the Venetian plain were repeatedly attacked. The worst raid was that made upon Venice on the night of February 26. Venice had already been attacked more than 40 times, but on this occasion eight hours passed from the first appearance of the enemy to the dropping of the last bomb, and over 300 bombs were dropped in all. The machines came in waves, and each no doubt made more than one journey, for Venice was very near the Austrian lines. In all 50 machines took part in the raid, or series of raids, and the damage they did was considerable. The Royal Palace was struck, 38 houses were smashed, and three churches were damaged—SS. Giovanni e Paolo, San Giovanni Crisostomo and San Simeone

Piccolo. Yet the sum of loss was amazingly small considering the thick cluster of treasures that makes up Venice. The escapes were extraordinary. Fifteen bombs fell near the Doge's Palace, all of them, fortunately, in the water. One only just missed the Bridge of Sighs, and bombs fell all round the Ponte di Rialto. It was a miracle that the finest jewels of Venice all remained untouched on this occasion as on others, though a bomb fell within five yards of the doors of St. Mark's in an earlier raid, and there were other escapes as narrow. Yet there was damage done that is irreparable, for to countless people there is hardly a stone of Venice that does not at least give something to the setting of the rarer jewels. And it was all sheer wantonness. No military purpose could be served by the attacks on the treasures of Venice, and both Port and Arsenal lay far enough away from the things that matter to refute the defence of confusion of aim.

The air activity displayed by the Italian and British airmen was of a different kind. It was confined to military operations, and it was very successful. Many destructive raids were made upon aerodromes, railway junctions, and encampments, and air fighting became commoner on the front than it had ever been, until the enemy once more grew shy, and showed himself as rarely as during the previous summer before the Italian retreat. At that time the Italians had established a complete superiority in the air, but they had lost much material during the retreat, and the enemy were now reinforced by German fighters as well as by German bombers. These turned out more daring than the Austrian fliers, for most of whom the Italians had little regard, but they suffered heavy loss, the British fighting machines in particular doing very useful work. The Italian speciality was the big bombing machine, and it did admirable service, while several long-distance flights were made by Italian airmen, the most remarkable of which was the 500-mile journey to Friedrichshafen and back, which was made by two Italian aeroplanes early in June.

As the winter passed in preparation, there was frequent interchange of British, French, and Italian officers, especially in the artillery arm. General Sir Herbert Plumer reported that the British officers made every effort "to illustrate the value of counter-battery work, the value of which we had learned by experi-

once in France, but which the Italians had not hitherto fully appreciated," and he noted the anxiety of the Italians "to profit by any experience we could give them." It had not been easy for the Italians to test for themselves the value of counter-battery work, for there had never been enough shells for the purpose, or enough guns for simultaneous barrage and counter-battery fire. But guns and shells were becoming more plentiful, and every advantage was taken of the experience of the

He was left with five Allied divisions, three British and two French, but the Italian corps which he had lost was a strong one, consisting of 50,000 men, and the French divisions were relatively weak, the entire French force in Italy totalling less than 30,000 men.

While it was evident that the Austrians would make an offensive as soon as the weather served, the Italian command considered the possibility of anticipating this offensive, not by an attack on the grand scale, but by "an



BOMBED BUILDINGS ADJOINING THE RIALTO BRIDGE.

British and French in this as in other new developments of warfare.

The spring came, and minds were turning to the prospect of an early offensive by the Austrians when the storm burst in France. Owing to the German successes and the consequent critical situation, three French divisions and two British were withdrawn from the Italian front,* and they were followed by the Italian Second Army Corps under General Albricci, which was also dispatched to thicken the line in France. This meant a serious weakening of the forces under General Diaz.

* General Plumer had left when it became evident that the first enemy effort of the year would not be in Italy but in France. His departure was very greatly regretted by the Italians, with whom he had soon established the best possible relations. Fortunately he left a worthy successor in Lord Cavan.

action of minor scope," which should at once improve the Italian positions in the Asiago-Brenta zone, and threaten the Austrian communications between Feltre and Trento.* During April it was clear that the enemy was planning an offensive on both sides of the Brenta, in the Asiago uplands and in the Grappa sector, but by the middle of May, a fortnight before the date chosen for the Italian attack, it had become evident that a much more ambitious scheme was being prepared by the Austrians. The offensive astride the Brenta was to be combined with a straight drive against the Italian lines on the Piave. New Austrian divisions were arriving on the front, and increasing the numerical superiority of the

* See General Diaz's Report.

enemy. The Italians had to change attack into defence, but special measures were taken to ensure that the defence should be essentially active—that it should be ready to develop at once into a strong counter-offensive.

The Italian forces were disposed as follows.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH AND ITALIANS WATCHING TOGETHER ON THE PIAVE.

On the extreme right was the Third Army under the Duke of Aosta, which was aligned along the Piave up from the sea so as to cover both Venice and Treviso. Next came the Eighth Army under General Pennella, which held the Middle Piave, including the Montello sector. On its left again was the Fourth Army under General Giardino, occupying the mountain sector between the Piave and the Brenta. Next lay the Sixth Army under General Montuori. This army, which held the line in the Asiago uplands, or rather the whole stretch between the Brenta and the Astico, was a composite army, Italian, British and French. It had been decided early in the spring that the British contingent should be transferred from the Montello to the mountains for the summer months, and by March 29 the troops were established in their new positions.

The transference of the French from the Monte Tomba sector took place about the same time. The right of the Sixth Army was composed of Italian troops, who held what might be termed the Val Frenzela sector. Then came the French XII. Corps, then the British, who held the hills which face Asiago and Canove from the south. The left wing of the army was Italian. Next the Sixth Army, from the Astico to Lake Garda, was the First Army, and beyond, from Lake Garda to the Swiss border, the Seventh Army. But these two armies were not engaged in the great battle upon which Austria-Hungary staked so much.

In April, 1918, the 56 divisions under General Diaz (51 Italian, 3 British, and 2 French) were faced by 60 enemy divisions. When the expected blow was struck at last, the number had been increased to 71. And the Austrian superiority in artillery was calculated at 25 per cent., mainly in medium and heavy calibres. The number of enemy guns employed in the offensive was estimated at 7,500.

The weeks of waiting—April, May, and the first half of June—were very anxious. The course of the fighting in France and Flanders seemed to prove that a resolute offensive, conducted on German methods, could almost count upon important gains at the outset, even if it were finally brought to a standstill. It was already realized that the way to kill an offensive of the latest German model was to dispose the defending troops in depth, with the front lines comparatively lightly held, the "battle positions" well back, and ample reserves behind them. A great part of the front held by the Italians was unsuitable for these defensive tactics. There was no depth in the positions, little room to yield and come again. Between the Piave and the Brenta especially they were fighting very near the edge of the mountain country. Nor was there far to go from the Asiago uplands to the Venetian plain. Here was the weakness in the Italian situation. The defenders could not afford to give much ground, for a comparatively slight retreat would have brought them down from the mountains, which fall very steeply to the plain. It follows that a comparatively rigid system of defence was necessary. The defenders had this advantage, however, that the nature of the ground in the mountain sector did not lend itself very well to the tactics which had been so successful in France. Communications were difficult, and, above all, speed was difficult.

When April passed without the expected offensive in the mountains, the most interesting event of the month was the first appearance among the Italian troops of the soldiers of a new Ally, the Czecho-Slovak State. It had been decided to form a Legion from the Czecho-Slovak prisoners in Italy, and while the men, to the strength of a division, were being organized and trained, advance detachments were sent to the front to try and get in touch with their brothers who were still with the Austrians. They were splendid men, and, looking at them, it was impossible not to be moved by the thought of what they faced in the hope of freeing their country. Others who fell into enemy hands had the right to fair and kindly treatment, though in this war that right was seldom respected by German or Austrian. But for these men, if they were taken, the gallows waited.

April came to an end, and May drew on. About the middle of the month, as has been said, signs showed that the Austrian offensive would be on an even more ambitious scale than had at first seemed probable. There was to be a double battle; on two wide fronts. The news from Franco was still far from reassuring. Whenever one German offensive ceased to gain

ground another attack was launched, and on each occasion important progress was made. There was grave preoccupation in all circles regarding the forthcoming Austrian drive, and it was generally felt that the enemy would probably win a considerable success, though there was no misgiving as to the final issue. He would be checked; the line would not be broken though it would be pressed back. But the plain was near the invaders in the mountains, and Venice was near their armies on the Piave. The outlook did not seem very encouraging.


While expectation was strung high, the Italian Command suddenly threw in two admirably conducted attacks towards the extreme ends of the long front. The first attack was in the Adamello sector, already the scene of extraordinary fighting, but farther north than the previous actions, near the Tonale Pass. On the morning of May 25, Italian Alpini advanced upon the rock fortresses of Cima Zigolon, Cima Presena and Monticello. The two former are both over 10,000 feet above the sea, and Monticello is about 1,300 feet lower. The Italian guns made it possible for the Alpini to do what seems on the face of it impossible. For the Austrian positions, or many of them, were



[Official photograph.]

VIEW FROM A BRITISH POSITION ON MONTELLO, LOOKING TOWARDS CORNUDA

inaccessible to anyone but a good climber, and to the onlooker it might have appeared that the defenders could repulse their enemies with stones. But the guns made it difficult for the Austrians to leave their caverns, and the indomitable Alpini had a slender chance. They took it, of course. Once more they did what apparently could not be done. Roped together, climbing slowly, laboriously, tirelessly, their haversacks full of bombs, these matchless mountain fighters reached their enemy, itself a feat, and then beat him. The struggle lasted throughout two days, and did not stop during all the moonlit night between, and at the end of the second day they were in possession of the peaks mentioned and the basin of the Presena Lake, together with nearly a thousand prisoners.



AN ITALIAN OBSERVATION POST ON MONTE ADAMELLO.

12 guns, 14 trench-mortars, 25 machine-guns, and several hundred rifles.

The second of the two actions, which took place near Capo Sile, was in every way a contrast to the first, except in its successful result. The first was carried out in a wilderness of glacier and eternal snow, broken by black rock ridges so steep that snow cannot lie there, and it was drawn out over two days. The second fight was fought in a flat green

land of ditches and lagoons, where the soil barely emerges from the water, and the roads are causeways. The attack was over in a few minutes; the enemy counter-attack failed badly, and the Italians were left in possession of their objective, with 440 prisoners, four trench-mortars and 10 machine-guns, besides several hundred rifles.

These were heartening actions, which gave confidence for the trial which all knew was imminent. There was a time of anxious tension, when all the information gained from prisoners told of great preparations and an early move, and finally the Italian Command was able to forecast the coming offensive even to its details. On June 14, which was marked by heavy fire from the Austrian guns all day, the army was ordered to be on the alert for an attack early next morning.

The attack came at the hour expected, preceded by a very violent bombardment, with much gas. But the Italian guns had opened first, with a short but furious barrage on the trenches and certain points of assembly, and heavy counter-battery fire. The enemy's shooting was clearly handicapped by this unexpected move. His fire was exceedingly intense, but it was not very accurate. Though smoke and gas were freely employed, the defending troops were now all equipped with the British mask, and were not greatly disturbed. Austrian attacks were launched on the western part of the front, near Riva and in the Adamello district, which resulted in the temporary occupation of two mountain positions, the Dosso Alto in the first-named sector, and in the second the Corno di Cavento, the "House of the Wind," which the Alpini had taken from the Austrians exactly a year before. The whole front was on fire from the Val Lagarina to the sea, but the real offensive developed as had been foreseen. The two fronts of attack were from south-west of Asiago to east of Monte Grappa, a distance of nearly 20 miles, and from the Montello to below San Donà di Piave, more than 25 miles. There were three main thrusts, the first on both sides of the Brenta valley, the second against the Montello front, the third lower down the river, from Fagarè, just north of the Troviso-Oderzo railway line, to below San Donà di Piave. The first sector was the centre of the northern attack, which had been entrusted by the enemy Generalissimo, Boroevitch, to Field-Marshal Conrad von Hötzen-

dorf. Conrad was the specialist in the Trentino region. He had made two great attacks, in May and June, 1916, and November and December, 1917. Each time he had failed to get through, but each time he had gained much ground. And now he was very near the plain. On the western side of the Asiago plateau he was starting where he came to a stop two years before. On the eastern side, and across the Brenta, the attack was launched from the lines that marked the limits of the advance in the winter of 1917. In that fierce struggle Conrad had only commanded the troops west of the Brenta, Krobatin directing operations between the Brenta and the Piave. Now, in his third attempt to reach the fat plains of the Veneto, Conrad had charge of the entire offensive on the mountain front. The attack across the Piave was conducted by a group of armies under Boroévitch himself, the Archduke Joseph commanding opposite the Montello, and General Wenzel von Wurm, with the old Isonzo Army, directing the thrust between Ponte di Piave and San Donà.

The attack in the mountain sector was a resounding failure, so great a failure that it was broken off, after three days' fighting, without any important alteration in the line of the front. In the first rush the lines of the Italians and their Allies were penetrated in various places, and an anxious day followed. During the morning the enemy made fair progress on both sides of the Brenta. The old Val Bella-Col del Rosso salient, from whose battered rocks the Italians had withdrawn all but a thin screen of infantry and machine-guns, fell before the advancing waves of the enemy, and Costalunga, to the west, was also taken. Troops penetrated eastwards of Monte Melago, by the ruined houses of Sasso, and attacked the Pizzo Razea, only a mile and a half west of Valstagna and the Brenta Valley. But northward, across the Frenzela Valley, the Alpini were immovable. They were tucked up under the crests of the hills that rise steeply from the valley, the Sasso Rosso and the Colle di San Francesco, but the enemy coming down on them from above could make no impression upon them. Three successive attacks all failed completely. Shells rained upon the rocky slopes, and the defenders suffered very heavily. On the ridge of the Cornone, under Sasso Rosso, little isolated posts kept back the enemy with machine-guns and bombs until the reserves could come into action. At one

critical spot all the defenders were killed or disabled with the exception of one man, but that one man held off four enemy attacks with his machine-gun until help came. North of the Frenzela Valley, where the enemy must have expected to have an easy task, he gained practically no ground at all. And farther west his early successes were soon countered. By



GENERAL WENZEL VON WURM.
Commanded an Austrian Army on the Piave.

midday the Italians were counter-attacking in force. Costalunga was soon regained, and the enemy troops who had taken Col del Rosso were checked and even pushed back a little. For three days this region was the scene of a fierce and uncertain struggle, in which the enemy strove in vain to widen and deepen the slight advance he had made. A desperate fight raged round Pizzo Razea, which was taken and retaken several times, but finally, at the end of the third day's fighting, was definitely re-occupied by the defenders. It was torn from the enemy by an assaulting column of Bersaglieri and infantry of the Padua Brigade, who also won back the ruins of Sasso and the cemetery which lies on the edge of the steep fall to the Frenzela Valley. The cemetery had been turned into a nest of machine-guns, but nothing could stop the advance of the Italians. The night of June 17

saw the definite failure of the Austrian effort west of the Brenta Valley.

Meanwhile the Fourth Italian Army, or rather the left of the army which lay between the Brenta and Monte Grappa, was going through a very similar experience to that of the right wing of the Sixth Army. General Giardino had kept his main forces well back, as far back as the lie of the ground would allow him, and the enemy, attacking in mass, swept through the advanced Italian positions in front of Col Caprile and Monte Asolone. Nor did their success end there. In spite of the gallant resistance of the second line of defenders the Austrians gained ground both to west and south. Col Mosehin was taken and the enemy looked down into the Brenta Valley. Pushing south, detachments reached Col Raniero*, so that the greater part of the plateau west of Grappa was in Austrian hands. Both north and west of Moschin, on the very edge of the valley, the Italians hung on stubbornly; and the enemy advance towards the plain, along the ridge that runs southward, parallel with the Brenta, was held up at Col Raniero. By midday on June 15 the Italians were counter-attacking with success. Reserves were thrown in at the right moment, and the enemy began to give back. Soon he was holding only Col Mosehin, having lost all his gains to the south and east. In the afternoon a storm rose, a hurricane of wind and rain and driving cloud that hid all the mountain ridges. The Italian guns pounded the enemy on Col Moschin, and towards evening the counter-attack was made. Troops of the Basilicata Brigade, a brigade which had distinguished itself greatly in the desperate resistance on Monte Tomba seven months earlier, went forward in an irresistible rush. In half an hour Col Moschin was in Italian hands again. Next day the enemy did not even attempt to continue the attack. Perhaps he was waiting for the result of the fighting on the other side of the Brenta, waiting, like a division which was lying in the Brenta Valley, for the successful action which should open the way to Bassano. Conrad had failed to get through in his first rush, and it almost seemed as though he made up his mind quickly to cut his loss. For it was only in the Frenzela region that he made any attempt to push his offensive after the disappointing results of the first day's fighting. Probably he was well ad-

vised. His attack was really smashed on the first day.

The attack immediately east and west of the Brenta seems to have been the main operation, but both farther east, against the Solarolo salient, and farther west, against the sectors held by the French and British, determined attacks were made. In the last-named sectors the Austrian aims were very ambitious.

In his attack against the Solarolo salient, the enemy succeeded in occupying the Porte di Salton, the ridge between the Ornic and Calcino torrents, but before the day was over he was pushed back to his point of departure. The attack in this sector was probably in the main demonstrative. There was no advantage in incurring losses here, when the main operations were staged to the west and south. It was different on the right of the attack. While the main drive was in the centre, it was hoped to break down the defence all the way from the Astico to the Brenta. In the British sector, for instance, captured maps showed that the enemy objectives for June 15 included Monte Pau and Cima di Fonte, which lie some three miles behind the slopes where the British were in line, and about the same distance from the plain.

The story of the fight in this sector can be told very shortly. South-east of Asiago the French troops lost a few outlying positions which were retaken when the reserves came into action. Next the French were two British divisions, the 23rd and 48th, which were attacked by four enemy divisions. The attack against the 23rd Division failed completely. The enemy were partly aided by mist, but they had to advance over a considerable stretch of open ground, and never really threatened danger. They were stopped for the most part with rifle and machine-gun fire, and their losses were heavy. On the left, against the 48th Division, the enemy had the advantage of the cover supplied by the valley or depression along which runs the Asiago-Schio railway; their attack was in some sense a surprise, and at first they made considerable progress. They occupied the British front line on a front of some 3,000 yards, and subsequently penetrated to a depth of about 1,000 yards. The defenders fell back on a series of switches, but the situation looked serious for a little. The reaction came quickly, however, and the Italian 12th Division on the left lent valuable assistance both with infantry and artillery, which, in the words of Lord

* Also known as Col del Gallo.

Cavan's dispatch, "was largely responsible for bringing the Austrian infiltration to an immediate halt." Advancing on to the switch lines, the Austrians found themselves in a kind of triangular pocket, where they were very uncomfortably situated. They hesitated, and were lost. All their subsequent efforts failed to enlarge their gains, and an isolated handful of British troops, who were still holding out

nished an admirable target for British and Italian artillery, which hammered them with cruel effect. Both British divisions attacked the enemy, taking full advantage of their disorder. Various positions were temporarily occupied, and over 1,000 prisoners were brought back, with 7 mountain guns and 72 machine-guns. It was calculated that the enemy casualties were close upon 5,000.



[Italian official photograph.]

IN THE ITALIAN FRONT LINE ON MONTEELLO.

though they were surrounded, gave them a good deal of trouble. They could gain no more ground all day. During the night, under the pressure of various British attacks, they began to give back. In the early morning of the next day they were driven completely out of the original British positions. They lost order, and, instead of retreating by the comparatively sheltered valley from which they had attacked, they retired over the open ground, and fur-

The northern half of the double attack, the drive which was to push back the Italian Armies in the mountains on to the flank and the line of retreat of the armies in the plain, had failed completely in less than two days. The southern battle was to last longer, but was to end in a failure no less complete.

On the morning of June 15 the Austrians succeeded in crossing the Piave, under

cover of a very cleverly managed smoke barrage. Crossings were effected at various points, but three main bridgeheads were formed, and the subsequent efforts of the enemy were chiefly concentrated on extending or maintaining the ground won at these three points. The right wing of Boroévitch's Army Group, the Sixth Army under the Archduke Joseph, attacked the Italian Eighth Army in the Montello region. The Montello is an isolated hog's back, some eight miles long by three wide, running from 400 to 800 feet above the plain. It runs nearly due east and west, and the Piave flows beneath it on the north and east, making a right-angled turn at the north-east corner of the ridge. It is partly cultivated and partly covered with little woods. There are a number of farms, and the whole mass is crossed from south to north by over a score of roads, as nearly as possible parallel. The Austrians made their first crossings from Falze di Piave, at the right angle mentioned above, and at Nervesa, below the south-east corner of the Montello. They overran the Italians in the front lines, and the two columns quickly established touch with each other. When they had once joined hands, reinforcements came over very quickly, and the bridgehead was rapidly extended. Their left wing was promptly held up. The end of two days' hard fighting found it still resting upon San Andrea, a bare kilometre from Nervesa, but

the centre and right had made good progress on the Montello and along the river bank to the north. At the end of the second day's fighting the Austrians held about two-thirds of the Montello, the battle-line running from Ciano, on the river bank, near the north-west corner of the Montello, across the ridge in a slanting direction, passing over the summit and thence eastwards to San Andrea. This was the term to the enemy's advance. His pressure was met by a constantly increasing counter-pressure from the Italian reserves, who fought with the utmost determination and slowly gained the upper hand. The Austrian gain in the Montello sector was considerable, but it fell very far short of expectations. According to the plan of attack, numerous copies of which fell into Italian hands, the objective for the first day was the railway between Treviso and Montebelluna, which was to be reached by the troops who crossed at Nervesa.

The crossing next below Nervesa was made some five miles farther down, by way of the long shoal island known as the Grave di Papadopoli. The enemy came over very early in the morning, some hours before the attacks to the north and south, and it is clear that this was a demonstrative action. A footing was established on the right bank, but an Italian counter-attack at daybreak drove most of the enemy back to the island, and took about 600 prisoners



TRANSPORT OF BRITISH GUNS FOR THE OFFENSIVE ON THE PIAVE FRONT.

*Official photograph.*

ROYAL ENGINEERS ON THEIR WAY TO WORK ON THE PIAVE FRONT.

Various other attempts were made to gain ground in this sector, but the Austrians, although they reached the right bank several times, could not maintain their hold, much less make any further progress. The third and fourth crossings were between Candelu and Fagarè, north of the Treviso-Oderzo railway, and at the Zenson bend, south of the railway. These two crossings were the first move in the second of the main operations on the Piave, the direct push for Treviso, which was to be reached at the end of the first day's fighting. Treviso is about 10 miles from the river, and it was only after four days' hard struggle that the Austrian Fourth Army Corps succeeded in putting any ground between themselves and the river. On June 18 they progressed about a mile astride of the road and railway between the river and San Biagio, but an Italian counter-attack began to push them back the same night, and next day they were back in their old positions, pressed up against the river.

Farther south again, astride the Mestre-Portogruaro railway, from Fossalta to Musile, the Austrians succeeded in establishing an ample bridgehead, but their gains never amounted to more than a bridgehead. Between the railway and the marshes west of the Old Piave they reached the Fossetta canal, a distance of about five miles from Musile, but they could not cross it. North of the railway, where the

canal is nearer the river, they crossed it and reached the village of Losson, but this was the farthest point of their advance. For several days the battle swayed backwards and forwards, and the nature of the country made the fighting very confused. It was enclosed country, with masses of trees and bushes broken up by very numerous roads and paths and ditches. The enemy was doing no more than holding his own, and was already giving ground in some places before the furious counter-attacks of the Italians, who hammered at the hard-won salient from west and north, when the rising waters of the Piave finally quenched the hopes that were already burning very low. Even before the river rose the Austrians had maintained their bridgeheads with difficulty, for the Italian counter-attacks were most determined; the Italian artillery kept up a devastating fire on the river-crossings, bridges, and boats, and Italian and British airmen made the task of bringing men and food and ammunition to the front still more difficult.

It was on June 19 that the flood waters of the Piave began to interfere with the Austrian bridges, and by that time the offensive was quite obviously held. By June 20 the enemy was making no further attempt to attack. He was stubbornly resisting the increasing weight of the Italian counter-pressure, but he was obviously in grave difficulties. Two days

later, on the night of June 22, he began to withdraw his troops. By this time the quick-risen flood waters had fallen as quickly, and it was owing to this fact that the Austrians were able to conduct a fairly successful retreat. Their losses were heavy during this operation, for the Piave was still an obstacle of some importance, and the Italian shells rained mercilessly along both banks of the river and on the bridges. If the sudden rise of the Piave handicapped the Austrians, its sudden fall saved those who had crossed to the right bank. The Italian counter-offensive was not fully under way. Another day would have seen the Austrians faced with the choice of surrender or of being forced into the river.

As it was, the Austrian losses in the double battle were enormous. They were calculated by the Italians at from 180,000 to 200,000 men, and it is probable that the figure is close to the truth. The Italian losses were 90,000. Hardly another single week throughout the long struggle of the war saw more blood shed than the week which put an end to the last Austrian hopes of a victorious peace.

The fortnight which followed was marked by various local offensives on the part of the Italians, which completely restored the few positions in the mountains which had not been won back in the early counter-attacks, and finally pushed back the Austrians from the positions they had occupied between the Old and the New Piave. This meant a gain of some three miles in depth, which gave a little more breathing-space to Venice. In all these attacks prisoners were taken, and the total number of captures from the beginning of the Austrian offensive was 523 officers and 23,911 men. The captures of material were 63 guns, 65 trench-mortars, 1,234 machine-

guns, and nearly 40,000 rifles. In addition the Italians recaptured 72 of their own guns which had been taken by the enemy in his first advance. Most of them were undamaged. The Austrians had been too hard pressed to destroy them. Their air service also suffered a very severe defeat. During the week June 15-22 95 aeroplanes and six balloons were destroyed. After June 22 the Austrian aircraft remained on the ground.

The June battle on the Italian front, which is generally known as the battle of the Piave, from the more extended of its two phases, was of extreme importance. It had a threefold significance. It showed that the Italian Army was in splendid fighting trim, with all its old *moral* and with increased skill, and it smashed the offensive power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The two facts taken together had an immense effect on the general military situation. And there was a third significance. This was the first Allied success of the year, and it followed upon a series of German victories which had tried our powers of resistance to the utmost. In the message which he sent to Signor Orlando in the name of the British War Cabinet, Mr. Lloyd George showed his realization of the truth. "This great success has been a deep source of encouragement to the Allies. Coming as it has at the most fateful hour of the whole war, it is a good augury that the alliance of free nations will ere long free the world once for all from the military domination which has threatened it so long."

The Italian victory on the Piave was indeed auspicious. It was the turning-point. It came at the end of a long series of defeats. It was the first of a succession of victories that led unbroken straight to the final triumph.



CHAPTER CCLXXVI.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA. (IV.)

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917-1918—DIFFICULTIES OF THE RAINY SEASON—GENERAL HOSKINS REORGANIZES THE FORCES—VAN DEVENTER IN COMMAND—GERMAN STRENGTH AND RESOURCES, JUNE, 1917—ENEMY SPYING OUT PORTUGUESE TERRITORY—THE CHASE OF NAUMANN—GERMANS MURDER BRITISH OFFICERS—VAN DEVENTER'S STRATEGY—NORTHEY'S OPERATIONS—KILWA AND LINDI OPERATIONS RECOUNTED—THE NEW BELGIAN CAMPAIGN—MAHENGE CAPTURED BY MAJOR BATAILLE—THE MAIN OFFENSIVE—VON LETTOW'S NARROW ESCAPE—COLONEL TAFEL SURRENDERS—SUFFERINGS OF BRITISH PRISONERS—TEN MONTHS' CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA—ENEMY SUCCESS NEAR QUELIMANE—RAPID ENEMY MARCH NORTH—GERMANS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA—VON LETTOW SURRENDERS.

EXCEPT for East Africa the Germans had lost all their colonial possessions by the early part of 1916. In East Africa, chiefly owing to the skill and resolution of the commander-in-chief, Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck—who won the Order Pour le Mérite and the rank of Major-General—enemy troops were in the field to the close of hostilities.

Previous chapters have described the early fighting, the Kilimanjaro campaign and the subsequent operations of Generals Smuts and Northey and of the Belgians. Fully two-thirds of German East Africa was conquered by the Allies between March and September, 1916. By that time the enemy was confined to the south-east and south central parts of the protectorate. In January, 1917, General Smuts began a new campaign in the Rufiji region. But before the month was out General Smuts was summoned to London to attend the Imperial War Cabinet, and he handed over the command to Lieut.-General Hoskins, who held the post for three and a half months. In May, 1917, General van Deventer was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and he took up his duties on May 29. Operations, which had been

interrupted by one of the wettest seasons on record in East Africa, began again in June, 1917; Belgian troops once more gave valuable assistance, and by the efforts of the combined forces of Generals Deventer and Northey and the Belgians, under Colonel Huyghe, the rest of the protectorate was cleared of the enemy. Mahenge, the German *point d'appui* in the south central plateau, was captured by the Belgians in October, 1917. There had been meantime fierce fighting between the British and the Germans in the coast areas near Kilwa and Lindi. In November the enemy was hard pressed in every direction. On the 28th of that month Colonel Tafel with some 3,500 followers (including carriers), all that was left of the Mahenge force, while marching south in an endeavour to join von Lettow, was trapped and surrendered. The troops under von Lettow, as the only means of avoiding immediate disaster, had abandoned German East Africa three days previously, crossing the Rovuma into Portuguese territory.

A small mobile force of veterans, well armed, and still well supplied with machine-guns, von Lettow's troops, overpowering several small Portuguese posts, made their way south, and

columns had to be organized to deal with them. Hustled, but not brought to decisive action, von Lettow reached the neighbourhood of Quelimane, where many plantations were ravaged and much loot obtained. Turning north, and once more evading the net spread to catch him, in September, 1918, he recrossed the Rovuma, and moving parallel to the east shores of Lake Nyasa entered Northern Rhodesia. He was by the Chambezi river when the armistice was signed in Franco. On November 14, he and his whole following, 1,300 fighting men and many carriers, surrendered at Kasama. Shortly afterwards von Lettow, Dr. Sehneo (the ex-Governor), and all the Europeans of his force were removed to Europe.

first on the Mgeta river front, the Germans extricated themselves from flanking columns, and then at Beho-Beho while retiring to the Rufiji, though severely handled, managed to slip away. It was in this engagement that Mr. F. C. Selous, the famous hunter-naturalist and explorer, was killed. Von Lettow next took up positions north of the Rufiji, but at the beginning of May 1917 evacuated the valley of that river. General Hoskins showed, in his dispatch of May 30, 1917, how great were the difficulties with which he had to contend when, on January 20, in the middle of the operations, he was called upon to succeed General Smuts.* The lower Rufiji, it may be recalled, runs parallel to and some 70 miles south of the eastern section of the Central Railway. The Nigerian

Chapter CCVI. carried the narrative of events up to the first campaign of 1917. One object General Smuts had in view when that campaign was begun, the envelopment of the enemy forces on the Rufiji, was not attained. Attacked

* It is related that when General Hoskins was asked to come and see Smuts in reference to taking over the command he was at Kibata. He rode some 20 miles through the hills, then motored into Kilwa, whence he finished his journey by a 180 miles flight in an aeroplane. See an article by Colonel G. M. Orr, D.S.O., in the *National Review*, December, 1918.



SOUTHERN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.



CAPT. F. C. SELOUS IN CAMP, CHRISTMAS 1916.

Captain Selous was killed in action January 4, 1917.

Brigade and other forces were pressing von Lettow from the north, and he was also threatened from the south, the southern column of the British being based on Kilwa, a seaport 60 miles south of the Rufiji delta. Farther west was the Mahenge force of the enemy—with General Northey on its left (western) flank and the Iringa column on its north-west. The Iringa column was based on Dodoma, a station on the Central Railway. The British operations proceeded favourably up to January 25,* when heavy rain began to fall and in two days the whole aspect of affairs was changed. Not only was the maintenance of communications rendered almost impossible, but great sickness was caused among the troops. The coast belt is always unhealthy, but now malaria was rife among the Europeans and Indians, while even the African troops suffered much from dysentery and pneumonia. The diffi-

culties of supply were so great, especially in February, that many of the troops were frequently on half rations.

It is perhaps hard to realize (wrote General Hoskins) the difficulties which the rainy season in East Africa entailed for a force acting from such widely separated bases, with several different lines of communication running through every variety of difficult country and necessitating in some cases as much as 130 miles of porter transport. In the Mgeta and Rufiji valleys roads constructed with much skill and labour, over which motor transport ran continuously in January, were traversed with difficulty and much hardship a month later by porters wading for miles in water above their waists. The Dodoma-Iringa line of communication crossed the Great Ruaha in the dry weather by an easy ford; when the rain had really set in, supplies had to be transported not only over a flooded river but also a swamp on each side of it 6 ft. deep and as many miles wide. Considerable anxiety was caused by this extensive flooding across the Dodoma-Iringa communication [a full 100 miles in length], and every effort was made to cope with this. The Iringa Column was kept as small as possible, and special flat-bottomed boats were prepared, but eventually it became necessary to switch on to a new line along the road which runs south from the railway at Kilossa. The valley of the Rufiji and its various tributaries became a vast lake, in which the true courses of the streams were often only discernible with difficulty, if at all. Patrol work had to be carried out for some time in canoes, and the men found themselves making

* On January 24 Commandant Grawert, with 40 Germans, 200 askari, a field gun and two machine-guns, surrendered to a detachment of General Northey's force.

fast to the roofs of houses which had lately formed their quarters.

That the Germans also suffered from the same causes as did the British is true, but they did not suffer to the same extent. The whites among them were more acclimatized than the British; their native troops—unlike the British African troops—were all indigenous to the country, and in two and a half years of warfare



THE MGETA VALLEY.

their ranks had been thinned of weaklings. The enemy also had the advantage arising from the possession of interior lines and of being able to rely on the country both for food and labour. The food of the natives was seized without compunction or payment, and all who could handle a load, men, women and children, were pressed into service as carriers—to be left to die when worn out, or else sent into the British lines in a starving condition.

Operations were not entirely abandoned during the rains, and by the end of February, largely as the result of the activity of the Nigerian Brigade and the Cape Corps, the Germans had abandoned the country north of the lower Rufiji. From that time onward a regular river transport service was organized. The survey of the Rufiji, especially among the mangrove swamps of the delta, was

an arduous task. It was successfully carried out, and in a remarkably short time, by Lieut.-Commander Garbett, R.N.—one of the many services rendered the Expeditionary Force by the Navy. By the end of May, “partly from the pressure of our forces and partly on account of floods and exhaustion of food supplies the enemy had given up practically the whole area north of the Matandu river,” that is, von Lettow had retired south some 70 miles from the Rufiji.

Except that another considerable slice of territory was freed from the Germans, this withdrawal of von Lettow was hardly a gain to the British. The rainy season was over and the enemy was now strongly posted in dense bush in the Kilwa area, notably at a place on the Ngaura river, 20 miles south-west of Kilwa port. Here patrol encounters were of daily occurrence. In one affair a detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment distinguished itself by ambushing an enemy force three times its strength, inflicting 40 casualties. Skirmishes apart, there was one considerable action. On April 18 Major Tyndall, with 400 of the 40th Pathans, 200 King’s African Rifles and two mountain guns of the Gold Coast Regiment attacked an enemy force to the south-west of Kilwa. The enemy were in strength, and after an engagement lasting several hours, in which both sides suffered severely, Major Tyndall retired. But in that direction the enemy’s aggressive action ceased.

The Germans had nevertheless advanced to the coast, and of this fact the people of Kilwa-Kissiwani (which is on a small island) were made unpleasantly aware one day—May 5—when a gun hidden in the mangrove swamps of the mainland suddenly opened fire on a ship lying at anchor in the harbour. With the Navy’s help the enemy was driven off and a British post established to guard against a repetition of the audacious action. In the Lindi area, a hundred miles farther south, the Germans were also close up to the coast. They held the hills south of Lindi harbour, and on April 24 made an attack with two companies (about 250 men) on the small British post at Sudi Bay, which is some 25 miles south of Lindi. The Germans had an affection for Sudi, for it was here; about a year previously (in March 1916) and at a time when they were “running short of ammunition, and contemplated the necessity of surrender on that account,” that a blockade runner had

brought them most welcome supplies.* Possibly they may again have expected aid of this kind; certainly the German Government was endeavouring to send more supplies, but the British Navy was now very much on the alert and had a shorter coast line to guard. In any case the attack on Sudi Bay in April 1917

* Reference to this blockade running at Sudi Bay is made in Vol. XII., p. 83. The following details may be added. They are extracted from the narrative of Brigadier-General Crowe, who in General Smuts's campaign was in command of the Royal Artillery. After an account of the surprising adventures of the *Rubens*, the first blockade runner, in April, 1915, General Crowe says:—"There was one other successful blockade runner which made her way into Sudi Bay, near Lindi. This was the *Maria*, which arrived in the middle of March, 1916, after a three months' voyage. She had found it necessary to come *via* South America, then went to East Indian waters, and eventually made Sudi Bay, *via* Madagascar. She was a German boat, built at Flensburg. [The *Rubens* was an English ship, seized by the Germans at Hamburg at the beginning of the war.] She brought with her a battery of 10·5 cm. (4·1 inch) howitzers, two batteries of mountain guns adapted for mule transport, 5,000,000 of 98 and a quantity of 71 small-arm ammunition, 12 machine-guns (with telescopic sights), a quantity of equipment and clothing, both for troops and for the German women in East Africa. She also had a quantity of stores and provisions, medicines, etc. She was discovered about April 10, and fired into by our man-of-war. Having completed the discharge of her cargo, the Germans succeeded in repairing the damage done by the shell, and she was shortly afterwards heard of in the Dutch East Indies." (*General Smuts's Campaign in East Africa*, London, John Murray, 1918, pp. 37, 38.)

was a failure, the enemy being driven off after a sharp engagement.

Much of General Hoskins's time was taken up by a reorganization of the force. It had been begun by General Smuts. Realizing that the climate of the country in which future operations were to be conducted was particularly unhealthy for whites, he had, in the closing months of 1916, sent back some 12,000 South Africans. But neither the state of the troops nor of the transport was, as indicated, satisfactory. Sickness among the remaining South Africans and the other white troops—including the 2nd Battalion of the Loyal North Lancshires, and the 25th Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers—had assumed such proportions that General Hoskins found it necessary to withdraw as many as possible to recuperate. They were sent to the Cape early in March and brought back at the end of May. Unfortunately the demands on the services of the Royal Engineers, Technical troops and Road Corps—among whom the wastage was high—was so great that none of these could be withdrawn for rest.

The white troops were not alone in needing a change. For nearly three years the brunt of the fighting and the hardships of the campaign had been borne by some Indian units



CAPE CORPS (coloured troops) ENTRENCHED.



LINDI.

and by the King's African Rifles—a fact which deserves remembrance—and these, notably the Indian troops, had suffered much from sickness. The units were so weak, however, that it was found impossible to give any of the Africans a rest, but some of the Indians were sent to healthier grounds for a time. Without new blood the force would have been too weak to assume the offensive after the rains. “Steps were therefore taken largely to increase the King's African Rifles, to reinforce the troops from West Africa, to bring the Indian battalions up to strength by drafts, and, if possible, to make some exchanges for new units.” West Africa and India sent trained men; the men for the new battalions of the King's African Rifles had to be taken raw. General Hoskins, who, as an old Inspector-General of the K.A.R.'s, spoke with authority, said:—

It is not generally understood that the African native takes a long time to train. Those of good fighting tribes are of little use before they have had fully a year's training with officers conversant with local conditions, and even then they must be used with care. Those recruited from inferior tribes take considerably longer, and all African natives require to be handled by white officers and N.C.O.'s who understand them and who can speak their language.

As, however, the need for the employment of more African troops had been foreseen, the organization and training of the new battalions had been begun months previously, and when

General Hoskins inspected the men at Nairobi and Tabora he was satisfied with the results. This was due in large measure to the patient and valuable work of Brig.-General E. H. Llewellyn, the Commandant of the King's African Rifles.

The provision of adequate transport was a problem of great perplexity. Animal transport—donkeys, cattle, horses, camels—which had more or less served General Smuts in the north, sickened and died at an alarming rate in the deadly climate of the south-east. And the heavy motor lorries first used had not been a success, as, indeed, might have been foreseen. The transport henceforth had to be chiefly by porters and light motor lorries. The lorries were sent, though not as many as were wished for, from England, South Africa and India, and, “as we had by now gained considerable experience of the rapidity with which motor drivers fall sick in this country,” a large increase in the number of drivers was arranged. The provision of porters gave greater trouble. The northern part of German East Africa was now under civil administration and settling down under the firm control of Sir Horace Byatt. It was thus able to furnish some carriers, but the great majority came from British East Africa and Uganda. In those protectorates a Compulsory Service Act was put in force in March, 1917, and an experienced

official, Mr. (later Colonel) John Ainsworth, supervised the collection and transportation of a Carrier Corps. The men were drawn mainly from the coast regions of the Victoria Nyanza, as being best fitted to withstand the climate of German East Africa, and most of them had to journey about 2,000 miles from their place of enlistment to their place of service. This corps soon proved its value, and not long after its arrival a marked improvement took place in the feeding of the troops. The

Deventer) bore no relation whatever to the numbers of men actually available in the field; and a brigade that could put 1,400 rifles into the firing line considered itself singularly fortunate." This applied to the troops on the coast: Iringa and the Ubena-Songea area (the latter the line east of Lake Nyasa held by General Northey) were more healthy. "and Northey's troops, though war-worn, were far fitter than those on the coast"

At this period, the beginning of June, 1917,



A PATROL OF KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES.

Baganda rendered further service by raising an African Medical Corps to provide personnel for carrier hospitals and trained dressers for the King's African Rifles. This corps did excellent work.

General Hoskins did not remain in East Africa to reap the benefit of the excellent work of reorganization he had undertaken. That work, indeed, was incomplete when Hoskins was called upon to take up command in another theatre of the war.

When, on May 29, General van Deventer took over the command the British force was still weak and suffering greatly from malaria. "The 'paper-strengths' (wrote Sir Jacob van

the Germans were still in two main bodies: a Western force, now commanded by Colonel Tafel, based on Mahenge, and an Eastern force, under Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeek, in the coast area facing the British at Kilwa and Lindi. According to General van Deventer, Tafel had between 2,000 and 3,000 fighting men with him, von Lettow between 4,000 and 5,000. These were later on seen to be too conservative estimates. The total German combatant force in the field in June, 1917, was over 9,000, and of these more than 1,800 were Europeans. The Germans had also about 20 field guns—the largest 4.1 inch—over 70 machine-guns, and plenty of rifles and small

arms ammunition—the ammunition largely home-made (like the “U-boat whisky,” which, in the earlier days of the war, a German merchant at Dar-es-Salaam had put on the market). Moreover, at this time the Germans still occupied territory over 300 miles square. This German occupied region extended in the west in some places to within 40 miles of the Central Railway, and both in the west and in the east they held the country right down to the Rovuma—that is, to the Portuguese frontier. Within this area von Lettow was supreme, the country being under strict military rule. The Governor, Dr. Schnee, appears to have spent a good part of 1917 at Massasi, which, up to October of that year, was remote from the scene of operations. The place—a mission station—was south of the Lukuledi river, about 60 miles south-west of Lindi, and not more than 25 from the Portuguese border. The Germans impressed here, as elsewhere, the *fundis* (skilled workmen) of the mission, and occupying the mission buildings made themselves comfortable. At Massasi were also prisoner of war camps. The condition of these camps was disgraceful—notably that in which the Sepoys were confined. Some Indians, captured unwounded in August, 1917,

when seen by English prisoners of war in the October following were “apathetic whining heaps.” What had been fine stalwart Sikhs were then fearfully emaciated, and, save for a loin cloth, naked. Yet both Dr. Meixner, the Principal German Medical Officer, and Dr. Schnee were at Massasi, which in that month—October, 1917—was chiefly a hospital; the church was used for European patients. Ndanga, another mission station in the Massasi region, was used as a sanatorium, and there lived a large number of German women. These gained local fame for their toffee, honey and biscuits, and especially for a preserve which was called Ndanga jam. Chiwata, another station near the Portuguese frontier, had also its amenities, except for prisoners of war. The prisoners’ camps, the hospital, and the soldiers’ camps were all close together. Thus life went on in this far-away southern region; in the fighting area things were somewhat different.

The headquarters of Tafel at Mahenge and those of von Lettow in the Kilwa district were about 200 miles apart. Communications between them were mainly by way of Liwale, which is south-east of Mahenge and south-west of Kilwa. Liwale appears to have been von Lettow’s base, being conveniently situated for



GERMAN LIGHT PETROL-DRIVEN ENGINE CAPTURED AT KILWA.

reinforcing either the Kilwa or the Lindi fronts. At Liwale, too, was a prisoners of war camp. About 35 miles south-east of Liwale, at the spot where the track from that station to Massasi crossed the Mbemkuru river, was Nangano, a place which von Lettow occasionally used as headquarters. At Nangano there was abundant water, grass, bamboo trees and shade, while neighbouring hills afforded good positions for defence. The hospital for Europeans here was, on the testimony of prisoners, ideally situated and had a big vegetable and fruit garden. But adjoining the hospital were the Ordnance, telegraph, supplies and other depôts "all liberally sprinkled with Red Cross flags."

Every German fighting unit was self-contained, and the organization was good. The native soldiers were treated as a privileged caste and always had their women with them in camp. They were of tougher metal than many of the Germans, among whom war-weariness was marked. "Von Lettow has done enough for glory," they said, and inquiries of British officer prisoners as to whether or not Ahmedabad was a healthy place showed the trend of their thoughts. The Germans had at Nangano and other places receiving wireless apparatus and by this means picked up various messages—usually in a mutilated form. Verdun, the Germans twice announced in September, had fallen; it fell again in October; Japan had joined Germany and was holding India; London was destroyed; Japan had gone to war with America. This was the kind of "news" they professed to have received. On the strength of some such news Dr. Schnee sent out a letter in July, 1917, announcing that "peace was in sight." Another official, a Captain Schutte, announced that any prisoners who escaped, if caught, would have six months' imprisonment after the war. The enemy had however, already adopted the plan of releasing white prisoners on their consenting to sign a "neutrality paper," that is a promise not again to fight against Germany in the war, and to give no information as to the enemy resources in East Africa. Few, however, were found willing to sign such a document. As to the German resources they were still considerable, though they had lost their railways, nearly all their plantations, and had been driven from all places which could properly be called towns. But they were now in what was practically a huge game reserve, a reserve also in many parts well stocked with fruit trees and

edible plants. Of food there was no lack. Water, however, was either too plentiful or altogether absent:—

The Germans had [wrote one of their captives] bananas, sweet potatoes, mangoes, coconuts, lemons, chillies, mahogo, spinach, tomatoes, cabbage, lettuce, beans etc. A circular was issued to the troops telling them how to distinguish and prepare wild fruits and roots



DR. SCHNEE.
Ex-Governor of German East Africa.

On Safari they carried with them fowls and pigeons and were rarely without eggs. They also carried elephant-meat extract in hollow bamboo sticks, the ends of which were plugged with wax. Wild honey was plentiful. Sugar they got from canes, and there was a herb from which they made "tea." "Coffee" was made from maize, freshly roasted and ground. They made good soup from elephant trunk, and hams of smoked wart-hog. *Udgi*, a porridge made from mealie flour, was good. Bread made from wheat, potato and rice flour was excellent when spread with elephant fat. Rhino fat was another substitute for butter. Biltong of buck or raw ham was most appetising. Rice and honey puddings, fresh water fish, custards flavoured with almonds, and honey syrup were hospital delicacies—apart from the "medical comforts" sent through by the British—which occasionally were allowed to reach their destination. The only shortage was milk. Von Lettow said that he could not sanction milk and beef tea for wounded prisoners. "It was demoralising to his men to see the British get them, but he would allow them if the British would let him purchase milk and beef tea for his sick."

Besides antelope of many kinds the Germans eat monkey, lion, elephant, giraffe, zebra and other strange meats, and also crocodile eggs. They had native pepper, and potash salts. The bark of the quillaia was used as a soap substitute; candles with cotton wool wicks were made in tens of thousands out of beeswax, which was poured into bamboo moulds. They manufactured ink, and instead of blotting paper used sand. Paper was very scarce, and messages were written on bamboo slips. They had minted coins at Tabora up to the fall of that place; afterwards they made brass and copper currency out of cartridge shell cases—their latest notes were typed on yellow packing paper. Pipes were made with ivory



BRITISH ON THE ROVUMA RIVER.

mouthpieces and a cartridge band; the tobacco was native grown. Indeed, in everything they showed ingenuity; for instance, aeroplane bombs were turned into land mines. This ingenuity was specially noticeable in their new buildings. Thus the hospital at Nangano, which accommodated 80 patients, was built without a nail. It was made of tree trunks padded with grass and bound with strips of soaked bark.

Such were the conditions and resources of the Germans in the territory they still held in the middle of 1917. The supply and transport difficulties which so greatly hampered the attack were almost non-existent on the German side, and by destroying the food supplies of the regions they abandoned they put another obstacle in the way of the British. And "the small band of heroes," as the Kaiser called them in his 1917 birthday message, were throughout overmastered by the spirit of von Lettow:—

Lettow, the one-eyed (wrote Captain R. V. Dolbey), indomitable and ubiquitous, has kept up the drooping spirits of his men by encouragement, by the example of great personal courage, and by threats that he can and will carry out. Wounded three times, he has never left the army, but has been carried about on a *machela* to prevent the half-resistance that leads to surrender. . . . His black askaris are not discouraged and, in this war, the black man is keeping up the courage of the white. These faithful fellows . . . will stay with him to the end."*

Von Lettow had contemplated the possibility of a retirement into Portuguese territory ever since he had been driven south of the

* *Sketches of the East African Campaign*, London, 1918.

Central Railway by General Smuts, but it was a part of the Mahenge force which first crossed the Rovuma to spy out the land.* For the time being von Lettow was sure of his ability to remain in German East Africa. As already chronicled (Vol. XIII., p. 422) Major Kraut had in February, 1917, made his way from Mahenge to the Portuguese border. Towards the end of April two enemy columns, mainly made up from Kraut's force, entered Portuguese territory. Under command of an officer named von Stuemmer they crossed the Rovuma in the Tunduru district—over 100 miles east of Songea—and overran the comparatively fertile region between the Lujenda river and Lake Nyasa. Having built fortified camps in this area von Stuemmer sent advanced parties to Lake Shirwa, and his patrols penetrated into the British Nyasaland protectorate at a place some 20 miles from Fort Mangoche. These patrols were, however, quickly driven back. In view of what happened later the following passage from the dispatch of General Hoskins concerning von Stuemmer's raid shows that he had a clear idea of von Lettow's intentions:

There were reports of a contemplated German advance

* In 1916, in the frontier section nearest the sea the Portuguese had made an advance into German territory, had been driven back, and had been followed up a short distance across the frontier by the enemy. The story of this fighting is told in Vol. XVII, Chapter CCLVIII.

in force at Lake Shirwa, and even to Quilimane on the sea coast; but it would appear more probable that the enemy were either running through the country to see its supply possibilities, or even making preparations for the eventual retirement of their forces into Portuguese East Africa. They also exploited the country on the banks of the Lujenda River, where food was collected and stored, some being sent northward to Massasi.

This was written in May, 1917: six months later the "eventual retirement" of the German forces into Portuguese East Africa took place. Meanwhile General Northey had dealt effectively with von Stuemmer, sending against him the 1/4th K.A.R.'s, under Lieut.-Colonel Shorthose. Half the battalion marched north from Fort

to abandon Portuguese territory. Following von Stuemmer close up, the 1/4th K.A.R.'s on the last day of July crossed the Rovuna on rafts near Sassawara. Shorthose then, by an advance north-east on Tundururu, blocked one of the routes by which the Germans might again seek to escape.

With the comparatively weak British forces available it had been decided by the British Government early in 1917 again to seek the help of the Belgians. Shortly after their capture of Tabora in September, 1916, the bulk of the then Belgian Force, which numbered



FIELD WIRELESS OUTFIT WITH GENERAL NORTHEY'S FORCE.

Johnston, at the southern end of Nyasa, the other half landed at Mtonia on the eastern shore of the lake and advanced eastward. On July 6 Mwembe was occupied by Colonel Shorthose after slight resistance, and three weeks later the Germans had been compelled

about 10,000, returned to the Congo, where the men had their homes. A few troops only were left at Tabora, Ujiji, and the other places in Belgian occupation. General Tombeur and several of his lieutenants had returned to Belgium.* But to the renewed appeal for

* The part of German East Africa occupied by the Belgians was administered by them with consideration for the rights of natives and Europeans alike. There were no "reprisals" for the brutal manner in which the Germans had treated Belgian prisoners at Tabora and other places. That the Germans anticipated no harm was proved by the large number of civilians and "sick" military who remained in Tabora when Colonel Olsen occupied the town. Among the civilians were several women and children, including Frau Schnee (a New Zealander), the wife of the Governor. In marked contrast to the conduct of the Germans in Belgium, who at once

installed themselves in the official residences of the Belgian Ministers, General Tombeur refused to occupy the Governor's house at Tabora because Frau Schnee was in residence. It was in "reprisal" for the "ill-treatment" of these civilians, who were at their own request taken to Europe, that the German Government in June, 1917, arrested 23 prominent Belgian citizens and placed them in Holzminden internment camp—one of the worst in Germany. Harsh treatment in the journey across Africa was alleged; in reality, Frau Schnee and her companions were treated with marked courtesy and the whole journey was performed by rail or steamer.

their help the Belgian colonial authorities had readily responded; a convention was concluded, and in April General Hoskins had gone to Tabora, where he conferred with General Malfeyt, the Belgian Royal Commissioner, and with Colonel Huyghe, C.B., appointed Belgian Commander-in-Chief. Satisfactory arrangements were made, the Belgian troops were aided with supplies, carriers, and equipment, and towards the end of May Colonel Huyghe took the field. The first



THE TRACK OF NAUMANN.

task the Belgians were asked to undertake was the pursuit, jointly with a British brigade, of the Wintgens column, and the fate of that column may be given before taking up the account of the main operations. Its early adventures—it broke away from the Mahenge force in February and turned north—have been told with some fullness in Vol. XIII., chapter CCVI. After the capture of Major Wintgens himself on the night of May 23 by the 6th Belgian battalion, the German column fell under the command of an officer named Naumann, whose substantive rank was that of lieutenant only. At the beginning of May Brigadier-General Edwards had been placed in command of the British forces in pursuit of Wintgens, succeeding Colonel Murray, released for service in the west.

During June, Naumann was chased both by Belgians and British, from June 25 to the end of July by Belgians alone. Major Bataille and the Belgian column, which had kept up the pursuit for 300 miles, were then recalled for more important operations in the south and the final rounding up of Naumann fell to the British. The trouble this roving band of

600 armed men caused is very evident from General van Deventer's dispatch of January 21, 1918. There is as much about Naumann in it as of the main operations "It was very necessary to get rid of Naumann" (June). "The force engaged in pursuing Naumann was too large" (June again). "It was never possible to forecast his intentions, as his detachment . . . was completely mobile and small enough to live on the country." "Naumann . . . threatened to prove a serious nuisance" (July). "He succeeded in evading our troops . . . by night marches through thick bush" (August). "One of his raiding parties held up a train near Kahe [Usambara Railway]" (September). But by September the end of Naumann was in sight. As early as June van Deventer had realized that the quickest way to deal with him would be to employ mounted troops, and at his request a regiment was raised by the Union Government for that purpose. It was known as the 10th South African Horse, was commanded by Colonel Breytenbach, and began to reinforce the pursuers of Naumann early in August. Native horsemen were also employed—the King's African Rifles Mounted Infantry—who "clung close to the enemy throughout."

Naumann had marched, at a moderate estimate, over 2,000 miles between May 27, when he crossed the Central Railway east of Tabora, and October 1, when he surrendered. He traversed almost the whole of the northern part of German East Africa and got, in June, as far north as the neighbourhood of Victoria Nyanza. On the 28th of that month he captured Fort Ikoma, a small post east of the Nyanza, garrisoned by a few irregulars. The Belgian pursuing column reached Ikoma the next day, and Naumann was forced to accept battle. After a sharp engagement, in which his losses were comparatively heavy, Naumann succeeded during the night in making good his escape to the east. He then moved towards the Magadi Lake, on the borders of British East Africa, next turning south to Kondoia Irangi, near which place he narrowly escaped capture. "After threatening Handeni he was next heard of near Moshii. [He seemed to have had a desire to visit the places best known in Smuts's campaign.] Finding our troops ready for him there, he doubled back on his tracks, recrossed the Kondoia-Irangi-Handeni road and was finally brought to bay." The last stage of the pursuit was carried out by a column under

Colonel P. H. Dyke, consisting of the 1st Battalion Cape Corps (Lieut.-Colonel Morris), the K.A.R. Mounted Infantry, faint but still pursuing, and the 10th S.A. Horse. During the last weeks of August and the first week of September minor captures from Naumann's force had been frequent, but he still had a full third of his original strength. Towards the end of September he had taken up a very strong natural position on Luita Hill (75 miles S.E. of Kondoa Irangi). "The 10th S.A. Horse occupied all surrounding water holes and kept Naumann's force in play until the arrival of the infantry. Naumann was then closely invested and surrounded on October 1, together with 14 other German whites, 165 askari and many porters." A detached remnant, the last of Wintgens's original force, consisting of three whites and 53 askari surrendered the next day.

Thus ended [wrote General van Deventer] a remarkable raid. The force which carried it out was composed of first-class askari, well led. . . . Such a raid could, perhaps, only have been carried out in a country like German East Africa, where the bush is often so thick that two considerable forces may pass within a mile, unaware of each other's presence; and where a ruthless leader of a small force can nearly always live on the country.

"A ruthless leader," like von Lettow himself, such was Naumann, though he may not have been responsible for a foul murder which

stained the record of his raid. General van Deventer officially brought the crime to the knowledge of Dr. Schnee, in the following communication:—

At the attack on Ikoma on June 29 [1 June 28] an officer of the British force, Lieutenant Sutherland, was seen to be taken prisoner by the force under Lieutenant Naumann and to be escorted inside the boma, apparently unwounded, or at most very slightly wounded. When the boma was subsequently occupied by us, this officer's body was found buried with the head absolutely smashed.

This was not the only deliberate murder of British soldiers by German troops in East Africa. The doing to death of a trooper of the 2nd South African Rifles by Germans under Count Falkenstein in circumstances of peculiar barbarity has already been recorded (Vol. XIII, pp. 413-414); General van Deventer gave the following particulars of another crime:—

After the fight at Ewehl Chini on September 22, when ground which had been occupied by the German troops was regained by our troops, the bodies of two officers who had been left on the ground wounded, and had so fallen into the hands of German troops were found stripped, and there could be no doubt that these two officers also had been murdered. The original wounds which disabled those officers were in one case in the arm and in the other in the leg. When their bodies were found, the head, in one case, had been smashed by blows, and, in the other, a rifle had been fired through the neck with the muzzle almost touching.

The chase of Naumann had deprived General



160 mm. GUNS FOR THE DEFENCE OF ALBERTVILLE, TANGANYIKA.

van Deventer of troops whose services would have been very useful in the principal theatre of operations, where von Lettow was endeavouring to prolong his resistance until the coming of the next rainy season should bring him another respite. He would not risk a decisive



GENERAL van DEVENTER (right) and Staff Major.

engagement if he could help it, but he never gave ground without a struggle. The country suited his strategy, being admirably adapted to defence and rearguard tactics, while his veteran askari, backed by numerous and well-handled machine-guns, were "worthy opponents for the best troops."

For his part, van Deventer's strategy was expressed in the formula, "find the enemy and hit him hard."

With the possible exception of Mahenge and certain food areas, there were [he wrote] no strategical objectives such as had been offered [in the 1916 campaign] by the Moshi area, the Tanga and Central Railways, Tabora, or Dar-es-Salaam. The country now held by the enemy was, for the most part, wild and inhospitable [nevertheless there were extensive fertile regions]; means of communication were practically non-existent; and even the better known places, such as Liwale and Massasi, were, from a military point of view, mere geographical expressions. It therefore became obvious to me, at a very early stage, that our true objectives in the coming campaign must be the enemy forces in the field, and that the completion of the conquest of German East Africa could only be brought about by hard hitting, and plenty of it.

For General Northey's force the plan adopted to achieve the hitting-hard process was, on

paper, simple. From its lines, parallel to and extending north of Lake Nyasa, it had to exert steady pressure on the western side of the Mahenge force, while Colonel Shorthose, who, as has been stated, had followed von Stuemmer across the Rovuma, had to exert pressure from the south. The rest was not so simple, even on paper. The Mahenge force might be attacked from the north by one or two routes, namely the line Dodoma-Iringa and the line Kilossa-Kidatu, while either of these routes might be chosen for the main advance. (There was a third, but hardly practicable, alternative of advancing on Mahenge by the Rufiji.) Then from the east van Deventer had the choice of striking inland from Kilwa or from Lindi. Of these alternatives Lindi had the greater attraction as, unless a line was pushed inland from Lindi along the valley of the Lukulodi until a junction was effected with Colonel Shorthose, the escape of von Lettow into Portuguese East Africa could hardly be prevented—unless the Portuguese forces on the frontier were strong enough to bar his passage. (This apparently was believed to be the case.) But the harbour of Lindi is poor, while that of Kilwa is very good. Moreover, the strongest of the German forces was near Kilwa. Taking all the factors into consideration General van Deventer decided, rightly or wrongly, to make his main advance first from Kilwa, and only later on from Lindi, while also operating both from Dodoma-Iringa and Kilossa-Kidatu. Van Deventer's plan differed little from that which Hoskins had contemplated.

General van Deventer had the help of many able lieutenants, though nearly all the South African commanders had been withdrawn. General Collyer, who had been Smuts's chief of staff, had left East Africa, his place as chief of staff was taken by Brigadier-General S. H. Sheppard, C.M.G., D.S.O., who had previously commanded divisions in the field with much skill. The Kilwa force had been under Brigadier-General J. A. Hannington, C.M.G., D.S.O. (in succession to General Hoskins), but at this time General Hannington was seriously ill, and did not resume his command until September. His place was taken temporarily by Brigadier-General Beves, whose handling of the 2nd South African (Infantry) Brigade had won the unstinted praise of General Smuts. The Lindi Force was under Brigadier-General H. de C. O'Grady ("who has shown great qualities as a fighting commander"). Brigadier-General

F. C. Cunliffe was commandant of the Nigerian Brigade. Colonel H. C. Tytler commanded the Iringa column. General Northey's column commanders were all men who had figured in the earlier stages of the campaign—Lieut.-Colonels G. M. P. Hawthorn, D.S.O., W. J. T. Shorthose, R. E. Murray, D.S.O., and C. H. Fair, D.S.O.

June and July (1917) were spent mainly in preparatory work, but this preparation involved some severe fighting on General Northey's side. A force, under Colonel Hawthorn, advanced north-eastward along the road leading from Songea to Liwale. It consisted of two battalions of the K.A.R.'s, the 1st South African Rifles, and a section of mountain artillery. By the end of June it had reached and occupied Likuju. The movement had been skilfully conducted, and the strength of Colonel Hawthorn's column was unknown to the enemy, who on June 29, having brought up some 600 men, opened fire on the British camp with a field-gun. Speedily realizing the strength of their opponents the Germans beat a hasty retreat. On July 3 Colonel Hawthorn moved out of Likuju along the Liwale road, and on the 7th drove the German rearguard from a

position covering the junction of the roads to Liwale and Mahenge. The enemy, instead of falling back on Liwale as had been expected, turned north towards Mahenge. Colonel Hawthorn followed up for 60 miles. "This advance continued steadily, the enemy force of about five companies, though offering a stubborn rearguard resistance in difficult country, being driven from position to position, until at the end of the month [July] Colonel Hawthorn had reached a point a few miles south of Mpundas." Farther north, from Lupembe, Colonel Fair, with Northern Rhodesian Police (who throughout rendered very good service) and other units, had by July 26 driven the enemy companies holding the front south-west of Mahenge over the Ruhuje river. In the north-west Colonel Tytler had moved forward from Iringa, and by July 7 had secured a crossing of the Ruipa river. This was a noteworthy feat, for the enemy held strongly entrenched positions on the Ruipa:—

Tytler's column first (July 3-5) drove the enemy over the river, then during the night of July 6-7 established covering parties on the farther bank and at once began building a bridge, which was completed on July 8. Against constant rearguard opposition Colonel Tytler had by the 15th secured all the Ruipa entrenched



A LIFT IN A MOTOR-LORRY.

positions. His advance was then resumed, but transport difficulties rendered it slow. However, on July 29, the enemy was attacked in the new position he had taken up and compelled again to retreat. Tytler had one advantage in that his line of supply, Dodoma-Iringa, unlike all the rest of van Deventer's routes, was free from "fly," and therefore available for animal transport.

These were the first and very promising steps in the concerted movement to corral Colonel Tafel at Mahenge. They caused Tafel to draw in his forces from outlying districts not yet directly threatened. In the north his

the estuary of the Lukuledi river, some 70 miles north of the Portuguese frontier. The surrounding country, which is covered with unusually dense bush, afforded good positions for the Germans, whose force in the neighbourhood of the port numbered about 700 rifles, with field and machine-guns. "It was very desirable," wrote General van Deventer, "to clear a larger area round Lindi in order to secure a better water supply and to prepare



THE BOMA OR FORT AT LINDI.

outposts began to fall back from the neighbourhood of the Central Railway to the line of the Ruaha; in the east the forces on the middle Rufiji were brought back, and the garrison of Madaba, in the Kilwa direction, was weakened. Tafel, however, retained free communication with Liwale and Massasi.

In the Kilwa area General Beves was in close contact with the main body of von Lettow's command. Here the Germans at first showed no disposition to yield ground. Towards the end of June, however, von Lettow, learning that a fairly large force had been concentrated against him, decided on another retirement. On June 27 and 28 he evacuated all his advanced positions except that at Kinamba Hill, which is on the coast adjoining the harbour of Kissivani (Kilwa Kissiwani), and from that he was driven on the morning of June 29.

At Lindi, ever since its occupation in September, 1916, the force there had been practically "bottled up." Lindi does not lie on the coast, but on the northern shore of

the main exits from the town and harbour" in view of the operations which would have to be made later on. The Lindi Force included the 25th Royal Fusiliers ("the Legion of Frontiersmen"), the 5th Light Infantry, and a company of the 61st Pioneers (both Indian troops), a section of the famous 27th (Indian) Mountain Battery, a section of the 3rd Battery South African Field Artillery, machine-gun section and trench mortars of the 2nd West India Regiment, and two battalions of the K.A.R.'s—the 1/2nd and 3/2nd. The force moved out of Lindi on June 10 in two columns, one under General O'Grady, the other under Lieut.-Colonel Law (2nd West India Regiment), and in three days it cleared the enemy from the shores of the Lukuledi estuary. The 25th Royal Fusiliers captured two machine-guns. Under cover of the fire of warships a surprise landing was effected on a creek on the south side of the estuary. The German detachment, which had mounted a naval gun by the creek, made good its escape, retiring over 20 miles.

The area abandoned by the enemy was occupied by General O'Grady. At the end of the month there was a sharp little engagement in which the British suffered a reverse. It is thus described by General van Deventer :

On June 29, the officer commanding at Naitiwi (Lieut.-Colonel Wilford, D.S.O., 5th Light Infantry) hearing of a small enemy party near Lutende, some eight miles north of his post, moved out with 150 rifles of his battalion to attack it. The enemy camp was rushed at dawn on the 30th, three white and several black prisoners being captured. Our force was, however almost immediately counter-attacked by three enemy companies, whose presence had not been suspected, and surrounded. Colonel Wilford was mortally wounded early in the engagement. Captain Hall took command, and, after a gallant fight against very heavy odds, finally broke out with some 50 men and reached Naitiwi.*

Operations on a larger scale were undertaken in July in the Kilwa area, while in the Lindi district the month passed uneventfully. For the Kilwa operations a (comparatively) strong force had been gathered, consisting of South Africans, Indians, King's African Rifles and the Gold Coast Regiment, all under command of General Beves. Its composition and division varied a little from time to time, but the following list gives its formation in the middle of July :

NO. 1 COLUMN (COLONEL ORR).

8th South African Infantry (less two companies).
Gold Coast Regiment.
33rd Punjabis.
2/2nd K.A.R.
27th Mountain Battery.

NO. 2 COLUMN (COLONEL RIDGWAY).

7th South African Infantry.
1/3rd K.A.R.
2/3rd K.A.R.
22nd Mountain Battery.

NO. 3 COLUMN (COLONEL TAYLOR).

8th South African Infantry (two companies).
3/3rd K.A.R. (less one company).
40th Pathans (detachment).

The task assigned General Beves was to drive the enemy south of the Kiturika Hills, which lie south-east of Kissiwani, and are crossed by tracks leading by Mtshakama and Narungombe to Liwale. It was hoped that this would lead to the discovery of Von Lettow's intended line of retreat; that is, whether he would fall back on Liwale or make south to Massasi. As in the last resort he intended to retreat into Portuguese East Africa, von Lettow was more likely to retire towards Massasi than Liwale, but of that there was no certainty on the British side in July, 1917. The Germans

* Among those taken prisoner was Captain H. Stokes, R.A.M.C. (5th Light Infantry), who was hit while attending wounded in his dressing station, upon which the German askari had deliberately fired.

did not give up their posts in the hills lightly. But in fifteen days' hard fighting, with severe losses to both sides, they were driven out of them. The advance began on July 5 with a converging movement, the first objective being a place called Mnindi, between Kilwa and Mtshakama.

Colonel Orr's and Colonel Ridgway's columns



GUN OF AN INDIAN MOUNTAIN BATTERY.

started from Kilwa, while Colonel Taylor moved out simultaneously from Wungwi, on the shores of Kissiwani harbour. Colonel Orr on the right attacked from the north-east, while Colonel Ridgway, in the centre, worked round to the west of Mnindi. The enemy was well entrenched on both fronts, and there was sharp fighting throughout July 6. Towards the evening the Germans made a heavy counter-attack on Colonel Taylor, and though they lost rather heavily they gained ground, reopened the road to Mtshakama and retired during the night. The left column (Colonel Taylor's) with the centre column then advanced direct on Mtshakama, while Colonel Orr dealt with some enemy columns on his flank. The

Germans did not await attack at Mtshakama, but fell back south on Narungombe. Rear-guards were left to dispute the progress of the British, but by nightfall on July 18 Colonels Ridgway and Taylor had reached a point two miles north of Narungombe, and it was arranged that Colonel Orr, on their right, should join them in an attack on that place the following day. It was held by the Germans in force. The fighting which developed is thus described by General van Deventer :

Early on the 19th No. 1 Column [Colonel Orr] gained touch with the enemy and engaged him in front, while Nos. 2 [Colonel Ridgway] and 3 [Colonel Taylor] Columns moved against his left and right flanks respectively. The enemy was found to be strongly entrenched and the fighting was particularly severe. In the centre the 33rd Punjabis and Gold Coast Regiment succeeded in capturing the enemy trenches in front of No. 1 Column, but were heavily counter-attacked, and finally compelled to evacuate them after a stubborn resistance. On the left bush-fires greatly interfered with the movements of No. 3 Column. The enemy took advantage of this to launch heavy counter-attacks against No. 3 Column, and the detachment of the 40th Pathans on the extreme left, which quickly lost all its British officers killed or wounded, was forced back. The remainder of the column, which was in imminent danger of being rolled up, was compelled to give ground.

Meanwhile on the right No. 2 Column had gained a position well round the enemy's left flank, repelling three counter-attacks, and by the afternoon was pressing the enemy closely. In order to relieve this pressure the German Commander made another strong counter-attack, which was stopped and in turn counter-attacked by the 1/3rd K.A.R. under Major Durham. The enemy was driven back right through the trenches on his left flank, which were taken and firmly held. This success decided the action, the enemy evacuating the

whole of his position at dark and retiring towards Mihambia. His losses had been heavy.

The 22nd and 27th Mountain Batteries and Gold Coast Battery gave close support throughout the day to the attacking infantry, whose gallantry and endurance were most marked. The casualties, particularly amongst officers, had been considerable in nearly all units engaged.

Mihambia, to which place the enemy withdrew, is 40 miles south of Kilwa, on the direct track to Lindi. The operations did not fully effect van Deventer's object, as von Lettow retreated neither to Liwale nor towards Massasi, but reinforced his Kilwa front. It had been found, too, as the British commander put on record, that "the enemy's capacity for resistance had not been in any way weakened by the rainy season, and that the moral and training of his troops remained high." Desertions from the ranks of his carriers were, it is true, becoming numerous, and no doubt caused the Germans some trouble. The carriers, however, were mainly local natives, almost always anxious to escape from the slavery imposed upon them, though from their ranks occasional recruits for von Lettow's fighting force were obtained. While the Germans had received a hard blow, the British Kilwa Force had been depleted by sickness, as well as by losses in the field. It needed rest, reinforcements and better communications before it could again take the offensive. These processes occupied nearly two months, and it may be doubted whether any substantial



ANCIENT FORT AT KILWA KISSIWANI.



A CAPTURED GERMAN FORT.

advantage accrued to the British from an offensive which had exhausted itself in a fortnight, when the great need was for continuous hammering at the German positions. However, by mid-September, when the Kilwa force was again ready, the Lindi force was also prepared for a continuous advance. In the interval the Lindi force had not been simply marking time. Here, at any rate, local and limited operations were justified, for it was essential to obtain sufficient elbow room for the intended advance on Massasi. General O'Grady began, on August 2, a movement which led to very stiff fighting.

The objective of the left or main column (25th Royal Fusiliers, 259th Machine Gun Company, 3/4th K.A.R.) was the enemy's right flank on Tandamuti Hill [overlooking the Lukuledi Estuary]. Here very stubborn resistance was encountered, the centre of which was a concealed redoubt, the existence of which was not previously known. Despite repeated efforts this redoubt could not be taken, and in consequence the main column was brought to a standstill. The centre column (30th Punjabis) became thus unsupported in its advance, and on being heavily counter-attacked by the enemy's reserve was compelled to withdraw with considerable loss after the whole of the British officers had become casualties. The engagement ended by our troops entrenching on the ground gained and organizing for a fresh advance.

This began on the 10th by a turning movement south of Tandamuti Hill, which was heavily bombarded by the navy with the object of deceiving the enemy as to the point of attack. The movement was successful in causing the enemy to abandon his ground and fall back to another strong position at Nurunyu.

General O'Grady followed in pursuit, keeping in close contact with the Germans, though now he was hindered by heavy rains. On the

18th the enemy, who had received considerable reinforcements from von Lettow's reserves, was closely engaged, but remained in possession of his main line of defences, the British force entrenching opposite the enemy. The operations were not further pressed for the time.

In the western or Mahenge area, meanwhile, operations were being carried on relentlessly. It will be recollected that by the end of July General Northey's columns were pressing back the Germans from south and west, and that Colonel Tytler from Iringa was pressing them from the north-west. Colonel Tafel had the choice of presently to accept action which would be decisive, or, after a series of delaying actions, to retire south-east and endeavour to join the main force under von Lettow, who in August was promoted by the Kaiser to the rank of Major-General. And if he (Tafel) delayed too long he might find himself surrounded and left without choice. During August both Colonel Hawthorn and Colonel Fair were very active; on the last day of August in the Mpepo area—40 miles east by south of Mahenge—Colonel Fair scored a neat success, killing or capturing 95 of the enemy, of whom three were Europeans. Colonel Hawthorn remained in the vicinity of Mpondas "engaged in a constant struggle, in the most difficult ravine country, with an enemy of equal strength, who received frequent minor reinforcements." Far away in the south Colonel Shorthose occupied Tundururu

on August 23. This place, which is about midway between Lake Nyasa and the Indian Ocean and 45 miles north of the Portuguese frontier, was of importance as being the centre of a district whence the enemy obtained food supplies, and hitherto it had been held by them without molestation, save for a bombing raid by British airmen in June.

The Iringa column under Colonel Tytler on August 26 crossed the Ideta river and pushed out patrols towards Ifakaras, which lies north of the important Ulanga (Kilombero) river and 50 miles due north of Mahenge. At this time, the Iringa column was no longer wholly British—it had been joined on August 10 by Belgians, and on the 28th the British troops were entirely withdrawn and the Mahenge operations left in the hands of the Belgians. Colonel Huyghe carried out the work he had undertaken with complete success. His plans had been made in consultation with General van Deventer, who on June 18 had a consultation with the Belgian commander at Dodoma on the Central Railway. It was then arranged that two Belgian columns should operate against Mahenge. One, known as the Northern Column (under Commandant Hubert), marched from Dodoma to Iringa. It was originally intended to go to the Mpepe front, but Colonel Fair's progress rendered that unnecessary and the Northern Column was deflected to Colonel Tytler at Ideta. Meanwhile, a second (the main) Belgian force, known as the Southern Column, commanded by Major Bataille, was concentrated on the Central Railway at Kilossa (east of Dodoma) and at Uleia, a little south of Kilossa. This column began an advance south on Mahenge on August 15. Colonel Huyghe's task had been arduous, and it had taken full three months to prepare for the Mahenge campaign. The troops had to be brought back from the Congo, medical and transport services had to be reorganized, munitions and supplies brought up (in all these things the British gave help), roads had to be made, and telegraphic communication with van Deventer established.

The country in which the Belgian operations were conducted, though more healthy than the Kilwa-Lindi districts, was exceedingly difficult. Between their base and Mahenge was a wide stretch of broken country, numerous small streams and two large rivers, the Ruaha and Kilombero (the latter bordered by extensive marshes) and the Kalemoto-Malege hills, 15

miles across. Mahenge itself lies on a healthy, though bleak, plateau, 6,000 ft. above the sea, in the midst of a fertile agricultural district. And for fully a year the enemy had been diligently preparing their defences there.

Major Bataille, who had already proved his soldierly qualities in the Tabora campaign, moved rapidly, driving in the opposing rear-guards at Kidoli, 50 miles south of Kilossa (August 18) and again at Tope (August 19). On the 21st Bataille crossed the Ruaha unopposed, and three days later the Sanga river. Here he had a brush with the enemy, who lost four whites and a machine-gun, while six British prisoners were released. On the 28th Bataille effected a junction with Tytler and Hubert at Ifakaras, having covered 97 miles in 14 days.

The enemy, wrote General van Deventer, had retired south of the Kilombero river, which was a formidable obstacle, but the rapidity and skill with which the Belgian columns acted deprived the enemy of any advantage he might have gained from this. By September 6 the Belgian columns had secured crossings at two places, and by the 8th the whole of the Belgian Southern Brigade was across and moving against Mahenge.

Four enemy companies had been posted to oppose the passage of the Belgians at the expected crossing place, but while some detachments made a feint attack at this place, two other detachments secured the passage of the river at a spot 10 miles away. The defenders, finding themselves threatened in rear, then gave way, and the Belgians, undisturbed, bridged the river. The Germans had fallen back on a defensive system in the Kalimoto-Malege hills with a front of 15 miles, and roughly 20 miles north by north-east of Mahenge. Here the Belgians opened an attack on September 9, exactly a year after their entry into Tabora. Strong resistance was encountered and the fight lasted for eight days. The Germans in the hilly, densely bushed country disputed every foot of the way. An encircling movement, however, settled the matter, and on September 16, beaten on the Luri, the Germans gave way—retiring to an inner line of defence, some seven miles only from Mahenge.

Major Bataille gave the enemy no rest and, though his progress, owing to the difficult country to be traversed, was slow it was steady. Slow progress was unavoidable also from another cause—the long tenuous lines of communication which made the supply of the force a puzzling matter. It had been hoped



LEWIS GUNNERS PRACTISING IN A DRIED SWAMP NEAR LINDI.

that the resources of the country would have been of some help, but the Germans in their retreat destroyed practically all food they could not carry away. In a fight on September 22 the Belgians seized an enemy post, capturing or killing 43 askari and three officers, together with two machine-guns and a large store of ammunition. By the 28th they were in touch with the last defences of Mahenge, a ridge of hills extending north, east, and west of the town and defended by 350 European and 2,000 native troops. Some days were spent in reconnoitring the positions; by October 4 the Belgians were in active contact with the enemy, and on October 7 a general attack was begun, in front and on both flanks. But Colonel Tafel had no intention of fighting the issue out. He resisted as long as it was safe to do so—as long, that is, as he had a way of escape. The Belgians pressed hard, and when, on October 8, both his right and left



wings gave way, Colonel Tafel ordered a general retreat. Major Muller, commanding the right flank of the Belgian force, entered Mahenge on October 9, capturing 20 whites in the last position held by the enemy. In Mahenge itself were found 92 German soldiers and 242 askari, "sick" in hospital. (Not all the German "sick" were ill or wounded—many were worn out with fatigue and others frankly stayed behind to be captured.) The Belgians also liberated at Mahenge several British and



BELGIAN NATIVE INFANTRY IN ACTION.

Belgian native soldier prisoners, and one British officer.

The first and main objective of the Belgians had been attained "most successfully and skilfully," and the high *moral* of the Congolese troops once more demonstrated. They still had their work to finish. After the capture of Mahenge a detachment, under Major Gilly, vigorously pursued the Germans, who had split up into various fragments, though Tafel had with him still over 1,000 men. Finding that Gilly could not be shaken off, the enemy turned, on October 13, some 20 miles south of Mahenge, and attacked him—unsuccessfully. Three days later another small Belgian force surprised a German detachment conveying prisoners of war, dispersed it, and rescued the prisoners. Meantime, on the 18th, the Belgian right had established contact with Colonel Fair, and a little later they were in liaison also with Colonel Hawthorn. On October 24 the 3rd Belgian battalion engaged and defeated an enemy force at Saidi. In this fight Captain van Damme fell at the head of his troops.

Again, for a few days it seemed that the much-desired decisive action might be forced, so far as Tafel's force was concerned, by the combined action of the Belgians and of the Lupembe (Colonel Fair's) and Songea (Colonel Hawthorn's) columns. Colonel Hawthorn, reinforced by the 2/4th K.A.R. from the dismembered Iringa column, renewed his offen-

sive on October 16th, but the enemy at Alprondas avoided his blow, and, having destroyed his two guns, retired north along the Luwega—that is, in the Mahenge direction. Colonel Tafel was in a tight corner, and deserters from his force had begun to surrender to the Belgians in large numbers. He retreated to the south-east, the only route not blocked, while the force in front of Hawthorn also now turned eastward. Circumstances favoured Tafel's escape. Heavy rains might be expected in the Mahenge area by the middle of November, and once they set in the roads south from the Central Railway would become impossible, at least for mechanical transport. The Belgians had had no opportunity to build up a food reserve, and supplies by way of Nyasaland or Rhodesia, owing to the great length of the route, could not be expected. Captain V. J. Keyte, who was responsible for the supply of all food to the African troops and carriers of the Nyasaland Force, worked strenuously and successfully, but with lines extending 1,000 miles there were obvious limits to the number of men who could be fed. In the circumstances General van Deventer (October 27) asked Colonel Huyghe to leave only two battalions in the Mahenge area to cooperate with General Northey's troops, sending the rest back to Kilossa.

The whole enemy front on the western area gave way, and it was only the very great

difficulty in supplying the Anglo-Belgian forces at the end of their long lines of communication which prevented full advantage being taken of the situation. Nevertheless by November 6 Colonel Fair had reached Kabita Mtoto, where 142 Germans and 140 askari surrendered; on the 6th 82 more askari gave themselves up to the Belgian columns. A day or two later the Belgians found that Tafel had got beyond their reach—their line of supply had reached the breaking point. But the Mahengo area was clear of the enemy; Tafel's one endeavour now was to break south and join von Lettow, while von Lettow himself by the middle of November was in a perilous position. The fate of Tafel and the final part played by the Belgians in the campaign is bound up with the operations which opened in September in the Kilwa region.

Since the capture of Narungombe by the Kilwa Force, on July 19, preparations for a renewal of the offensive had gone on steadily. The tram-line, or light railway, which ran from Kilwa was extended towards the south,*

* The railway administration under Colonel Sir William Johns, C.B., laid down in all 115 miles of track in the Kilwa and Lindi areas. The requirements of the army were also met by petrol-driven tractors and trailers.

roads were improved, transport (largely mechanical) collected and supplies accumulated in forward areas. The bulk of the Nigerian brigade—one battalion had been sent to give a hand in the chase of Naumann—was brought to Kilwa, and there also were landed welcome reinforcements from India—the 25th Cavalry, the 55th Rifles, and the 127th Baluchis. They were all at Kilwa by the end of the first week in September, and General Hannington was back in command. The Lindi force was also strengthened and organized in two principal columns. "By the middle of September the situation," wrote General van Deventer, "was ripe for the main advance. . . . Sufficient motor transport was by this time available for the whole force." It had taken van Deventer three and a half months to arrive at this happy stage; part of the delay was due to the difficulty of meeting all his demands in view of the exigencies of the situation in France and the Near East.

Van Deventer now undertook a combined movement, his forces advancing southward from Kilwa and south-westward from Lindi. He went himself to advanced headquarters at



BELGIAN NATIVE TROOPS IN TABORA.

Kilwa on September 10 and nine days later the real main offensive was begun. And from that date, September 19, the operations continued without a pause until the middle of December

At Kilwa General Hannington had now the major part of his force in two columns, under Colonels Orr and Ridgway respectively. The Nigerian Brigade under General Cunliffe on the extreme right moved by a circuitous route



IN THE BUSH.

to try and cut off the enemy. The 25th (Indian) Cavalry was sent on a special mission to destroy the enemy's food depots at Nangano and other places in or near the upper Mbemkuru valley. Advancing over an area almost waterless at that season, and covered by dense bush through which roads had to be cut, the infantry on the 19th drove the enemy from his advanced position, and then after a smart action with Colonel Orr's column the Germans evacuated Mihambia. In falling back to the south-west the Germans unexpectedly found their passage barred (September 22) by two Nigerian battalions. The enemy fought hard, making repeated and determined attempts to break through. Finally the Germans broke into

small parties and, scattering through the bush, escaped, leaving over 100 dead on the ground. The pursuit continued, the Germans making for Nahunga Hill, a strong post near the Mbemkuru river. Here on September 26 Colonel Orr was closely engaged all day, the brunt of the attack being borne by the 2/2nd K.A.R.'s, supported by the 27th Mountain Battery—which knocked out one of the enemy's guns. The next day Cunliffe's Nigerians joined in the attack. Under cover of darkness the Germans evacuated Nahunga (September 29), at which place the 25th Cavalry arrived on September 30, having successfully accomplished its mission, including a raid on the much-prized Nangano.

It was now clear that von Lettow was not going to fall back on Liwale, but southward towards Massasi. Hannington's two columns and the cavalry were therefore directed to pursue the enemy up the Mbemkuru, while the Nigerian Brigade was sent south to help to cut off the enemy's line of retreat. Cunliffe left Nahunga on October 4 and after a trying march through most difficult country—which caused it to be three days late in reaching its objective—gained touch with the Lindi Force on the 11th. In the interval Orr and Ridgway had driven the enemy from the Mbemkuru. "While Ridgway's column now contained Lettow towards Ruangwa [south-west of Nahunga], Hannington sent Orr's column by forced marches to Ruponda, an important enemy grain depot, which it reached on October 10, thus completely severing the main enemy communication from Mahenge to Massasi via Liwale" (Colonel Orr). Von Lettow had sensed the danger to Ruponda and he got away by an alternative route, which his foresight had provided, connecting with the Lindi-Massasi road.

When these operations had begun to take effect the Lindi Force, then under General Beves, moved out (September 24) to bar the German retreat. Its immediate objective was Mtama, 22 miles south-west of Lindi. Mtama covered Nyangao, a mission station on the Lukuledi where converged the most practicable tracks connecting the Lindi area with the Mbemkuru valley. The advance, though strongly resisted, made good progress, and von Lettow fully realizing the serious character of the offensive hastened south with his reserves, concentrating a considerable portion of his force at Mahiwa, to the south-west of Nyangao. To that station the enemy had,



OX-DRAWN FIELD GUN

on October 15, retreated from Mtawa. There ensued in the middle of October some of the severest fighting seen in East Africa. The Nigerian Brigade, which was on the right, was given the task of cutting off the enemy retreat from Nyangao and Mahiwa, while in the centre and south two other columns, commanded respectively by General O'Grady and Colonel Tytler, advanced on and parallel to the main road to Massasi. All day on the 15th and 16th von Lettow succeeded in holding off the Nigerians, and he compelled the 1st Battalion, called up in support, to fall back. On the night of the 16th he abandoned Nyangao station to take up a position on a ridge about two miles to the south, behind the bed of the Nakadi river. Here, on the 17th and 18th, he offered desperate resistance and succeeded in holding up the British. Von Lettow was playing for time to get the bulk of his force away south.

Colonel Tytler advanced from Nyangao at daybreak on the 17th, and at once gained touch with the enemy. The 3/4th K.A.R. attacked, supported by artillery fire, and by one o'clock had taken part of the position. General O'Grady had meanwhile come up on the right of Colonel Tytler's column, the Bharatpur Infantry attacking with 1/2nd K.A.R. in support. Opposition to this attack increased steadily, and both battalions were soon fully engaged. At four o'clock a determined counter-attack was made against both columns, and the whole line was pressed back, but again advanced and regained part of the lost ground. Darkness set in with the engagement still proceeding.

On the morning of the 18th the action was resumed, Colonel Tytler's column pressing the enemy vigorously in order to enable General O'Grady's column to effect a junction with the Nigerian Brigade, which it succeeded in doing at 8 o'clock. Colonel Tytler's attack was at first successful, the 30th Punjabis driving the enemy from their trenches and occupying them, while part of the 3/4th K.A.R. and of the 259th Machine Gun Company

came up on the Punjabis' left to strengthen that flank. The enemy was, however, in force, and delivered a strong counter-attack on the left, which eventually compelled our line to fall back to the river bed. This position was maintained during the afternoon, several counter-attacks being repulsed.

General O'Grady meanwhile attacked the enemy's left flank and forced it back for some distance, the 3/2nd K.A.R. leading, while the 25th Fusiliers (from Colonel Tytler's column) filled the gap between the attack fronts of the two columns. On this flank also the enemy developed a very strong counter-attack, gaining some ground, and it was found necessary to restore the situation by bringing up the 3rd Nigerians from reserve to the left of General O'Grady's column. The enemy pressure continued until dark, but without further result, and on the morning of the 19th he was found to have retired to his original line.

Much of the fighting in this four days' battle, for such it was, had been at close quarters. The German losses were heavy—53 Europeans and 268 askari killed, 241 Europeans and 677 askari captured. The number of wounded was unknown. The British casualties were also severe. After this action a brief pause in the advance was essential. It did not greatly advantage von Lettow, for he now found himself compelled to detach troops from Mahiwa to meet a threat to his left flank. Colonel Orr from Ruponda raided (October 19) Lukuledi Mission Station, only 10 to 12 miles north of Massasi, towards which he reconnoitred. On the 21st a counter-attack on Orr was repulsed, two machine-guns and some prisoners being taken. Orr then returned to Ruponda. Three or four days previously Colonel Ridgway had driven the enemy rear-guards from Ruangwe. The enemy's Kilwa front was crumbling.

At this time General Hannington was rein-

forced by Belgian troops sent from Colonel Huyghe's reserve by the Central Railway to Dar-es-Salaam, and thence by boat. The special mission of this Belgian and Kilwa force was to help in the rounding up of Colonel Tafel, and its objective was Liwale. That place was entered on October 29 by a raiding



BRIG.-GENERAL F. G. CUNLIFFE, C.B.
Commanded the Nigerian Brigade, and later the Lindi Force.

party of Northey's force, under Major Hawkins, which was sent forward by Colonel Shorthose from Tunduru. Hawkins held it for five days, when (November 2) Liwale was taken over by the Belgians. The Belgian contingent was under Commandant Herion, and consisted of the 9th Battalion and Cyclists, reinforced some 10 days later by the 4th Belgian Battalion. Tafel was then endeavouring to break through to von Lettow. The only forces in his direct path were those of Shorthose and Hawkins. From the north-west Colonel Murray, with 400 Rhodesians, pushed on to their help; from Liwale Commandant Herion sent 200 rifles with the same object

These reinforcements could not, however, arrive in time to assist Shorthose and Hawkins in stemming the enemy movement to the south, which they most gallantly attempted to do on the 16th when still separated from each other by some hours' march. Each of their small forces put up a determined fight, and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy before being compelled to withdraw towards Tunduru in face of great odds. [Tafel had some 1,800 rifles.] The Belgian column succeeded in overtaking the enemy's rearguard company and captured a maxim and some prisoners, including the company commander.

Tafel in going south towards the Rovuma was marching into a hornets' nest, for after their brief pause both the Kilwa and Lindi Forces were again going forward and Tafel found between him and von Lettow troops whom he could not break through. Here it may be added that the Belgian force, its mission accomplished, was shortly afterwards withdrawn to the Congo. General van Deventer paid his allies no more than their due when, in thanking Colonel Huyghe, he said "the Belgian troops are splendid fighters, keen and reliable, and their participation in the campaign has been of the greatest value to the Allied force."

What was virtually the final stage of the campaign so far as German East Africa was concerned began on November 6, 1917. To be sure of complete success Portuguese aid was required. Nine months before General Hoskins had discussed with the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief feasible methods of co-operation should von Lettow try to cross the Rovuma. The Portuguese were very willing, and they sent a large force to Mozambique—some 8,800 men (see Vol. XVII, page 347). Troops had been posted along the Rovuma and recently had even made incursions across the frontier. General van Deventer now suggested to Colonel Rosa that he should dispose his force in a manner to bar von Lettow's retreat, and to this course the Portuguese commander readily assented. One of van Deventer's suggestions was that a strong Portuguese detachment should be stationed at Ngomano, the point where the Lujenda river joins the Rovuma. It was felt to be not improbable that von Lettow might make for that spot if he evaded the British columns, and that was precisely what he did do, and what Tafel tried to do. But in the end it was touch and go.

On November 6 the Lindi Force, now under General Cunliffe, renewed its attack on Mahiwa with the Nigerian Brigade, and General O'Grady's and Colonel Tytler's columns. The bulk of the fighting that day fell to General O'Grady's column, which got to the enemy's right rear, while in turn the

Germans attacked O'Grady's flanks and rear. Mahiwa itself was taken by Indian troops—the 5th Light Infantry—of Colonel Tytler's column, the infantry being well supported by artillery fire. During the night the enemy retreated across a 20 miles waterless track of country. Cunliffe was ordered to pursue the foe, No. 3 column (O'Grady's) being brought up to a strength of 2,000 rifles for this purpose. The Nigerians and the Cape Corps (the coloured South African troops) were engaged on November 8 in clearing a way for General O'Grady. They were stoutly opposed by rear guards and reserves had to be brought up before the enemy gave way. In this action the Cape Corps rushed a machine-gun which was annoyingly active on the British flank, killing or capturing the whole of the gun crew. O'Grady moved out at dawn on the 9th. Von Lettow put up many delaying actions which caused him considerable loss, including the last serviceable 4.1 inch gun of the Königsberg, which he was compelled to abandon. He fell back from Mahiwa to Nangoo, and thence to Chiwata. O'Grady, notwithstanding the great difficulty experienced in supplying his men with water, did not slacken in his effort, and by the morning of November 14 had seized a commanding position overlooking Chiwata.

General Hannington, from the Kilwa direction, had moved simultaneously with the Lindi Force. Hannington had now the help of the 10th South African Horse, which after the capture of Naumann was brought south,

and a mounted column was formed, composed of the 10th S.A. Horse, the 25th (Indian) Cavalry and a K.A.R. Mounted Infantry Company, the whole under command of Colonel Breytenbach. The three Kilwa columns, those of Colonels Orr, Ridgway, and Breytenbach, all moved to the Lukulidi valley, and crossing the river a detachment of the Mounted Column occupied Massasi on November 10. The bulk of the Germans there, including Dr. Schnee, had already fled, but 57 German whites and 142 askari were taken prisoner, while a damaged 4.1 inch Königsberg gun was discovered. On the same day Colonel Orr, farther east, occupied Ndanga mission station, after some opposition, capturing 64 Europeans—men and women—and 129 askari, including sick. A couple of days later Orr entered Mwita, which lies south of Chiwata. The junction of the Kilwa and Lindi forces was effected, and the cordon was being drawn close round von Lettow, who had by now brought the whole of his command into the Chiwata area, which for some days had received the constant attention of the British airmen, the "Schwein dor Luft," as the Germans called them.*

Von Lettow realized that he could no longer hope to hold any part of German East Africa. With Tafel's force he had lost touch for weeks—

* When the airmen came, wrote a British officer, the prisoners of war walked into the bush. Five aeroplanes came together one day—their total "bag" was a rat killed in an officer's *banda*. Often, however, the airmen had better luck.



PETROL DUMP AT A BRITISH BASE.



DISPATCHING GERMAN WOUNDED TO THE BASE.

and Tafel must be left to his fate. For himself and his force the one hope now was to move rapidly south-east to the Rovuma, and get away into Portuguese territory before the British surrounded him. All sick and wounded, all the war-weary, and the prisoners of war must be abandoned. Von Lettow translated his hope into action. A small fighting force was left at Chiwata with orders to put up a fight, and then "live for bush," while he and his force retreated. By November 14 Chiwata was waiting to be taken. Van Deventer, anxious that nothing should go amiss, had that day arrived at Ndanda. On the 15th General O'Grady's column met with some resistance from enemy rearguards on the heights east of Chiwata; the next day Colonel Ridgway and the Nigerian Brigade entered the place, after trifling opposition. Here 121 prisoners of war were found and released, 71 of them being Europeans. Ninety-eight German whites and 425 askari (including sick) surrendered. The hospital was found to be full of "funk holes," they were round the operating theatre, in the wards—everywhere. "Why are they here," asked a British officer prisoner, "you would not fight so near a hospital." "Well," replied the German medical officer, "if we objected Lettow would say, 'Take down the Red Cross flags and hold the hospital.'"

Chiwata had been abandoned, but von Lettow was not yet safe. He was immediately pursued, and had constantly to fight strong

rearguard actions to prevent himself from being hemmed in in the Lutshemi valley. His route was along the edge of the Mkondi Plateau. "The country was extremely broken and difficult, and progress [of the British columns] was slow. . . . The extreme thickness of the bush made it impossible to surround the enemy completely, and during the night of the 17th-18th his main force retired south-east towards Simba's by an unsuspected path." Von Lettow had "shed" nearly a third of his force in this retreat. At Lutshemi camp, occupied by the Nigerians, General O'Grady's and Colonel Orr's columns on the 18th, some 300 Germans and 700 askari, were captured and 32 European officer prisoners of war released. On the same day Colonel Ridgway's column captured a patrol sent by Colonel Tafel to get in touch with von Lettow. Tafel had then arrived west of Massasi, near the Bangala river, and von Lettow was also making for that river. He had at last got the news of Tafel's whereabouts and was trying to join him. The mounted column was accordingly sent towards the confluence of the Bangala with the Rovuma. Von Lettow now "by very rapid marching swept southward through Nevala to the Rovuma, leaving hundreds of sick and wounded in his trail; keeping along the north-bank [of the Rovuma] he crossed the Bangala on the 24th, going west. Attempts to catch him with Orr's column and Breytenbach's mounted troops, first at Nevala,

and then on the Bangala, failed by a few hours at both places in spite of hard marching." (Colonel Orr.)

While the speed of von Lettow's movements prevented the stern chase of him from succeeding, the speed of the British movements prevented the junction of Tafel and von Lettow, though at this time their forces were only a comparatively short distance apart. Finding the pace too hot for him von Lettow now abandoned German territory. He crossed the Rovuma on November 25-26 at the spot where it is joined from the south by the Lujenda river, before Colonel Ridgway's column and the Nigerian Brigade, coming from Massasi could reach it. Colonel Rosa, the Portuguese commander, had placed a force at Ngoinano, at the Lujenda confluence, but the attempt of the Portuguese there to delay the crossing was not successful. Von Lettow's force at that time numbered about 300 Europeans and 2,000 to 2,200 black troops, with three or four times that number of carriers and followers. He was very short both of rations and ammunition, and was a few days later followed across the Rovuma by the 25th Cavalry and the Nigerian Brigade. "He could not," said General Northey, "have held out for more than two or three days, but unfortunately the Portuguese at Ngoinano surrendered to him [they were greatly out-numbered], and he was

thus able to replenish his failing stock of food and ammunition." Moreover, the rainy season setting in early in December, further pursuit by the cavalry and Nigerians was rendered impossible. Thus favoured, von Lettow got clear away up the Lujenda valley.

Colonel Tafel was not as successful as his chief. Von Lettow moved with such rapidity that Tafel had turned towards Nevala two or three days after that station had been abandoned by von Lettow. On November 25 he appeared on Colonel Orr's line of communications, and discovered his mistake. On the 26th Tafel had a sharp engagement with a cavalry patrol and the 129th Baluchis (about 150 rifles strong). He forced back this weak detachment and turned south, endeavouring to get out of the net into which he had run. Colonel Orr's column, which had turned back from following von Lettow, now went in pursuit of Tafel, who had reached the Rovuma. But cut off from von Lettow, foodless, and in an unknown country, he decided to surrender. On November 27 a party of 37 Germans, 178 askari, and about 1,100 followers marched into a British post and gave themselves up. Colonel Orr was to march the next day to intercept Tafel's main column, but in the evening a message was received from Colonel Tafel stating that he intended to cease hostilities. "A meeting was arranged and at midday on



FIELD AMBULANCE.

November 28 [1917] Tafel surrendered unconditionally with 19 officers, 92 other Europeans, over 1,200 askari, and some 2,200 other natives." Not a single enemy combatant was left in the protectorate, and the conquest of German East Africa was complete.

It was a hard-won conquest, and nearly two years had passed since the British offensive opened. During that period the Germans had lost in killed or captured over nine-tenths of their total force; between May and December, 1917, the enemy casualties were 1,618 whites and 5,482 blacks; they had in the same six months lost 14 guns and 73 machine-guns, besides rifles and military stores. The British casualties in the six months were also high. Without reckoning the sick roll and deaths from disease, they were close on 6,000 in action alone. The large majority were wounded, who recovered, and over 1,000 of the 6,000 casualties were suffered by carriers and followers. These men often delivered ammunition right into the firing line, and attention has already been drawn to their devotion and courage. The losses from disease were serious, as may be inferred from the figures of the South African contingent for 1916-1917. Of their 1,800 dead, 1,200 succumbed to disease. The Germans also suffered much from the climate, and in the last half of 1917 their medical stores were running low. A remarkable effort was made to replenish them. It is alleged that von Lettow "sent word by wireless that unless a supply of quinine reached him by a certain date he would be unable to carry on." Von Lettow certainly had then no wireless capable of communicating direct with Berlin, but there were indirect methods of making known his necessities; while the British War Office reports bore testimony to the large number of German sick in hospital. Aware of von Lettow's needs, the German Government tried to send him supplies by air. The man chosen for the task was von Butlar, one of the best of the German air pilots, and he made the attempt in Zeppelin L 59. His intention was to fly over Egypt and the Sudan to East Africa, and the starting point chosen was Jamboli, a town in Bulgaria. But there were delays, and when, on November 16, von Butlar started, the sands were already running out in German East Africa. Moreover, the "Balkan Terror," as L 59 was called, had only got as far as Smyrna when it was so heavily fired upon by its friends, who mistook it for an Allied airship, that it was

obliged to land. The enterprise was not abandoned, and von Butlar started again from Jamboli at 5 a.m. on November 21. This time it looked as if he might succeed. Flying without a hitch L 59 crossed the Mediterranean, the eastern edge of the Libyan Desert, and very early in the morning of November 23 was nearing the latitude of Khartum. It then, at 2.45 a.m., received a wireless message from Nauen saying, "Return; East Africa occupied." Von Butlar, who had gone more than half-way to his objective, accomplished his return journey in safety, and landed at Jamboli at 10 a.m. on November 25, having flown over 4,500 miles without a stop. L 59 had been observed while passing over the oases in the Libyan Desert, and fears were entertained at Cairo that its objective might be the great Assuan Dam. Such measures as were possible were at once taken to meet the danger.

Von Lettow's medical stores were low, but they were by no means exhausted, and he augmented his medical staff by detaining R.A.M.C. doctor prisoners. His own staff were able men; among them was Dr. Taute, who had worked with Sir David Bruce on the Sleeping Sickness Commission. On the whole the German M.O's treated the wounded prisoners decently, but they were much hampered by the instruction of von Lettow and Dr. Schnee. Badly wounded men were carried on grass pallets, and improvised bark dressings were used, as well as locally-made drugs. The wounded men were repeatedly made to go on long safaris, and the lot of the unwounded was even worse, so that a very satisfactory feature of van Deventer's advance was the liberation of the prisoners of war. During October and November over 150 European prisoners, British, Belgian and Portuguese, were released, together with a larger number of Indians and Africans. Among the whites were men who had been posted as missing, for von Lettow did not report the capture of officers or men unless they were seen to be taken. The lot of the prisoners had been one of unnecessary privations, dangers and shame, if not quite as bad as that of the prisoners who had been rescued at Tabora in September, 1916.

There was generally (wrote a correspondent) good fare for the men in hospital, but the rations of the unwounded prisoners were totally inadequate. Neither meat nor salt was given to the black prisoners. When we [wounded British] were at Nangano three other prisoner camps came in. Among the men were Nyasaland Volunteers and South Africans, Sepoys, Gold Coast Regiment N.C.O.'s and Portuguese askari. One camp

was known as the "old men's" as it consisted of prisoners taken in 1914—two were survivors of the fight at Tanga. These "old men" had been constantly shifted about, and presented a strange spectacle. They had been given no clothing or utensils by their captors. Some were dressed in bark clothing and wore lion skin sandals. They had washing basins mended with wax and were boiling their rice in small jugs. At Chiwata a naval officer who was placed in charge of all the prisoners' camps often appeared dressed in a complete suit of bark. Blackwater fever, dysentery, and other diseases carried off many of the prisoners—others went mad. One officer who had been left for dead at the Rufiji estuary, and was at the mercy of the tides for days, survived, and was released at Chiwata. Here, when they saw the end coming, the Germans issued decent rations, and at the last the Sepoys were given

had got clear away, African troops were almost exclusively employed. The Imperial, South African and Indian combatant units were released, except the Indian Mountain Artillery and the Engineers (Imperial and South African). In February, 1918, the Nigerian Brigade was sent back to the West Coast; later on the West India Regiment and the 2nd Cape Corps were also released, the last-named being sent to Palestine to join General Allenby. The bulk of the fighting in 1918 fell to the King's African Rifles and the Gold Coast Regt. (which remained in East



SWAHILI WOMEN COOKS.

salt and rice. (At Nangano those who had money had been able to buy sufficient food through the German guards.)

At Chiwata there were some alleviations in the lot of the officer prisoners. There were books to read; they had, it was said, been the collection of an elephant hunter; there was a *Punch Almanac* for 1916; an ingenious officer had made a pack of cards—it required an effort in honesty not to read their backs. Sing-songs were given, plantation songs alternating with Moody and Sankey hymns, while we had operatic selections from a gifted performer on a bamboo flute. All sorts of people were represented at the mess, the professional soldier, travellers, journalists, men of science and letters. Some of the officers learned German during their captivity—one, a Belgian, devoted his time to a study of Bantu and other African languages.

For the pursuit of von Lettow in Portuguese East Africa, as soon as it was realized that he

Africa till August, 1918), though the Portuguese force which cooperated with the British contained a considerable proportion of Europeans.

Von Lettow when he crossed the Rovuma marched with great speed up the valley of the Lujenda and supplemented the ammunition, rifles and food he had seized at Ngomano by the further capture of isolated posts. For three weeks the 25th Cavalry and the Nigerians gave chase, but when on December 19 the cavalry patrols reached Nanguare, a post on the Lujenda, some 50 miles south of Ngomano, it was only to find that von Lettow had already captured the Portuguese garrison there and was gone away westward. The Lindi force thus

lost touch with the Germans, and it was clear that further operations would constitute an entirely new undertaking. The prospect was not encouraging, especially when the character of the country over which von Lettow and his veterans were free to roam was considered.

The portion of Portuguese East Africa bounded by the Rovuma and Zambesi rivers, Lake Nyasa, and the sea, is but little smaller than France (wrote General van Deventer). Much of this vast area was a *terra incognita* to Europeans, and no accurate maps were available. In some parts the natives were as yet unsubdued, while in others they were in more or less open rebellion. There were but few roads, and no railways except 30 miles of 3 ft. 6 in. gauge starting from Lumbo, on the mainland west of Mozambique. . . . The central districts (which the enemy would naturally make for) were reported to be well elevated, healthy, and fertile. In fact, Portuguese East Africa appeared an ideal theatre for the operations of a commander of a compact and mobile force, tied to no base, independent of lines of communication, and adept in the art of "living on the country," whose aim would probably be to avoid encounters with superior forces and to remain in being as long as possible.

In his new plan of campaign General van Deventer (who had been made a K.C.M.G. in

recognition of his services in the 1917 campaign) set before himself two objects, "to prevent the enemy returning in any force to German East Africa and to get to grips with him as soon and as often as possible." Given the known character of the enemy commander and the known difficulty of forcing decisive action, the campaign had "perforce to be one of virtual extermination." No time was lost in getting to work, and the new campaign was initiated while the 25th Cavalry and the Nigerian Brigade were still engaged in their fruitless chase. Von Lettow had made, as was foreseen, for the central region between Lake Nyasa and the sea. Before December was over the German force was spread over an area extending 200 miles east and west, from Unango, 50 miles east of Nyasa to Medo, some 130 miles west of the Indian Ocean at Port Amelia. They were at once attacked from both sides. General Northey landed the 2nd Cape Corps at Mtengula, on the eastern shores of Nyasa, and on December 19 it started for Unango, while



NORTHERN PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA.



A TRADER GIVES INFORMATION.

Colonel Hawthorn, who had been transferred by boat to the south end of the lake, was marching north-east towards the Lujenda river. For the eastern operations the Gold Coast Regiment under Colonel Rose was sent to Port Amelia. By the end of December it had begun to move towards Medo and was soon afterwards joined by the 4/4th K.A.R.'s and a section of the 22nd Mountain Battery. Thus, while with the aid of Portuguese troops a barrier was formed against von Lettow's return north, the British forces were at the beginning of January, 1918, closing on the enemy simultaneously from east and west. Operations were to continue as far as possible throughout the rainy season, which had then begun. Of the 15 companies into which von Lettow's force was formed 11 were at that time between the Lujenda and Lake Nyasa, von Lettow's headquarters being at Mtarica, 140 miles east of Mtengula. Between those two places he had forces at Mwembe as well as Unango, and further south at Luambala, on the upper Lujenda, were three German companies. Despite heavy rains the Cape Corps—750 rifles—pushed on, occupied Unango, and, on January 21, entered Mwembe, whence the enemy had fallen back on Mtarica. To Mtarica the Cape Corps pushed on, February 3, but von Lettow had gone, leaving only a small rearguard, whose opposition was quickly overcome. Meantime Hawthorn (with some 1,300 rifles) had occupied Luambala, and by the middle of

February General Northey had completed the clearance of the west bank of the Lujenda. "The enemy's opposition had been constant, but not severe."

Von Lettow had retired south-east to the Msalu-Nanungu region, in the very centre of the country, and at the greatest distance possible from either Lake Nyasa or the sea. The difficulties of supply, especially for the Nyasaland forces, were consequently largely increased. But no pause in the operations occurred; Colonel Rose pushed steadily west from Port Amelia, and General Northey's columns as steadily advanced east from the Lujenda. In addition, a column of 1,500 Portuguese troops was got ready to move from the north, and for the better co-ordination of the movements of the troops General van Deventer assumed command of the Allied forces. Shortly afterwards a K.A.R. battalion was sent to Mozambique, whence it advanced to support the Portuguese force round Nampula, south of Colonel Rose's column.

Colonel Rose had in January pushed his advanced troops to Pamune, 50 miles south-west of Port Amelia, and had occupied Meza, whence, in February, they reached to within 30 miles of Medo. The Port Amelia force was now strengthened and formed into two columns under General Edwards, with Colonels Rose and Giffard as column commanders. At Medo an enemy force of six companies held a strong position on Chirimba Hill, a rocky ridge over

a mile long. Here, on April 12, there was a hot engagement, the Germans counter-attacking Colonel Giffard, who was endeavouring to turn their position. For four hours the fighting was heavy and close, and casualties were serious on both sides, but all the attacks were repulsed. On the approach of Rose, who had taken Medo, the enemy broke off the fight and succeeded in getting away.

On April 17 the enemy was found in an entrenched position some 18 miles west of Medo, and fighting continued all day, the enemy retiring during the night. The country was exceedingly difficult, the jungle being so thick that roads were mere tunnels through bamboo thickets and elephant grass, while long stretches of track appeared more suitable for boats than for motor transport. Successive positions flanking the road had to be cleared, and progress was slow.

Both General Edwards and General Northey were now closing on Nanungu. Mahua, south-west of Nanungu, had been taken by Northey's troops on April 5. On the 9th a detachment of the 2nd/1st K.A.R.'s, under Captain Debenham, accomplished a smart piece of work, completely dispersing an enemy company and capturing both its machine-guns.

On May 4 Colonel Barton (3rd/1st K.A.R. and half 2nd/1st K.A.R.) engaged an enemy company about five hours west of Nanungu. The enemy were dispersed and retired eastwards. Colonel Barton pursued, and, on May 5 his leading company surprised and most pluckily attacked a large enemy camp west of Nanungu. The enemy [who were commanded by von Lettow in person] immediately counter-attacked vigorously, with a force of from four to five companies. Sharp fighting at close quarters lasted throughout the whole day, the enemy finally withdrawing under cover of night, over 30 Germans and 100 askaris having been killed and wounded in this engagement. Colonel Barton was also wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Griffiths took over command of his column.

Forces were sent north to Msalu to prevent the Germans breaking back, and their main body was forced to Korewa, 24 miles south-west of Nanungu, and east of Mahua. Here, on May 23, severe fighting took place among rocky hills and thick bush. Colonels Giffard and Griffiths attacked the enemy, who was roughly handled, losing 11 whites and 49 askari (killed or captured), besides several hundred porters, a field and a machine-gun, stores of ammunition and the complete baggage of four companies. A few days later an enemy hospital, with 93 patients (15 of them whites) fell into the hands of the British.* Von Lettow now made his way south, and by the last day of May he was on the Lurio river, near Vatiwa. Thence

* When inconveniently hampered by sick and wounded von Lettow simply left them behind for the British to pick up, "a considerable advantage to the enemy," said General van Deventer.

through extremely difficult country, "where rugged heights rise in almost every direction out of a sea of almost impenetrable bush," he continued south through the Namule region by Malema to Ille. He was pursued from the north, a combined British-Portuguese column advanced from the Mozambique direction, and other dispositions were made to overtake him. They failed, and "so rapid had been the enemy's movements that he captured valuable stores and supplies [in his march on Ille] which the Portuguese had not been able to remove in time." During June General Edwards moved his base from Port Amolia to Mozambique, while, towards the end of the month, General Northey left, having been appointed Governor of British East Africa. Colonel Hawthorn, with the rank of Brigadier-General, took over Northey's command.

Meanwhile von Lettow had reached the coastal area in the region of Quelimane, and was gaily raiding some of the richest *prazas* the Portuguese possessed in East Africa. The whereabouts of his main force was unknown, and it was necessary to guard Quelimane itself, where British and Portuguese marines were landed. For further protection a mixed British and Portuguese force, under Major Gore-Brown, was sent to Nhamacurra, 25 miles north-east of Quelimane, and the terminus of a tramway line running from the port towards the Licungo river. It guarded a rich sugar factory.

Reliable information was extremely hard to obtain as the enemy had suborned many of the native chiefs and headmen by lavish presents of cloth and other goods captured by them between Alto Molecue and Lugella. Thus the enemy not only denied information to us, but was able to depend on early and accurate news of our movements. The same difficulty was experienced by us during the whole time that the enemy was in the coastal zone. Our columns were doing everything possible to get to grips with the enemy but were frequently led astray by false reports. . . . They were occasionally completely out of touch with their headquarters, and with one another, as the rapidity of their movements made it impossible for cable parties to keep up with them and pack wireless has a very small and uncertain range in thick bush. The difficulties of concerted action, always great in bush country, were thus very greatly enhanced.

On the afternoon of July 1 a sudden attack was made on the Western sector of Nhamacurra by three enemy companies. The enemy had undoubtedly received accurate information about the position, as the attack was pushed straight in between the Portuguese Western flank and the river. The garrison of about 500 native troops was surprised; and, though the Portuguese officers and N.C.O.'s fought bravely, the whole of this sector of the defence, including two quick-firing guns (one rendered useless), was in the enemy's hands within a very short time. The enemy consolidated his position, and the Portuguese garrison of the centre sector retired

by order to the British position on the east, which was now held by about 300 K.A.R. The enemy attacked on July 2 and again on the 3rd, but was repulsed. At 3 p.m. on the 3rd, however, fire was opened from one of the captured guns, seconded by a large number of Maxims, under cover of which a determined assault was pushed in, which carried the defences on the north-east face. The garrison then retired, maintaining good order, until they found themselves penned in an angle of the river, when a considerable number were drowned in crossing. (Van Deventer.)

Von Lettow was not able to take full advan-

the Ligonha and Mehuli rivers, and was raiding in every direction." The whole of this district was practically in rebellion, and in return for lavish presents from plundered Portuguese stores the natives gave the enemy every help in food and guides, while the attraction of loot was very strong for the German askari. However, they could not stay long in these sea-board areas, for British columns were drawing



CARRYING THE SICK.

tage of his success, in view of the approach of several British columns. An attempt to pin the enemy between Nhamacurra and the sea failed owing to false information given by natives. The Germans retired, parallel to the coast, crossed the Melela river on July 13 and attacked and overpowered a small British garrison of about 100 men covering road-making parties. The garrison held out for two days, most of the defenders being killed or wounded. By the beginning of August von Lettow, going towards Mozambique, "had established himself near Chalaua, in the rich country lying between

near. These columns closed in, but only to find an evacuated camp. Von Lettow was then marching west to Ille, though with many twistings to evade his pursuers. On August 30 his main body, which had turned north, encountered part of General Hawthorn's force; after severe fighting it was driven back, and next day the Germans were in turn attacked at Lioma, in the Malema district.

It was hoped that the enemy might have been cornered, but the rugged country and thick bush made operations very difficult, and he finally broke away to the northward. In the two days' fighting the enemy lost 17 whites killed and 11 captured, while several more were

known to have been wounded. His known loss in askari was about 200. Nearly 100,000 rounds of ammunition, much baggage and stores, and a small hospital fell into our hands.*

Attempts to head off the enemy were made, and on September 6 he was severely mauled, while in the Upper Lurio valley. He was not, however, cornered, and for the next two months appears to have completely outdistanced his pursuers. Covering over 200 miles in three weeks, at the end of September he succeeded in recrossing the Rovuma towards the Nyasaland side. He then made towards Songea, but was turned aside by a detachment of Northern Rhodesia Police. Von Lettow next marched north parallel to Lake Nyasa. Preparations were made to bar his progress, and besides other measures adopted a force was dispatched from Nyasaland. But two steamers conveying troops to the north end of Lake Nyasa broke down, and the force did not arrive in time to intercept the enemy. Von Lettow was expected to make towards the Tabora region, where most of his askari had been recruited. Foreseeing that in that direction he would find the British in strength he, however, turned north-west, entered Northern Rhodesia, and on November 2 attacked the garrison of Fife. Repulsed, he now turned fairly west, as if making for the Cape to Cairo railway, in the neighbourhood of the Broken Hill mine. He did much damage as he went, and on November 11, the day the Armistice was signed in France,

* The known German casualties since they crossed the Rovuma on November 25, 1917, to this date, September 1, 1918, were 140 white and 1,100 askari.

was on the Chambezi river (the most distant head stream of the Congo), 50 miles within the British border, and near Kasama, one of the chief stations in Northern Rhodesia. There was a good deal of criticism in South Africa that it should have been possible for the enemy not only to return to German East Africa but to penetrate with such impunity into Rhodesia. Nor was there evidence that von Lettow was yet at the end of his resources.

News of the armistice reached the enemy on the 12th, and, somewhat to the general surprise, von Lettow at once complied with its terms, tendering his submission on November 14 to Mr. H. C. Cread, the magistrate at Kasama, and throwing on him the burden of feeding his force. The formal surrender was made to General Edwards at Abercorn, near the south end of Lake Tanganyika, on November 25, and was a ceremonious affair. His askari having been drawn up in a hollow square, von Lettow, after saluting the British flag, took out a pocket-book and read from it in German his formal statement of surrender. Having repeated his statement in English, he called upon his troops to lay down their arms. The force surrendering included Dr. Schnee and Major Krant. It numbered 30 officers, 125 other Europeans, 1,165 askari, 1,516 porters, 482 Portuguese natives, 282 followers, 13 headmen and 819 women, with one field gun, 24 Maxims, and 14 Lewis guns. General Edwards formally accepted the surrender in the name of King George. The German flag had disappeared from Africa.



CHAPTER CCLXXVII.

SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE : JULY, 1918.


MINOR OPERATIONS AT END OF JUNE, 1918—AMERICANS AND AUSTRALIANS—SUCCESS OF THE TANKS—THE STRATEGIC SITUATION—GERMANS ATTACK EAST AND WEST OF REIMS, JULY 15—COMPLETE FAILURE IN EAST—GERMANS CROSS THE MARNE—END OF GERMAN ADVANCE, JULY 17—GERMAN COMMENT—JULY 18: FOCH STRIKES BETWEEN SOISSONS AND THE MARNE—GREAT ALLIED SUCCESS—THE GERMAN RETREAT CONTINUES—FIGHTING IN THE AIR—RAIDS INTO GERMANY—OPERATIONS ON OTHER SECTORS—THE TURN OF THE TIDE.

AFTER the events described in Chapter CCLXXIII. there was an interval of comparative rest on the Western front. The German movements appeared to be held up for a time and counter-efforts were executed by the Allies against them on a somewhat larger scale.

On June 28 the 5th Division under Major-General R. B. Stephens and the 31st Division commanded by Major-General J. Campbell, which occupied the ground between Vieux Berquin and Merville, with the little stream known as the Plate Becque about 1,500 yards in front of it covering the approach to the Nieppe Forest, attacked the Germans along a line of a little less than four miles eastward from the Forest. The troops attacked were commanded by General von Bernhardt and comprised the XV. Corps. They held a line west of the Estaires-Cassel Road. The object of the movement was to push back the Germans and occupy the line of this stream, which gave a better position to the defences protecting Hazebrouck in advance of the wooded ground which was constantly being shelled with gas; Hazebrouck, it will be remembered, was only about five miles in rear of this line. The assault was undertaken

without preliminary bombardment and was successful from the first onset. The hamlets of L'Épinette, Verte Rue and La Becque were taken. The enemy's trenches were cleared without difficulty by our troops, consisting of units from Yorkshire, Lancashire and the Northern Counties, with some southern English units coöperating. Prisoners were taken to the number of 450, including 9 officers, also 30 machine-guns and two field guns. The prisoners comprised Saxons from the 32nd Division and Prussians from the 44th. It was a successful action of considerable value, and a complete surprise to the enemy.

At the same time the Australian 1st Division captured some hostile posts west of Merris, just to the north of Vieux Berquin, taking 43 prisoners, 9 machine-guns and 2 trench-mortars. It was a curious little affair. A patrol of South Australians in No Man's Land about 6 o'clock noticed that the enemy in front of them had a distinct disinclination to fight. They therefore rushed the enemy post and captured the whole garrison. Some of the prisoners then pointed out the position of the next post, whereupon another Australian patrol captured that also! The operation was repeated, and thus in this impromptu fashion four or five other



Line July 18. shown thus - - - - -

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE.

(H 1064)

enemy posts were taken possession of one after the other, and the position was consolidated by the capture of a strong dug-out position a little to the south of those already taken. This advanced our line west of Merris for 300 yards or more, on a front of half a mile, with hardly any loss to our men. The enemy made no attempt to recapture this ground until June 30, and was then repulsed with loss.

On June 29 the French made a surprise attack on the German positions between Amblény and the north side of the forest of Villers-Cotteret, which was completely successful. The advance, on a front of five miles, was begun without any special preliminary bombardment; there was merely the ordinary interchange of artillery fire. It was covered by a strong barrage. The object of the attack was to win the eastern side of the ravine through which a small stream runs past Laversine and Amblény to the Aisne. This ravine had steep banks, the eastern of which overlooked to some extent the French positions back to Mortefontaine, especially from the high plateau near Dommiers. Moreover, the quarries on the sides of the ravine afforded good shelter for German troops close up to the French lines in positions which it was impossible to reach by artillery fire. At Laversine the Germans held a post on the western side which was a good centre for observation and for patrols. The attack was directed up the gully between Laversine and Cutry and also against the high ground between Cutry and Dommiers, the troops being directed round the flanks. It was greatly aided by the action of the new light French tanks and was very successful, the German lines being penetrated to a depth of over a mile. Finally the French established themselves along the ground which ran from Fosse-en-Haut, a mile to the north of Laversine by Cutry, Hill 162 and back by St. Pierre-Aigle to Montgobert, thus transforming the re-entrant form of the trenches to a blunt salient penetrating the German lines. Over 1,300 prisoners were taken, of whom 20 were officers. The result was a great improvement of the French position, as it gave them a strong situation in the German lines, outflanking any attack to the north of it and also against the eastern side of the forest.

The same date marked an advance by the French on the south of the Ourcq between La Ferté-Milon and Passy-en-Valois; they gained ground to the extent of half a mile on a

front of rather over a mile and captured 275 prisoners.

On July 1 the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd American Division seized the village of Vaux, supported by the 4th Brigade, just west of Château-Thierry on the road to Paris. On the other side of the road they took La Roche Wood, close to the village. On this occasion the French acted on the right of the Americans. The action was thoroughly successful, the whole of the points desired being taken.

On July 3, as the result of small local operations near Autrechtes and Moulin-sous-Touvent,



DUG-OUT IN A QUARRY ON THE MARNE.

the French considerably improved their position, biting into the German lines for about half a mile on a front of nearly two miles, taking 457 prisoners and 30 machine-guns. The enemy's works here had been under the usual artillery fire the three previous days, but the intensive artillery fire was only begun at 7.25 a.m. after the guns had been silent for an hour to lull the enemy. It lasted for two minutes and then the French infantry went forward covered by a barrage. In 10 minutes the first line of German trenches, some 500 yards away, was reached, and an engineer company which had accompanied the attacking troops, who were mostly Bretons, began to join up the old with the new position by a communication trench. By half-past eight the French



[French official photograph.]

LA FERTÉ MILON: REGULATING TRAFFIC ON ONE OF THE BRIDGES.

were thoroughly established, and when, three-quarters of an hour later, the Germans made a counter-attack, it was completely defeated before it could get up to the new line. In one dug-out the French captured the whole Staff of a German battalion, together with the telegraph, telephone and ambulance sections.

The Americans marked Independence Day (July 4) by aiding the Australians in a considerable success on the south side of the Somme. The American contingent consisted of four companies from their 33rd Division. The combined forces captured ground a mile and a half deep, including the village of Hamel and Vaire Wood, and took over 1,500 prisoners, more than 100 machine-guns, some 20 trench mortars and an anti-tank field-gun. The Germans also lost heavily in killed and wounded, while the total casualties on our side were under 500. The attack commenced shortly after 3 a.m. under favourable atmospheric conditions. The Australians, as we know, had been gradually progressing forward north of the Somme towards Morlancourt and had already recaptured ground to the extent of about 3 miles in front of the point to which we had fallen back at the end of March. On the south side of the river also considerable progress had been made beyond Vaire, and the object of the operation now being described was to straighten out the line on the north

and south sides of the river. Before the attack commenced the German lines were subjected to intensive fire over a much wider front than that which was actually assaulted by the infantry, and the Germans appear to have been completely surprised by the movement. Sixty tanks accompanied the advancing infantry, which was also covered by a smoke screen and the usual barrage, while in the air pilots flew over the ground to be attacked and dropped bombs on many important points. One thing which added to the surprise of the movement was that the German trenches in this part of the field had been recently treated to a considerable bombardment of gas shells, and as this was continued during the artillery preparation, the Germans appear to have thought that nothing more was intended. At any rate, when our men reached the enemy's lines, they found the Germans wearing their gas masks and not expecting an infantry attack. Our guns practically held the enemy batteries, and consequently our men suffered but little from them.

The efficacy of our artillery fire may be judged from the fact that, when the Germans commenced to put down their barrage, it fell on our first line trenches, which were then practically empty, our men having by that time reached those of the enemy; they had been so dominated by our fire as not to have noticed

our infantry advance. The main attack was four miles long, and on the north and south of it small raiding operations were also carried out; thus on the Villers-Bretonneux road a successful raid took 60 prisoners and killed many Germans. Other similar expeditions at Ville-sur-Ancre and another below Morlancourt were also successful; the former had a special object, viz., the capture of a point which made a material improvement in our line. This was successfully taken and held.

The American troops that took part in this action were new to the work, but all behaved with great gallantry. They appear to have been engaged more especially round Hamel and Vaire. There is no doubt that the success of the operation was very largely due to the able and efficient manner in which the tanks were handled. All succeeded in going over the German lines except five, and of those only one was sufficiently injured to be put out of action, being struck by a shell. When the fighting was over, they were of great utility in bringing back the wounded. As usual the front line of the Germans consisted practically of machine-gun nests only, and it was against these defences that the tanks were so useful. Moving up and down behind our barrage

they shot down the garrisons or crushed them and their weapons into the earth. Some few of the German gunners took refuge in their dug-outs, where they were trapped and compelled to give themselves up to our infantry. In one case a tank which was 200 yards in advance of the infantry disposed of a nest of six machine-guns which refused to surrender. The tank went over them like a roller, crushing all the guns and most of the crews, and shooting down others who tried to escape. Another nest of four was similarly disposed of, three being snuffed out in the first attack; then turning round on the fourth, which still kept in action, the tank passed over gun and crew alike. Many more instances might be given of this use of the weapon. On one occasion a tank destroyed a post of five machine-guns; the crews then went out, took the weapons into the tank and brought them back.

Against a point whence a good deal of fire had been coming a tank went forward to locate the exact position. It was an irregular hummock on the top of a low rise of ground, and round this the tank went. It had no sooner got behind it than some 40 Germans sprang up with their hands in the air and ran back as hard



[American official photograph.]

GERMAN PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS AT VAUX.

Marching to a prison camp under French escort.

as they could away from the tank to surrender to the infantry behind.

There were one or two points where tanks could not be used, and here the attack was carried out by infantry fire and bombing



[Australian official photograph

**AUSTRALIAN INFANTRYMAN WITH
FIELD KIT.**

When the position had been captured, the tanks patrolled the front, keeping down the German machine-gun fire. From a cornfield a considerable amount of sniping took place from men whose position could not be exactly located, and against them a tank went forward; as soon as it got near, German infantry were seen bobbing up in all directions, bolting back; many of them were shot down as they went. One of these little incidents was extremely

typical of German ways. An officer, after having surrendered, shot an American sergeant in cold blood with his pistol; neither this officer nor other Germans who came across the Americans in this part of the field failed to suffer for this dastardly conduct.

There were small counter-attacks, but no serious effort to regain the position the Allies had captured, and on July 6 the Australians advanced once more and pushed their line another 400 yards forward to the south of Hamel and east of Vaire Wood over a front of a mile. The bold capture of this wood and the ground beyond it was a great advantage, as it commanded the ground which sloped down thence towards Warfusée. On the edge of the eastern slope there was another wood, about 250 yards wide from east to west and some 1,300 yards long from north to south. In this there was a German machine-gun post which gave some trouble to our men after they had captured Vaire Wood. It was disposed of in a very gallant manner. One man crept cautiously forward, and so imposed upon the garrison with his rifle and bombs that 12 privates and one officer surrendered to him and were brought back to our front line. In Hamel itself there were several dug-outs, and these were dealt with one after the other until all surrendered. Finally, under some considerable machine-gun fire an Australian officer climbed to the top of the most prominent ruin in the village and planted there the French tricolour.

In all these operations the British and French aviators played a prominent part; besides doing their ordinary work of observation and distant bombing, they accompanied the troops in their advance, dropped many tons of bombs on the enemy, exploded his ammunition dumps, and constantly brought machine-gun fire to bear on his troops. Our superiority was shown by the fact that we accounted for 21 German aeroplanes and one observation balloon against only four of our own machines missing. This intimate co-relation between the air and the land services had now become a matter of routine.

During the month of June we had put out of action 1,235 of the enemy's aeroplanes.

On the night of July 7-8 the Australians again advanced their line slightly, capturing several prisoners. Farther north our troops also raided the German lines south of the La Bassée Canal and also east of Hazebrouck. The

result of the Australian advance was to cause great artillery activity on the part of the Germans, but their efforts were limited to gun-fire.

The French south of the Aisne and east of Villers-Cotterets attacked on a front of two miles and took some 370 prisoners. During the day the French also attacked the enemy's positions south of the Aisne in front of the Retz Forest, north-west of Longpont, on a front of two miles. They made good for about three-quarters of a mile, and captured Chavigny, and the ground north and south of that point, taking 346 prisoners.

On the next day the French made a further advance between Montdidier and the Oise. The attack was begun at 3.30 a.m. on a front of two and a half miles to the west of Anthenil. Tanks supported the infantry attack, which carried the line forward a little over a mile, capturing the Porte Ferme and the Ferme des Loges—the Germans themselves admit this success—with 530 prisoners and 30 machine-guns. The position was held in spite of counter-efforts by the enemy. The Germans also attacked in the region of Chavigny Farm, but were driven off. There seems to have been on this day more or less activity along the whole line of the Western Front, but nothing

of any moment except what has just been noted.

On July 9 the German artillery fire in the neighbourhood of Villers-Bretonneux was more intense than usual, and it was followed by some local attacks, but all of these were driven off. We also had a successful little raid in the neighbourhood of Merris in the northern section, where, in addition to some prisoners, we captured nine machine-guns and two trench mortars.

The small attacks by which the Allies consistently and constantly gained ground continued. On July 10 the French captured the village of Corey north of the Oureq and took 50 prisoners. The next day, once more near Merris, the 1st Australian Division gained a considerable advantage. It was of a very interesting character, extended over a front of more than 2,000 yards, and succeeded in carrying our line to within 500 yards of Merris. At first only one small patrol of ours was concerned, but it succeeded in rounding up between 30 and 40 prisoners. The enemy's line, which our men attacked, formed an awkward salient projecting into our lines, and consisted of a chain of fortified posts, but with no connected regular line immediately behind them. These seem to have been dealt with in detail, a few being



ENTRAINING FRENCH TANKS.

[French official photograph.]

captured, which involved the loss of others, and so the successes spread along the line, our original force being joined by other patrols from the 1st Australian and also the British 33rd Division. The process was continued the next day. The net result of these small operations, which were conducted in broad daylight, without any special artillery assistance, resulted in the capture of 223 prisoners and 15 machine-guns and gave us a new line of posts well in advance of our former line.

considerably strengthened their position against a further German advance against Amiens. On July 14 the British line in the north was advanced east of Dickebusch Lake over a front of 2,000 yards near Ridge Wood, and 300 prisoners were captured.

On the night of July 17/18, Australian troops made a successful advance in the neighbourhood of Villers-Bretonneux, two miles south of the Somme. They made good on a distance of some 600 yards on a front of over



LOADING "BUNTY."

[Official photograph.]

The French pressure against the German lines in front of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets was also continued. On July 12 the village of Longpont, south-west of Soissons, and Javage Farm, north-east of Faveroles, were taken. In the evening the French made a still more important gain south-east of Amiens and immediately west of the Avre. The front of attack measured three miles between Castel and north of Mailly Raineval. The village of Castel was captured, also Anchin Farm, and several strongly organized posts were captured. A considerable irruption into the enemy's lines was completed and in some points a depth of over 2,000 yards reached, in addition to which 500 prisoners were taken. This was an important rectification of the Allied line which

a mile, capturing one officer, thirty-three men, some machine-guns, and two field guns.

To the south-west of Arras, at Hébuterne, we also made a successful raid to the south of the village and drove off a hostile raiding party south of Bucquoy. During July 18 Yorkshire troops made a successful raid in the afternoon south-east of Robecq. The operation was carried on with very little resistance from the enemy. On the same date the Germans shelled the neighbourhood of Ypres and the hills towards Kemmel with considerable vigour. Prisoners taken from the enemy at this time showed great interest in the fighting on the Marne, and stated that the battle was meant to end the war. On the next night the Germans attempted to raid in the Villers-Bretonneux

and Morlancourt regions, but in each case they were driven off. On the other hand, our troops made successful attacks in the neighbourhood of Buequoy, Willerval and Loere and captured some prisoners.

July 19 saw a successful operation carried out by the 9th Division under Major-General H. H. Tudor near Bailleul. It was directed against Meteren which stood on high ground close to the British line, and it was therefore desirable to deprive the Germans of it. This

posed of Scottish troops, with whom were South Africans, the Australians also advanced and extended the success to a front of about 4,000 yards, including a group of buildings to the south-west of Meteren. Except on the left of the attack the enemy offered but little resistance, and our objectives were quickly gained and over 350 prisoners taken, with 10 trench mortars and 50 machine-guns. Numerous raids were also undertaken which gained us slight advantages, and wo



Official photograph.

"BUNTY" SPEAKS.

village had, indeed, seen a good deal of fighting; both sides striving to capture and hold it. The Germans gained a footing there on the morning of July 16, but in the evening we counter-attacked and drove back the enemy; however, it would seem that our line was still kept to the west of this point, and it was not until the operation about to be described was successful that the village was taken and held. It straightened out our line and diminished the sharpness of the salient about Bailleul. The combat was sharp but decisive, and our troops carried the line forward to an extreme depth of 1,300 yards on a front of about two miles. They captured the village of Meteren, taking over 300 prisoners, with a number of machine-guns. On the right of the 9th Division, com-

pleted a busy week by a raid upon the enemy's positions in Aveluy Wood on July 20, in the course of which they destroyed several dug-outs and strong points.

The operations in the Meteren region were completed by the capture of Merris on the night of July 28/29 by the 1st Australian Division, which greatly improved and strengthened our line.

English troops pushed forward on a front of about a mile, south of Hébuterne, on the 19th, and the operation was continued the next day (July 20). The enemy was also compelled to withdraw from the Rossignol Wood between Hébuterne and Buequoy. This advance considerably improved our position. There was again a little fighting during the night of July 20

south-west of La Bassée and in the Merville and Dickebusch segments.

The aggregate result of all these small affairs was to improve our front considerably. Incidentally they showed that our troops were superior to the Germans in hand-to-hand fighting.

With the exception of these minor operations, the front had been without German enterprise for nearly a month, and what energy was displayed was entirely on the side of the Allies, but it was known that concentrations were taking place which pointed to a further effort as soon as circumstances were favourable to the enemy. The weather at this time was bad, and that possibly postponed his attack. It is said also that the ravages of influenza had something to do with the delay. It was ascertained at the beginning of July that the group of reserve divisions about Douai and Valenciennes was still intact, but there were also indications which led the French General Headquarters to believe that a further attack would be made in strength east and west of Reims, and might even be continued still farther to the east, thus involving a wide length of the French positions. The object of an advance in

this direction was plainly to intercept the main line of communications between Nancy and Paris by Vitry. Were it successful, it would much facilitate the advance by Château-Thierry on Paris, and would cut the eastern French forces, from Verdun to Nancy and downwards, from those which were facing directly north.

Moreover, if the attack were extended to the Argonne, as at one time seemed probable, and if it were possible to push down to Vitry-le-François, Lorraine would have been cut off; while if the attack could have been pushed down east of the Argonne to the salient of St. Mihiel, Verdun would have been isolated. It is evident, therefore, that such an attack offered great possibilities.

It was really a reversion to the same strategical plan that had dictated the double attempt to turn the Allied flanks in 1914, both on the left and on the right. The latter has been alluded to recently in Chapter CCLIV, pp. 207-8. The attacks on Verdun were all made in pursuance of this idea, and just as the far wider effort of the early part of the war had been narrowed down to an attack on Verdun, now this was still more to be shortened by the attempt to advance from Reims. Huge as were



[French official photograph.]

A BATTERY OF 75mm. GUNS ON THE MARNE.



REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVING BETWEEN DORMANS AND REIMS, HEADED BY PIPERS.

the German forces employed in the war, their grandiose plan of campaign had always been in excess of their available strength, and they had come down to much more concentrated and less ambitious efforts than those which had formed the general idea of the 1914 offensive.

In no one of the four attacks which he had undertaken had Ludendorff been really successful. The advance on Amiens had been held up. He had managed to widen the wedge he had then made to the south of the Oise, and he had added on to this by the offensive on the western side of Reims to Soissons, but the whole of this advance was indeterminate, and, although offering possibilities, had nothing decisive about it. In the north, too, the German advance had been definitely held, and an advance in this direction offered but little prospect of any striking success. It was natural, therefore, that any further attempt should be made more in connexion with the bigger irruption in the neighbourhood of Amiens, an extension of which offered greater possibilities of a striking result.

Marshal Foch thoroughly understood this, and his view was confirmed by the knowledge that the Germans were concentrating in great strength round Reims. At the beginning of July, to meet the coming attack, he transferred the whole of the French forces, amounting to eight divisions, from Flanders to the south, to the threatened French front. He also asked Sir Douglas Haig for four British divisions, two

to be placed in areas south of the Somme and two in position astride that river, to ensure the connexion between the French and British Armies about Amiens, and to enable him to remove four more French divisions from this portion of the theatre of war to a more eastward position to strengthen the French right flank. Sir Douglas Haig agreed to this proposal. Thus, in addition to the troops he had already in reserve, Foch had now available 12 further divisions to meet the coming attack.

On July 14, he requested that the four British divisions might be placed unreservedly at his disposition, and that four others might be detailed to take their place. This request was also agreed to, and the XXII. Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, consisting of the 15th, 34th, 51st and 62nd British Divisions, was accordingly sent down to the French front. The Allies were then prepared to meet the German offensive in the neighbourhood of Reims.

On July 7, General Gouraud, whose troops were stationed on the eastern side of the town, issued the following order:—

“To the French and American soldiers of the Fourth Army. We may be attacked at any moment. You must all feel that never was a defensive battle entered on under more favourable conditions. We are warned and we are ready. We have been powerfully reinforced in infantry and artillery.”

"You will fight on ground which your leaders have made into a redoubtable fortress, which will be unconquerable if the approaches are well held. The enemy's bombardment will be terrible, but you will sustain it without yielding. The attack will be vigorous, through a cloud of smoke, dust and gas, but your position and your arms are formidable.

"In your breasts beat the strong and brave hearts of free men. There must be no thought of recoiling. You must be animated but, by one thought—kill as many of them as you can until they have had enough of it. Feeling you will do so, your General tells you that you will crush the assault and that it will be a great day when you do it."

It was a prophetic utterance, and it is a proof that, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, the whole Army felt the confidence due to adequate preparations to meet the situation.

On July 15, the expected attack was begun



GENERAL VON MUDRA.

Commanded a German Army operating east of Reims.

both on the east and west of Reims. The attack was made on a front of 50 miles, and was divided into two parts by the town of Reims, which the assault of June 18 had failed to take.

South and east of Reims was the forest-covered height known as the Montagne de Reims, difficult to take, but south of it the country down towards the camp of Châlons was for the most part flat, and the Suippe and the Vesle were the only natural defences north of the Marne. The defects of the ground had

been made good by elaborate defensive preparations and it had been turned into a veritable fortress with lines of great depth so that to break through them all would have been a costly undertaking and one which would have required great time. Moreover, it must be



GENERAL VON EINEM.

Commanded the German Third Army.

remembered that so long as the Montagne de Reims was uncaptured it formed a dangerous position on the flank of any German irruption on one or other side of the town.

The First German Army under General von Boehn operated on the west of Reims, while on the east, the German Third Army, under General von Einem, formerly Prussian Minister of War, was strengthened by a new army under General von Mudra, consisting of troops brought up from Lorraine, and the whole force was nominally (though of course not really) under the command of the German Crown Prince.

The Allied troops opposed to these forces were the Fourth Army east of Reims, under General Gouraud, immediately south and south-west of the town to the Marne, the Fifth Army under General Berthelot, and the Seventh Army, commanded by General de Mitry, which extended the line from Venteuil to Fossoy. With this force was the 3rd American Division between Fossoy and Château-Thierry, while English and Italian troops were near the Ardre river. North of the American troops about Château-Thierry was Degoutte's army up to the Oureq, and north

of it in front of the Retz Forest was Mangin with the Tenth Army. General Pétain was in general command of the whole front.

Mangin, who appeared for the second time in this part of the country, had been criticized for his conduct in the April offensive of 1917,



GENERAL DEGOUTTE.

Commanded the French Army between Marne and Ourcq.

but the result of the enquiry exonerated him, and General Foch appointed him to the command of the army he now held. Like General Gouraud, he had had considerable experience in Colonial warfare; he was appointed to the command of a brigade in 1913 and at the outbreak of war he was at the head of the 8th Brigade in the region of Dinant. During the first battle of the Marne he commanded a division and greatly contributed by his personal efforts to the success of the fighting. At the end of March, 1916, he was at Verdun, and recaptured Douaumont and afterwards Vaux.

The Allied plan of defence was to hold their defence line, in accordance with their latest practice, by a series of small infantry groups armed with machine-guns, and it was expected that these should give notice to the defences farther back the moment the real infantry attack of the Germans commenced. These posts formed indeed a series of forlorn hopes, and the men who occupied them knew it. But

at no point along the whole line did they fail in their desperate task. Behind these posts, and separated from them by a cleared space, there were a number of strong points powerfully armed and protected by strong zones of barbed wire. It was the duty of these defences to hold and break up the assaulting waves of the enemy. Throughout the period of waiting constant little pin-pricks of raids had been carried on against the German lines to prevent them localizing the defensive distributions, while at the same time every necessary step had been taken to strengthen the position. Ranges had been measured with the greatest care and with a minimum expenditure of shell-fire so as not to attract attention.

German troops had been brought up in large numbers and on July 13 there was a large in-



GENERAL MANGIN.

Commanded the Tenth French Army.

crease of traffic on the narrow ways from the Suippe towards Epoye. The roads to the north from the Suippe were also full of wagons marching from the north towards the south, and on the morning of July 14 these were seen returning, which showed that the previous night there had been a large provision of ammunition taken up. The aviators had constantly brought in news of the German concentration. The numerous little raids had taught the soldiers

that this was occurring. As early as July 6 it became plain that the attack was about to commence. On July 10 it was known that it would take place on July 14 or 15, and that the front would affect the Fourth Army from



[French official photograph.]

PHOTOGRAPHING THE ENEMY'S POSITIONS FROM A TRENCH.

Mont Téton to the east. The evidence went on accumulating during July 11, 12 and 13. On July 14 a raid, successfully carried out, showed that it was only a question of hours, and it was known that the artillery preparation would commence at 12.10 a.m., and at 4.15 a.m. the infantry would move to the assault, covered by a moving barrage.

The front line of the German attack consisted of some 15 divisions with 10 others in support. These, it is true, over-ran the advanced defences, but made very little further progress and never reached the French main line, which ran from Prunay in front of Prosnès-Souain-Perthes and Massiges, where it joined the French line as it was before the attack of June 9.

So certain was General Gouraud of the impending attack that at 11 p.m. on July 14 he ordered the commencement of the counter-battery fire—*i.e.*, 70 minutes before the German artillery preparation commenced. Except for the artillery, the French troops sat quiet in their positions of readiness. As soon as the first lines of German infantry were seen to be

coming on rockets were sent up from the French advanced posts notifying that the attack had commenced, and the artillery barrage was at once put down against the attack. All went like clockwork. The resistance put up by the French advanced posts was an extremely tenacious one. As happens on all such occasions, posts were surrounded here and there, but still went on fighting. This front line held up the Germans for at least three hours, and even then, when parties of them tried to slip through the intervals, many still held on, fighting desperately. One instance may be quoted as showing an interesting development. A post kept up its resistance till six in the evening, when it appears to have been relieved, and it was able all the time to send back information by means of wireless telephony, giving most important information as to the progress of the battle. Eventually, when their ammunition was exhausted, the men were relieved and made their way back through to the French line behind. But although the enemy had these few successes, on the whole they made no great progress. It is curious to note that, in accordance with the usual practice of a distinct time-table laying down exactly what the artillery was to do, the German gun-fire was directed totally without regard to the progress made by the infantry; thus, the second line of infantry came on though the first had not done its task, and behind them advanced artillery batteries and ammunition columns. These were all seen by the French artillery, for the day was fine, and they suffered terribly. The hecatombs of slain, the mounds of dismounted guns and destroyed wagons, bore terrible testimony to the fire of the French artillerymen. There is little doubt that the progress the German front line made over the French advanced posts deceived them as to the amount of resistance they were likely to meet with, but they received a rude awakening when they came across the line of works which formed the real main line of works of the French position.

An amusing story is told with regard to this. An officer commanding five German tanks was writing a report at 5 a.m., which ran as follows: "The five tanks have all crossed the first line of the enemy and are continuing to advance towards the Wardberg, where the enemy has a number of machine-gun nests. I am going to Somme-Suppe to continue the



AN ISOLATED FRENCH MACHINE-GUN POST.

Holding up an enemy attack.

pursuit of the enemy and I shall return immediately." Unfortunately, just as he finished this dispatch, which he was writing on the hill of Tahure, he was captured, and conducted back to the point which he had determined on as his immediate objective, where he was presented to the General Headquarters.

At 7 o'clock, the position was as follows: The French still held their line of strong posts. In the centre the enemy had progressed somewhat beyond it. On the left the pressure was severe between the Marquises Farm and the Maison du Garde. To the south-east of Prunay the

Germans had gained the Roman road which runs from Reims to the Argonne, and the wood; but by noon the attack was dying down. At Prosnes and at Perthes-les-Hurlus they gained a momentary footing, but were at once turned out.

The result of the day's fighting was that on the east of Reims no progress of any moment had been made and the Germans suffered very heavy losses. Nor was their success much greater on the west of the town. The most violent fighting here took place between Dormans and Fossey on a

front of about seven miles. The Germans made many desperate efforts to cross the Marne between these points, especially directing their attacks towards Condé-en-Brie. Strenuous efforts were also made at Château-Thierry, where the Americans held the ground. At 6 a.m. a vigorous attempt was made on Vaux, but it was quickly repelled by the Americans, who captured the German officer in charge of the operations. On the eastern side of Château-Thierry, covered by smoke clouds, the Germans crossed the Marne by means of pontoon bridges at 13 points under the cover of severe artillery fire. The first troops crossed in canvas boats, each of which held about 30 men, and when a footing had been established on the southern bank they proceeded to lay down pontoon bridges. At first the Americans fell back and poured a hail of shell and machine-gun fire, under the effect of which bridges were swept away and boats sunk. The right bank of the river was somewhat higher than the left, and thus the Allied troops had little cover from the ground, and it was found difficult to bring up reserve ammunition, of which a good deal was necessary owing to the enormous expenditure of shells in withstanding the attack. The number of bridges thrown by the enemy was

six in all. Two of these were destroyed by the French bombing squadrons. Low clouds somewhat interfered with their work, but, when they could not see the river itself, they bombed the masses of infantry concentrated in the woods north of Dormans and Fossoy and inflicted heavy casualties. So heavy were the losses that a message taken from one of the enemy's carrier pigeons which fell into our hands described the passage of the river as "worse than hell." However, they did succeed in crossing and drove our advanced posts a little back, but later in the day a counter-attack of the Americans drove them in turn on to the river bank and in many places back over it.

To the south of Dormans the fighting was particularly severe round the villages of Reuilly, Courthiézy, and Vassy, and also north of the river from Chatillon-sur-Marne to Bouilly. Here were stationed some of the Italians fighting with the Allies, and these, with the French immediately on their right on the western slopes of the Montagne-de-Reims, on a front running from Bouilly to Marfaux and then west to Cuchery, to which they had withdrawn from the front line of posts, held firmly to this line.



THE MARKET-PLACE, EPERNAY.

French official photog. aph.

The extreme points reached south of the river were St. Agnan and La Chapelle-Montholon on the road which runs on to Condé, but no further progress was made beyond these points. More to the east, on the north side of the Marne near Châtillon, the enemy got no farther than the forest of Rodemat.

It will thus be seen that west of Reims the advance had produced no great results and was indeed limited to a point in the direction of Condé, and the bridge-head (the river here was about 80 yards broad) thus gained was not extended enough to cover any large number of troops, nor to allow them to deploy from it to capture more ground on the left bank of the river. On the east the success was even smaller, for, with the exception of the capture of the heights round Moronvilliers, that old point of contest, the Germans had gained nothing of moment.

Fourteen German divisions appear to have been engaged on the west side of Reims and about the same number in reserve. Documents captured show that the enemy had meant to reach the line Epernay-Montmirail on the first day, and on the second day Châlons.

The airmen played a considerable part in this battle. They kept up a constant supply of information as to the points at which the enemy were trying to cross the Marne, in spite of the clouds of smoke with which the Germans tried to conceal their movements, and they helped greatly by bombing collections of troops and spraying them with machine-gun fire.

The German report of the fighting does not differ much from that given by our own side. They claim to have taken 13,000 prisoners, but that was a gross exaggeration. Naturally where they overran the advanced machine-gun posts they captured some, but nothing like the number they claim; nor did they take many weapons; east of Reims, General Gouraud's men did not lose a single gun. During the night the fighting was intermittent, and in some places of extraordinary violence, the enemy attempting to push on south of Dormans, but they only succeeded in reaching the southern edge of the forest at Bouquigny, and the French maintained their hold on Mareuil on the high ground behind it.

On the second day of the battle General Gouraud issued the following Order to his Army:—

“During the 15th you have broken the efforts of 15 German divisions, supported by 10 others.

According to their orders they should have reached the Marne by the evening, but you stopped them dead in the position from which we had determined to give battle, and we have gained it. You have the right to be proud, infantry and machine-gunners of the advanced posts, and you aviators, who flew over the



ON THE CHEMIN DES DAMES: A FRENCH TELEPHONE STATION.

enemy, battalions and batteries which have crushed them, and the staff which prepared with such care the field of battle. It is a hard blow for the enemy and a great day for France. I know you will always do the same, every time that the enemy dares to attack you. As a soldier I thank you from my heart.”

On July 16 the fighting was uneventful. The Germans made several attempts but made scarcely any gain. On the eastern side of Reims, five separate attacks were made on Gouraud's army. Between the Vesle and the Suipe, the first assault was delivered at 10 a.m. and a second at 1.15 p.m.; both were repulsed with loss. To the east and the south they attacked three times, and on each occasion were repulsed in disorder. During the morning, after an intensive artillery preparation, an

important attack was made to the south of Maisons-de-Champagne, but only succeeded in getting through the outpost position at a few points. West of Reims the French regained ground in the hills south of Dormans.

The Germans, however, managed to push forward a little farther in the direction of Epernay, reaching the villages of Montvoisin and Chéno-la-Reine, but were driven out by counter-attacks. Later in the day they came



FRENCH AND ITALIAN GUARDS ON A MARNE BRIDGE.

on again and took the first-named point. They also made strenuous efforts to drive back the French from the crest of the hills north of St. Agnan and la Chapelle Monthodon, but made but little progress, the Allied main line being firmly held.

During the night of July 16-17 a German attack towards Beaumont-sur-Vesle, south of Prunay, was beaten back.

On July 17, on a six-mile front towards the Montagne de Reims in the wooded country between Reims and the Marne, the Germans once more attacked, and, after severe fighting, forced their way forward as far as the villages of Nante and Pourey, but from the latter point they were driven back into the Ardre valley by the Italians stationed at this part of the line.

On the whole the day was favourable to the Allies. The German attacks were no longer made in force, and consisted of half-hearted local

attempts. An important point was that they had been unable to bring up their artillery across the river in any strength to aid a further advance, and the guns were still firing from the positions they had held before the attack commenced. It was evident that the offensive spirit of the Germans was dying out. The flood of the German irruption tide had been reached.

The fact that over 50 German divisions should have been used with the usual vigour, not to say recklessness, should have been brought up and their progress stopped in 48 hours, demands some consideration. How was it that on this occasion not even the initial success which had been obtained in March, April, May and June was in any way equalled? The troops were as good; they consisted very largely of the special "storm" organizations, carefully trained and wrought up to a high pitch of enthusiasm; they had been informed that it was the "Peace" assault (*Friedenssturm*). Even the German papers looked on the coming battle as the beginning of the end, if not the end itself. Thus the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of July 14, remarking on the coming battle, said "the only doubt on the subject is whether the necessary strategical preparations have been brought to such a point that the next attack will be the main blow or whether further preparatory battles are necessary for the final success of the campaign." The Kaiser himself had come up to witness the victory (as indeed he had on many previous occasions). Writing from the battlefield north-east of Reims on July 17, the well-known correspondent Karl Rosner reported:

The Kaiser, who desired to participate in the battle from its very beginning, in the midst of his fighting troops, went on the night of July 14 to the region of the impending fighting and spent the night in an advanced observation post. There he listened to the terrible music of our surprise fire attack and watched the unparalleled picture of projectiles raging over the enemy positions. A few minutes after our bombardment, which burst forth at 4.50 a.m., he had in his hands the first reports of the good progress made. From then on till nightfall, denying himself even a moment's rest, he remained with his troops, and again all day to-day he stopped on the battlefield, facing the contested ground, and received the news of the fresh and fine successes on the Marne and to the south-west of Reims.

Let us look at the troops opposed to General Gouraud from Prunay to Massiges. There were the 15th Bavarians, the 3rd Guards, the 26th Division, the Ersatz Division of the Guard, the 199th Division, the 239th Division, the 1st Division, the Dismounted Guard Cavalry Division, the 2nd Bavarian, the 88th, the 7th



[From "Illustrirte Zeitung."]

THE KAISER ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

He is in the act of instructing Hindenburg and Ludendorff where they should attack.
From a painting by Felix Schwormstädt, German official artist.

Division and the 33rd Reserve Division, with others in reserve, amounting to 25 in all. They had not against them in the front line much more than half these numbers, and it was the first line troops only of the French that were engaged. Reserve corps which were ready if needed were not employed, and yet the German troops were so cut up that they were perfectly incapable of going on beyond the line they occupied at the end of the first 24 hours. The French, on the other hand, suffered but little. A number of their advanced posts were overrun. A certain number of men were taken prisoners and a certain number of machine-guns captured, but there was little else to show for the enormous losses the Germans had sustained, and *not one single gun was captured*, showing that they never penetrated any depth into the French position. The real reasons for the failure were that the French positions were scientifically defended, and their troops better handled and more enthusiastic.

Numerous stories are told of the enormous losses sustained—up to 60 per cent. of many of the units. It was not overcrowding which produced these losses, for the front of attack of each division appears to have been from a mile and a half to two miles. Nor were dense formations used, for the units were arranged

in line after line in depth, and all those who led the attack had only been brought on to the front either the night just before the attack or at the most 24 hours earlier. It is quite true that the French fought splendidly, and so did the Americans who were associated with them towards the left flank of Gouraud's army. The plan of attack of the Germans was most carefully thought out. The right flank of the enemy consisted of two groups under Lindequist and Gontard, each having three specially trained divisions in the front line intended to push forward obliquely to the south-west across the Vesle, reach the Marne and envelop Epernay. In conjunction with the Germans operating west of Reims, it would cut off from Dormans the Montagne-de-Reims. In the centre Ilse's group, consisting of the XII. Corps and the I. Bavarian Corps, pushed straight down on Châlons, while on the left, the 88th and 7th Divisions with the 33rd Reserve Division were to move obliquely down on St. Menchould and cut the railway line. Judging from various Orders which were captured, the object of the first day was to reach the south of Verzy, Villers Marmery-Livry-sur-Vesle, Bouy, Vasselay, Cuperly, la Cheppe, Bussy-le-Château-La Croix-en-Champagne, Somme, Bionne, Hans,

Dommartin. The second day Reims, Epernay, Chalons were to be captured. It is plain that the idea was to intercept the remaining straight line of railway to Lorraine and to advance the German line until it straightened out due east from Château-Thierry to Châlons—*i.e.*, to capture the whole of the Marne river line.

The most meticulous arrangements had been made for carrying out the advance. Thus, when various localities were captured, the troops were not to occupy them, but to proceed forward, only guarding the issues, and administrative officers were then to arrange for carrying off the booty captured. No individual pillage was to be permitted. The supply of magazines which was known to exist at Châlons was to be taken over as quickly as possible.

Unfortunately this scheme, carefully organized as it was, failed in the most important point. It did not obtain even the smallest success. In face of the splendid French resistance it failed, and it was the bravery and resolution of our Ally which brought it to nought.

The situation, then, on the evening of July 17 was, that on the east of Reims Gouraud had beaten off the army of von Einem and was holding a line roughly that of the Roman road.

To the west of Reims, General Berthelot, with whom were some Italian troops, had stopped the advance of Mudra (who about this time seems to have replaced von Below) and held a line from Pourcy through the Bois de Courton and the Bois du Roi back to the Marne at Reuil. On his left, on the south side of the Marne, General de Mitry, with his newly formed army, carried on the line to the American troops round Château-Thierry. It will be remembered that in front of the forest of Retz the French held a line from the Aisne in front of Villers-Cotterets (Retz Forest) down to the Marne. From the Aisne to the Oureq was Mangin's army, while Degoutte's army held the line from the Oureq down to Clignon, where he joined on to the Americans, who continued it to Château-Thierry. Thus there was a re-entrant line formed by Gouraud, Berthelot and de Mitry on the south side of the angle, Degoutte and Mangin on the side which ran from it towards the north. Into these pincers the German General Staff had pushed its forces, and they were now about to reap the consequences. No such favourable opportunity had occurred to the French since September, 1914, when Maunoury, on the flank of Kluck's army,



SOME OF THE BOOTY ASSEMBLED AT VILLERS-COTTERETS.



GENERAL GOURAUD.

Commanded the French Fourth Army, to which Americans were attached.

combined with the frontal attack on the Marne, drove back the Germans to the Aisne. The second battle of the Marne, then, reproduced the main feature of the first, and was destined to bring about the same consequences. Foch was ready, and had waited until the situation developed as he hoped. Now he saw his opportunity and proceeded to take full advantage of it. On the night of July 17-18 the orders were issued for the counter-attack.

The German General Staff had of course

understood that an attack might come from the west against their exposed flank, and they had thrown up works which extended from Soissons to the south, but although they had done this, they seem not to have believed that Foch had troops sufficient for any important movement from this direction, nor do they seem to have anticipated the attack at the time it was made.

It was impossible, however, for the Germans not to admit that their own attack had been



[French official photograph.]

A LONG COLUMN OF GERMAN PRISONERS ON THE MARNE.

held up. The war correspondent of the *Vorwärts* on July 17 wrote with regard to the operation :

Two things are conspicuous here : first, American infantry are supporting the French troops in their defence ; secondly, the French are adopting a new method of defence. While in the March, April, and May offensives they stoutly defended their first positions, yesterday they evacuated the ground between their first and second positions almost without a blow or opposition, and then defended their second line stubbornly. This naturally weakened the effect of the German artillery. These defensive tactics, which the French learned from Hindenburg and which Foch tried in the recent battles near Compiègne, will naturally have the result that a new method of attack must be applied, which will not be long delayed.

There is no doubt it was a somewhat rude awakening to the hopes once more raised of a decisive battle. Von Ardenne in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, on July 18, said :

It will only be possible to perceive the strategic intentions of the German Army Command from the further course and extension of the battle. . . The victory is as yet no complete one, but the Homeland has the right to hope that it will become so.

The *Cologne Gazette* of the same date was of the opinion that

The Entente, by its immense propaganda, can keep the entire Continent under the impression that the Entente is victorious. Germany's only antidote is deeds. On this idea rests the decision to start again a fresh, big attack to compel the Entente finally to admit that Germany is invincible, and that the con-

tinuation of the fighting can have no other issue for the Entente than the further loss of land, money, and men.

Of course, there were the usual attempts to discount the possibility of an Allied victory. The *Vossische Zeitung* stated : "The new attack was, as a matter of fact, a complete and entire surprise for the enemy. He had taken some steps to deal with it, but he had not established a strong position, nor had he believed that the blow was about to fall, and it came with startling suddenness on him." As a matter of fact, the attack was fully expected by the French, and was not in the least a surprise.

Possibly one reason why the Germans thought this was the bad weather. It had been for some little time uncertain. There was rain on July 14, but the next day, when the German attack began, was fine at first, though later a thunderstorm of great severity swept over the north of France. July 16 was again bad weather, and on the night of July 17-18 there was once more severe rain.

The counter-stroke of the French was delivered first of all by their left wing on a line some 27 miles running from north to south from Fontenoy, north of the Aisne, some six miles west of Soissons, to Belleau, five miles north-west of Château-Thierry. A severe

thunderstorm and furious rain favoured the operations, for a large number of tanks were employed in it, and the noise of the thunder completely covered their movement to the points of concentration before the advance. There was no preliminary bombardment. The surprise was not on the French side, but on the German. Especially would it seem that Mangin's concentration had not been observed.

Let us now examine the object of the French attack in the direction in which it was delivered. As we have seen, the original idea of the Germans in going down to the Marne was to enlarge the salient they had already made and give themselves more ample space for manoeuvre in the direction of Paris. They seem to have thought that there was no fear of an offensive return from the French, which is merely a tribute to the intelligence which Foch had displayed in carrying out his combinations. A reference to the map shows that as long as Reims held out and thus prevented a flattening forward of the Germans' line, the western front of the salient they created by their advanced movement was always open to attack, and that an attack

coming in a very dangerous direction, for it struck right across the lines of supply down to the Marne and also threatened two main lines of railroad—the one from Oulchy back through Bazoches, while an advance beyond Soissons struck at the junction of railways just east of that town which led up to the north and also to the east. If successful, the Germans were bound to retreat behind the Aisne, because the advance eastwards past Soissons threatened the whole of the roads used for supply from the north towards the south, and, in addition, endangered the railroads which, gathering together near Soissons, formed the main supply lines of the Germans.

It seems incredible that the German Supreme Command should have run the great risk they did in such a light-hearted fashion, and it would be entirely incredible had it not been a fact that they had committed precisely the same error in the autumn of 1914.

The country over which the advance took place can be considered in two parts: that to the north of the Ourcq, and that to the south of that river. North of the Ourcq the ground is comparatively clear of wood, and with only gentle undulations: it was country extremely well suited for the action of tanks. South of



French official photograph.

FEEDING A GROUP OF GERMAN PRISONERS.

the Oureq the ground is much more cut up by small streams, big roads and railroads. The Aisne itself runs through a steepish valley, and is a difficult river to cross except at permanent bridges owing to the steepness of its banks. It was on this fact that Napoleon depended so much in 1814, and the defection of Moreau, who yielded up Soissons without an effort, enabled Blücher to escape across the river and join on to the Russians coming down through Belgium. Near Soissons, about a couple of miles to the south-west, is a hill known as the Montagne de Paris, which not only dominates the town, but also enables artillery fire to be brought upon the railway junction to the east of it. These considerations show that the first effort of the French would evidently be directed along the ground immediately close to Soissons—that is to say, at the northern extremity of the attack; and it is striking proof not only of generalship, but also of the fighting capacity of the French soldiers, that at the outset of the battle this position was carried almost at a rush.

At 4.35 a.m. on July 18 all was ready for the advance, and the artillery fire opened. It was a complete surprise to the enemy—in fact, the most complete surprise that had happened in the whole course of the war. The Germans were quietly resting in fancied security

when the assault fell on them like a whirlwind. A heavy moving barrage was put down; behind it came the tanks, and on their heels the infantry, and at first there was hardly any opposition. Village after village was captured. In the neighbourhood of Soissons the hill ground which dominated the town was occupied, including the Montagne de Paris. Berzy-le-Sec was captured by cavalry; and the horse-men even got across the Soissons-Château-Thierry road, making it impossible for the enemy to use it. In this fighting one French regiment with colours flying charged the enemy with the bayonet, singing the "Chant du Départ," and east of Donniers a mixed regiment of Zouaves and Tirailleurs Indigènes swept on through the German positions, captured 1,500 prisoners, and, going on, met and defeated a column of German supports, drove it before them and reached Chaudun, having penetrated to a distance of five miles. Chaudun, Vierzy, Villers-Hélon, Noroy-sur-Oureq, Cheuy were taken. Behind Chouy, the wood called Buisson-de-Cresnes, on the edge of the Villers-Cotterets forest, which was strongly held by machine-gun detachments, held out after the general line of battle had passed on beyond it. About 10 a.m. a unit of American infantry was brought up to clear it out. They did this and killed and wounded the whole



IN TORCY.

[French official photograph.]



[French official photograph.]

OULCHY-LE-CHÂTEAU.

garrison except 29, whom they brought in as prisoners. On the south of the river by 9 o'clock the line was pushed forward to Hautevesnes-Bussiares-Courchamps; all along the line of the French attack many prisoners were taken. The Americans, too, made rapid progress. The attack commencing about 5 a.m., Torcy was taken in 15 minutes, Belleau fell at 8.20 and Givry was also captured, and the advance continued. The point of junction of the French and American troops appears to have been Courchamps, and here 18 guns were captured. In some cases prisoners were surprised when resting asleep in their dug-outs, and men were caught setting out to harvest the rye crops. The cavalry also took a part in the advance, for the opportunity was a favourable one, the Germans falling back without offering much resistance. By 7 o'clock in the morning the weather cleared up, and this enabled the French heavy guns to bring a good deal of fire to bear on the rear areas of the German positions, carrying confusion among the German reserves and their supply and ammunition trains.

While this severe counter-stroke was being delivered against the German flank, the direct advance of the Allied troops from Château-Thierry was not neglected, and the pressure thus exercised, combined with the more active attack, sufficed to reverse the whole German position. Instead of advancing, they now began to retreat. Von Mudra fell back from the wood of Courton and on the Ardre, where

the mill fell to the Italians. Von Boelun, who, it will be remembered, had part of his troops on the south of the Marne, abandoned Montvoisin and retired to the borders of Oeuilly, probably with a view to covering the bridge over the re-entrant angle of the Marne there.

Higher up, the Allies attacked near La Poterno and Pourcy and forced the Germans back for over 1,000 yards. Here the Italians fought with the French, and between them they took nearly 500 prisoners and captured some guns.

During the night the Germans made an attempt at a counter-stroke, chiefly in the region of Oulchy-le-Château, bringing up for the purpose numerous reserves, but very little success was gained, and, generally speaking, the French held the line they had captured.

All along the line the progress was extremely rapid, so much so that in many cases guns were taken before the gunners appreciated that the French were on them. When night fell, the advance of the French left averaged over five miles and on the south over one. Soissons was dominated, the lines of rail leading from it were under French artillery fire, and far away to the rear the roads by which food and ammunition were being brought up to the advanced German troops were under such fire as to render those near the front of the French left wing almost useless. It is not to be wondered at that the Germans at once began their retreat to the Aisne.

July 19 saw a continuance of the victorious movement. The Germans brought up supports

to stop Mangin's progress, but in vain. They were thrown back, and the French left consolidated its position in the neighbourhood of Soissons, while Mangin's right moved forward a mile and a half east of the line Villers-Hélon-Noroy. More to the south Licy-Clignon was captured, while in the centre Neuilly-St. Front was taken and a considerable advance made



CHÂTEAU-THIERRY: LA GRANDE RUE.

from Oulchy-le-Château and towards Fère-en-Tardenois.

The enemy's retreat still went on, and along the whole 80 miles of battle-front from the Aisne to Massiges they were being pressed by the Allies. They were driven back on the west of Reims, while General Gouraud on the right riveted their troops to the ground they held. General Degoutte reached the line Neuilly-St. Front-Courchamps.

To the north-east of Baisieux in the direction of Reims British troops of the 51st and 62nd Divisions* of the XXII. Corps were employed on both sides of the Ardre in conjunction with French divisions on the left and right of them. The position here was occupied in great strength by the Germans, as it was necessary to hold it to guard the left flank of their retreat from the Marne to give time for their troops in the centre to retire. The ground near the river was open, with steep wooded slopes at the sides. Numerous villages and hamlets, for the most part intact, gave excellent cover to the enemy.

The British arrived on July 19, expecting at first to be on the defensive, but the general

* The other two divisions of the XXII. Corps were with Mangin's force on the left.

attack of the French changed the situation, and it was necessary to press onward against the left flank of the retreating enemy. They took up for the evening a position in the woods on the west slope of the Montagne-de-Reims behind the Italian division holding the Allied line at this point. The next day they advanced to the attack. The 51st Division made good progress and reached the western edge of the Courton Wood south of Nappes, the 62nd Division being on their right. The resistance offered was very vigorous, and they were unable to advance beyond a line some 500 yards short of Marfaux between the Courton and Reims woods. On the other side, the right half of the latter division took Courmas and also Bouilly, a little more to the north, capturing 500 prisoners. The advance was continued on July 21, when the 51st Division captured Nappes and the Yorkshiremen occupied Bouilly.

The progress on this day was somewhat slowed down, as the Germans were receiving reinforcements and were fighting hard to cover the retreat of their troops from the Marne, but still some advance was made, and in the evening the general line was advanced as far as Ploisy-Parcy-Tigny-St. Remy-Blanzy-Rozet-St. Albin-Priez, north-east of Courchamps. On the right of Degoutte, the Americans had won the higher ground of Etrépilly north of Château-Thierry, and thus dominated the line of retreat of the Germans from this point. This position forced the enemy to abandon this town during the night of July 20-21. Berthelot also made progress between Reims and the Marne, and by this date over 20,000 prisoners had been taken, with more than 400 guns. Eight German divisions had been compelled to retreat behind the Marne, and a much larger force in reserve had been driven back on an average depth of between five and six miles along a front of more than 20 miles. Large quantities of stores had been captured and very heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy.

A good proportion of these was due to the fact that the Germans experienced great difficulty in retiring across the river. The temporary bridges which they constructed were constantly shot away, and, practically, the troops on the left bank of the river had nothing but mountain artillery to support them, for the wheeled guns had been unable to cross to help them. The retreat of the enemy retiring from Dormans in the direction of Reims was not only menaced by the French and American's

following them up directly, but the position of the British divisions on the left flank of the German force threatened them with further disaster

When the Germans retreated from Château-Thierry they completely sacked the town; such inhabitants as were in it who were not hidden in cellars were forced into the church and kept there during the night, and when they emerged later on, they saw the wagons laden with the spoils of their houses being taken back by the enemy. But this was not all. The town had been in possession of the Germans

for some weeks; when they saw they were about to be turned out, they proceeded to carry out their usual vile practices, carting off all they could, destroying all they could not. In the larger houses and mansions everything was destroyed. Tapestries were hacked to pieces, pictures slit from corner to corner, the leather and other chair coverings ripped from their frames, all the delicate marqueterie and the irreplaceable examples of the craftsmanship of past centuries smashed. Legs were torn off tables and used to further the work of destruction. There was not a mirror which



THE FATAL MARNE: THE SECOND DISASTROUS CROSSING BY THE GERMANS.

had not been broken; the glass and china flung at them were lying in pieces on the floor beneath them. Statues and statuettes in marble and ivory were dismembered with hammers, and a pickaxe was used to destroy a wonderful grand piano, which must have cost hundreds of pounds. In one house a valuable collection of books was torn to pieces or their bindings ripped off.

Vengeful fury had been carried even to the extent of smashing the nurseries and dolls' houses. The dolls were trampled on and torn to pieces, a rocking-horse was cleft with an axe, cradles were flung out of the windows, and all drawers and cupboards were ransacked and their contents ripped up, burned, or besmirched in a manner worthy of loathsome lunatics.* The retreating troops were followed up by French cavalry and armoured cars.

The rapid retreat of the Germans was due to the fact that they had placed themselves in a position in which the slightest interruption of a victorious offensive brought them within measurable distance of disaster. General Foch had brought about the great object of strategy, concentration of superior numbers at the

* Taken chiefly from Reuter's telegram published in the *Morning Post* of July 29, 1918.

decisive point. General Gouraud's determined defence on the eastern side of Reims had stopped the German advance there. This had reduced their forward movement on the western side of Reims to a comparatively feeble effort with no great vitality in it. The line of the Marne, if not completely held, had at any rate afforded so much resistance as to take the "go" out of the German forces, and exactly at the moment when this object was attained the counter-attack was delivered by Mangin and Degoutte in the most favourable direction, parallel to the German lines of advance, which ran north and south from the Aisne to the Marne along the roads. The railways ran east and west, and their utility for the forward movement was therefore very limited.

Some portion of the success was doubtless due to the free use of tanks, to which the nature of the ground over which Mangin's force especially advanced, was very suitable; particularly was the part played by the new light French tanks of great importance. The French, like ourselves, had found that a lighter and more rapid machine was a desideratum, and the Renault car was the outcome (see fig.). It differed materially from our light tank inasmuch as it only contained one weapon, either a




[French official photog. aph.]

A GERMAN BARRICADE IN THE RUE CARNOT, CHATEAU-THIERRY.

machine-gun or one of the automatic 37 mm., or occasionally a 75.* The car itself had the form of a long and narrow box, from which rose a species of turret. This, in the case of the cars armed with the machine-gun or 37 mm., was capable of revolution. When the armament was of the field-gun type, it was fixed. The car or tank was about 13 feet long and 5 feet 6 inches wide and about 6 feet 8 inches high, constructed of a special resisting steel which varied in

hollow or trench. The tank manœuvred with great facility and was capable of revolving on its own centre. Its total weight was about 7 tons and on level ground it attained a speed of $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles. It could climb up a slope of 50 degrees and run through 2 feet 6 inches of water. It was capable of flattening out wire entanglement, and could beat its way through a 15-inch brick wall.

By this time, too, the French had their new



DIAGRAMMATIC SECTION OF A FRENCH LIGHT (OR "MOSQUITO") TANK.

thickness from about one-quarter to six-tenths of an inch, sufficient to stop bullets and splinters of shells of small calibre. The turret itself was originally formed in the same manner, but in the latest patterns was made of a special cast steel. The crew consisted of two men, one sitting in the front part of the tank, guiding it, while behind him was the gunner who sat on a higher level. The gun projected out of the turret over that portion of the tank where the steerer sat. The motor was in the rear part of the tank, and was divided from the front part by a partition. The driving method used was two caterpillar chains, one on either side of the car, which could be independently driven for steering purposes. The tanks were rested on the caterpillar chain by two bogies. The system of movement was analogous to that which the Germans employed in their large tanks described in Vol. XVIII, pp. 47 and 49. To facilitate the passage over ditches or trenches, there was a tail in the shape of a broad flat spade attached to the rear part, so that the end of the tank would not drop down when crossing over a

* The 37 mm. a shell weighed about 1 lb., the 75, 16 lbs.

arrangement of *artillerie d'accompagnement*—i.e., artillery specially told off to accompany the infantry attack—which was composed of automatic 37 mm. guns or the new Joulandeau-Deslandre, a lighter weapon which fired a similar shell to the 37 mm.

But the great point in the success was strategical, for so soon as the road from Soissons to Château-Thierry was dominated an important line of communications was interrupted by the Allies, and roads farther back had to be made use of by the Germans. Thus the westernmost troops of the enemy were, as the French advanced, perpetually threatened with being cut off. The failure to beat Gouraud made the German advance insecure.

They made desperate efforts during July 19 and 20 by counter-attacks to hold back the steady forward movement of Mangin and Degoutte with his Americans, but the position was getting every moment more difficult because, from July 20, when Château-Thierry was taken, the retreat from the Marne became necessary, while on the right flank the British troops, acting in conjunction with Berthelot's



[French official photograph.]

BRIDGE AT CHATEAU-THIERRY DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS IN THEIR RETREAT.

army, struck towards the left rear of the German forces engaged in the Marne attack.

On July 21 further progress was made, and by the evening the Allied line ran from north-west to south-east beyond La Croix-Grissolles-Bezu-St. Germain down to the Marne at Mont St. Père east of Château-Thierry. Opposed to



**HOW THE FRENCH SCALED THE -
BROKEN BRIDGE.**

them were the rearguards of von Boehn and von Below, their object being to stave off the French attack and give time for the withdrawal of the artillery and supplies beyond the Vesle. Mangin's left was somewhat behind; he held Belleu and Buzaney, but his centre was at Hartin and Taux, so that the Soissons-

Château-Thierry road was held down to this point, and his troops were also at Le Plessier-Huleu. Degoutte, south of the Oureq, was on the Château-Thierry road in front of La Croix and Grissolles, while the two American Divisions held Bezu-St. Germain-Epièdes down to Chartèves on the Marne.

Berthelot's army, which had followed up over the Aisne, and was in a position roughly from Châtillon by Baslieux to the forest of Courton with the Italian Division and Godley's force on the Ardre was attacked in great force, Berthelot held his own, and Godley made some progress up the Ardre, taking St. Euphraise with his right and part of the Bois de Reims with his centre, but on the left the British were held up about Marfaux. Later in the day they completed the capture of the Bois de Reims and, as already narrated, took Bouilly and advanced in the valley of the Ardre towards Bligny and Chaumuzy.* The Germans were now clearing out as fast as they could from the too-advanced positions into which they had been thrust, losing heavily in prisoners, guns and munitions.

* According to Field-Marshal Haig's dispatch Marfaux was not taken until the 23rd. Apparently, therefore, the British Divisions advanced on the north-east side of the Pourcy-Chambuey road. There was probably nothing but a small rearguard force of Germans in Marfaux, which was neglected.

On July 22 the advance was continued. Mangin's right wing pushed on as far as Montgru on the Oureq; while, south of the river, Degoutte captured the Châtelet wood and arrived at Brécy, while on the south the Americans captured Jaulgonne. But there was still a good deal of resisting power in the Germans opposite Degoutte's centre, and, late in the afternoon, they re-captured from him Epieds. On the right of the Allied attack, the French, Italians and British pressed forward about three-quarters of a mile in the Vrigny direction, thus still more threatening the retreat of the Germans.

The French also crossed the Marne at Chassins and Passy, near Dormans, and on the east of Reims General Gouraud moved forward and re-occupied all his old positions between the Suippe and Massiges.

It is interesting to note the German view of the last few days' fighting. Their official report runs as follows: "Between the Aisne and the Marne the battle continues with undiminished violence; in spite of his heavy defeat on July 20, the enemy, bringing into action fresh divisions and tanks, again advanced and violently attacked our lines. His assaults broke down. Prisoners confirm the enemy's heavy losses. Yesterday's fighting [*i.e.*, July 21] again resulted in a complete success for the German arms. Between the Aisne and the south-west of Hartennes, in the early morning, the strongest drum-fire preceded infantry attacks by the enemy. South-west of Soissons and of Hartennes they broke down in front of our lines. North of Villomontoire some of the enemy pushed forward temporarily over the Soissons-Château-Thierry road. Our counter-attack completely threw them back again. Villomontoire and Tigny were also foci of the battle, which our counter-attacks brought to a favourable conclusion. In the evening renewed enemy attacks south-west of Soissons were checked at their starting point—where they were carried forward they broke down with heavy losses. On both sides of the Oureq, in the forenoon, the enemy in vain frequently advanced against our lines. After bringing up fresh forces, he returned to the attack in the afternoon. After heavy fighting the enemy's assault on both sides of Oulehy-le-Château was defeated by counter-attacks. North and north-east of Château-Thierry our detachments which had been left in the fore-field hindered the approach of the enemy to

our new lines. It was not till the evening that he succeeded in launching strong attacks here, which broke down with heavy losses." A more complete travesty of what actually occurred it would be impossible to write. If the German account were correct, no Allied gains had been made at all, whereas we know they had been very considerable.

The position of the enemy on the main field of battle was now, a dangerous one. On their



GENERAL BERTHELOT.
Commanded the Fifth French Army.

right flank they had the armies of Mangin and Degoutte. On their left were French, British and Italian divisions. They were being followed up straight by de Mitry's and Berthelot's men, while on the eastern side of Reims they were held by Gouraud. They were bringing up reserves to help to stay the retreat, but did not succeed in doing more than slow down the rate of progress of their opponents.

Up to this date the Allies had taken over 20,000 prisoners and 400 guns.

On July 23, Degoutte, south of the Oureq, reached Brécy and American troops north of Jaulgonne took Epieds and entered the forest. De Mitry's troops, crossing the Marne, were moving up north. Beyond these movements there was little to record on this date. The enemy's counter-attacks, which he had delivered the day before, seemed to have exhausted him; the weather was very hot; all the troops on both sides had now been fighting without



Official photograph.

MACHINE-GUN DRILL, IN GAS MASKS. BEHIND THE LINES.

cessation for six days. Still the Germans continued to hang on to Oulchy, which was an important point on the railroad back to Fère-en-Tardenois.

On July 24 the Allies continued to press the retreating enemy. During the previous night there was considerable artillery activity in the Courton and Roi woods, and about 9 o'clock in the evening the Germans made a counter-attack in the neighbourhood of Vrigny, but this was easily beaten off, and the French held their positions. Between the Oureq and near to the first-named river, the French renewed their attacks, which were successful throughout the day. South of Armentières, Brécy and the Châtelet Wood were captured.

The French and American troops advanced some two miles in the region of Epieds and Trugny, and Epieds, which had been recaptured by the Germans in the evening of July 23, fell once more into American hands. The advance was continued beyond Courpoil. To the south of this considerable progress was made in the forest of Fère north of Chartèves and Jaulgonne, while ground was gained in front of Tréloup and Dormans and the southern corner of the forest of Ris was taken by de Mitry's troops. Considerable booty was also captured, including five 15 cm. guns, about

50 machine-guns and a considerable amount of material. Between the Marne and Reims there was not much more than artillery action nor was any progress made beyond the points reached the day before. In the north despite the vigorous resistance of the Germans, who felt how vital it was to hold back the French advancing along the south bank of the Aisne, Mangin's troops carried the village of Ville-montoire, and Oulchy was also captured. Thus the road down from Soissons to Château-Thierry was completely in the hands of the French.

By the 21st the development of the situation had forced the German Press to change its tone somewhat. The *Vorwärts* stated:—

There is no doubt that we are approaching new and energetic attempts on the part of the Entente to regain the initiative, possibly on other fronts also. Even on this occasion, Foch's ultimate aim was not gain of ground but the disturbance of German plans as a whole. It must remain our main aim not to allow the initiative to be wrested from us and not to sacrifice troops uselessly, but to keep in view with strong nerves the military aim once it is recognised as right. Unless all signs are deceptive, the decisive phase of the world war, which both adversaries are seeking with all the means at their disposal, is beginning.

The victories hitherto attained in attack and defence justify the German people in further strong hopes. On the other hand, these days and weeks which the Western front is now passing through are well calculated to bring to reason those who pictured the German summer campaign of 1918 as a grandiose military

promenade, at the end of which was the uninterrupted annihilation of the enemy. Despite all her victories, Germany is still as ever fighting against material and numerical superiority. Therefore, the military initiative must every day be fought for and obtained anew, and the hydra heads of the Entente reserves daily struck off. All our victories are the victories of a defender.

This is a somewhat different view to that which had brought the Kaiser down to see the victorious on-sweep of his troops towards their goal.

The egregious von Ardenne indulged in some of his cryptic and platitudinous utterances:—

That commander will ultimately win the game who still has the best trumps finally in hand. Both Army Commands will, therefore, endeavour

confidentially communicated its intention beforehand. The object which the forcing of the Marne had in view was attained, and, therefore, it did not appear dangerous to retreat locally in order to save losses which seemed unnecessary.

It does not explain what had been the object of crossing the river; apparently it was to advance at great cost and be beaten back at greater.

It is impossible not to contrast these very much quieter lucubrations with the arrogant ardour which characterized the German utterances during the earlier period of the great offensive. The detailed history of the recent



French official photograph.

FRENCH ENGINEERS REPAIRING A MINED ROAD.

to concentrate as many troops and guns as possible on the decisive point, which momentarily remains between the Aisne and the Marne. The German Army Command, therefore, has resolved on a step which cannot have been easy for it. It has voluntarily given up the territory south of the Marne, so bravely fought for and so toughly held from July 15 to 19, and in the night of July 20 withdrew the troops there, unmolested by the enemy, to the northern bank. The enemy will jubilate about this and reverence the Marne even more than hitherto as their "sacred river." The strategic move of the German Army Command has, however, its full justification, and its effect will soon make itself felt.

The *Cologne Gazette* of July 21 informed its readers:—

The withdrawal of our troops to the northern bank of the Marne came as no surprise to well-informed circles, because the Supreme Army Command had

fighting shows a distinct falling off in the moral of the German troops and a less decided handling by their leaders, whereas with the Allied troops there was a complete confidence which the rude trials of the previous month had in no wise diminished. A not unimportant item among the factors which led to this mental condition was the ever-increasing supremacy of the Allied airmen. The long-distance raids into Germany were beginning to tell, and the fact that both on the battlefield and in the areas immediately behind it our aviators were constantly harassing the German troops on the march and in bivouacs, constantly

bombing troops marching to the front and the columns of supply for their maintenance. The tide was indeed beginning to turn.

The mastery obtained by our aviators enabled the air forces to carry on their work of observation and photographing in a way which was quite impossible for the enemy to equal, and enormously added to the efficacy of our artillery fire. Numerically we were far superior in the air, and the number of machines



FLIGHT-LIEUT. QUENTIN ROOSEVELT
Killed in aerial combat, July 17, 1918.

employed, the number of raids made and the amount of bombs dropped was far in excess of the German performance. The most striking point of all was perhaps that the fighting in the air was habitually carried on behind the German lines, which meant that the German aviators did not care to advance beyond the security afforded by their anti-aircraft service.

On the night of July 11/12, and again in daylight on July 12, successful distant raids were made against enemy aerodromes, and on the last date the railway sidings at Saarburg were attacked, all our machines returning in safety. Then came a few days of bad weather, which prevented the distant work, and espe-

cially damped down the ardour of the enemy. On July 14 we accounted for 16 of the enemy's machines with a loss of only three to ourselves; we also dropped 19 tons of bombs on back areas. In the next two days Offenburg and Thionville were successfully bombed and good bursts were observed on each occasion, while all our machines came back without injury.

On July 16/17 our aviation service played a brilliant part in the battle, attacking without cessation the Marne bridges, dropping five tons of explosives, and thus hampering the passage of the German troops. The latter, attacked by machine-gun fire and bombs when they were on the northern and southern banks of the river, were constantly compelled to scatter to seek safety. A bridge thrown over the river at Dormans was destroyed, and the waggons which were crossing by it sank in the river. Twenty-one tons of explosives were dropped in these operations, and a further 14 tons during the night. Violent explosions and fires were caused at the station of Maison Bleue, at Coucy, Les Etapes and Bazoches. Our aviators also accounted for 29 German machines and five captive balloons.

During the night of July 16/17 more raids were made into Germany, and works at Hagedingen north of Metz and the Burbach works near Saarbrücken were bombed, and also a German aerodrome. During the day on July 17 our machines successfully attacked the railway sidings at Thionville, in all cases without loss. On this day Lieutenant Quentin Roosevelt, the youngest son of Colonel Roosevelt, was brought down in an aerial combat. He was an able and successful aviator, and his loss was much deplored.

The Germans did not do very much in the way of retaliation for our aviators' exploits, but they succeeded in bombing a camp of German prisoners, 30 miles from the front near Troyes, killing 94 and wounding 74, besides two French guards.

The Benz Chemical Works at Mannheim were again the object of attack during the night of July 18/19, as also the station at Heidelberg and the blast furnaces at Burbach and Wadgassen, near Saarbrücken, in all cases with considerable effect; also two trains were hit by bombs, brought to a standstill, and then subjected to machine-gun fire. The powder factory at Oberndorf, 40 miles south-east of Strassburg, was also attacked, and bursts were observed on various buildings. This was the first time that

this place and Heidelberg had been the objectives of British airmen. About eight tons of bombs were dropped on the Mons-Valenciennes railroad and six more on the railways at Courtrai, Seclin and Lille. The weather was very bad on this occasion, and two of our machines failed to return.

The activity of our air service was continued during July 19 and 20 in the immediate area of fighting on the Marne. British and French bombing machines paid special attention to the crossings over the river; in many cases they hindered progress considerably, and in some completely stopped the enemy's supply service, while they attacked with vigour both with machine-guns and bombs the concentration of troops which the enemy was preparing for his counter-attacks in the endeavour to stop the advance of the Allies' flank attack. At Oulchy-le-Château, Fère-en-Tardenois, Fismes, Bazoches, and indeed along the whole rear zone of the battle, 24 tons of bombs were dropped during the day and another 28 tons during the night, thus harassing enormously the enemy's lines of communication and the movements of both troops and convoys. A violent fire broke out at Vouziers, and fires were also seen at Fère, at Fismes, and explosions were

noted at Laon railway station. Besides all this, British and French low-flying planes fought in close combination with the infantry.

On the night of July 21/22 distant attacks were again carried out by the Independent Air Force. The railway sidings at Lunas, south-east of Mezières, were treated to a ton of bombs. Mannheim was again attacked, and the Badische Anilin und Soda Factory was also attacked, as was a factory south-east of Zweibrücken. Low-flying aeroplanes attacked and hit five trains, bringing them to a standstill, while the anti-aircraft defences of searchlights and guns were also attacked and great damage done to them, and this without any loss to our own men.

On July 22 the very important powder factory at Rottwoil, on the Neckar, was attacked and a severe explosion caused, a fire breaking out which could be seen 60 miles away, and this without any loss to our own men.

This brief account of the aeroplane work will show what a large part it now played in the operations. The air service was becoming more and more an integral portion of the fighting services.

The successful counter-stroke of the French was a hard nut for the Germans to crack, but



SAND-BAG PROTECTION FOR AEROPLANES.

Official photograph.

they did their best to explain it away. Thus, the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* said :

The place and time of Foch's counter-offensive were prescribed for him by the measures of the German Army Command. The time and place must have appeared so far favourable to Foch in that his counter-offensive was conducted here against the right flank of the German attack on the Marne at the moment when he might believe that the German reserves were held south of the Marne by his strong counter-attack there immediately before. His attack, which was again carried out with the aid of a very strong squadron of tanks, had the preliminary success which a strong massed offensive thrust usually obtains. Even if the attack had been expected by the German Command, the momentary surprise necessarily succeeded locally to a certain extent, so that in some places penetration was possible. But the penetration never amounted to a break-through, this being prevented by the tough resistance of the German troops in the line, and also by the intervention of our reserves, which were not, as Foch perhaps believed, employed on the Marne, but remained at the disposal of the command on this front. . . . The next few days will show whether Foch will continue his counter-offensive or whether it is a passing episode, leaving no great traces behind.

Another excuse, made in a Berlin telegram to the same newspaper, was that the Germans were betrayed by their own troops.

We have, now that we know it positively, no ground for concealing the fact that in the ranks of the German troops there were deserters to the enemy who utilized their knowledge of our plans for base treachery to

the Fatherland and their comrades in arms. They informed the enemy of the German plans, and the French in consequence naturally had a certain advantage.

It was also, seeing what had occurred, necessary to look upon the great march on Paris as no longer a certainty.

It cannot be the object of every military operation in all circumstances to attain definite ends. The victorious military operations of the third week of July aroused various presumptions among the population not warranted by the actual conditions, not to speak of those who on July 16 were absolutely certain that Hindenburg would carry out an attack on Paris. Our military command is prudent enough, in every case acting after consideration of the actual conditions to attain its decisions.

It adds :

West of Reims our attack on the southern bank of the Marne had quite a definite object. It was to extend our battle front. The attack succeeded, although the enemy was forewarned. But from all parts of the neighbouring Western front the French Commander drew troops upon troops to undertake an attack on a grand scale on the German positions. He thereby compelled the German troops to make a partial retirement.

No one can study the record of the war during the month of August without seeing that all along the line from the Yser to the Somme the situation was becoming more and more favourable to the Allies.



CHAPTER CCLXXVIII.

THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE MARNE: JULY—AUGUST, 1918.

GERMANS IN RETREAT—CAPTURE OF OULCHY-LE-CHATEAU—GERMAN COMMENT—AMERICAN AND BRITISH ASSISTANCE—THE OURCQ ABANDONED—FÈRE-EN-TARDENOIS OCCUPIED—FRENCH REACH THE CRISE—SOISSONS CAPTURED—RETREAT BEYOND THE VESLE—AMERICANS TAKE FISMES—GERMAN WITHDRAWALS IN SOMME AND ANCRE AREAS—MINOR ACTIONS—FIGHTING IN THE AIR—MARSHAL FOCH'S PLANS—HAIG'S OFFENSIVE OPENS, AUGUST 8, 1918—HIS DISPOSITIONS—RESULTS OF THE FIRST TWO DAYS.


ON July 25, 1918, General Gouraud advancing some 1,000 yards on a front of $13\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond the line St. Hilaire-le-Grand-Souain-Mesnil, regained the whole of the Main-de-Massiges and reoccupied the positions which had been held before the German advance of July 15. In this operation 1,100 prisoners, 200 machine-guns and seven guns were taken.

On the other extremity of the French line Mangin occupied a line from the west of Soissons to the east of Oulchy-le-Château, having retaken during the day Villemontoire and captured Oulchy-la-Ville and Oulchy-le-Château. The fighting at Villemontoire was very violent, the numerous grotto houses in the sides of the hill forming strong points from which it was difficult to drive the Germans.

The German resistance was now beginning to stiffen up. A new German army under von Ehen was thrust in between the armies of von Hutier and von Boehn, and other divisions were hurried up until thirty were added to the original thirty which had been engaged between Château-Thierry and the Argonne; of these at least forty were on the portion of the field between Soissons and Reims. At each extremity of the French line on the western side of Reims the Germans were making desperate efforts to maintain their ground. Counter-

attacks were made and two small successes were obtained about Vrigny, while on the Soissons-Château-Thierry road the railway station of Le Plessier-Hulen was retaken by the Germans. But all these gains were of no real utility, as they were soon submerged beneath the ever-flowing tide of French success.

Still, the additional forces employed and the energy with which they were used made the advance of the Allies more difficult. Especially was this the case north of the Ourcq. Here an advance of Mangin's troops along the Aisne had to be held off to save that portion of the troops which had been engaged in the German thrust towards the Marne. It was also difficult for the French, because from the heights on the northern side of the Aisne their troops advancing south of it along the river could be taken in flank. The forward movement of the French south of the Ourcq on the previous day had been very vigorous, but had been held on the left near the river by German artillery near Nanteuil-notre-Dame and Bruyères; these positions were evidently clung to so as to hold back the French from Fère-en-Tardenois, which was an important railway station on the German line of communications. More to the south, however, the opposition was not so great, and they experienced but little artillery fire, which showed



THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE MARNE.

that the German guns were being moved backwards for fear of capture. Fère-en-Tardenois had been under distant artillery fire for the last two or three days, and it was evident that this point was also being abandoned, as large fires from burning stores were clearly seen; other dépôts near Oulchy-le-Château were also fired.

The advance was now being opposed almost entirely by squads of machine-guns, carefully ensconced in holes or in the borders of woods and sometimes up in trees. Their capture involved delay, for to have carried them directly would have resulted in heavy losses, and it was therefore necessary to outflank them and take them in rear. This was done, but it naturally slowed the rate of the forward movement. The untouched character of the woods in this district was a great advantage to the Germans, as they afforded cover from aeroplanes and also good rearguard positions. As the villages were retaken, the usual tales of brutality, pillage, and violence were recounted by the few inhabitants. Such acts as these did not tend to make the troops when they captured Germans merciful in their treatment of them.

On the south of the Ourcq Degoutte's army with the Americans crossed the Nanteuil brook, taking the village of Coincy, and the greater part of the Tournelle wood, advancing through the Fère Forest up to a line extending from Le-Charmel to Beuvarde. De Mitry's army continued in part on the south side of the Marne between Reuil and Dormans, while part of his troops penetrated into the forest of Riz, thus making a line in connexion with Degoutte. The Germans delivered a strong counter-attack in the region of Dormans, and succeeded in occupying for a time a small wood about a mile north of Tréloup, and also the village of Chassins, but they were speedily driven out by a counter attack; while farther east, Berthelot, fighting hard, pushed up both sides of the upper valley of the Ardre, especially between St. Euphraise and Vrigny. It was at this point that the Italians were acting with the French of Berthelot's army. This attack, protected by General Gouraud's advance on the east of Reims, was becoming very dangerous to the left flank of the German wedge. Up in the north the Germans were holding tight to the lines which ran from Villemonaire to the Aisne. Especially important for them was it to cover the railway over that river which they had constructed between Missy-sur-Aisne and Sermoise, to connect the single

line running along the north bank of the Aisne with the double line on the south bank going to Reims, which greatly facilitated the bringing up of supplies to the great dépôt at Fismes.

This point was situated in the centre of the country into which the irruption of the Germans had taken place, and it was therefore a fairly easy task to supply the troops from it by wheeled carriage, the most distant point being hardly 10 miles from it, but once Fismes



GENERAL VON EBEN.

Commanded a German Army on the Marne.

were lost, road transport had to be used right back to the Aisne. It will be seen, therefore, how important for the supply of the German troops was the railroad which led from Oulchy back by Fère-en-Tardenois through Bazoches and thence towards Reims, while the line from Bazoches to Sermoise across the Aisne, which enabled this line to be fed, was also of great moment to them. The ill-considered movement of the enemy had led to his thrusting out forces which were in themselves insufficient for defence when vigorously attacked, and the consequence was that, to save these troops from disaster, large reinforcements had to be brought in. This involved an overcrowding of the area, because, while the exhausted troops had to be relieved, others had to take up the defensive to cover their retreat, and the consequence was that the roads were occupied by the marching to and fro of men and by long



[French official photograph.]

PRESIDENT POINCARÉ AT CHATEAU-THIERRY.

supply columns. These were particularly open to attack from the air, and the Allied aviators acted vigorously against them.

The capture of Oulhy-le-Château was of great moment, as it dominated the crossing of the Oureq along the Château-Thierry road and closed the river valley and the road going from the west towards Fère. It had, moreover, been one of the German advanced dépôts, although not so important as Fère, where many roads met, which, radiating out, served to supply the German forces from Château-Thierry to Châtillon-sur-Marne. The situation of the German advanced troops was becoming more and more hazardous.

The whole country from the front back as far as the valley of the Vesle was now coming under French artillery fire, which rendered their road communications, at no time very good, still more precarious. Fresh fires and explosions were seen, which showed that they began to appreciate that "the battle to win peace" was not going in their favour. Gradually the Allied troops were converging on Fère, and it could not be long before it fell into their hands.

Notwithstanding the many counter-attacks made by the Germans the position of the Allies on the western side of the German

salient continued to improve. They were now within four miles of Fère-en-Tardenois, and a considerable advance had been made through the forest of Fère and the Forest of Riz, and more to the east the troops were still advancing. From Epernay the enemy had withdrawn and Reuil had been abandoned.

The capture of Château-Thierry made this town valuable as a supply centre for the French troops, which greatly facilitated their progress. On the other hand, the fact that Fère-en-Tardenois was practically useless for the Germans was very detrimental to them, as there was no other station available as a rail-head in the country in which they were operating, and the supply of the large number of troops that were concentrated there was becoming more and more difficult, being dependent on road transport. The inherent mistake of the German advance was bearing full fruit. They had undertaken a movement which had not sufficient breadth and which was open to attack on both sides. They had refused to believe that the French had sufficient numbers available to attack them on their right and had to suffer the consequences. They had lost 25,000 prisoners, and their casualties amounted in all probability to not less than 120,000.

The official bulletins on the German side,

of course, admitted no failure. On July 23 we were informed that the Allies in the early morning, after summoning their reserves, continued their mass attacks. "General von Boehn's army had completely defeated many enemy thrusts. The French and Americans again suffered very heavy losses. Between Noyant and Hartennes the enemy stormed five times in vain. On both sides of Ville-montoire the enemy temporarily gained some ground, but our counter-attack drove him back, re-captured the village, and the dense masses of the enemy when retreating were fired at by our artillery.

"North of the Oureq our annihilating fire smashed enemy attacks. Tanks which pierced our lines were shot to pieces. Troops fighting between the Oureq and the Marne repulsed strong enemy attacks. We drove the enemy back by a counter-thrust from the height north-east of Rocourt and from the Clâtelet Wood.

"South-west of Reims heavy combats lasted during the whole day. The enemy in four violent partial attacks advanced repeatedly in vain. North of the Ardre the French, besides

white and coloured troops, also throw Italians and British into the fray. The attack of the Italians only feebly developed and was rapidly crushed." But notwithstanding all these favourable official reports although this battle was to have been the final blow the German newspapers were now beginning to take a less optimistic view about the situation.

Major Endres in the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, writing on July 21, said: "War is a hard trade and the strategic-tactical results of every single operation, as of the whole, is bound up with assumptions that with the best goodwill do not always materialize. . . . The more the country learns that France is still very strong; that America has more than half a million soldiers in France, and that by the U-boat war alone she cannot be prevented from continually sending material and transports to France; that, finally, the English Army is in good condition, and with strength made up stands prepared for battle, the more will the country appreciate the magnificent performance of our troops, and all the more will it be in a position to look things in the face as they really are, with iron determination. It



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH ENGINEERS SALVING THE PONTOON BRIDGE THROWN ACROSS THE MARNE AT CHATEAU-THIERRY BY THE GERMANS, And which had been cut adrift by them in their hasty retreat.

never hurts an efficient people to see clearly the difficulties of the position. Here in the west it may be weeks before the initiative that General Foch has seized comes again to our side. In this situation any undue haste would be amateurish and dangerous, and therefore will certainly be avoided; and any nervous-



TRENCH MINES LEFT BY THE GERMANS AS TRAPS FOR TANKS.

ness at home would be useless and also unnecessary." The fatuity of these comments must be evident to every reader.

There was evidence, too, that the retreat was having a discouraging effect on the German population. The *Cologne Gazette* on July 23 said: "General Foch's attack has caused pessimism in Germany. The dismal ones are going round with their heads bowed, uttering lugubrious cries and endeavouring, behind the concise statements of the official reports [of which examples have been given above] to discover all kinds of bad suppressed events. . . . People who have not learned in four years of war to accept the enemy's official reports with the sharpest criticism, ought to regard with equal distrust all rumours which emerge whenever hard movements occur. . . . Field-grey soldiers of the most varied ranks competed with the civil population in the streets, the tavern or the railway, to announce quite openly what every one of them had heard, and professional spies only needed to

keep their ears open in order to obtain important hints. They gave their employers timely information. Statements from perjured traitors were added. The consequence was that the enemy east of Reims evaded [!] our attack, which could not come to full execution."

What apparently rankled most in the German mind was that "General Foch's whole offensive was in many respects a surprise, owing to the statements made by prisoners taken from many detachments of troops, in whose view no Entente attack was planned on this front." This shows a credulous state of mind which one would hardly have attributed to so expert a body as the German General Staff, and also shows that their Intelligence Department was singularly at fault. "It was also a surprise owing to the employment of masses of tanks which had cover from view during their approach in the high cornfields. Thus, the first days of battle brought the adversary, besides a gain of ground, prisoners and booty. His losses then began to increase frightfully, and it may be assumed that he has now more dead than we have had in all the offensives this year together."

One can only express surprise that the *Cologne Gazette* did not say that we had more dead than living on this Front! Georg Wegener wrote: "The enemy ruthlessly employed every means known to modern warfare—shells of all calibres, gas, airmen's bombs, infantry attacks prepared by artillery fire and supported by battle air squadrons; even cavalry; above all, tanks were assembled in enormous number, and advanced disregarding all volley firing by our artillery." How extremely wicked of the enemy to use such dreadful means of war! Frederick the Great remarked, when he had found the futility of asking his men to attack without firing, that it would be as reasonable to expect them to assault with broomsticks as not to use their muskets; no doubt Herr Wegener would have liked us to make use of the former.

On July 27 the armies of Degoutte and De Mitry followed up the retreat of the German forces, which on this date became more pronounced; in fact, our outposts during the night of July 26-27 had already reported that a definite retreat had begun. The Germans still fought rearguard actions, but the pressure of the Allies against them was too strong for them to attempt to maintain any definite position. With no specially marked incidents all along a



[French official photograph.]

GERMAN SOLDIERS' GRAVES OUTSIDE DORMANS.

line of over 20 miles from the valley of the Oureq to the south-east, from Oulchy-le-Château to the Ardre, above Bligny, the retreat was general, to a line extending from Bruyères Villeneuve-sur-Fère—Courmont—Passy-Grigny—Cuisles—Neuville-aux-Larris to Chaumuzy. The Germans were falling back unit by unit, by alternate companies or machine-gun squads, followed up closely by our advanced guards reinforced by tanks. The weather was cold with heavy squalls of rain, and this, combined with the fire of our airmen, who notwithstanding the unpropitious circumstances still managed to keep the air, threw them into a good deal of confusion. The whole line of the Marne was now in our hands, and the valley of Oulchy-le-Château enabled the troops to push still further through Coincy and the forest of Fère towards Fère-en-Tardenois, from which point the French were only three miles away at Villeneuve and Bruyères. In the centre, from the Marne between Châtillon and Dormans, the Allies pushed forward through Reuil in the one direction and from Dormans in the other, while on the Ardre the British troops pushed through Marfaux to Chaumuzy, and this still more threatened the left flank of the German salient. The entire forest of Fère was now in the Allies' hands, and the retreat of the Germans was sufficiently disorganized to allow the French cavalry to press hard on the heels of the retiring troops, who suffered very heavily in the fighting which ensued.

Our aviators, flying over the enemy's front line and over the communications along the Dormans—Fère road and the Château Thierry—Fismes road, and that which led from Dormans to Ville-en-Tardenois, reported that the whole of the German rear was in a state of confusion; that the high road to Fère was blocked by lorries and troops for 11 hours, which gave the Allied aviators a magnificent target. It may here be remarked that between July 15 and July 22 the French air squadrons dropped along the battle front over 182 tons of bombs in daylight operations, and over 102 tons during the night. The tanks also had proved to be a great success. Each tank section on an average accounted for 15 to 20 German machine guns, and in some places whole batteries of field guns were captured. The ground through which the forces were now advancing was difficult, consisting of woods, thick forests, and slopes crowned by commanding plateaux which gave excellent positions for machine-gun detachments to fire along the line of approach. There was but little artillery fire, as the Germans seemed to be withdrawing their guns for fear of capture.

South of the Oureq, near Villeneuve, a very pretty engagement took place between the American and French troops and the Germans defending the front of Fère-en-Tardenois. German guns were in action on the Butte-de-Chalmont above Oulchy, a high bare hill just north of the Oureq, which commands an extensive view over the country to the north

and east, and others on the high ground of Seringes, which swept across towards Villeneuve, but Mangin's troops north of the Oureq threatened the guns at Oulehy and compelled them to retire, and this enabled the French to bring up more artillery to the high ground about Villeneuve after they had captured Bruyères, and thus to overpower the guns at Seringes, while Fère was brought under



REMOVING THE FUSE FROM AN UN-EXPLODED GERMAN SHELL.

fire from a range of little more than two miles. East of Reims progress was also made, the French taking Mont-sans-Nom and 200 prisoners.

The whole ground down to the Oureq was thus dominated by the French fire, and gradually the enemy withdrew to the other side of the river. Fère-en-Tardenois was occupied on July 28, while Berthelot's troops pressed on towards Olizy et Violaine and Anthenay. It will thus be seen that in the centre and on the right of the Allies considerable progress had been made, but on Mangin's extreme left no great success had been attained; still, the position into which the Germans had been forced left their line at a dangerous angle to the position which the French Tenth Army occupied.

On July 28 Mangin struck with great vigour and made a considerable advance, in which the two British divisions, the 15th and 34th, he had with him played a notable part. They had already participated in the fighting on July 23, acting on the left of Mangin's troops and assisting in the capture of Berzy-le-Sec and Parcy-Tigny. According to a French

account they again fought most brilliantly, and when Mangin's forward movement began they acted as a flank guard while the French crossed the brook in front of Cugny and advanced on the Butte-de-Chalmont. On this day the resistance met with was chiefly of a rear-guard character, consisting of machine-gun detachments, and the French took the hill with very little loss; this was doubtless due to the fact that the Germans were conscious of the pressure that was being made against their left by the troops advancing in the direction of Fère-en-Tardenois.

On July 29 the principal attack was delivered by the British, their objective being the line of heights beyond the village of Grand Rozoy. Here they met a determined resistance, as it was still the object of the Germans to keep back the Allied left, and they had concentrated in this part of the battlefield a considerable number of guns, while the infantry held on with determination to the village and woods in its neighbourhood. In the early morning the attack went forward, and in spite of all the German efforts the British carried the points aimed at, while on their right the French carried the ground to the south-east of Beugneux between that village and Corbény farm, and also captured the Butte-de-Chalmont. But Beugneux itself, which the British attacked, was very strongly defended and the attack was held there. At 2.30 p.m. the British again advanced up very difficult open ground and made some progress. The attack seems to have come to a standstill at nightfall.

Meanwhile the French took the crests of the heights looking down on the valley of the Crise, but the resistance of the Germans became greater, and the advance was in consequence slower. Nevertheless the British 15th Division in front of Villenontoire took the Château and Park of Buzancy on the 30th. On the upper Oureq the Americans took Sergy and Ronchères, and still further to the east towards Villers-Agron. The main road from Dormans to Reims was thus interrupted. The fighting round Sergy was of a very bitter character, and the village changed hands no less than four times. After the Americans had captured it for the first time the 4th Guards Division, composed of fresh troops that had just come up, attacked with considerable vigour, but were eventually driven back. On re-entering the village after one of



order. There is no doubt that the Germans made a great effort to penetrate our advancing line in this direction, but the united efforts of the Americans and British, combined with the French troops, stopped them, though not without severe fighting.

The Oureq above Fère was now completely in the Allies' hands, and in the centre generally considerable progress was made though on the extreme flanks the Germans still clung to their ground with great tenacity; especially was this the case in the valley of the Ardre,



these counter-attacks, the Americans found that their wounded had been bayoneted. The Germans here had placed machine guns in the church and also in a building which bore the Red Cross flag. The fighting was continuous and violent throughout the whole day. The Germans made attack after attack, in which they sometimes made a little progress, only to be driven back by counter-strokes, and hand-to-hand encounters took place on many occasions, but at the end of the day the Guards Division was finally beaten and had to retire.

The Germans had also massed troops behind Seringes, with a view to extend the attack they made on Sergy, but they were observed by the Americans, who brought a heavy fire of artillery to bear on them and drove them back in dis-



[French official photographs.]

FÈRE-EN-TARDENOIS.

Above: The Old Market House. In centre, a main street after the recapture of the town. Below: The Place de la République.

where indeed it was vitally necessary for them to hold on to prevent the cutting off of a considerable portion of their troops.

July 30 and 31 brought no important modification in the position. On the former date the British on both sides of St. Euphraise were counter-attacked by the Germans, but they failed to capture the village. Further efforts of the Germans round Sergy, to the east of Oulchy, and to the north-east of Fère were also in vain, and the Americans took the village of Seringes.

A great deal of the fighting, as has been seen, took place in woods which were practically in an uninjured condition. The Germans had foreseen this and had issued special instructions for the conduct of their troops in their fighting in the forests. It was pointed out that the dense woods would be defended by the French on the borders; those of less dense character would be defended in depth by sections. Reserves would be found along the roads near open spaces and in rear of the woods, and guns and machine guns would be posted in such a way as to sweep down the roads and rides leading through them. Compasses would have to be made free use of, to keep the direction of attack correctly. Maps were to be marked with minute accuracy show-

ing meeting-places and cross-roads where units could be re-formed. Grenades were forbidden: the reason for that is evident—they would, at such close quarters among trees be as dangerous to the users as to those they were thrown at. Light trench mortars and machine guns, rifles and pistols were all to be used. Lachrymatory shells were to be employed, but they were not to be used for an hour before the attack. The infantry advance was to be made in a thin line with machine guns, but such a formation could only be employed in thin forests; when the wood was dense, the troops were to remain on or near the roads, while the borders and flanks of the wood should be swept by machine guns from favourable ground. Small local reserves should be kept in readiness to move forward along the roads behind the advanced line of infantry. Attempts should constantly be made to outflank the enemy's posts and to circle round the woods. When the rear of a wood was reached, drums should be beaten to show the enemy he was surrounded and to inform the German troops of the position of the troops encircling various points. Guns should always be kept muzzle forward; this would, of course, involve man-handling to get them forward.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH TANKS AS SLEEPING QUARTERS FOR THEIR CREWS.

*(French official photograph.)*

ARRIVAL OF ITALIANS ON THE FRONT IN FRANCE.

The same orders contained also interesting remarks on the necessity for concealing the movements of the German troops. They were informed how important it was that every soldier should do all in his power to prevent the presence of his unit on the front being suspected. Any infringement of the regulations was liable to draw fire and imperil the life of the man himself and his comrades. Troops were to obey scrupulously all orders given them by sentinels. They were ordered to take cover from aeroplanes by remaining motionless, hiding in the shade, or lying down, and no one was to move unless it was imperatively necessary. The men were instructed, when the bombing aeroplanes were about, never to remain in large groups, but to scatter over the ground and, as far as possible, to remain in the shade. They were urged to close cooperation in all cases, particularly in helping vehicles in distress, and clearing roads, etc. By doing this they would facilitate the push forward and so improve the situation. It will be observed that the failure of the Germans, at any rate, was not due to the want of careful instructions and training.

The taking of Oulchy-le-Château on July 25, with Villemontoire on the same date, opened the way to the capture of the plateau of

Hartennes, which could now be attacked both from the south and north. The German situation here was rendered more precarious by the capture of Buzaney on July 30 and of Grand Rozoy and Beugneux on August 1. This made it easier to take Hartennes, which was carried on the evening of the same date. It was attacked on three sides by Franco-British troops, and although at first the Germans resisted with some tenacity, they were unable to withstand the direction of the assault, which threatened to cut off their troops holding this point, and they fell back towards Droizy and Launoy. They were closely followed by the French, who rapidly reached the valley of the Crise. Conflagrations seen during the night, and the noise of explosions, showed that the enemy were destroying stores they could not remove.

August 1 saw an important advance of Mangin's troops. British, French, and Americans joined in the movement by which important gains were made north of the Oureq, in front of Grand Rozoy; Beugneux, Cramoiselle, and Cramaille being taken, and south of the latter Raperie and Saponay; also 600 prisoners were captured. A little farther to the north, on the Château-Thierry road, Taux was seized, and the general line was advanced.



[French official photograph.]

**AMERICANS HAULING A BIG GUN ON
A NEWLY-MADE RAILWAY.**

connecting up between Beugneux and the ground in front of Hartennes and Taux. South of the Oureq De Mitry pushed on beyond the Meunière wood to Goussancourt and Coulonges, and reached the southern portion of the wood in front of Vezilly. Still farther to the east progress was made in front of Romigny and a mile north of Ville-en-Tardenois.

On the extreme left of the Allied line the Germans still held out to protect the line of the Aisne, but more to the south the general advance was wheeling up and pressing the Germans all along and back to the north. The general line of the Allies was now 6 to 7 miles in front of the Marne, from which the enemy had been completely driven.

The advance had not been made without severe fighting, more especially in the centre between Seringes and Cierge, where the Americans were opposed by Bavarians, Prussian Guards, and Jägers, but still the progress was steady, and it was becoming plain that the resisting power of the Germans was steadily

decreasing. The general line they now held ran from the valley of the Crise in the north along the crests of the plateau to the north-west of Fère, and to the southern edge of the forest of Nesles by Sergy and Ronnières to the hill of Sainte-Gemme, and then up by Ville-en-Tardenois, thus leaving a somewhat pronounced salient at Sainte-Gemme, of very cut-up ground, and in many places covered with wood. This salient seemed to indicate that the German Supreme Command had not yet given up completely all idea of a further advance, because it is plain that to keep this point projecting out and liable to attack on all sides was wrong, unless it was intended to advance from it. But notwithstanding this apparent contradiction, it was plain in fact that the offensive spirit was dying out of the German Army, and the next few days was to see a complete abandonment of any further offensive idea towards the south. The number of prisoners taken by the Allies on the battle front of the Marne and Champagne from July 15 to July 31 was 33,400, of whom 674 were officers.

Soissons had now (August 2) to be captured. General Villemont's brigade of Chasseurs-à-Pied broke through the German lines at Mercin, two miles west of the town, and drove back the garrison, although they were aided by a considerable artillery force. By four o'clock Mercin was captured, and the Chasseurs then advanced through the suburbs of St. Jean and St. Christophe and took possession of the ruined town which had been set on fire in many places, while the Germans made a last but vain attempt to hold a position in the Faubourg St. Vaast, on the north of the river. The Chasseurs, following up the retreating Germans, reached the village of Cuffies, about two miles up the Soissons—Folembray road. Two hours later General Mangin was able to telephone to Paris the news of a complete victory. His troops had established themselves in the town, and the bulk were then moving on eastward. The taking of Soissons was a most important gain. It gave to the French the power of transference to the northern bank of the Aisne, interrupted the railway lines running to Reims, rendered nugatory the connection made between the north and south lines on the banks of the Aisne between Missy and Sermoise, and turned the whole of the German positions on that river. Already to the south of the

Oureq the pressure on the Germans had become severe, and now the upper portion of their right flank was threatened by the 10th French Army.

The ground over which the advance had been made on the southern bank of the Aisne near Soissons was very difficult, and the long-range guns from the northern bank of the river were able to bring fire to bear on the flank of our troops' advance eastward from the town, and thus it was that until the advance of the more southern portions of the Allied line began

from the Marne, and they were compelled to retreat to the river, then Mangin's forward movement, with the capture of Soissons and Buzaney and the progression beyond, pinched off still more of the territory which the Germans held and diminished the number of passages over the river, and therefore rendered a retreat still more necessary.

By the evening of August 1, the position which has been indicated was plainly a very threatening one to the German right, and hence it was that they apparently gave up all intention



AMERICAN MILITARY POLICE ESCORTING PRISONERS.

to bring pressure on the Germans and compel the troops in the angle between Degoutte and Mangin to retire, the latter was not in a position to bring a flank attack to bear against the Germans south of Soissons. When they had to fall back they left the town an easy prey to the French advance. Generally, it may be said that the forward movement of the armies of Berthelot, De Mitry, Degoutte and the right flank of Mangin north of the Oureq was constantly narrowing the ground which the Germans could occupy, and when at the end of July this movement had pressed the Germans well back

of a further offensive and abandoned Soissons the next day. General Mangin's left flank then swept up the valley of the Crise, and during the night on to the high ground to the east of it, and with the British divisions and his own troops he continued the advance eastward. Degoutte pushed towards Fismes up the valley of the Orillon, while De Mitry and Berthelot, advancing over the road from Dormans to Reims, threatened Ville-en-Tardenois and the ground to the west of Reims. Farther south, the Dôle road was reached, and the French were well up the valley of the Orillon beyond Coulonges. Farther east, the

line of Vezilly—Lhery was reached, while to the east of these points Gueux and Thillois were attained, and thus the Vesle in the neighbourhood of Reims was reached.

The fighting of the two British divisions, the 15th and 34th, is worthy of more detailed account, for it was some of the hardest that had taken place in the war. Our troops went forward on July 28, when they formed a flank guard to the French attacking the German line more to the south. They advanced on Buzancy and the high ground beyond it, and by midday the front line of the Scottish Division was through the village, and a number of prisoners were taken. The position was by no means an easy one to hold, for the high ground on the Aisne enabled the German long-range guns to bring an enfilade fire to bear on the village; it was found impossible to hold it, and our troops were therefore compelled to fall back. The French on their right reached a position which was very strongly held by machine guns, and were unable to advance. The Scottish troops, therefore, who had taken the village, were compelled to abandon it, and take up a defensive position on its western outskirts, but the next day they went on again and completed the conquest of the enemy's works. They were continuously engaged, and on

August 1 carried the dominating country between the Aisne and the Oureq. Their conduct gave rise to the following "Order of the Day" addressed to them by General Mangin:

"You came into the battle at its fiercest moment. The enemy, defeated the first time, brought up against us his best divisions in numbers superior to our own. You continued to advance, foot after foot, in spite of his bitter resistance, and you held on to the conquered ground notwithstanding the violence of his counter-attacks. Then, on August 1, side by side with your French colleagues, you carried the height dominating the country between the Aisne and the Oureq, which the defenders had been ordered to hold at all costs. Having failed in his attempts to retake the height with his last reserves, the enemy was compelled to retreat, pursued and harassed for a distance of seven miles. All you English and Scottish troops, both the young soldiers and the victors of Flanders and Palestine, have shown the magnificent qualities of your race, namely, indomitable courage and tenacity. You have won the admiration of your brothers-in-arms. Your country will be proud of you, for to you and to your commanders is due in large measure the victory which we have just gained against



[Official photograph.]

BRITISH TROOPS STARTING ON A DAYLIGHT PATROL INTO ALBERT.



[Official photograph.]

SCOTS ON THE MARCH.

the barbarous enemies of all free peoples. I am happy to have you under my command, and I thank you."

On August 3 still more progress was made, and by evening the line of the Aisne and of the Vesle as far as Fismes was reached, the Americans facing the last-named point. To the east of Fismes the Allied troops were on the high ground which dominated the river, while their outposts were pushed on down to the southern bank. In 24 hours the French had advanced over more than six miles, and retaken 50 villages from the Germans.

North of the Vesle, close to Fismes, the Germans had thrown up a strong position which was held by two divisions

On the next day, August 4, the Allies throw three bridges and secured them with bridgeheads, at La Grange Farm, above the town of Braine, at Le Venteux Farm, east of Fismes, and a few miles farther east at Jonchery.

The Americans moved forward against Fismes; they had to wade across the Vesle west of the town under machine-gun fire from the heights above the river and of artillery fire from the heights higher up. A direct attack was also made on the town itself, and here the Germans fought with considerable tenacity

until the outflanking movement of the Americans, which brought them down against the northern side of the roads leading northwards from Fismes, threatened the capture of the whole garrison; and when the Germans appreciated this they broke back in disorder, and as they fled from the town towards the Vesle they were played upon by machine guns, and lost heavily. This little town was not completely taken until the next day, for here and there small posts still held out.

On the west of Reims the Vesle was also reached, and in spite of a lively resistance parties managed to cross the river between Muizon and Champigny, while more to the north our line was taken on to the outskirts of La Neuville.

On this date the Germans also commenced to retreat in the Montdidier region behind the Avre and on the British front behind the Ancre on both sides of Albert. These were both positions calculated to favour an offensive from them, which shows that the fighting on the Marne had begun to take effect on the whole German line. The withdrawal to the right bank of the Avre between Montdidier and Moreuil was on a front of ten miles. The French held Hargicourt and Braches, and were in the outskirts of Courtemanche. On the British front,



[Official photograph.]

A REGIMENTAL FIRST-AID POST.

in retiring behind the Ancre, the Germans had surrendered the villages of Hamel, north of Albert, and Dernancourt, south of it.

On the Marne the rate of progress on this day was becoming slower. The weather was bad. The troops were tired with their tremendous exertions, and the difficulty of movement along the cut-up roads necessarily diminished the rate of advance. It was evident that the enemy had not completely given up the idea of standing between the Vesle and the Aisne, because he had artillery in position on the watershed between the two rivers. He was also in a more favourable position for opposing the advance of the Allies. His line was now much shortened by giving up the extension to Soissons, and therefore capable of greater resistance. But there was still the disadvantage of the French holding the passage of the river at St. Vaast and also farther west at Pommiers, and hence the right flank of the enemy's forces was still exposed to attack. Nor could the position between the Vesle and the Aisne be looked upon as a very advantageous one. It had very little depth, and the Aisne, while forming a good obstacle to a frontal attack, was an extremely bad one to have behind a defensive line, being difficult to cross except at the bridges, which would be under fire from

the French guns when they had won the watershed. On the whole, therefore, it was fairly evident that it would be prudent for the Germans to retire to their old position on the Chemin-des-Dames. From there they were still in a position to threaten Reims, as their line turned southwards towards Berry-au-Bac and Nogent-l'Abbesse.

Believing that their successful advance was a certainty, they had accumulated huge masses of stores and ammunition quite close up to the front. So great was the number of shells that an American officer declared that it seemed impossible for any army to have had the number the Germans had abandoned in their retirement. A good deal of these were now falling into the hands of the Allies, and were used against the enemy, still more were being destroyed by the Germans themselves. Explosions of ammunition dumps and burnings of stores were daily and nightly visible.

The Germans had now begun to admit that they were falling back "according to plan," but in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, commenting on the beginning of the fifth year of war, Count Reventlow wrote that it was "marked in the German press by reflections showing an act of deepest resignation and melancholy and even of protest. The trait of defeatism which in these

days runs through German public life has a pronouncedly weakening effect, and the more so because in those who are affected by it an underlying conviction may be perceived, or is even expressly stated." The *Cologne Gazette*, at the end of July, remarked that "a true offensive spirit against our enemies is lacking at home. In this connection there is no more instructive comparison than that of our arch-enemy—Great Britain; for Britain's home front has no loopholes and no weak spots. On all points of real vital importance to Great Britain no party and no class will make any concessions in our favour."

There can be no doubt that by this time the enemy was in a depressed frame of mind. The perpetual assertion of victories which had not been gained; of prisoners who had not been taken; which statements the troops themselves knew to be without foundation, were beginning to have their effect. The perpetual promises that the submarines were going to end the war were also found to be untrue, and the German soldiers were beginning to appreciate real facts. A letter written by a man in a trench-mortar company, dated July 21, shows that even then the situation was pretty accurately judged. It ran as follows: "You will be back in the thick of the mist now.

Shirk it as much as you can; don't be stupid; we are risking our lives for the bigwigs. Our regiment is nearly wiped out, but we didn't push on very far. This war is becoming the greatest massacre that ever was. What is going to happen I don't know. Germany is slowly crumbling to pieces."

At the end of July it was officially stated by the Germans that they had taken since July 15 more than 24,000 prisoners. It was plain and palpable that this could not be true, because, except on the first day of the fighting, the Germans were absolutely unsuccessful, and unsuccessful troops do not reap large captures. This comes out quite clearly from the statements of Ludendorff and Hindenburg. Even Ludendorff, on August 2, was constrained to admit that the German strategic offensive plan had not succeeded. "Its result was limited to a tactical success. The enemy evaded us on July 15, and we thereupon, as early as the evening of July 16, broke off operations. It is always our endeavour to stop an undertaking as soon as the result is not worth the cost, because I consider it one of my principal duties to spare the blood and the strength of our soldiers."

Field-Marshal Hindenburg on the same date said: "Our troops have accustomed them



[Australian official photograph.]

A GERMAN HOWITZER CAPTURED BY THE AUSTRALIANS

selves to the Americans just as quickly as the black Frenchmen. They had to leave many of their own men strewn in front of our positions, whereas we were economical with our soldiers.



RUINS OF SOISSONS CATHEDRAL.

This circumstance and supply considerations decide our measures. We transferred the fighting to more favourable ground in order to facilitate the fighting and vital condition of our troops by better supplies."

Field-Marshal Haig's Special Order of the day, dated August 4, the anniversary of our entry into the War, was a far more accurate summation of the situation than any of the German statements:—

"The conclusion of the fourth year of the war marks the passing of a period of crisis. We can now with added confidence look forward to the future. The Revolution in Russia set free large hostile forces on the Eastern front, which were transferred to the West. It was the enemy's intention to use his great numbers thus created to gain a decisive victory before the arrival of American troops should give superiority to the Allies.

"The enemy has made his effort to obtain a decision on the Western front, and has failed. The steady stream of American troops arriving in France has already restored the balance. The enemy's first and most powerful blows fell on the British; his superiority of force was nearly three to one. Although he succeeded in pressing back parts of the fronts attacked, the British line remained unbroken. After many days of heroic fighting, the glory of which will live for all time in the history of our race, the enemy was held.

"At the end of four years of war the magnificent fighting qualities and spirit of our troops remain of the highest order. I thank them for the devoted bravery and unshaken resolution with which they responded to my appeal at the height of the struggle, and I know that they will show a like steadfastness and courage in whatever task they may yet be called upon to perform."

On August 5 the Germans admitted that their rear guards, in accordance with orders, had withdrawn to the north bank of the Vesle, and along the whole of the front from Soissons they continued to fall back. The weather had turned execrable and the Vesle itself was in flood. From this day the position that both sides occupied from Soissons to Reims may be considered as fairly settled. There was now a comparative lull in this part of the theatre of war.

On August 6 General Foch was created a Marshal of France, a promotion which he had most certainly earned by his masterly conduct of the war since the date on which he first took over the supreme direction.

The following telegram, dated August 7, was sent to Marshal Foch, Commanding-in-Chief Allied Forces, by Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig:—

"Please allow me, my dear Maréchal, on my own behalf and that of all ranks of the British Armies under my command, to send you our very heartiest congratulations on your attaining to the highest military rank. It is a fitting recognition of your magnificent work for the Allies ever since the commencement of the war, now so gloriously crowned by this second victory of the Marne.

"It is especially pleasing to me, personally, who have been associated so intimately and so continuously with you ever since October, 1914, to be able to congratulate you to-day on this great distinction which we all take to be a happy augury for the future."

On August 7, between Braine and Fismes, French and American troops crossed the river and established positions on the northern bank which they held against two determined attacks made by the enemy. German attacks between the Oise and the Aisne between Vailly and Tracy-le-Val were repulsed. To the north of Reims, the French advanced again between the Réthel and Laon railways, and conquered some ground.

Returning to the region of the Somme, and to the north of it: on July 23, on the line of the Avre, the French attacked at a point some

seven miles north of Montdidier on a front of about four miles, and took the villages of Mailly-Raineval, Sauvillers and Aubvillers. These three villages had been in the possession of the enemy ever since the offensive at the end of March. The main object of the attack was the big plateau of Sauvillers, which, when gained, commanded the ground towards the river. Aubvillers and Mailly-Raineval formed, as it were, two flank guards to the central part of the position. It was strongly fortified with an almost continuous line of trenches covered by numerous machine-guns nests in the woods, while in the villages themselves

of July 26, and the Germans were cleared off the high ground back to the valley of the Avre.

It had always been the object of the Allies to stop the German advance on the western side of the Avre, and this new attack effectually put an end to any hostile efforts in this direction, as it established the French firmly on the western bank of the Avre in a position which greatly supported the line of trenches down that river and protected the flank against an attack over the Doms brook between the Avre and Montdidier. It was a successful operation, and resulted in the taking of 1,850 prisoners, including 52



M. Clemenceau. M. Poincaré.

[French official photograph.
General Foch.

**PRESENTATION OF THE BATON OF A MARSHAL OF FRANCE TO
GENERAL FOCH.**

the cellars had been improved into strong points of resistance. The attack was preceded by British tanks, which did very useful work and disposed of a large number of machine-gun positions. The assault was a complete surprise to the enemy, and he did not begin a counter-fire of artillery till it had been some time in progress, with the result that it inflicted very little damage on the troops engaged. The result of this action was that the centre of the German line on the western side of the Avre was penetrated, and thus their troops on the north were separated from those on the south of the French ingress. West of Morisel a wood was occupied on the morning

officers, among whom were four battalion commanders, in addition to which four 77 mm. guns, 45 trench mortars, and 300 machine-guns were captured. The French losses were only about one-tenth of the number of prisoners they took.

On the next day British troops carried out a successful raid near Bucquoy, midway between Arras and Albert, capturing 18 prisoners, and a few more were taken by another raiding party north-west of the latter point.

There was also a considerable liveliness at the northern end of our line in the Scherpenberg area about this date, where the Germans indulged in a considerable amount of artillery



[French official photograph.]

MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES CAPTURED AT MAILLY-RAINEVAL, SAUVILLERS, AND AUBVILLERS.

fire, to which we replied with equal vigour. A similar action occurred on our side of the Lys in the Béthune area and to the south of it.

The country round Hébuterne was also subjected to considerable bombardment, to which we replied, and the New Zealanders on July 25 pushed their line farther forward under its cover. The German troops in the front line on the Anere, and also at Aveluy wood, near Albert, where they were on low ground, had suffered greatly from the artillery fire. The wood was taken. Against Villers-Bretonneux the enemy indulged in a severe gas bombardment, but our troops were prepared for it and suffered nothing much more than inconvenience.

On July 26 the Germans attacked our positions about Hébuterne, and also in the Flêtre-Meteren area, but on both occasions were driven back after sharp fighting, as also were raids attempted against our posts in Aveluy wood and at Vieux-Berquin. The attack at this point was of a more serious character than the others. It was preceded by a heavy bombardment, and followed by an infantry assault, executed by six companies, two furnished by each of three different regiments of the 12th German Division. Their idea was apparently to reach and hold the line of road south-west of Meteren towards Strazeele, probably as a jumping-off point for a farther advance; but it was completely unsuccessful, except at one point, where they succeeded in penetrating the line, only to be turned out at once by a counter-attack.

The harassing fire of our artillery in the Ypres portion of our line inflicted considerable loss on the Germans. Their troops had to lie out in the open fields before Meteren, and got very little cover; moreover, the heavy rains had seriously affected them. Between the discomfort and the casualties, a considerable moral effect had been created on the German infantry.

On July 27 there was a certain amount of raiding activity near Albert, Arras, and Lens, and on July 28 about Arras, Loere, and Givenchy.

Early on the morning of July 29 the Germans made another advance in the neighbourhood of Morlancourt between the Somme and the Anere. It will be remembered that from early in May our troops had been constantly pushing on and thrusting back the Germans from their close proximity to Amiens. Vaire Wood and the village of Hamel had been taken south of the Somme and north of the river the villages of Treux and Ville-sous-Corbie had been captured. These little affairs had varied from mere raids to operations of some magnitude, and now the object was to gain the high ground south of Morlancourt, where the German lines ran over the ridge across the Corbie-Bray road. Two successive lines were captured, 143 prisoners and 36 machine-guns were taken. The whole depth advanced was 500 yards along a front of over two miles; very little opposition was made by the Germans. This gain strengthened the position and made another obstacle to an advance on Amiens.

On the same date the Canadians carried out two successful raids, one on the north and the other on the south side of Gavrelle, north-east of Arras. Three counter-attacks were easily beaten off. Shortly after midnight patrols from the Australian First Division entered the enemy's positions about Merris, east of Hazebrouck. The village was surrounded and captured and 169 prisoners and a number of trench mortars and machine-guns taken.

During July 31 hostile artillery developed a lively fire against Merris in the Kemmel sector ; otherwise there was nothing of importance.

There was still a good deal of minor fighting on the north of the Somme towards Ypres, and on August 3 our patrols in the neighbourhood of Albert made further progress, and the greater part of the ground previously held by the enemy west of the Ancre river was captured by us. A hostile raid against our line south-east of Hébuterne was completely repulsed.

By Sunday morning (August 4) our patrols had reached the river Ancre between Dernancourt and Hamel, and a hostile raid to the south of Arras was driven back without further loss. The result of this constant harassing of the German front led to an important result, for, on August 4, as already mentioned, the Germans abandoned their front line positions on the

Ancre section of the British front, over a length of 12 miles from Beaumont-Hamel to Dernancourt. The retreat extended to a depth varying from 1½ miles to 2 miles, though occasionally it was deeper, and it showed that in this portion of the front the enemy had given up all idea of a further advance towards Amiens.

The offensive of the end of March had not enabled the Germans to push across the Ancre and up the western slopes to the high ground, which, indeed, they had reached at very few points, being definitely held from Hébuterne to La Signy Farm, and they were thus prevented from occupying the dominating hill south-west of the latter point. They were also thrust back at Auehonvillers, though they managed to cling to the eastern edge of the plateau near Beaumont-Hamel, and also by Mesnil to the northern rim of Aveluy Wood. The position they held was an unfavourable one. They had no command of view westward, and the swamps of the river valley lay immediately behind their backs. Similarly, to the east of Bouzincourt, they were beaten back, and only retained a precarious footing on the eastern edge of the summit. The position was too dangerous to be adhered to unless they made further progress ; but as the continual pressure exercised by the British troops against them



[French official photograph.]

MAILLY-RAINEVAL SET ON FIRE BY THE GERMANS.

prevented this, they made the best of a bad job, and now retreated from their front line, which was fully exposed to our artillery attack, and was also severely dealt with by our aeroplanes. The result of this combined treatment was that the German troops scarcely dared move by day, and even in the darkness had to come by by-paths and winding tracks so as to avoid the bombing of the aeroplanes. On the north side of Albert, above Aveluy, there was one place where the only means of access was a causeway across the 500-yards wide marsh of the valley bottom. Along this all troops and supplies had to move. Unceasingly pounded night and day, supplies and vehicles could not cross at all, and even the troops had to run across it at a rapid pace.

The retirement actually began on the night of August 1-2. On that night a patrol of Yorkshire troops raiding the enemy's line found it occupied only by pioneers who had come up to destroy the dug-outs and other military works as soon as the infantry had retired.

On August 2 our troops began to move forward, and by the afternoon of August 3 had reached the Ancre all along the line aimed at. Here and there a few machine-guns were left, but with this exception the lines were abandoned, and the Germans had retired to the

east side of the Ancre from Dernancourt to a point near St. Pierre-Divion

Altogether, during the month of July, the British captured 4,503 prisoners, including 89 officers, this being the total along the general front.

On August 5 we made further small advances in the neighbourhood of Neuville-Vitasse, south-east of Arras, and also at Pacaut Wood, east of Robecq. There was also considerable artillery fire along the whole front.

There had not been much fighting on the northern part of the Allied line, though on July 27 and 29 there was some increase of artillery fire against the Belgians, and the latter captured some prisoners to the north of Dixmude and in the Merckem area.

In front of the French on the Avre the Germans were also retiring, the French following up closely on the retreating troops. Strong outpost lines were left; but the distance to which the main line was taken back was considerable. The retirement was largely due to the threatening position the Allies occupied on the Luce.

The way in which our aviators aided the advance has been alluded to in describing the operations, but a very important part of their duties was carrying the war into the enemy's



[French official photograph.]

BRINGING UP AMMUNITION FOR THE FRENCH GUNS AT THE FRONT.

country by long-range bombing expeditions, treating the Germans in the way in which they treated England and France. We only differed from them in one detail—whereas for preference they selected undefended towns or hospital areas, we confined our efforts to military objectives. The bombardment of the important powder factory of Rottweil on July 22 has already been alluded to. On the afternoon of the same day the station at Offenburg was also hit, and many long-distance reconnaissances were completed during the day.

The next day but little flying was possible owing to wind and rain, which, as we have seen, also affected the German retreat from the Marne.

On July 24, in spite of the weather, which, however, was not so bad as on the previous day, a considerable amount of bombing was done behind the German lines. Towards evening it cleared, and there was some sharp fighting in the air, in which we accounted for 18 hostile machines, with the loss of only three to ourselves. Two trains were hit, and thousands of rounds fired from machine-guns at various targets. All our night-working machines returned in safety. During the night over 24 tons of bombs were dropped on the railways at Valenciennes, Seclin, Courtrai, and Armentières.

July 25 saw an improvement in the weather, though there was still a high wind. Visibility was, however, so much improved that more work could be undertaken. In addition to the usual work close up to the Army, three large ammunition dumps behind the front, the docks at Bruges, and numerous villages used as billets by the enemy's troops were bombed. In spite of the fact that the strong west wind favoured the enemy, as it enabled him to escape from our aviators while they had to fly back home against it, 21 of their machines were dealt with and a hostile balloon was also shot down, but on this occasion we had to pay the penalty with 15 of our own. After dark our night-bombing machines again attacked the railway at Courtrai and Seclin and dropped over 300 bombs on rest billets. All our machines returned safely, but one of the enemy's night-flying aeroplanes, which had attempted to go behind our lines, was brought down by anti-aircraft fire. The French also were very active on this date. They brought down seven German machines and dropped over 38 tons of projectiles by day and night—on railway stations, lines of communication, dumps, etc., behind the front zone of battle.

During the night of July 25-26 successful attacks were carried out on the station and factory at Pforzheim in Baden (north-west of Stuttgart), the factory at Baalon, 25 miles north of Verdun, and the station at Offenburg; at the latter point two fires were seen to break



A GERMAN BOMBER.

out. Four hostile aerodromes were bombed and attacked with machine-gun fire, besides which trains, anti-aircraft batteries, and searchlights were also fired upon with the machine-guns and in spite of all the Germans could do the whole of our machines returned unscathed.

During the next two days the weather put almost an entire stop to daylight operations and there was but small activity on our part at night.

On July 28, in spite of low clouds, our air-men did good work. Ten tons of bombs were distributed over various military objectives in the neighbourhood of Douai, Armentières, Bapaume, and Chaulnes. There was some fighting in the air, in which we brought down nine hostile aeroplanes and two balloons with a cost to ourselves of four only. The night saw our men again at work with great energy, and various back areas were bombed, all our machines returning in safety.

On the night of July 29-30 our Independent

Air Force attacked the railway stations at Offenburg, Rastatt, and Baden. Stuttgart and Sölingen were also attacked. Sölingen is a small town between Karlsruhe and Pforzheim; Rastatt—at one time a fortified town of considerable strength—and Baden are respectively 13 and 22 miles south of Karlsruhe. Offenburg lies to the south-west of Stuttgart.

On the morning of July 30 Offenburg was again attacked and good results were obtained. The station at Lahr, not far from Strasburg, was also bombed. On this road three enemy machines were crashed and another driven down out of control. Only one of our machines was missing.

The work of our machines more immediately in connexion with the troops, although somewhat interfered with by ground mists and low visibility, was very active on July 29, many tons of bombs being dropped and 14 German



Official photograph.

R.A.F. PHOTOGRAPHIC OFFICER SHOWING A PILOT THE AREA TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED.

machines destroyed with the loss of only two to ourselves.

The French were as active as ourselves on July 28 and 29 and did a good deal of excellent work in the immediate rear of the German forces.

On the night of July 30-31 the Independent Air Force was again active. Stuttgart was once more visited and some two tons of bombs were dropped on the Bosche-Magneto works, the Daimler works, and the railway station, where a fire was seen to break out. At Hagenau the station and barracks were also bombed

and a heavy explosion was observed. Remilly junction and two German aerodromes were also attacked with bombs and machine-gun fire.

At 7.30 a.m. on July 31 one of our squadrons attacked Coblenz station. Clouds prevented the observation of results. The station and factories at Saarbrücken also received two attacks on this morning. Our first formation was met by a considerable number of hostile scouts before reaching their objective. In the fighting which ensued four of our machines were shot down. They succeeded in bombing their objective, but on the return journey were again heavily attacked and lost three more machines. The second attack was completely successful, bursts were observed in a factory and although attacked by hostile scouts all machines returned in safety, from which it may be deduced that the Germans had had enough of air fighting when they met our first squadron.

On the night of July 31 German aeroplanes attacked Rouen and Havre. There were no casualties at the first town; one killed and four slightly injured at the second.

An interesting detail was revealed on this day by two British airmen who were forced to land at Valkenisse near Walcheren. They were obliged to come down to earth because the water-tank of their machine was injured by a fragment of shrapnel when they were at a height of some 14,000 feet, but they ascertained that the Zeebrugge Canal was still completely shut off by our sunken ships and that great damage was done to the locks during the recent bombing. It was also learned that a fortnight previously some of the bombs dropped at Bruges fell among 400 German marines who were drilling, causing a large number of casualties, while others blew up an ammunition dépôt situated at the land end of Zeebrugge Mole.

During the month of July the number of German machines destroyed or captured by the British airmen or gunners on the Western front was 316; in addition to which 36 balloons were accounted for. The French claim 184, besides 154 which were seen falling out of control; also they destroyed 49 German captive balloons. Of our aeroplanes 117 failed to return to their aerodromes, 14 of which belonged to the Independent Force. In addition to the definitely ascertained casualties, 98 enemy machines were driven down out of control. German balloons to the number of 48 were shot down by the Allied forces. Against



[Official photograph

RETURN OF A BATTLE-SCARRED BOMBER.

these successes the Germans claim to have accounted for 316 machines and 19 balloons.

On the morning of August 1 a squadron belonging to the British Independent Air Force started out to bomb Cologne, but finding it enveloped in cloud, turned and dropped their bombs on the factories of Düren, half way between Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle. A fire was seen to break out. All our machines returned in safety. A second squadron attacked the railway workshops at Trèves with some success. They were heavily attacked by a large number of German machines, of which they destroyed three, losing only one; thus the two expeditions were executed with only one casualty against three inflicted on the enemy. The German account, with its usual veracity, reports that six of our big battle-planes were destroyed by six of their machines before they dropped any bombs, and out of the second squadron one British aeroplane was brought down. Evidently the German observers had been unable to see through the clouds which covered Cologne from our men. On the same date the French dropped some 24 tons of bombs on various objectives behind the German lines, and in the ensuing night a further 10 tons of bombs were distributed on railway lines, stations, and aerodromes. These

results were obtained with a loss of only two machines, while 17 of the enemy's were accounted for.

The next day the weather was very unfavourable and at night no flying was possible.

On August 3 the weather was again unpropitious, but some work was done, and although the night was very dark, five tons were dropped by us on the stations of Fives, south-east of Lille, and Steenwerck.

August 4 and 5 were almost without incident in the air, but the next day there was some recrudescence and 24 tons of bombs were dropped by us and five German machines were accounted for. We lost none.

On the morning of August 8 our machines carried out a successful attack on the explosive factories at Rombach, north of Metz. Good results were obtained without any casualties to us. These results must be regarded as very satisfactory, and show that the Allies had now obtained a distinct superiority in the air.

The active operations, so far as the Crown Prince's armies were concerned, came to an end on August 5. They were driven back to the Aisne. They had suffered heavy losses in men and material, but there was no dissolution of the organization of the units and on the whole the

retirement took place in fair order, which was the more remarkable as they had lost heavily in prisoners, killed, and wounded and day after day had also to abandon a large amount of material.

The German Army had now made four great efforts and one smaller to penetrate into the Allied lines and had been brought up in all of them.* They had in these efforts used up a large proportion of their reserves,

undergone their *baptême-de-feu* and had proved themselves to be good men.

Marshal Foch had from the time he took over the command impressed a definite character on the operations of the Allied Armies. His plan was ably conceived and had been well carried out by the Allied Commanders. It was no light task to devote himself at first in difficult circumstances to a patient and obstinate defensive and to keep in suspense any counter move-



From a German photograph.

AMONG THE CLOUDS.

and had no means of replenishing them. On the other hand, the Allies were becoming stronger day by day. The French had replaced a good proportion of their losses, and the fresh troops which had come over from England in the late spring and early summer had by now been incorporated into various units and properly trained. The British Army was ready to assume the offensive, and considerable access of strength was now being gained by the rapidly growing numbers of trained troops in the American Army. Many of these had

* March 21 against our Third and Fifth Armies.

April 9 against the British and Portuguese between Armentières and La Bassée.

May 27 against the French at the Chemin-des-Dames.

June 9 against the French from Montdidier to Noyon, smaller affair.

July 14 against the French east and west of Reims and down to the Marne.

ment until the circumstances were absolutely those which were required for its success. His apparently passive attitude was not allowed to pass without criticism. Many amateurs of the closet thought he might have attacked before he did; but he knew better; he measured the pulse of battle accurately. He waited until its beats slowed down, and when the Crown Prince's army by its wild rush to the Marne exposed its right flank in the way that the French leader rightly foresaw it very likely would, he turned on it and attacked with concentrated vigour. The result of his action has just been described. This preliminary campaign was an earnest of further successes, more especially as circumstances were continually becoming more favourable to him.

On July 23, by which time it was quite plain

that the Soissons-Reims attack of the Germans was a failure, a Conference was held at which were present the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the leaders of the British, French and American Armies. Marshal Foch asked Field-Marshal Haig, General Pétain, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies in the north and north-east, and General Pershing each to prepare a scheme for local offensives to be begun at once with certain definite objectives of a limited nature. So far as the British Army was concerned, its main object was to be the thrusting back of the German front so as to free the Paris-Amiens railroad, and for this purpose it was necessary to attack the flat salient occupied by the Germans from Albert down to the Oise.

The French and American Armies were to free other strategic railroads for operations farther south and east. It was also desirable to put an end to the threat on Hazebrouck and through this town to the northern French ports. This involved the recapture of Kemmel Hill and the general pressing back of the salient which the Germans had won at Kemmel earlier in the year, combined with an operation in the direction of La Bassée. If this could be successfully carried out, it would greatly improve the British position at Ypres and put an end to all fear of a German break-through down to the ports which were important bases for our supplies. It would, moreover, ensure the safety of the Bruay coal mines, which were of enormous importance to the north of France and Belgium.

Field-Marshal Haig had carefully considered the different operations open to the British Army and had discussed them with Marshal Foch. Ultimately, after much thought, he had come to the conclusion that the Amiens direction was the most pressing and the most promising in immediate results. To press back the Germans here was to intensify their defeat on the Marne, and would completely relieve Paris of all danger and put an end to any hope of separating the British from the French forces. The more northern operation could wait until this was successful.

The general idea of the operations to be undertaken arrived at was, after dealing successfully with the more pressing requirements in front of Amiens, that the British forces should attack the line St. Quentin-Cambrai, while the French and American Armies would converge in an attack on Mezières. If this

combination was successfully carried out, the communications of the Germans, which ran back through the line Maubeuge-Hirson-Mezières and by which line their forces on the Champagne front could be supplied and maintained would be threatened, if not interrupted. Once Maubeuge was occupied, a forward movement of the Allies on Mons and towards Brussels would threaten the main line of communication between Belgium and Germany on which the supply and maintenance of the troops in the former country depended, and this of course would have been a powerful adjunct to any



A CAMOUFLAGED GERMAN SEARCH-LIGHT.

direct advance on the German Armies between Brussels, Antwerp, and Ghent.

The Germans were quite aware of the vital character of any advance between St. Quentin and Cambrai. This was clearly shown when General Byng had made his successful advance, in November, 1917; his unexpected irruption had caused the Germans to accumulate every available man they could against his army. It was unfortunate that lack of numbers had prevented the operation being the brilliant success it might otherwise have been.

This part of the German front was defended by the great organized zone to which the general name of the Hindenburg line may be applied. The main Hindenburg line ran down from Lille, past Le Catelet to La Fère-Laon-Vouziers-Verdun, through the St. Mihiel salient to Pagny. Part of the line from about the Aisne to the southern end was known as the Brunnhilde; somewhat in advance of it very near Lens were the Wotan, the Siegfried, and Alberich lines running to Reims. Behind the



THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF AUGUST 8, 1918.

main line was another fortified system running from Douai by Mezières-Sedan-Montmédy down to where the Brunnhilde line terminated about Pagny. An additional reserve system was under construction, which ran from Valenciennes to Givet. It does not appear that this was ever completed. But at any rate, the lines were extensive and formidable, and their capture could scarcely be calculated upon without very serious resistance.

The special idea so far as the forces entrusted to Sir Douglas Haig were concerned was the attack on the German positions from Albert and Villers-Bretonneux back to the Hindenburg line between St. Quentin and the Scarpe, and behind them was the Hindenburg line of defences.

To strengthen the British force, the French First Army under General Doheney was placed at Sir Douglas Haig's disposal, and to strengthen his attack, which was to be conducted mainly by the British Fourth Army, he added to it the Canadian Corps and the two British Divisions (from the First Army) which had been held in readiness astride the Somme as has been previously described, ante p. 83.

On the evening of August 7, along the line from which the attack was to be made, the following were the dispositions: Between the Ancre and the Luce from Albert to Hangard the Fourth British Army, under General Sir Henry Rawlinson, was faced across the Somme by nine German Divisions belonging to the Second German Army under General von der Marwitz. From Hangard to Courcelles, south-east of Montdidier, was the First French Army, opposed by von Hutier's Eighteenth German Army; south of the First Army was the Third French Army under General Humbert, prolonging the front to the junction of the Matz with the Oise. The situation was in some ways a repetition of that which had taken place on the Marne. There Mangin and Degoutte had been on the right flank of the German salient. On this occasion the Third French Army would, when the frontal attack by the British and French directly facing the Germans had sufficiently developed, strike against the left flank of von Hutier's Army and help to drive it back.

Sir Douglas Haig was placed in command of the First French Army as well as the British troops, and he was responsible for its movements. Humbert, with the Third French Army, would enter into action at the

moment considered by Marshal Foch to be favourable.

The plan of operations designed by Sir Douglas Haig was to strike in an easterly and south-easterly direction, using the river Somme to cover the left flank of his troops, aiming in the first instance at the line between Méricourt-sur-



RUSTIC QUARTERS IN THE HINDENBURG LINE.

Somme and Le Quesnel, so as to push back the Germans and render more secure the railroad from Paris to Amiens. The next step was to be the capture of Roye and the important railway junction of Chaulnes. The advantages to be gained from the capture of the latter point are evident. In the case of Roye the great object was to cut the railway connexions of the Germans in the country between Lassigny and Montdidier, and this object would be eventually made easier by the action of the Third French Army striking up in a northerly direction from its initial position. As early as July 13 General Rawlinson had received instructions to be ready to attack to the east of Amiens at an early date, and the Canadian Corps and the two British Divisions from the Somme were added to his army. On July 28

the First French Army was definitely placed under Sir Douglas Haig for the proposed attack.

Elaborate preparations were taken to mislead the enemy and to lead him to think that no movement was intended in the direction in which it was to be carried out. For this purpose considerable preparations were made to lead the Germans to think that the British attack would be made in Flanders. Canadian battalions were put into line on the Kemmel



GENERAL VON DER MARWITZ.
Commanded the German Second Army.

front so that the enemy might recognize their position there. Headquarters for various Army Corps were prepared and casualty clearing stations constructed in positions where they could be easily observed by the Germans in the Somme area. Great activity took place on our wireless stations on the First Army front, and arrangements were made to lead the enemy to suppose that a great concentration of tanks was taking place round St. Pol, all this pointing to the main attack being in the direction of Ypres. In that area, too, combined training operations with infantry and tanks were carried out on days on which the enemy's long-distance reconnoitring and photographing aeroplanes were likely to work behind our lines. The consequence of all this activity was that the Germans thoroughly believed that a large and important operation on the northern front was about to begin, and during the course of the actual movements definite evidence was obtained that such had been their belief.

Final details for the combined British and

French attack were ready early in August and the morning of August 8 was fixed as the day on which the attack was to commence. The line held by the Australian Corps on the right of the British Fourth Army was extended southward so as to include the Amiens-Roye road and the Canadian Corps was brought up by night behind this portion of our lines. There was to be a large collection of tanks, but their concentration was put off till the last moment and carried out as secretly as possible.

We have already seen that the enemy had during the early part of August drawn somewhat backward from the positions he had held west of the Avre and Ancre rivers, which was of some advantage to our troops, though scarcely affecting the general position, but the Germans seem still to have had some notion of attacking towards Amiens, and a strong local attack was launched by them on August 6 south of Morlancourt, which fell on the III. Army Corps on the left of General Rawlinson's Army. This added to the difficulty which this unit had when the attack commenced on August 8.

The operation undertaken by the Germans at 4.30 a.m. on August 6 was made by fresh troops of their 27th Division and was preceded by considerable artillery fire and heavy gas shelling. The ground chosen for attack was that which the Australians had taken and consolidated on July 28-29, south of Morlancourt. It was to a great extent successful, the advanced positions along most of the front being captured and held by the enemy during the day, but the next morning our troops counter-attacked and drove him out of the captured position and practically re-established the original line of our front. As a set-off against this temporary success of the Germans, the French troops progressed on the same date, made a further movement to the Avre, seizing the left bank between Morisel and Braches. The German raid to the south-east of Montdidier broke down completely.

It is possible that the Morlancourt incident was the commencement of a further important attack by the Germans, and this is somewhat borne out by the statement of von Ardenne in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of August 6, which runs as follows :

It is clear that the defensive battle now being fought by our retreating troops will not be continued indefinitely. The German offensive has suffered an unpleasant interruption, but it will certainly be resumed. A fact which will contribute to such a resumption of the offensive is

that our armies between the Aisne and the Marne were able to carry out these operations with their own reserves, without being obliged to draw upon those army reserves the unrestricted use of which secures the initiative to the German Supreme Command. Apart from other factors, the happy confidence of our army leaders, which has recently been described by our war correspondents, guarantees that this freedom of initiative will, at the right time, be utilized.

It may here be remarked that the "freedom of initiative" was henceforth to remain in the hands of the Allies until the armistice.

There was no old-fashioned preliminary bombardment which only served to warn the enemy; but at 4.20 a.m. on August 8 the massed British artillery opened a devastating fire against the whole front of attack, completely crushing the enemy's batteries, some of which indeed never succeeded in going into action.

General Rawlinson's attack was made on a front of over 11 miles from the south of the Amiens-Roye road to Morlancourt inclusive. On the left, north of the Somme, was the III. Corps under Lieut.-General Sir H. K. Butler, who had the 58th and 18th Divisions in front line and the 12th Division in support. On the right of this and in the centre general line came the Australian Corps under Lieut.-General Sir J. Monash, with the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions in the front and the

5th and 4th Australians in support. On the right of the line was the Canadian Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir A. E. Currie, with the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Canadian Divisions in front line and the 4th Canadian Division in the second. The French First Army under General Debeney was on the right of the British Fourth Army on a line of between four and five miles extending down to Moreuil inclusive. As the Allied troops progressed forward the right of the French attack was to be gradually extended southwards until its southern extremity would be opposite Braches. General Debeney was to move forward an hour later than the opening of the British attack; the idea no doubt being that this would be favourable to an outflanking movement.

The British Cavalry Corps, consisting of three cavalry divisions, under the command of Lieut.-General C. T. McM. Kavanagh, was behind the British front, while the special mobile force of two motor machine-gun brigades and a Canadian Cyclist Battalion, under Brigadier-General Brutinel, was ordered to follow up the success along the line of the Amiens-Roye road.

Shortly after the artillery fire opened, the British infantry with an important force of tanks advanced to the attack. The ground



GERMAN PRISONERS PASSING BRITISH ARTILLERY.

[Official photograph.]

was covered with a heavy mist, which aided the operation, and the first objectives on the line Demuin-Marcelcave-Cerisy, to the south of Morlancourt, were quickly captured, the enemy being completely surprised. This attack was well into the first line of the German defenses and represented an advance varying from a few hundred yards to over a mile. The barrage which our guns put down was so powerful that it reduced the German reply to comparative impotence. This was no doubt to some extent due to the mist, which operated in our favour precisely in the same way that it had operated to the German advantage in the advance against General Gough's Army on March 21, that is to say, while our men knew exactly where to put down the shells on certain fixed points the Germans could not see where to shell effectively our moving forces. The tanks played a great part in the advance, going on ahead of the infantry in many parts of the line, smothering the machine-gun nests.

Very hard fighting took place just at the point of junction of our line with that of the French. Here, beyond the windings of the river Luce, the ground rose up steeply to the edge of the plateau intersected by many gullies, with the woods known as the Dodo Wood and Hamon Wood on the upper slopes. The attack here was greatly aided by the tanks which had been brought over the river during the previous night. The infantry advanced behind the tanks, while the barrage cut off all German support from the points attacked, coming down like a curtain behind the woods. These were quickly cleared by our men, and a considerable number of prisoners taken. To the north of this point, above Hangard, there were three small woods known as Hangard Copse, Wren Copse, and Cemetery Copse, and here the Germans offered a more strenuous resistance. In the attack on Marcelcave and Aubercourt the tanks were of great utility, going on in advance of the infantry where the enemy machine-guns were strongest, and destroying the nests in which they were ensconced. Our aeroplanes did what they could to help the attack, but the misty weather and consequent low visibility much impeded them; but they had the air completely to themselves, and not even one German observation balloon was to be seen, although ours went up quite early in the action.

North of the area referred to, where the railroad runs from Villers-Bretonneux to Chaumes, and on the Somme itself, the ad-

vance was carried out with extraordinary rapidity, and our men suffered extremely small losses, and took some 2,000 prisoners. Immediately along the northern bank of the Somme the advance was fairly successful. Towards Chipilly the advance was also rapid, and part of the wood which covered it to the north with the aid of the tanks was captured, but the village itself remained in German hands. In the Morlancourt region the Germans offered a greater resistance, and here our troops made but little progress; they did not succeed in capturing the village, and the machine-gun fire from the heights north of it distinctly held back our attack. Between Morlancourt and Chipilly, on the Bray-Corbie road, our advance was held up for some time, although our troops had extended a good bit to the north of Morlancourt.

The artillery followed up the operation with great celerity, and our men, when they occupied the advanced German positions, soon found themselves supported by the guns. Opposite the area attacked by the British there were some eight German divisions—viz., the 27th, 43rd, 13th, 41st, 109th, 25th and the 14th, while, near Marcelcave, the 117th had come up during the previous night. From all these divisions a considerable number of prisoners were taken. As the attack progressed, our cavalry and armoured cars and motor machine-guns pushed on ahead and played havoc among the retreating Germans. By nightfall the British south of the Somme were in possession of the line Morcourt-Harbonnières-Caix; this represented a bulge forward into the German line varying on the left from $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles to 6 miles on the right.

On the right of the attack, Le Quesnel was still in the hands of the Germans, but this was the only point in their outer line of defenses which remained in their hands up to the south bank of the Somme. Field-Marshal Haig reported on the brilliant and predominating part taken by the Canadian and Australian Corps as being worthy of the highest commendation. The British cavalry was also of the greatest use. The three divisions under Lieut.-General Sir C. T. McM. Kavanagh had completed their assembly behind the battle front at the points of concentration by a series of night-marches, and on August 8 they advanced 23 miles from these points, and by the dash and vigour of their action, aided by the tanks and motor machine-guns, rendered most valuable

and gallant service. Passing through the line of infantry, they carried confusion into the retreating Germans, captured numerous convoys, and altogether greatly added to the successes of the day. The whole day's fighting showed the admirable manner in which General

was sent against the Malard and Gressaire Woods, and another directed against Chipilly. The first-named wood we contrived to capture and hold for a time, taking 500 prisoners with some field-guns and two howitzers, but when the attempt was made to advance on Chipilly



BRITISH CAVALRY CLEARING UP GERMAN MACHINE-GUN NESTS.

Rawlinson had carried out the preparations for the advance, and the success of the movement was largely due to him and his staff.

North of the Somme our progress had, as we have seen, not been so great. Here the Germans were well established at Morlancourt, and on the heights to the north of it. One brigade

it was brought to a standstill. The ground here was full of dug-outs and machine-guns and there was a complete absence of cover in front of the village, where on the river bank the ground was flat and open. The mist also had prevented the proper co-ordination of the various units, and especially was this the

case with the tanks, which had gone too far to the north. The result was at the end of August 8 we had only got to the ground west of the village; the latter was still in German hands.

The captures of the day were significant of our success: 13,000 prisoners, between 300 and 400 guns, very large numbers of machine-guns, and vast quantities of ammunition and stores.

By nightfall it was evident that the Germans themselves felt they had received a severe blow, because, behind the line captured, explosions and conflagration showed that they were engaged in blowing up and destroying ammunition and supply dumps. The roads, heavily encumbered by their wagons retreating eastwards, formed excellent targets for our airmen, who rained bombs and machine-gun fire on them.

A great deal of our wide-ranging success was due to the cavalry and the tanks; both were fearlessly used and results gained which could hardly have been counted on. Nightfall did not stop their progress, and the Germans were attacked in places so remote from the front line that the surprise in them was complete. One

armoured car met a German transport column coming up, which tried to turn and escape. Four German mounted officers came up to see what was the reason which had stopped the advance. They were all shot down by the car, which then proceeded to round up the column. At many places the cars caught both mechanical and horse-drawn transport, took the personnel prisoners and shot down the horses. One car attacked a train on the railroad and wrecked it. At another point a village was entered, in which the German troops were peacefully sleeping unaware of the approaching danger. The car went through the street, shooting at the windows, and in one place found an officers' mess enjoying a meal which the arrival of the British bullets soon put an end to. Near Framerville another car happened on a Corps Headquarters. It shot down many of the Corps Staff and poured bullets into the different huts. Then it was rumoured that some part of the Staff had escaped along the road toward Péronne. At once the crew started off after them; came up on the fugitives and literally hunted them, killing many and forcing the others to scatter from the road and take refuge in the woods. Among the harvest of prisoners there were one or two interesting cases. A regimental commander was captured and was seen to be hiding some papers by thrusting them into his breeches down to the knees. The bulge they made betrayed their presence and he was at once overhauled. He denied that there was anything there at all, but the men who had seized him, having a proper appreciation of the German officer's notions of honour, proceeded to search him, which was done courteously, while he swore horribly all the



(Official photographs.)

CHIPILLY, AND ITS BRIDGE DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS IN THEIR RETREAT.

time, reviling the coarseness of the brutal English nation and their utter lack of courtesy to a distinguished German officer. This from a member of the race which had treated our own officers with habitual gross and vulgar insult is not only characteristic, but amusing. Amongst other notable items captured by our men was a whole train, which was intercepted as it was coming up to the front and 500 Saxons were taken prisoner from it.

The battlefield south of the Somme over which the centre and right of General Rawlinson's Army advanced, and to the south General Debeney's I. French Corps, is known as the Saunterre plateau and consists of a wide expanse of rich farm-land, and like most of the country in this part of France, is without hedges, the buildings being confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the farms. It was covered with crops of wheat, oats, and barley, which were ready for the sickle, and here and there good crops of potatoes. The whole flat expanse being covered with growing crops, hid to a great extent the works which the Germans had newly constructed. These do not appear in most places to have been of a very formidable character, nor were the wire entanglements of the usual broad and strong construction, and it was perfectly evident from the results observed that our artillery fire had been far in excess of that of the enemy, for over the whole field was spread a vast and complicated mass of equipment which had been abandoned in the hurried retreat of the Germans. Amongst the booty captured was a box of 450 Iron Crosses sent up for distribution to a certain division, which went to form welcome "souvenirs" for those who captured them. One agreeable deduction made from the perambulation of the battle-field was the undoubted fact that our casualties bore but a very small proportion to those we had inflicted on our adversaries. The centre of our attack was, as we know, feebly opposed, and one Australian division had only 300 casualties and took 1,600 prisoners, besides inflicting a large number of casualties in killed and wounded on the troops opposed to them.

South of Sir Henry Rawlinson's attacks, General Debeney, in accordance with the arranged plan, moved forward at 5.5 a.m. His attack was a complete surprise to the Germans. This may have been to some extent due to the fact that the British attack had commenced nearly an hour before. To the

south Morisel and then Moreuil were quickly captured and thus the passage over the Avre secured. Pressing farther onward, Fresnoy and Plessier were captured and touch was gained with Brutinel's forces on the Amiens-Roye road, a little to the west of Le Quesnel, while farther south the Avre was again passed



Elliott & Fry.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HIGGINSON.
Commanded the Twelfth Division.

at Pierrepont; 3,350 prisoners and many guns and machine-guns were taken by our Ally on this day.

The whole day represented a most brilliant strategical success. Our line had been carried forward a long distance from the Avre at Pierrepont to the Somme at Morecourt. The German command must have been conscious that their position from Montdidier eastward was now being threatened, and the only consolation they had was that they had held us on the north flank of the Somme.

To use Sir Douglas Haig's own words, "the sweeping character of the success which in one day had gained our first objective and disengaged the Paris-Amiens railway opened a clear field for the measures of exploitation determined upon to meet such an event."

The attack was continued on August 9. From the First Cavalry Division, commanded by Major-General R. L. Mullen, the 8th Hussars advanced and took Méharicourt at a gallop, while the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, under Major-General T. T. Pitman and Major-General A. E. W. Harnan respectively, passing through

our infantry, pressed on the enemy, captured many prisoners and gained a considerable amount of ground. That night south of the Somme we held Bouchoir, Rouvroy, Maucourt * and Framerville, and reached the western edges of Lihons and Proyart, being thus within striking distance of Chaulnes, the junction point of the railways by which the supplies for von Hutier's Army were brought up.

North of the Somme the attack did not start till late in the afternoon, when the 12th Division, under Major-General H. W. Higginson, and a regiment from the 33rd American Division, which was commanded by Major-General G. Bell, advanced to a line east of Chipilly, Morlancourt, and Dernancourt. Chipilly was an extremely difficult point, as we have before seen, and although on the previous day we had succeeded in capturing Gressaire Wood, we were compelled to give it up owing to the heavy fire which was brought to bear on it from the height above. Malard Wood was also captured, which may thus have

* The Dispatch, para. 18, calls this place Morcourt. This is obviously a mistake; Morcourt is on the south flank of the Somme and was taken, according to para. 17 on August 8.

allowed the Germans to suppose that the assault would not be prolonged to the south of it.

Le Quesnel was taken about 6 a.m. and later the general advance was continued. At first there was considerable opposition on the line Beaufort-Vrély-Rosières-Framerville, and also in the neighbourhood of Chipilly. Gressaire Wood was taken, but it was only after hard fighting that Chipilly was entered by our troops at 5.30 in the evening. When this was done the enemy appears to have lost heart in this neighbourhood and to have retreated precipitately. We had now gained possession of the high ground which ran back from Morlancourt in a north-easterly direction parallel to the Somme, and Morlancourt was in our hands.

On the 9th Debeney's Army advanced to battle at 9 a.m., deploying on the line from Beaucourt down to Montdidier. The progress at midday was very rapid and by the afternoon the troops had gained the line Arvillers-Hangest and back to the Avre about Pierrepont.

Altogether, in the two days' fighting, the Allies had gained a signal victory.



CHAPTER CCLXXIX.

THE BATTLES OF AMIENS AND BAPAUME, AUGUST, 1918.

BATTLE OF AMIENS RESUMED—WORK OF THE CAVALRY AND TANKS—DEFENSIVE TACTICS : LUDENDORFF'S ORDER—HUMBERT'S ATTACK TOWARDS LASSIGNY—ALLIES REACH THE LINE OF 1917—KING'S VISIT TO THE FRONT—GERMAN DAMAGE TO AMIENS—LASSIGNY CAPTURED—ENEMY WITHDRAWAL ON THE ANCRE—GERMAN COMMENT ON THE FIGHTING—BRITISH DISPOSITIONS—OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME—PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK—WORK IN THE AIR—FALL OF ALBERT—THIEPVAL RIDGE CARRIED—AIR FIGHTING IN AUGUST.

WE have seen in Chapter CCLXXVII. that the Germans had been defeated in their advance to the Marne. They had not retired from their advanced positions without carrying with them souvenirs of their visit. On the present occasion several of these were quite unique in character. Thus at Arey, a Major von Titzsch stole from the shrine of Ste. Restitué (6½ miles south-east from Hartennes) a gold shrine, valued at some £500. He also stole lead from the coffins and plate and other valuables at the Château of Muret at Muret-et-Crouette (3 miles north-east of Hartennes). Letters which were taken show that the robbery of the French was calculated and systematic. We have seen earlier in the war how the German women asked for watches and jewellery; some of them were now proposing to set up shop on the ill-gotten gains of their menkind in France. This is shown by two letters dated July 11 and 13, of which the first is reproduced below :

DEAR JOSEPH.—You say that I only write when I want something. If for every letter or card I sent you I got a shirt, skirt, or pair of trousers in return I should to-day be able to open shop. For three months I've been impatiently waiting for the tobacco for H—. Don't forget the address. Every day I ask whether there are any parcels for me, but there are never any.

Are the dresses you've got pretty? Examine them

well to see there are no holes in them. You must hold them up against the light, and you'll see at once. Anna was very grateful for the little slippers. I told her to send you her warmest thanks. Willy promises to get her a cloak. Get me one, too, and don't forget a good French woollen coverlet. As the policeman says, anything you can put on your back or use in any way should be carried off.

The second letter was in a similar strain, but apparently haberdashery wanted supplementing by a supply of linen goods, which was asked for in it. It is perhaps not extraordinary to find that people who were guilty of acts of this kind also robbed one another.

Lotte Brandt wrote from Neu Köln on June 24 a letter to a soldier at the front as follows :

According to your letter of June 20 the parcel contains all sorts of loot (*schnafte Sachen*). Mamma and I will certainly gladly give some marks to the soldier on leave. We also badly want a purse. You say Uncle Max can choose from what you've sent. What is he to have? Write and let us know if you mean a pair of shoes, and tell us which. It is quite natural you should keep the best pipe for yourself. I am delighted over the earrings and bracelet.

Four days later the soldier on leave arrived, but the gentle Lotte Brandt had a bitter disappointment. She writes :

To-day the person came, but I must tell you, you've been taken in by a rogue. Yesterday we went to his house, but he was out. To-day Emma went with him to Potsdam Station, but the parcel was not there. He has simply pinched (*geklaut*) the parcel and done a stroke of



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THE CHÂTEAU DE MURET.

business. When you see him hit him over the face with your rifle-butt. May the first shell be for him and blow him to bits that will go where the things are. We could not sleep all night, we were so angry. I see red when I think of the earrings. What were they like? Even if I never got them I should like to know what they were like. Good-bye; that dirty thief, that cursed hound, has quite upset me.

We left off with Field-Marshal Haig's offensive on August 9. The first two days' fighting may be looked upon as the first act of the drama, and had been very successful. Seventeen thousand prisoners had been taken; 400 guns, including a gun on a railway mount-

ing of heavy calibre, and trench mortars and machine-guns innumerable; vast quantities of stores and material of all descriptions, including a complete railway train and other rolling stock. The guns came in especially useful. The ammunition supplies captured by us were enormous, and these served for employment in the captured artillery against the troops they had formerly belonged to, among whom they created very heavy casualties.

The good work done by our cavalry has been alluded to, but a few more details may be



WHAT WAS LEFT BY THE GERMANS OF THE CHÂTEAU DE MURET.

interesting. So well did they come to the front that by 11 o'clock on August 8 a cavalry brigade operating with the left of the Canadians was pushing through the infantry from Mareelcave to Wiencourt and Guillaucourt. Coming



BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN AMIENS.

out from the latter place, it was received by heavy machine-gun fire, but taking advantage of the low ground on the right, worked on to the German advance line, rounding up a number of prisoners on the way. A brigade operating with the Australians on the other side of the Chaules railway line reached their objectives by 1 o'clock, having taken numbers of prisoners and some guns and other booty. Both on the north and south the cavalry held the line they had reached till the infantry came up and took over at 7.30 that evening. Dragoon Guards on the same day had captured Vauvillers with a rapid dash and Dragoon Guards and Hussars together rushed into the big woods south of Cayeux at a gallop and took 200 prisoners, then, pushing on, they held the high ground to the south of Caix.

On August 9, Hussars distinguished themselves greatly near the village of Vrély. Here machine-guns and some cavalry which had tried to approach the place from the westward found the enemy's fire too strong for them. The Hussars then galloped round north of Rosières, and then wheeling back, galloped into Méharicourt, four miles to the east of Vrély before the Germans were aware that they were on them. They cleared and held the wood, pushing out patrols to hold positions still farther east towards the "Halte" on the north near Lihons and Maucourt on the east. The in-

fantry then came up and seized Vrély. The cavalry pushed forward to the south-east, but found themselves brought up near Fouques-court, where there were some old entrenchments covered by wire and held strongly by machine-guns. The total number of prisoners taken by the cavalry was over 2,500. They captured the big gun on railway mountings in conjunction with a tank which fired into the engine and brought it up, and also a large periscope. The Canadian Cavalry, in addition to their work on the Roye road, near Daméry, took Beaucourt in most gallant style, acting first as cavalry, and then dismounting and clearing out machine-gun nests.

Tanks, as we have seen, also played a very large part in the fighting. On the Frenel front the Avre had to be crossed by them before they could be brought into battle line this slowed down the progress of the French at first, and limited their front. The Avre had to be bridged, and this had to be done at many points before the troops could cross in sufficient numbers. At the beginning of the battle the line was only $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Asnières to the Hourtes-Roye road on the west of Morisel, but was afterwards widened to include the whole valley as far as Hargicourt, a length of $6\frac{1}{4}$ miles, and by the end of the day the depth was $8\frac{3}{4}$ miles.

In these two days of the Allied offensive when the tanks got across in fair numbers, the effect was immediate, and the extension of the French line of attack was largely due to their action. Heavy patterns were employed, as well as the "Whippet" tanks, and the former were extremely useful in dealing with buildings. At one point the French had some difficulty with a village which was heavily defended with machine-guns, many of which were in the upper stories, which held them up for a time. Five of the heavy tanks were brought up and proceeded to demolish the houses from which the fire came. In this way 10 houses were dealt with in succession. The tanks butted into them and literally went through them, bringing down bricks, joists, floors and roofs, machine-guns and machine-gunnery in one confused and helpless mass. They emerged from their task covered with the debris, but the job was done. The French infantry were enabled to come on and gather up the fragments which remained.

At Treux, north of the Somme, a tank which had come up in that direction was asked to

help an advanced post. When it arrived there, the Commander asked the Tank Commander to destroy a small post in the opposite line which was annoying him very much. He asked for some infantry to help and 12 men went on with him. Straight into the post went the tank, clean over one of the machine-guns; the rest of the German garrison then, thinking discretion the better part of valour, came out into the open with their hands in the air, and the tank and the 12 infantrymen, all unwounded, escorted back seven officers and 200 prisoners.

character which our tanks performed, both with the French and also with our own troops, would take too long. Suffice it to say that many of the light nature cooperated with our aeroplanes in raiding the lines along which the retreating Germans were hurrying to safety. They supported the cavalry in similar efforts and did enormous service in crushing out small machine-gun nests, scattered about the battlefield. These would have been costly to take with infantry, but fell without any casualties to speak of into our hands, though with great losses both in



A GERMAN 280mm. GUN FOR THE BOMBARDMENT OF AMIENS.

Captured by the Australians and exhibited in Paris. The range of this weapon is about 20 miles.

A little incident near Marcelet formed a typical example of what cavalry and light tanks working in unison are capable of. In a small wood to the south-east of it, near the road from Villers-Bretonneux to Dénuin, the Germans with their machine-guns held up our advanced cavalry. Some light tanks went off, going round to the south and attacking the wood from that side; the Germans, believing this to be the main attack, ran out across the open to escape it. The cavalry, who had been held back, then saw their chance and charged into the bolting enemy. A good many were killed with cold steel; the rest promptly surrendered, 700 prisoners being taken. To recount all the deeds of a special

machine-guns and the men who manned them to the Germans.

There seems little doubt that the Germans had acquiesced in the efforts to thrust them back over the Avre, which have already been described, because they did not want to meet the tanks on the open ground above the river, nor indeed to fight with this obstacle behind them.

The military critic of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* early in August gave as his opinion: —

That the tank in its improved form is doubtless a factor seriously to be reckoned with, all the more when it appears in great masses.

Hitherto tank squadrons containing hundreds of tanks have been employed. If part, even half of them, are destroyed, it is the same as when human fighters

fall, who have helped the survivors and therefore have not fallen in vain. It is conceivable (he says) that the enemy and the world's almost unlimited war industry may produce this arm in unprecedented masses. As human shock-troops advance in waves, solid tank waves might also advance. This may seem fantastic, but sober reflection will admit that such wholesale production and employment are not outside the bounds of possibility, witness the analagous increase during the war of guns of all calibres to a colossal extent. The flight service is also an instructive example. The writer urges the further construction of tanks and special defence artillery.

Readiness (he says) is everything; the tank has a future.

The Germans indeed admitted their value. The *Deutsche Tagezeitung* stated that the withdrawals of the German troops on the rivers Ancre, Avre and Doms were made in order to relieve unfavourable local conditions, and to create a situation tactically more favourable to the Germans. The plain to the west of the Ancre is lower than the eastern bank of the river and the conditions on the eastern side of the Avre and its tributary, the Doms, with their improved possibilities for observation, facilitated defence. In these sectors the Ancre, the Avre and the Doms form extremely favourable natural barriers. The *Essen Allgemeine Zeitung* described the retreat as a strategical measure to spare troops, and added: "Summing up, we may say that, thanks to our leaders and the bravery of our soldiers, all the

enemy's plans have been frustrated and the Army Command now, as before, retains its freedom of action."

This was quite evident in the next days. The German leaders were quite at liberty—to go backwards—which they did, pursued by the Allies with much vigour.

It is plain from what has been written that for some weeks past the Germans had felt it necessary to adopt a pure defensive; this was no doubt due to the heavy losses they had had in men and material. An order signed by Ludendorff and dated July 6 is a clear proof of this. It runs as follows:

The principles expounded in the secret circular No 0950 of June 25, 1918, still require completion as regards defensive fighting. The repeated recent enemy attacks and the unhappily large number of prisoners lost in them show that our occupation of first lines is always too dense on defensive actions, and that the depth of our advanced zone is insufficient. The enemy is imitating our surprise use of artillery, and by means of it is achieving successes similar to ours. We must oppose him vigorously.

Defensive actions require very special attention—first of all, very active reconnaissance on our part, and especially correct tactical principles. An advanced zone of one to two hundred yards is not sufficient, and can only be contemplated when one holds a well organized position and is strong in artillery. It should be between 500 and 1,000 yards deep, or more, if there are no good positions and there is only weak artillery. The relation between the depth of the advanced zone, the organization of the artillery, and the strength of the artillery is still not realized by some officers. The weaker the artil-



[French official photograph.]

A FRENCH TANK.

tery is, and the more the organization of the ground is inferior, the greater should be the depth of the advanced zone.

The advanced zone need not have a garrison with very deep echelons. It should rather have the form of patrols, sentinels, and small outposts. Echelons of the garrison, properly so-called, begin at the principal line of resistance. By the principal line of resistance one should understand not merely an organized position, but the whole line of defence that corresponds with the plan of defence that has been decided on. It can only be determined on the actual ground. It is certainly easier to trace it with organized positions than in open country after an attack. It is the mission of the Command to overcome the inevitable difficulties.

Advanced posts must be supported by fire from the

ground, but the fear that the Entente might force us to fall back several miles is quite without justification, for they have as few men as we for such attacks.

We can only be glad if the Entente should attack. It usually does so in dense lines. We can ask for no more favourable occasion to inflict losses on it. The command and the troops should be prepared, and should cause losses to the enemy without sustaining them. Clearer tactical conception is decisive here as elsewhere. It is only by this means that uncertainty will disappear. Leaders and troops must know what they have to do. If the way in which the enemy attacks leave it in doubt whether the garrison of an advanced zone would do better to retreat or hold, it should be decided to retreat. That will always be better than suffering losses by defending the advanced zone.



A BRITISH TANK DESTROYING A GERMAN MACHINE-GUN POST.

principal line of resistance. Rifles, light and heavy machine-guns, light mortars, and batteries, posted for defence of the advanced zone, must be methodically used for this purpose. Even *stosstruppen* may be left in front of the principal line of resistance. Small actions can in this way be fought in the advanced zone. When it is a question of repelling strong patrol attacks the line of resistance must always give considerable support; sufficient strength must be engaged, and must destroy the enemy elements that have penetrated into the advanced zone. In such cases barrage fire will always lose its effect, the more so the weaker the artillery. Artillery must deliver destructive fire on the zone of combat, follow the fluctuations of the battle, and be as mobile in its fire as the infantry in fighting.

Such defensive tactics naturally imply the absolute necessity of instructing the troops, especially the infantry and artillery. In the case of an attack methodically prepared by artillery fire, it is necessary, equally methodically, to give up fighting to retain the advanced zone. It is far better to evacuate it. It may be necessary later to draw up a fresh line of resistance in the event of our destructive fire not preventing the enemy from establishing himself in the advanced zone and not driving him out of it. It is obvious that we shall lose

Another Army Order of Ludendorff's of July 10 marked "Secret" drew attention to the great scarcity of horses. One of its paragraphs runs as follows: "We must take care of our horses as they cannot be replaced. The men must thoroughly understand that this is absolutely necessary in order to continue the war until victory is reached." As emphasizing this scarcity, the statement of a prisoner captured in the middle of August is worthy of record. He said that 900 remounts received at one depot 14 days before were nearly all riding horses which had been taken from officers. It had been known for some time that the German cavalry was now very badly mounted, and this confirms the information we had received.

August 10 saw a fresh strategic movement in

accordance with Marshal Foch's plan. Humbert's army struck upwards. During the previous night, the French First Army continued their offensive movement towards the right, carried the village of Faverolles on the east of Montdidier, on the railroad to Roye, and Assainvillers on the south-east. Montdidier was therefore almost surrounded and the retreat of the Germans from it so seriously threatened that it was abandoned, and nothing but a few machine-gun posts to act as



†French official photograph.

THE CHURCH OF ORVILLERS-SOREL.

a rear-guard was left on its borders. What proportion of the garrison eventually reached safety there is no evidence to show; it can but have been a small one, as the whole of the centre of von Hutier's army had been forced back in the direction of Roye. The retreat of the troops in this direction was closely followed up, and then came Humbert's blow on their flank.

At 4.20 a.m., the French Third Army advanced rapidly to the attack without any artillery preparation, though, of course, there was the usual moving barrage which covered the actual advance of the infantry. The attack took place on a front of over 10 miles from Rollot to Elinecourt. The villages of Rollot, Orvillers-Sorel, Conehy-les-Pots, Ressons-sur-Matz, Neuville-sur-Ressons, Roye-sur-Matz, Elinecourt, were quickly reached and taken, and by the evening the enemy had been driven back over five miles, the Thiéscourt hills were taken, the high ground about Lassigny was nearly reached, and considerable progress made towards Roye. It seems pretty certain that the Germans had not expected General Humbert's attack any more than they had expected General Debeney's. As soon as the French troops began to advance, the German front trenches sent up rockets

asking for reinforcements, but the French advance was so rapid it is doubtful if any of them arrived before the front line of the enemy had been driven back, leaving nothing but nests of machine-gunners to cover the hurried retreat. The strongest resistance was made near Marquéglise in the wood north of that village, where the high ground of the Thiéscourt height began, but the French were not to be denied, and pushing over it, they attacked in succession Mareuil-Lamotte, Lamotte, Gury and La Berlière.

Operating on the right of the British troops, the French First Army progressed beyond Arvillers and captured Davenescourt on the Avre, whilst south of Montdidier between Ayencourt and Le Frétoy they had, as mentioned above, taken Rubescourt and Assainvillers and reached Faverolles.

After a number of fights for localities, a line from Fresnoy-les-Roye—*i.e.*, only half a mile from the railway line from Chaulnes—to Roye was won, and farther south, the right wing, advancing from the Montdidier direction, captured Fescamps, Bus, and in the evening, the height of Boulogne-la-Grasse. Thus Débeney and Humbert were in touch south of the Avre, and the line of the Allies was in complete unison well to the north of the Somme.

The fighting on August 10 was very severe where the Australians were in line opposite Lihons. It was natural that the Germans should resist there as long as possible, for they could not be expected to allow the important railway junction of Chaulnes to fall into our hands without a determined struggle.

During the night of August 9-10 the Germans brought up fresh troops from Cambrai and hurried them into the trenches on the rising ground round Lihons. At 8 a.m. on August 10 the Australians advanced again, marching directly on the German position at Lihons. The fighting was very severe, but the situation was considerably relieved about an hour later when the Canadians advanced with a considerable number of tanks on the right of the Australians. Queenslanders and Western Australians attacked the woods near Grand Manoir on the north of Lihons, pushed through on to the hilltop, and captured some German artillery. About midday, a considerable reinforcement of artillery was brought up, which dealt effectively with the German guns, and by the afternoon the Australian line had got

a footing well on the ridge to the west of Lihons, covered by the British artillery. About 6 o'clock the Germans opened a severe bombardment on the wood and high ground and, covered by it, their infantry attacked, but they were unable to make any progress.

On the same day other troops of the 4th British Army reached Méharicourt on the south of Lihons and Proyart to the north-west, while in the evening, north of the Somme, Morlancourt had been captured and the heights to the south-east and the borders of Etinehem were attained. The Germans blew up the bridge at Bray to impede as much as possible the connexion between our troops north and south of the river.

August 11, after three days of unarrested victory, the Allied Armies had reached the position in which they had been from the Autumn of 1914 to the Spring of 1917. Here the enemy still possessed some of the defensive organizations which he had formerly held, which strengthened his position. Moreover, the advance of our line had taken from us the two existing advantages to be derived from flank attack. This was of course inevitable, because the enemy was wise enough, when he saw what was threatening, to remove himself from the pincers before they closed on him.

During the morning of this day, the Germans delivered further attacks with fresh divisions against the British positions at Lihons and to the north and south of that place; but all their efforts were in vain. They were beaten back with heavy losses. At one point immediately north of the Ancre they succeeded in penetrating one of our trenches and indeed reached the western side of the village, but they were then counter-attacked and driven back, fighting fiercely, to the east and north of the village, and our line was completely restored and Lihons definitely held. Roye they still clung on to with tenacity.

During the night of August 10-11, our troops gained the high ground between Etinehem and Dernancourt, and there was also a certain amount of night fighting south of the river, especially by the French Army, which reached the outskirts of L'Echelle-St. Aurin.

From the Somme southwards, the German line was now marked out by four points: Braye, Chaulnes, Roye, Lassigny, and during the afternoon of this day, there were combats in which fighting went on along all the roads leading to these points. The position on the Somme was complicated by the difficulty of progress on the northern bank so long as the Germans held the



THE CHÂTEAU OF BOULOGNE-LA-GRASSE.

{French official photograph.

high ground about Proyart and Chuignolles, as it took in reverse and flank our troops when endeavouring to press their way against Bray. During August 11, however, affairs developed more favourably for us. The Australians attacked in the afternoon. The fighting had swayed to and fro during the day, but at half-past eight in the evening a determined attempt was made to take the wood north of Proyart known as the Germaine Wood. At first held back by strong machine-gun fire from this wood, our troops under the cover of dusk appear to have advanced through the village of Méricourt and also to have turned Proyart by advancing along the ridge which led from Rainecourt towards Chuignolles, and eventually Proyart fell into our hands. The enemy lost heavily in killed, wounded and prisoners. This enabled us to make more progress; on the north of the river Étinehem was occupied, and more to the north British troops advanced across the plateau extending north-east from Morlancourt to about Méaulte. Debeney's troops had also somewhat severe fighting near Daméry on the 100 m. Hill between Andéchy and Daméry. The German position here was part of their old trenches and was a strong one. Our cavalry had endeavoured to push forward, but were held up by machine-gun fire, and the British troops on the north and the French on the south both had a severe struggle, and the battle became

stationary. This, however, led our guns to come forward, and the advent of the artillery enabled a strong fire to be brought to bear not only on the trenches in question but on the ground behind them.

The result was that we were enabled to link up our posts east of Méricourt with our lines east of Étinehem on the north bank of the river. In the neighbourhood of the Roye road and east of Fouquescourt, a little more than a mile west of the Chaulnes-Roye railway, further progress was made and prisoners taken. Troops of the French First Army captured Les Loges $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles due south of Roye on the single line which ran up to Roye from the south through Ressons-sur-Matz. They also made further progress north of Roye-sur-Matz and north of Chevincourt. There was also artillery fighting by Marquillers and Grivillers—the latter point was on the Montdidier-Roye railroad. It will thus be seen that between L'Echelle-St. Aurin and Les Loges, there was still a pocket of Germans left. Obviously they could not remain long where they were, as the French position to the south from Fescamps-Bus back to Les Loges threatened them in flank.

Once more King George came to France to see his armies. He arrived on August 5, and as usual put in strenuous work; during the whole seven days he was at the front, from



[Australian official photograph.]

IN THE SOMME VALLEY. SLOPES TAKEN BY THE AUSTRALIANS.



[Australian official photograph.]

BRITISH HEAVY GUN IN ACTION BEHIND THE AUSTRALIANS.

Monday afternoon on August 5 when he arrived, till Tuesday afternoon, August 13 when he left France, there was not a moment of his time that was not occupied in visiting his troops and taking a personal interest in all connected with the armies. On Tuesday he motored up to the north of our line, where he was met by General Plumer, whom he invested with the Grand Cross of the Bath, and gave the Victoria Cross to two officers and a sergeant. On the same day he visited a brigade of the Royal Air Force, and proceeded to a large training ground where a considerable body of troops was under instruction.

On August 7 he visited the Forestry Schools and saw the work carried on there, and then went on to meet President Poincaré at a luncheon given by Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. On August 8 a good deal of the day was spent with the American troops, and afterwards he visited a Casualty Clearing Station. Sir Julian Byng was the next to receive a visit from His Majesty, who on August 9 inspected a School of Instruction. Here he saw in progress battle-practice at different ranges, scouting, observation, sniping, musketry and revolver shooting. The remainder of the day His Majesty spent calling on various Corps Commanders of the Third Army at their respective Headquarters.

The early part of Saturday was devoted to the tanks. The various natures were seen at their work, and His Majesty watched with great interest the many astounding feats which these war chariots performed, upsetting walls, bowling over trees, and moving over

ground full of shell-holes. From this he went on to an aerodrome of the Australian Flying Corps, and afterwards lunched with General Sir John Monash, who commanded the Australian Corps.

The back areas, which had been heavily bombarded, and where occasional shells were still falling, were next visited. The Labour Corps, with its cosmopolitan contingents, was next inspected and the Portuguese Division visited.

On Sunday the King went once more to visit Sir Herbert Plumer, and here a special inter-denominational service was held, and after church was concluded he held a review of various troops. When this was finished, King George motored over to the Headquarters of the King and Queen of the Belgians and lunched there with them. In the afternoon, attended by Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, he proceeded to visit a squadron of the Royal Air Force which had done good work in attacking enemy submarine lairs.

The last day, Monday, August 12, was devoted to a tour round the back area of the Fourth Army, in the course of which the King visited Amiens and Villers-Brettonneux, and on the next day he motored to a Channel port and embarked for England. The visit was well timed, coinciding as it did with the great victory gained by the Allies. The kindly and personal interest which the King took on this occasion, as indeed he did whenever he visited the troops, aroused the greatest enthusiasm among the men not only of his own Army but those of our Allies, and it was a happy augury

for the future that the visit should have coincided with so important a gain as was made by the Allies between August 8 and 13.

August 12-13 were comparatively uneventful. The Germans continued to make attacks in the centre about Lihons and down to Fouquescourt, but one and all were failures. We made a little progress on the north side of the Somme, improving our position, and also a little near Lihons. On the right of the Allied line, the French First Army still continued its pressure. They were now beyond Les Loges and Roye-sur-Matz, and on August 13 held the line from

the south corner of the Bois des Loges, close to Fresnières, and this pushing forward of the right centre of this army effectually stopped a German counter-attack in the direction of Thiéscourt. The plateau north-east of Mareuil was cleared by the French and their position firmly established at Ecouvillon. Canny-sur-Matz was still held by the Germans, but here again it formed a salient point which was threatened on the south, north and west. These latter points were reached by August 13, and thus the French lines now passed down by Belval to the farther side



[Official photograph.]

THE KING ENJOYS A JOKE OF GENERAL PLUMER'S.

Echelles-St. Aurin to Armancourt and Tilloloy, while the left of the French Third Army penetrated into the eastern edge of the Bois des Loges. The centre of this force had now arrived at Canny-sur-Matz, and progressing through the wood of Thiéscourt reached Belval, a short distance from Plessis-le-Roye and close to Mont Plémont, which had been the scene of so much hard fighting in March and June. Humbert's right was to the north of Machemont. Farther east, to the south-east of Ecouvillon, his extreme right was a mile to the north of Cambronne. Further progress brought his line from near Courcelles on the south of Lassigny in a north-easterly direction to

of Ecouvillon straight to the Oise. On August 14, Ribécourt was captured. The division which took Ribécourt had greatly distinguished itself in the fighting of the past two years. On August 12 the main body of the division had pushed up on to the high ground of Thiéscourt and reached the edge of Ecouvillon, the regiment on its right wing taking Cambronne, less than a mile from Ribécourt. The next day, after an intensive artillery bombardment, the division had rushed the heights of Antoval just beyond Cambronne to the north, from which Ribécourt could be seen in the low ground below. At 11 a.m. on August 14, the Divisional

Commander asked the Colonel in command of a dismounted cavalry battalion if he could take the town before the evening; and in the afternoon, when General Humbert had come up to congratulate the men on what they had already done and was at the Divisional Headquarters, news was received by carrier-pigeon that the village had been taken. On August 15 the Alish farm was captured on the ground beyond Le Hamel.

The effect of this victory following close on the defeat of the Germans on the Marne had depressed the latter and encouraged both the British and French Armies. They looked forward to delivering further and stronger blows against the already shaken enemy.

The advance of the Allies had now freed Amiens from all danger. The unfortunate city had undergone a sad experience since the opening of the German offensive on March 21. On the night of March 24-25, the German aviators bombed the city very severely, causing much damage and some loss of life, and on the following morning, it was considered desirable for the civilian inhabitants to retire. The movement was conducted without panic. Large numbers left by train; others marched out by the roads with their belongings on all kinds of vehicles. The object of the Germans had evidently been primarily the large railway yards towards Longeau, for Amiens was an important railway centre, and at the part in question there was a large collection of sidings and workshops. On the evening of March 27, the first shells began to fall in the suburb of Rivery, and a very heavy bombing by aeroplanes took place during the night. The centre of the town formed their especial target: for instance, the chief hotels about the Place René Goblet and the densely populated area from the Cathedral to the Place Gambetta and on the Rue de la République. All night long the bombing went on, the damage done was very considerable, and a good many lives, too, were lost. On March 26 and 27 there were various rumours that the German cavalry and armoured cars were pushing on towards Amiens. On March 27 it was stated that they were already on the city side of Villers-Bretonneux. By March 30 few were left in the town but soldiers and the anti-aircraft organizations. By the end of the month almost every night was marked by an attack from the air; in addition to that, the guns, which were now within range

of the town, commenced to do their worst on the Cathedral, but except for the gratification of their natural vice, the Germans gained no advantage. They inflicted an immense amount



THE CHATEAU OF PLESSIS-LE-ROYE.

of injury on the houses, however, and it was calculated that one house in seven had been more or less damaged by bombs or shell-fire, and one in 27 completely wrecked. The Hotel de Ville was scorched and damaged by the shell-fire, but was not wrecked. The Prefecture, however, was totally destroyed by a bomb, and the Museum had one wing badly damaged. A good deal of injury was inflicted on the Cathedral, but with the exception of valuable stained glass, the injuries were all repairable. The heart of the business town, along the Rue des Trois Cailloux, close to the Place Gambetta, was almost totally destroyed—large business buildings were wiped out and an immense amount of damage done. Some of the finest residences in Amiens had been badly hit and many of the churches and other ancient buildings more or less seriously damaged.

On the night of August 13, the situation on the right of the Allied attack was becoming stationary. The pocket occupied between the Avre and the Oise by von Hutier had been cleared out and the British and French occupied a position 12 miles in advance of the line from which they had advanced. The area which now lay before the troops was the general



[Official photograph.]

A STREET IN AMIENS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BOMBARDMENT.

line of the old Roye-Chaulnes defences and gave the enemy a strong position for defensive fighting. Crossed as it was in all directions by tangled belts of wire, covered by the vegetable growth of two years, full of shell holes and old trench lines, it formed a most excellent position for machine-gun defence. The attacks made by the Allies on August 13 had shown the strength of these positions and also that the enemy was very strongly reinforced.

This determined Field-Marshal Haig to break off the battle on this front and transfer it from the Fourth Army to the sector north of the Somme, where it did not seem that the enemy expected attack. His intention was to advance in the direction of Bapaume, so as to turn the old line of the Somme defences from the north. South of the Somme the pressure was to be continued by the French First and Third Armies, the former of which now ceased to be under the British Commander-in-Chief.

On August 15 Fransart, Parvillers and Daméry were all captured by Canadians, fighting in connexion with the French on the left of the First French Army. Many counter-attacks were delivered by the Germans at 5.30 in the evening, but all were beaten off, and the Canadians alone reported that in the fighting of the previous 24 hours, 260 more

prisoners and some machine-guns had been captured and 1,300 casualties inflicted on the enemy. The Germans, however, did not seem inclined to give up Roye, for they still hung on to Fresnoy-les-Roye and Goyencourt.

On August 16-17 these places were subject to a continuous and powerful artillery fire, but to no infantry assault, which would have been a very costly operation. The French were chiefly concerned with Goyencourt, our troops with Fresnoy; meantime, Debeney's troops had pressed on towards Roye and had captured Caesar's Camp immediately west of the town, and St. Mard-les-Triet, a suburb, and Lancourt, a little village to the south, and were within 500 yards of the station on the north-western outskirts of the town. La Chavotte, between Fransart and Fresnoy, was taken by the Canadians on August 17. The Germans still held a strong position about Hattencourt, which was now being bombarded. Immediately north of the Somme the position was not materially changed.

Beyond the killed and wounded, which were very numerous, the Allies had captured from the Germans over 33,000 prisoners and 700 guns. Of the prisoners taken, there fell to the British share some 20,000, in which 17 German divisions were well represented. By far the

largest number were taken from the 13th Division, which seems to have been practically annihilated. From this Division, the 55th Infantry Regiment lost 8 officers and 1,080 men; the 13th Regiment 20 officers and 964 men; the 15th Regiment 14 officers and 677 men; the total being 2,763. Previous to the fighting now dealt with, this division had suffered heavily on July 4 at Hamel, where 500 prisoners were taken and heavy casualties inflicted. From documents captured, it appears that on the 20th of the month one of the Brigade Commanders asked to have drafts hurried up, as he could not do the work of the brigade on the present strength. The reply

captured at the same time included the diary of a man of the 169th Regiment, who recorded in it that on March 16 our airmen absolutely wiped out both village and station of Longuyon about 100 miles east of St. Quentin and far in rear of the enemy's front line. In the station an ammunition train laden with 15,000 shells was blown up, and the explosion destroyed another train loaded with aeroplanes. This gives some idea of the damage which our aviators inflicted on the Germans.

On August 19, after a number of fights, the Third French Army carried Fresnoires, while more to the south they reached the edge



[Official photograph.]

THE SAME STREET AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.

of General von Borries, who appears to have been the Army Corps Commander, stated that the conditions described were known to the division and to the higher authorities, but a supply of drafts could not be expected before August 15. Conditions were even more unfavourable among neighbouring units, and in the interests of all the situation had to be tolerated. The division then stopped in the front line and suffered the enormous losses above enumerated. It must have been reduced to the strength of little more than a company.

Other divisions also suffered very heavily; from the 41st were taken 2,500 prisoners, while from the 114th came 2,300; the 117th Division yielded up 1,800, and the 109th and 119th something under 1,000 each. Papers

of Lassigny, won their way through to the eastern side of the Thiéscourt wood, and stormed Pimprez on the Oise, thus reaching a point only five miles from Noyon. The advance by Thiéscourt kept the upper portion of the valley of the Divette, and was another danger to Noyon.

On August 20 the northern end of Humbert's army captured Beauvraignes, another point on the railway from the south to Roye, and which had formed part of the German line of 1916.

The next day Lassigny was captured, the whole of the ground round Plémont occupied, while the French advanced through the wood of Orval and reached the outskirts of Chiry-Ourscamp. These movements of the French Third Army were supplemented by further operations of Mangin's army on the high ground



A BATTERY OF FRENCH 155mm. GUNS IN ACTION NEAR LASSIGNY.

between the Oise, Ailette and Aisne. They extended over a length of 15 miles, and their object was, starting from the forest of Ourcamp to the region of Fontenoy on the Aisne west of Soissons, to carry the high ground of Coucy-St. Gobain. This formed the central pivot of the German defences in northern France; but as a preparation for the complete development of the new movement it was necessary to carry certain preliminary positions which would facilitate the movement. On the morning of August 17, the German lines round the village of Autrechies were captured on a front of about three miles. On the evening of the next day

gance was quite undiminished even after the events of August 8.

The *Weser Zeitung* on August 8, reviewing what it describes as Foch's expensive offensive, makes the following statement, which is certainly a tribute to the accuracy of the German Intelligence Department:

It is very significant that the English only contributed four divisions as their entire assistance. They certainly lengthened their own front on a small section by giving one division, but the weak detachments given to the French front which were placed under General Berthelot's command could naturally only have a small value as a relief. Perhaps fears of a new German attack on their front partially occasioned their attitude of reserve, but the main ground for their keeping important forces from



LASSIGNY CHURCH IN AUGUST, 1918.

[French official photograph.]

a wider forward movement from the south of Carlepont to the north of Fontenoy won another $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the Germans. At the same time French troops occupied the plateau to the west of Nampeel, taking Tracy-le-Val and the southern side of the ravine of Audignicourt. Nouvion-Vingré, not far from Fontenoy, was also captured. The Germans made no strenuous resistance, and 2,200 prisoners were taken from them.

On August 19 the Germans were driven out of Morsain and Vassens. On the same day the French Third Army advanced from Ribécourt and captured Le Hamel; thus both from the south and from the west Noyon was being approached.

As we have seen from Ludendorff's Order, the Germans were beginning to think they had got in a tight place, but their ridiculous arro-

Marshal Foch must be sought in the fact that General Hutig is still so greatly weakened by the German spring offensive. He has every reason to be economical with his forces.

There can be no doubt that early in June if not earlier the Germans had begun to feel the falling off in their man-power; their reserves were getting used up. This is clearly shown from an Order of General Ludendorff's dated July 9, which is as follows:—

The condition of our resources in men, and the internal economic situation force us to return men of the active service to fighting units and to proceed with the greatest economy in the use of the *personnel* in the auxiliary service [men fit for garrison duty or labour]. All service or personal considerations will be set aside in the face of this urgent necessity.

It is clear from reports as submitted to the Higher Command that non-commissioned officers and men from the active service are still being employed on posts which can, and must, absolutely be occupied by non-commissioned officers and men from the auxiliary service, such as cooks, orderlies, canteens, salesmen, clerks, etc.

For positions in rear of the front requiring vigorous



SITE OF A GERMAN BATTERY NEAR LASSIGNY.

personnel, men on active service who cannot be employed on the front under the War Ministry circulars of October 3, 1916 [families who have suffered severe losses], and November 18, 1917 [men born in 1875 or previously, and who have served more than six months in the front line], will in the first instance be chosen.

A commission has been appointed for each army on the Western front, and for each of the groups of armies of von Mackensen and von Scholtz, in order to investigate these questions and put an end to abuses.

The main purpose of the Higher Command is to recover the infantry.

Additional notes for the groups of armies of von Mackensen and von Scholtz. Instead of utilising the German *personnel* of the auxiliary service as reinforcements, a greater demand will be made for local *personnel*.

A matter is complained of in the above which has always been a source of trouble to Commanders in the field—the tendency to immobilise fighting men in auxiliary duties. Wellington in the Peninsular War complained that his Cavalry was used up to a large extent in supplying orderlies to General officers. Napoleon also drew attention to the waste of men taken from the fighting units for comparatively useless purposes, and no doubt the disease was extremely prevalent amongst the officers of the German Army, especially in the higher ranks, whose dignity in their opinion required the support of a number of underlings.

It is interesting to read the German view of the Anglo-French attack which commenced on August 8:

The plan was to overrun this front of the German defence system, which was only weakly fortified. There had been no time and the claims upon transport material

had been too heavy for any but hasty defences to be erected at this portion of the front. The Entente plan was, under the protection of a very short but extremely intense bombardment, to cut lanes through the German infantry and artillery lines for the Tank squadrons. Thereupon their cavalry, supported by Tanks, was to be pushed through the infantry lines in order to reach on the very first day of the offensive the high road from Péronne to Roye.

"The failure of this plan" is attributed, in the first place, to "the heroic resistance of the trench garrisons, which at many points held on in a hurricane of fire until surrounded on all sides." "All our telegraph and telephone communications broke down and signal rockets were invisible in the thick fog. Our gunners continued to put up a barrage until they suddenly found the Tanks upon them in the flank and rear. The machine-guns from these played terrible havoc in the gunners' ranks. Quick as lightning gun after gun was turned round to blaze into the Tanks at short range, while other guns maintained the barrage to impede the bringing up of the British reserves. In many batteries the last surviving officers kept up machine-gun fire to the last, some, after hours of tough resistance, even succeeding in fighting their way back to the German lines.

"On the second day the British and French recommenced their offensive with Tank attacks, but, weakened by the losses of the previous day, they did not display the same vigour. Caught in the fire of the German batteries, whose shell-bursts raised black fountains around the Tanks, their attack wavered. Several Tanks were hit and burst into flames, while others turned tail. The infantry did not follow up properly, and their attacks stopped dead. Only in the afternoon were the British able, with the help of fresh troops, to renew the attack,

"On the entire front from Morlancourt to the Avre deeply echeloned storming waves advanced, headed once more by strong Tank divisions. Air squadrons flew overhead, attempting to smother the German ranks with a hail of machine-gun bullets. A smart parrying counter-attack by the German infantry followed. The fight swayed this way and that, but finally the British, in spite of the strong forces employed, were unable to

make headway on the banks of the Somme and the great Roman high road.

"Farther south, Franco-British assaults on the Rosières-Arvillers line succeeded in gaining ground on a terrain extremely unsuited for defence, so that eventually the battleground on both banks of the Somme, which furious British attacks could not capture, was voluntarily given up."

The following account of the proceedings on August 10, the third day of the attack, only needs to be compared with the actual facts as recorded above to put its value in a true light. The German loss in material was enormous.

On the third day of their offensive the French launched a frontal attack on the German front between Montdidier and the Matz. As there were only temporary defence works here, the main German troops were withdrawn to a more favourable fighting terrain. The French attacking forces, which advanced after strong artillery preparation, accompanied by Tanks, only came into contact with our rearguard, whose machine-guns, however, caused the enemy such severe losses that his attacks were everywhere arrested. After the very sanguinary repulse of the French, whose assaults collapsed with severe losses before our rearguard line, the German rearguard was able with very slight losses and without the loss of any material to disengage itself from the enemy and to withdraw to the line mentioned in the official army report.

North of the Avre, Franco-British forces made the strongest efforts both towards the south with the object of taking the new German formations in the rear and towards the north with the object of rolling up the German Avre front, but these efforts were quite unsuccessful.

General von Ardenne, whose comments on

the war from the opening to its close, if collected together, would form an amusing volume, contributed to the *Dusseldorfer Nachrichten* about August 13, contributed a statement in which he quite rightly says "the Germans at home want to know how far the German retirement is going." His views are of that form which is peculiar to German mentality.

To this question, he says, no precise answer is possible, but it would reach its limit if vital parts of the German front as a whole were reached, or if the whole war situation experienced a turn in Germany's favour, a supposition nowise excluded, and indeed probable. Meanwhile, what concerns the German Command is that the enemy on the whole giant battle line from the Ancre, over the Somme to the Oise and Aisne and away to the Argonne—a distance of 200 kilometres—[124 miles]—has exhausted himself in bloody battles costly in losses. Even if the German retirement should be extended to the line Péronne-Ham-La Fère—that is, to the middle Somme and the Crozat Canal—which is a military assumption, even then the enemy would have no ground for victorious jubilation. It would not be German ground he would have won, but a French desert which he himself has mainly made what it is. The present battle region is for the German Command no object for protection, it is only a manœuvring ground calling for no payment for compensation for damage done to the floor.

His comment on the assistance we derived from the fog is delightful. It enabled us, he said, to effect a surprise, and it will, as the




[French official photograph.]

GERMAN PRISONERS, LED BY THEIR OFFICERS, MARCHING THROUGH MONTDIDIER.

season advances, play a still greater part. He goes on to say that :

A second important factor was the Tanks, which developed into a valuable variety of the artillery arm. The Entente Command sent forward many hundreds of Tanks, partly very light, thinly protected types, as the advanced guard of the infantry storm waves. What the types lack in the strength of their protection is attempted to be made good by an increase of speed to nearly 20 kilometres [$12\frac{1}{2}$ miles] an



GENERAL GILLRAIN.

Commanded the Belgian Army opposing the German Marine Corps.

hour. The preliminary success of this weapon, which, although not new, had so far not been employed in such strength, was noteworthy. The German infantry's adaptability, however, succeeded in finding effective methods in the moment of need against the fire of "the forward-streaming terror."

"Of course," he adds, "the Tanks and armoured vehicles which the Germans possess are undoubtedly better," and he finishes up by saying :

August 8 brought a new battle avalanche into motion. In its threatening course it did much damage, but it is to be hoped that it will soon find its end in the glacier crevasses of the German defence.

The German wireless report of August 11 remarks: "After the failure of the plan of Foch to cut off the German troops in the advanced positions in the Marne wedge and the sanguinary collapse of the Franco-American attacks against the Vesle line, the French commander attempted a similar manoeuvre at another part of the line. The haste with which these two operations had followed one another shows the nervous anxiety of the Entente leadership to maintain the initiative

and to intercept the dreaded new German attack." All the retirements which were made about this period by the Germans—for instance, near Montdidier and Albert—were carried out to evade the Franco-British attack. Even more remarkable is the statement in this report—it must not be forgotten it was for home consumption—"that in the heavy fighting between the Ancre and the Avre on August 8 the German aerial forces played a preponderating part; infantry and artillery aviators were constantly active from morning to evening, notwithstanding the unfavourable weather conditions. Bombing squadrons attacked in the daytime the enemy assembling of troops, Tanks and batteries with observed good results. Anti-aircraft guns not only shot down, in spite of the enemy's counter-measures, six enemy aeroplanes, but also took a successful part in the earth fighting. At close range they directed their fire against attacking infantry and destroyed a large number of armoured cars by direct hits. One account alone reported the destruction of seven enemy Tanks. By valuable reports of indefatigably working balloon observers, who continued their work in spite of the strongest enemy artillery and aerial attacks, our leadership was kept splendidly uniform. The enemy endeavoured by the formidable massed employment of aeroplanes to gain the mastery of the air. German chasing squadrons were able to frustrate his plans. Again and again they threw themselves against the enemy and shot down 33 enemy machines" Now, considering the fact that our attack was so successful on this date that the Germans were driven back helter-skelter, destroyed in large numbers and captured in masses, that their observation balloons did not work at all, and that our aviators simply swept them from the sky—and the truth of all this is proved by the absolute débacle which overtook our opponents—it is inconceivable that anybody could have been found even in Germany to write such ridiculous falsehoods.

The enemy was now compelled definitely to assume the defensive policy laid down by Ludendorff, and was already commencing to withdraw from his positions about Serre and farther north. As early as August 9, the Germans had begun to withdraw from their forward positions in the Lys Valley, and our line had been advanced on the whole front from the Lawe River to the Bourre north-west of

Merville, a maximum depth of 2,000 yards. Our troops held Locon, Le Cornet-Malo, Quentin, Le Petit-Pacaut and Le Sart. The Bourre flows south-easterly through the forest of Nieppe and joins the Lys at Merville. The Lawe joins the Lys also near that town to the south of it. Le Sart is just a mile to the west and Le Petit-Pacaut $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles, Quentin $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles and Le Cornet-Malo $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles south, while Locon is about $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the south-east.

On the night of August 8-9, north of Kemmel, our line was pushed forward a short distance on a front of over 1,000 yards and a few prisoners were taken.

The most important indication of German weakness was their withdrawal on the line from Bucquoy to Beaumont-Hamel which began in the Hébuterne region. Beaumont-Hamel, Serre, Puisieux-au-Mont and Bucquoy were abandoned. The German object here seems to have been to flatten out their salient and thus shorten their line and diminish the danger of flank attacks. The ground yielded was of a very important character, for the position between Beaumont Hamel and Serre was an extremely strong one. The retirement

began on the night of August 13-14, and the next day New Zealand patrols pushing forward discovered it and noticed that the ground was evacuated from Rossignol Wood towards Puisieux. On the north side of Serre our patrols were held up by strong rearguards, especially at Box Wood just west of Puisieux. Here the New Zealanders, helped by English troops, worked forward and completely turned this position, taking it and capturing its garrison.

On August 15 the advance was continued. The British crossed the Ancre and the New Zealanders found Puisieux was abandoned; Beaucourt-sur-Ancre was occupied. On the right, English troops pushed forward 1,500 yards to the south-east of Serre and on the night of August 15 both this place and Puisieux were captured. This gave us a total advance of 3,000 yards into the enemy's lines. He, however, still hung on to Bucquoy, and though the advance was for a time held up here, still the success gained was considerable. Numerous small posts of the usual character—*i.e.*, machine-gun sections carefully entrenched—were passed by, but had to yield to our advancing troops.

The Germans on August 16 attacked the



[Official photograph.]

THE MAHARAJAH OF PATIALA INSPECTS A BIG GUN.

The Maharajah visited the Western Front in the latter part of July and the beginning of August.

British at Daméry, but were beaten back with heavy loss.

The northern end of the German line was held by the German Fourth Army under Sixt von Armin, the coastal portion being garrisoned by the German Marine Corps under Admiral von Schröder. This was opposed on our left by the Belgian Army, with the Second British Army next it in the Ypres sector. The Belgian Army was under General Gillrain, and our outer flank was watched by the Dover Patrol under Admiral Keyes. King Albert of Belgium was in chief command here, and at his disposal was a French Reserve Army under Degoutte which had been brought to this flank.

Next to Plumer's army was the Fifth British Army under General Birdwood, then the First under General Horne, the Third under General Byng, and the Fourth under General Rawlinson. Facing these troops, the Germans had their Sixth Army under General von Quast in the Lille region; the Seventeenth Army under General von Below holding their line from Vimy to the south of Arras; then came the Second German Army under General von der Marwitz in the Somme district; then von Hutier in the neighbourhood of Roye. Opposed

to him was General Debeney's First French Army and the Third French Army under General Humbert. The German troops from the Oise to the Aisne comprised Boehn's and Carlowitz's army, with Mudra on the right. Then came Eberhardt's force in the Vesle sector. From the Oise to the Vesle the French had in line their Tenth Army under Mangin, the Fifth Army under Guillaumat; General Gourand with the Fourth Army about Reims was opposed to von Einem with the so-called Army of Champagne. Farther down on the right was Gallwitz, holding the northern part of Lorraine.

By August 18 there was a general backward movement of the German Armies facing the British, not of a very pronounced character, rather one of readjustment of their trenches to repair the damages effected by our advances into their front positions so as to give them a more continuous and better line to resist further encroachments. Their leaders were evidently keeping in their minds the ultimate necessity of being forced to depend on the great Hindenburg line on which so much labour had been expended. They were gradually coming to the opinion that all in front of that would have to be given up.



[Australian official photograph.]

A CAPTURED GERMAN POM-POM GUN, SHOWING THE DISC WHICH CARRIES THE CARTRIDGES.

*(French official photograph.)*

MATERIAL ABANDONED BY THE GERMANS AT FRESNOY-LEZ-ROYE.

On August 18 when the Fourth German Army lost the Outtersteeno hillock on the eastern side of the Becque—a position of some importance as it was over 100 feet over country in which the more retired lines of the Germans lay—the 4th and 12th German Divisions holding the edge of the plain in front of Meteren were fully expecting attack and indeed had been reinforced to resist it. But the British troops did not advance at dawn as expected, and the Germans apparently thought that no attack was intended for the moment. At 11 a.m., however, a screen from smoke shells was thrown upon them, and a heavy barrage began under which our troops advanced and rapidly carried the trenches, and by 1 o'clock the ridge was occupied in strength. At 2 p.m. a heavy bombardment was begun against the line we had won and was continued without ceasing till 9 p.m., when a counter-attack of infantry was delivered. It was brought to a complete standstill by our machine-gun fire from the newly captured crest and driven back with considerable loss. The result of the entire movement was that we captured 700 prisoners besides inflicting heavy losses in killed and wounded on the enemy, and won a position which gave us considerable observation over the surrounding country and deprived the enemy of this advantage. The whole front of the British advance between Vieux Berquin and Bailleul measured nearly four miles, and in depth varied from 1,000 to 2,000 yards.

On August 19 the pressure was continued. In the Merville district this village was captured and our line was pushed forward to the north up to the Lawe river near Lestrem. It was a considerable advance and north of Merville our troops reached La Couronne and Vierhouck, so that the new line we now held ran north and

south from the east of Merville to the east of Vieux Berquin. Merris, it will be remembered, had been captured a short time before. In the Loere area, still farther north, the enemy's line of defence was also captured and severe casualties inflicted on him.

The German Seventeenth Army athwart the Scarpe east of Arras retired on the 18th from before Feuchy, but still clung to the marshes. The Second Army was also pushed near Peronne.

We have seen that Field-Marshal Haig, in the middle of August, had determined to transfer his attack to the sector north of the Somme, where it did not seem that the enemy expected attack. There was another reason which largely influenced him, viz., that the success of the Fourth Army in driving back the German forces opposed to it had threatened the left flank of the position then held by the Germans from the south; yet another reason was the use of tanks, which had played such a great part in the recent fighting. For this, the ground north of the Ancre river, which was not greatly damaged by shell-fire, was very suitable. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a south-easterly direction would turn the line of the Somme south of Peronne and would thus be a step forward towards the great strategic objective—St. Quentin—Cambrai. Moreover, from the tactical point of view, the situation was favourable. The British now held the plateau south of Arras about Bucquoy and Ablainzeville which in the time of the former fighting on the Somme had been behind the enemy's lines. The British were therefore either across or to the east of the German systems of trench lines which in 1916 it had been necessary to attack frontally, and had, moreover, the advantage of



[Aus taken official photograph.]

LAYING A SIGNAL WIRE FROM THE TRENCHES TO HEADQUARTERS.

command of view which at that date had been denied to them.

It was arranged that on the morning of August 21 an attack should be delivered on the north of the Ancre to gain the line of the Arras-Albert Railway, which was believed to be the enemy's main line of resistance.

August 22 would then be devoted to the arrangement of troops and guns on this front so as to prepare for a further movement, while the left of the Fourth Army was to be brought up between the Somme and the Ancre.

On August 23 the principal attack would be delivered by the Third Army and those divisions of the Fourth Army which were north of the Somme; the remainder of General Rawlinson's force, while keeping south of the river, would push forward so as to cover the flank of the movement. If the operation were successful, then both the Third and Fourth Armies would press forward with the greatest vigour and make the most of the advantage gained.

As soon as the Third Army had captured the Mercatel spur, thereby securing the southern flank of the British while assaulting the German positions on Orange Hill and round Monchy-le-Preux, then the First Army would extend the British front by attacking to the north of the

Third Army; the river Sensée would serve to cover the left of this force. The right of the First Army would attack east of Arras and turn from the north the western end of the Hindenburg line, from which the enemy would thereby be compelled to retreat. Sir Douglas Haig hoped that this very gradual extension of the British front of attack would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would cause him, for this reason, to throw in his reserves in a piece-meal manner.

On August 21, at five minutes to five a.m., the IV. Corps, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. M. Harper, and the VI. Corps, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. J. A. L. Haldane, both belonging to Sir Julian Byng's Third Army, attacked on a line which extended from Beaucourt-sur-Ancre south-west of Miraumont to Moyenneville, a front of some nine miles. The attack was opened by five divisions in front line, viz., the 42nd, New Zealand, and 37th Divisions belonging to the IV. Corps and the 2nd and Guards Divisions of the VI. Corps. With them was a considerable number of tanks. The enemy's front line of defences was rapidly mastered without much resistance. Through the leading divisions of the IV. Corps the 5th Division and the 63rd Division, the latter

under Major-Gen. C. E. Lawrie, passed, and through the 2nd and Guards Divisions, the 3rd Division of the VI. Corps under Major-Gen. C. J. Deverell continued the attack.

When the assault began, it was covered to some extent by fog. In the second phase of the movement, it became more dense and led to some loss of direction, although this did not have much effect on the battle. As in the fighting south of the Somme, so here the mist helped us. Our artillery fire knew the ranges of its targets, whereas the enemy could not see our infantry advancing. Only a vague outline of the nearest and largest objects was visible, so much so that prisoners or wounded coming back only became visible when they approached within 50 yards.

The artillery and our trench mortars were able to pour a mass of fire on the positions to be attacked, whereas the enemy's fire was casual and ill-directed. So superior was our fire and such good work did the tanks do that our men suffered very little even from the machine-guns of the Germans.

The fighting was now more bitter, particularly about Achiet-Le-Petit and Logeast wood. At both these places the enemy counter-attacked with great vigour. Nevertheless our troops reached the line of the Arras-Albert railway on practically the whole front of attack, captured the two points just named, and also Courcelles and Moyenneville. East of these two places they crossed the railroad. The 21st Division of the V. Corps aided the movement by clearing the Germans from the north bank of the Ancre about Beaucourt. Thus the result of the limited attack was completely gained without great loss, and 2,000 prisoners were taken. These belonged to the 234th German Division, to the 2nd Guard Reserve Division, the 4th Bavarian, the 183rd and the 16th Reserve Division. This gave us favourable ground from which to set out for our main attack. The advance was a clear proof of the advantage we had gained by the German retirement, previously alluded to on page 165, and the occupation of Beaumont Hamel, Serre, Puisieux -au-Mont, Bucquoy and Ablainzeville. The distances our troops had to move for the first portion of the attack were comparatively moderate, and under cover of the fog were easily traversed. No preliminary bombardment was made, and the artillery fire and infantry attack supported by the tanks took place together.

It would appear that the Germans in a general sense were expecting to be attacked, but when it actually occurred it took them somewhat by surprise. The depth of our advance varied from 3,000 to 5,000 yards.

The fighting round Miraumont was more severe than at most parts of the line, especially at a point just north-west of the village known as the Beau-Regard Dovecot, which was on the Miraumont-Puisieux road. This was apparently a home for carrier pigeons, and also was the site for a wireless telegraphy plant.



[Elliott & Fry.]

MAJOR-GENERAL C. J. DEVERELL.

Commanded the 3rd Division of the VI. Corps.

and a field-gun was in position there. The wireless plant was removed, but before the gun could be taken the Germans counter-attacked and drove back our men. Early in the evening, however, a fresh attack re-conquered the Dovecot and the gun was finally taken; but the Germans did not give up all hope at this point. There was heavy artillery fire throughout the night and at 3 a.m. they put down a heavy barrage of gas shells. This was followed up at 4 o'clock; a new division of the enemy, the 52nd, attacking, and once more our line was driven back. Our artillery then opened an intensive fire against this point, and at 6 o'clock the position was again captured by us and the gun taken back to the rear.

Achiet-le-Grand was another point where a

severe struggle took place. Here there was a deep cutting through which the railway ran, the near-side bank of which was organized for machine-guns, while behind the cutting was a number of field guns. This made it difficult for our tanks to get to work, but eventually the troops succeeded in acquiring it. A German division which was concentrated for an attack at 5 a.m. on August 22 farther up the line, was completely brought to a standstill by our artillery fire, the position being reported to the guns by our aeroplane observers.

When Sir Douglas Haig's great offensive began on August 21 the Air Force came into great prominence again. In the early morning a thick mist prevented our machines from taking part in the battle, but as the sun obtained more power the sky grew clearer, and for the rest of the day our aviators took a very active part in the battle. The same system was employed as at the attacks in the earlier part of August on the Somme. Some of the aeroplanes kept touch with the enemy and reported back to our advancing troops. Others actively supported our infantry with bombs and machine-gun fire, while some acted on the lines behind the enemy attacking the transport

coming up and his columns on the march. In many instances they succeeded in silencing the anti-aircraft guns of the enemy by bomb dropping and machine-gun fire. Altogether 12 tons of bombs were dropped by us during the day on several objectives. Twenty-nine German machines were accounted for, against which we had 8 of ours missing. One of the German observation balloons also was shot down.

The night of August 21-22 was clear and the moon was full, and this enabled our aeroplanes to do very good work; large numbers of bombs were dropped over the communications close behind the front and low-flying machines attacked troops and transports on the roads. Some of our bombing machines saw a long column of some 20 German lorries going through a defile in a sunken road. They bombed it and got direct hits, which accounted for eight vehicles. Some of the remaining lorries got away, only to be blocked in another cutting farther along the road. Here again our airmen attacked, and with their bombs and machine-guns wrecked them all. In addition to the attention which they paid to the immediate front of action, aviators also bombed many points behind the German front lines.



TANKS AND PRISONERS.

[Canadian official photograph.]

*Official photograph.*

A SIX-INCH HOWITZER IN ACTION.

Early on August 22 the III. Corps belonging to part of the Fourth Army assisted by a small number of Tanks, attacked in company with the 47th, 12th and 18th Divisions; the 3rd Australian Division cooperating on the right of the 38th Division on the left flank. The 18th Division, under Major-General R. P. Lee, successfully forced the river Ancre and captured Albert by a well-executed enveloping movement from the south-east. Thus our line between the Somme and the Ancre was advanced well to the east of the Bray-Albert road and the left of the Fourth Army on the Somme was brought up in conformity with this advance and prolonged our line to the south. Over 2,400 prisoners and a few guns were taken by us.

The night of August 22 was clear and light almost to the rising of the sun. This enabled our bombing machines to drop 25½ tons of bombs on selected targets. A notable one of these was the bridge at Aubigny-au-Bac on the road connecting Douay with Cambrai. All our machines returned in safety and succeeded in bringing down one of the enemy's night-flying aeroplanes of large size.

August 23 saw the beginning of the main attack of Sir Douglas Haig's armies, along a front of 33 miles from the point where we joined on to the French First Army, just north of Lihons, to Mercatel, which is on the Arras-Bapaune road, about 3½ miles south of the former town, and near where the Hindenburg

line from Bullecourt-Quéant joined the old Arras-Vimy German defences of 1916

On the eve of the operations Sir Douglas Haig issued instructions to the troops under his command, in which he drew attention to the favourable changes which had taken place in the Allied position. Well might he do so, for the Germans had been driven back all along their line from Kemmel to Soissons and beyond. Sir Douglas emphasized the necessity for all ranks to act with the utmost boldness and resolution, and ordered that wherever the enemy was giving way there pressure was to be increased. This was taking a leaf out of the German book, for, as we have seen ever since March 21, it had been laid down by the enemy commanders that where successes were gained there they were to be pushed home, and that troops were not to be vainly sacrificed against points which held out. This was, of course, common sense; where a line is partially and successfully broken small portions which are not conquered for the moment must eventually fall if the line of conquest sweeps on.

During the night of August 22-23 the Germans made two attacks on our positions in the neighbourhood of Baillecourt Farm, east of Beaucourt, and a small local attack to the north-west of Bailleul was stopped before it reached our trenches.

At a quarter to five on the morning of August 23 the great attack began. More than 100 Tanks were employed on different parts of the



[Official photograph.]

ROAD-MAKING IN THE RECONQUERED AREA: BREAKING UP THE GROUND FOR LEVELLING.

front; there was no preliminary bombardment, but the artillery supplied the usual barrage. On the right flank and south of the Somme the 32nd British Division, under Major-Gen. T. S. Lambert, and the 1st Australian Division, under Major-Gen. T. W. Glasgow, advanced and captured Herleville, Chuignolles and Chuignes. The position round the two latter villages was a strong one, the woods north of the former and between it and the Somme Canal being stoutly defended, and there was a good deal of severe fighting before they were captured; but eventually the Germans were repulsed (with a loss of over 2,000 prisoners) and our troops occupied them and proceeded a little farther on to the high ground east of Chuignes.

At the same time the 18th Division from the III. Corps and the right Brigade of the 38th Division from the V. Corps attacked in the neighbourhood of Albert, and after hard fighting captured the high ground east of the town known to the British Staff as the Tara and Usna hills.* Two companies of the Welsh Regiment, forming part of the left Brigade of the 38th Division, waded across the Ancre in the neighbourhood of Hamel and prolonged the left of the former attack, holding

* While it is a practice to give the various hills and various ground features distinguishing names, it is a pity that when dispatches are published maps do not accompany them, showing where these points are, because when they are made known to the public there can be no reason for carefully concealing the localities in question.

their position on the east of the river against constant counter-attacks by the Germans. During the morning the other divisions of the V. Corps—*i.e.*, the 17th and 21st Divisions, the IV. Corps, consisting of the 42nd Division, the New Zealand Division and the 5th and 37th Divisions, and the VI. Corps, comprising the Guards, the 2nd, 3rd, 56th, and 52nd Divisions—attacked along the front north of Albert, directing the chief weight of their assault upon the German line extending from Miramont up to Boiry-Becquerelle just a little north of Boyelles. The 17th and 21st Divisions pushed up the left bank of the Ancre north of Thiépvail—*i.e.*, on the left of our attack from Hamel—but, although the ground about Thiépvail was apparently occupied, it was not part of the plan to advance to any depth in that direction on this day. The 3rd Division of the VI. Corps moved to the assault at 4 a.m. and captured Gomiécourt, taking 500 prisoners, and during the morning the attack spread along the front of the IV. Corps also. The German outpost line was quickly penetrated and their main line of resistance was stormed, our troops penetrating some distance beyond it. Bihucourt, Ervillers, Boyelles, and Boiry-Becquerelle were captured. More than 5,000 prisoners were taken, and a considerable number of guns. The Germans were here beginning to show that the continued successes of the British troops were affecting their moral, and signs of confusion and disorganization became evident. The Arras-

Bapaume main road was cut and our forces were closing on Bapaume both from the north and north-west. This left the enemy on the Thiépval ridge salient in a perilous position. It will be remembered that the 17th and 21st Divisions had not made any attempt at great progress in this direction. It was plainly better to outflank the Germans, as was done by the advance of the IV. Corps, and thereby expose them to being cut off.

During the ensuing night (23rd-24th) the action was kept up and went on with great vigour the next morning on the whole front from the Somme to Neuville-Vitasse. Shortly after midnight the 3rd Australian Division took Bray-sur-Somme and the 47th Division, under Major-General Sir G. T. Goringe, with the 12th and 18th Divisions of the III. Corps, comprising London and East County troops, extended our line right across the high ground between Bray and La Boisselle on the road Albert-Bapaume. In the neighbourhood of the latter village and at some other points the fighting was very severe, and a number of prisoners were captured. Thus our line was complete from the French south of the Somme to a point on the north about Neuville-Vitasse.

On the left of the 4th Army the Third Army again moved forward with the same divisions, attacked the half-demoralized Germans and pressed them back with great vigour. The hostile positions on the Thiépval ridge, which in

1916 had been such a cause of heavy loss to us, were carried by a well-arranged concentric attack which came down from the high ground about Pozières. The brigade of the 38th Division which attacked on the right, crossed the Anero at Albert during the early part of the night and formed up close to the German lines on a narrow front between the Albert-Pozières line and the marshy ground on the left bank of the Anero. The left brigade of this division waded through the stream opposite Hamol, notwithstanding that it was breast high and that the troops were under heavy fire, and formed up as a German counter-attack was being delivered against the two companies of the Welsh Regiment which had crossed the river at the same point early on the morning of August 23. Other divisions of the V. Corps moved forward on the left of the 38th Division, and between them they drove the Germans from the high ground above Ovillers-la-Boisselle and Thiépval. Continuing the advance, the V. Corps gained Courcellette and Martinpuich. Miraumont, which had held out for three days against our attacks, and the garrison of which had now apparently come to the end of their resisting power, was carried by the 42nd Division, under Major-General A. Solly-Flood. Many prisoners were captured. Then the division advanced and captured Pys. Major-General J. Ponsonby, with the 5th Division, captured Irlés, then pushed on



ROAD-MAKING IN THE RECONQUERED AREA: THE SCOPER AT WORK.

Official photograph.

and, aided by the New Zealand Division, under Major-General Sir A. H. Russell, and some Tanks, which rendered great service, cleared Loupart Wood. New Zealand troops in section took Grévillers, and reached Avesnes-les-Bapaume, and also aided in the capture of Biefvillers-les-Bapaume by the 37th Division, under Major-General H. B. Williams.

On the high ground between Saignies and Morytheresistance of the Germans strengthened, but our troops pressed up closely to those villages, while the Guards Division, under Major-General G. P. T. Fielding, carried St. Léger. Still more to the north the 56th Division, under Major-General Sir C. P. A. Hull, had heavy fighting round Croisilles, and on the high ground of the spur to the north-west known as Héninel several thousands of prisoners were taken, and many guns and a very large amount of material of all kinds were captured by our troops. To the left of the 56th Division was the 52nd Division, under Major-General J. Hill; his troops took Henin-sur-Cojeul and St Martin-sur-Cojeul.

North of the Scarpe the section of the German front line north-west of Fampoux was taken, and north of the La Bassée Canal our

troops penetrated into the old British front line north-east of Givenchy and took some 60 prisoners. During the night our patrols occupied Neuf-Berquin, which had been abandoned by the Germans, who left a considerable number of dead there, and early in the next morning our line to the north of Bailleul was advanced on a front of a mile. A counter-attack attempted by the enemy later on in the day was completely stopped by our artillery fire.

The predominance which the Allied aircraft had obtained in the air was particularly shown during the commencement of Sir Douglas Haig's offensive. On August 8 the aeroplane squadrons were in close co-operation with the Army along the whole battle-front throughout the day. They worked hand in hand with the cavalry, giving them information as to where the enemy were and aiding the horsemen by their machine-gun fire and by bombing points which had to be attacked. Our aviators constantly reported the position reached by our attacking forces, while the machines in connexion with the artillery signalled back to our guns the positions of the hostile artillery, infantry, and



[Official photograph.]

ARTILLERY OBSERVERS.



[Official photograph.]

CAVALRY MOVING FORWARD.

transport on the line of march. Moreover, special machines supplied our advanced troops with ammunition. Their co-operation with the Tanks was also very thorough. They gave them information as to where the enemy's strong points were, and they attacked these with bombs and machine-gun fire. They rendered another great service, for they dropped smoke bombs along the line of advance, which helped to conceal the approach of the Tanks from the Germans. The actual part in the battle taken by our fighting squadrons was a great one. They bombed the enemy in his retreat, causing havoc amongst masses of troops and transport on roads congested with traffic, and they deluged them with their machine-gun fire. Bombing squadrons flying farther afield and keeping only a few hundred feet from the ground attacked trains, railway junctions and bridges. We lost altogether 49 machines, the larger portion of which were brought down by fire from the ground, which shows how closely our aviators had sought out their targets. On the other side they brought down 65 German machines and also five hostile balloons.

On August 9 the work of our airmen continued without intermission and our balloons followed up close behind the advancing line

and carried out continuous and valuable observations. Sixty-one German machines were accounted for, against which we lost 23. Thirty-eight and a half tons of bombs were dropped during the day and $18\frac{1}{2}$ in the course of the following night.

The next day there was severe fighting in the air, chiefly over the area where the fighting was taking place. Sixty-one of the enemy's machines were brought down, against which we had only to set off 12 of ours missing. In their work on the battlefield $23\frac{1}{2}$ tons of bombs were dropped, while in the Sommo valley, principally upon bridges and stations, during the night of August 10-11 31 tons were let fall. In addition to this, there was, of course, the usual work of reconnaissance and observation for the artillery and the same close connexion between the troops actually fighting on the ground and those in the air. The amount of small-arm ammunition that the latter poured down broke all recent records. During the same night two German bombing machines were brought down. The first was a giant with five engines and a heavy load of bombs. Unfortunately it came down in flames and its bombs exploded when they hit the ground. The result was that very little information was obtained with regard to the construction



[Official photograph.]

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN BUSY WITH THE ENEMY.

of the aeroplane. The French were equally active during this period, working in close contact with their attacking forces and engaging the German aviators in many combats. Fourteen of their machines were brought down and nine captive balloons destroyed.

During the day 23 tons of bombs were dropped on troops and transport in the battle zone as well as on various points behind the front, and during the night (9th-10th) seventeen tons of bombs were dropped on stations at Ham, Tergnier, Nesle, Hombieux, and on many of the German bivouacks. The Germans gave the number of machines brought down by them on August 9 at the same figure as we published—viz., 23. The rest of their reports were chiefly filled up with the records which their airmen were supposed to have obtained. These are quite uninteresting, and would require much more verification than they have hitherto received to be believed.

The German report for August 10 states that there was very lively aerial activity over the battlefield, but gives no details. These can be supplied from British reports. Forty-one German machines were destroyed and 20 others driven down out of control, against which we lost 12.

On the morning of August 11 the Independent Air Force attacked the railway station at Karlsruhe and also a hostile aerodrome. Observation was difficult owing to clouds, but one

large bomb was seen to cause an explosion in the station. Both on the way to their objective and on the road home from it a good deal of fighting took place in the air, the result of which was that we drove down three of the German machines and they accounted for one of ours. In the afternoon of that day a few bombs were dropped on the triangle of railways near Metz, and on the night of August 11-12 our machines attacked two hostile aerodromes and several ground targets. During the day the aeroplanes in immediate contact with the troops fighting on the battle-front were very active. Courtrai station and sidings were heavily bombed without our men suffering in casualties, and during the night Péronne and Cambrai stations were also heavily attacked, and again without loss to us. The enemy had been more active than usual, but the result of the fighting was extremely unfavourable to them. Fifty-three of their machines were accounted for, while we lost only five of ours; four hostile balloons were also shot down in flames.

One of the most important raids of the Independent Air Force took place on August 12, when during the daytime one of our squadrons, despite unfavourable weather, successfully attacked and caused great damage to the aeroplane and chemical works at Frankfurt. A large number of the enemy's aviators endeavoured to ward off our attack, but in

vain, and going and coming they kept up a running fight for about 30 miles, in which two of their machines were destroyed, whereas all ours returned in safety. Bursts were observed well in the centre of the targets aimed at, and great destruction was caused to them. This was the first occasion that a raid on this important seat of international banking had been undertaken, although the French had on the night of October 1-2, 1917, made a short raid on the city. Another of our squadrons attacked the aerodrome at Hagenau, 16 miles north of Strasburg. On their way to their objective, they were attacked by large numbers of the enemy machines. A severe fight ensued, in which four of the latter were destroyed and one more driven down out of control, against a loss of only two to ourselves. The squadron then proceeded towards its objective unmolested, a direct hit was obtained on a large hut in the aerodrome, and the bomb fell on four German machines on the ground near a shed and destroyed them.

On the same date the Germans made one of their usual air reports, in which they claimed for the month of July 518 aeroplanes, including 69 shot down by their anti-aircraft guns, also 39 captive balloons, and they went on to state that 239 of the aeroplanes were in their possession, and that the rest were seen to fall

within the enemy's position. They claimed, too, that they had only lost 129 aeroplanes and 63 captive balloons in the same period—a statement ridiculously inaccurate, as will be seen on comparing it with the numbers given previously on page 132, Chapter CCLXXVIII. There is not even a pretence of truth in the German report.

During August 12 our air activity was continued; with an expenditure of 12 of our own machines we brought down 37 belonging to the enemy and one observation balloon. The usual routine of our airmen was carried out with great vigour, that of the captive balloons being especially noteworthy. They worked close up behind our advancing line and sent down much useful information. Altogether our men dropped 45 tons of bombs during the 24 hours. The French brought down 11 German aeroplanes and also four captive balloons. The American Air Force, too, was active. On August 11-12 they successfully bombed the railway yards at Longuyon, Dommary, Baronecourt and Conflans without any loss to themselves. An attack was also made on Thionville in which we lost three of our machines and destroyed two belonging to the enemy.

The fine weather of August 14 enabled our aviators to do a great deal of work. The bombing of the Somme bridges, railway lines



(Australian official photograph.)

A DAYLIGHT PATROL SEARCHING DUG-OUTS AFTER THE GERMAN RETIREMENT.



[Official photograph.]
KITE BALLOON WITH PARACHUTES
ATTACHED.

and junctions, which had been constantly going on, was continued with great vigour, and materially interfered with the arrival of German reinforcements. The enemy made an endeavour by employing large formations of aerial scouts to interfere with our men and stop their work, which was producing disastrous consequences to him; but our machines easily dealt with these endeavours, and in the fighting which ensued 31 of the enemy's aeroplanes were brought down and we only lost six.

The amount of our work can be judged from the fact that 21 tons of bombs were dropped during the day and 37 by night. An especially successful raid was carried out on a hostile aerodrome by British and American aviators,

which resulted in six machines on the ground being destroyed and the sheds set on fire. The French, too, were very successful on this date. On August 13 they put out of action 12 German machines and during the night 13th-14th dropped 32 tons of bombs at Terngnier, St Quentin, Ham, Nesle, Noyon and on bivouacs in the neighbourhood of Ognolles and the railway stations at Maison Bleu, Guignicourt and Le Chatelet-sur-Retourne. At Ham and Noyon, where 15 tons of bombs were dropped, violent conflagrations were observed.

The next day, as a result doubtless of our superiority, the enemy's activity in the air was somewhat decreased. Our men brought down altogether 28 German aeroplanes with a loss to ourselves of 15. Twenty-two tons of bombs were dropped during the day on Péronne, Roisel, Engel ammunition dump and Bruges docks. During the night following the Somme bridges were again heavily bombed, as also were the railways at Péronne, Douay and Cambrai, 30 tons of bombs being dropped. We brought down one of the enemy's night-flying machines and lost one of our own.

In the afternoon of this day our Independent Air Force made a daylight raid on the station at Offenburg in Baden, doing considerable damage. Severe fighting took place with the enemy's aerial force, in which we accounted for four of his aeroplanes without any loss to ourselves. The French also did very good work



AN ABANDONED GERMAN GUN WITH
BREECH BLOWN OUT.

in the air, bringing down 15 enemy machines and eight balloons.

The frequency with which the enemy had been beaten in the air led him to raid Paris during the night of August 15. The Germans succeeded in dropping many bombs and some casualties were reported, but no serious damage of any kind was done.

On August 15 there was less fighting in the air, but we brought down nine German machines and two observation balloons. We lost one aeroplane. The routine work of the Force, including reconnaissance and observation for artillery fire, was carried on successfully, and a considerable number of bombs were dropped during the previous night and this day, amounting in all to 22½ tons.

The superiority of the Allies became more and more marked. Leaving aside for the moment the actual fighting on the battlefield, the Independent Air Force and French organiza-

lost seven, but our objective was reached and we destroyed three of the German aviators. Coblenz and Hagenau were also dealt with early in the morning. The German version of the Cologne attack on the morning of August 22 was that five persons were killed and two badly injured and not inconsiderable damage done to private property, but there was no military or material damage. The French made an important raid on August 22, causing great damage to the aerodrome at Mars-la-Tour.

During the remainder of the month our Independent Force constantly raided well into



Official photograph.

STARTING TO WORK WITH THE ARTILLERY.

tions of a similar character were constantly engaged in highly successful work. Thus on the night of August 21-22, when the weather was favourable, Frankfurt and Cologne were heavily attacked and the stations and barracks bombed. Similar treatment was served out to the railway junction at Trèves, four hostile aerodromes were attacked and many hangars hit, and the anti-aircraft guns were also attacked, especially with machine-gun fire. We only lost one machine.

On the morning of August 22 Mannheim was once more attacked, but this time, both going and returning, our machines were subjected to fierce fighting, the result of which was that we

Germany. Frankfurt and the chemical factories at Mannheim were again successfully attacked on the night of August 25-26, and all our machines returned in safety. The Mannheim attack was conducted at such a low elevation, not more than a height of 200 feet from the ground, that the pilots narrowly escaped running into some of the factory chimneys. The barrage put up was totally ineffective and we lost no machines, but the explosions caused by our bombs were very heavy and considerable damage was done.

On August 30 the Independent Air Force again bombed Conflans and Thionville.



{Official photograph.

CARRYING UP AMMUNITION BY PACK MULES.

The weather continued to be fine on August 16, but the enemy's aviators displayed no great anxiety to indulge in combat. The consequence was we scored heavily against them. Thirteen German aeroplanes were disposed of by our men with a loss of only six to ourselves.

During the mornings of both August 16 and 17 the German aerodromes at Haubourdin and Lomme (near Lille) were heavily attacked. At the first-named place bombs were dropped from a low height and six hangars were demolished, as well as two machines standing in the open. At the latter three hangars were

destroyed, and at both places great havoc was caused in the living quarters, several fires being started. On the night of August 16-17 the Independent Force attacked four hostile aerodromes and two railway junctions. The results could not be ascertained as the visibility was very poor.

The next night once more aerodromes, railway junctions, blast furnaces, trains, and other targets were attacked with success, and our aviators descending to a low height used machine-guns freely against many of the targets; one of our machines failed to return.



CHAPTER CCLXXX.

THE CONQUEST OF SYRIA.

TURKS EXPELLED FROM ARABIC VILAYETS—OPPOSING FORCES IN PALESTINE—ALLENBY'S STRATEGY—BATTLES OF SHARON AND MOUNT EPHRAIM—THE GREAT CAVALRY RIDE—VON LIMAN'S NARROW ESCAPE—WORK OF THE AIR FORCE—TWO TURKISH ARMIES DESTROYED—THE EAST JORDAN OPERATIONS—FROM GALILEE TO DAMASCUS—SYRIAN SEAPORTS SEIZED—HOMS OCCUPIED—THE ADVANCE TO ALEPPO—TASKS OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT—MARSHALL'S VICTORY ON THE TIGRIS—TWO YEARS AT ADEN—SURRENDER OF MEDINA.

GENERAL ALLENBY'S campaign in the autumn of 1918 did more than free Palestine and Syria from the Ottoman yoke. In conjunction with the advance of General Milne from Macedonia to the Turkish frontier near Adrianople, and the new advance of General Marshall in Mesopotamia, it brought about the capitulation of Turkey. General Allenby opened his offensive on September 19, the Turks then holding positions at Sinjil, only 16 miles north of Jerusalem. In six weeks the situation was completely transformed. The main Turkish armies were shattered in two days: by October 1 Damascus had been occupied, and Aleppo fell on October 25. General Allenby was about to advance on Alexandretta when, on October 30, the armistice was signed. On that day, before the armistice took effect, the Ottoman Division defending Mosul surrendered to General Marshall, while General Milne's force, after an arduous march from the Struma, was ready to seize Adrianople and advance on Constantinople.

A condition of the armistice was that all the remaining Turkish garrisons and troops in the field in the Arabic vilayets of the Empire should surrender to the nearest Allied post. Alexandretta was accordingly occupied by General Allenby, and Mosul and other places in

Upper Mesopotamia by General Marshall. The Turkish force which for three years had been encamped near Aden surrendered and was deported. The Turkish posts in the Yemen and Asir were likewise withdrawn, and various small enemy posts guarding the Hedjaz railway south of Ma'an were given up to the Arabs. But at Medina a determined attempt was made to disregard the terms of the armistice, and it was not until January 10, 1919, that the Turkish commander there was forced to capitulate. With the entry of the Hedjaz Arabs into that city, to Moslems second in sanctity only to Mecca, Turkish authority throughout the Arabic vilayets vanished.

In Vol. XVIII, Chapter CCLXVIII, the opening phases of General Allenby's campaign were briefly outlined, the part taken by the Arab Army under the Emir Faisal being alone given in any detail. Allenby's campaign, one of the most successful in military history, can now be treated as a whole. With it, completing the survey of the destruction of the enemy power in the Arabic vilayets, falls for description the last campaign in Mesopotamia and the final stages of the war in Arabia itself.

At the beginning of September, 1918, General Allenby estimated that the Turkish Armies on



JERUSALEM TO DAMASCUS AND BEYRUT.

his front had 4,000 cavalry and 32,000 infantry, with 400 guns—representing a "ration strength" of 104,000 men. The German-Austrian contingent numbered about 15,000, consisting mostly of technical troops. The enemy forces were in three groups:

(1) The VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, with 27,000 infantry and 268 guns.

(2) The IVth Turkish Army east of the Jordan, with 6,000 infantry, 2,000 sabres, and 74 guns.

(3) The 2nd Turkish Army Corps in garrison at Ma'an—south-east of the Dead Sea—and on posts on the Hedjaz railway north of Ma'an, some 6,000 infantry and 30 guns.

Besides these three bodies there were in reserve between Tiberias, Nazareth and Haifa about 3,000 infantry, with 30 guns. The German General Liman von Sanders, commander-in-chief of the enemy forces, had his headquarters at Nazareth. For the defence of Syria, should the armies in Palestine be defeated, the Turks had no adequate force. They had lost the flower of their army in the defence of Gallipoli and in the previous campaigns in Palestine, Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. They had squandered, too, thousands of excellent troops as German and Austrian auxiliaries in the Dobrudja and the Carpathians.

On his side General Allenby had in the fighting line a total of "some 12,000 sabres, 57,000 rifles and 540 guns. . . . a considerable superiority in numbers over the enemy, especially in mounted troops." His force was, he stated, "made up of two cavalry divisions, two mounted divisions, seven infantry divisions, an Indian infantry brigade, four unallotted battalions and the French Detachment (the equivalent of an infantry brigade with other arms attached)." It was a considerable force, but, as has been shown in Chapter CCLXVIII, a large proportion of the troops consisted of newly raised Indian battalions, the bulk of the European units having been withdrawn for service in France. The last Indian battalions to arrive had only been formed a few months and had not been incorporated into divisions till early in August. While the majority of Allenby's army now consisted of Indians, its composition was cosmopolitan. The mounted troops were made up of British and Indian (Regular and Imperial Service) regiments, Yeomanry, the Australian Light Horse, New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and a regiment of French cavalry. The infantry, besides some famous British regiments, included the American troops of the Légion d'Orient, the

Tirailleurs Algériens, the 1st Battalion of the Cape Corps (coloured troops from South Africa), the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the British West Indies Regiment, and notably Jewry's contribution—the 38th and 39th (Jewish) Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers. In addition mention should be made of the Italian Detachment, which, though taking no



GENERAL LIMAN VON SANDERS.
Commander-in-Chief of the Germano-Turkish Forces.

prominent part in the campaign, "throughout the operations gave valuable and loyal assistance";* of the South African Field Artillery, the Australian Flying Corps, Egyptian Infantry Battalions, and, behind the fighting line, of the Egyptian Labour Corps. Canada, too, was not wholly unrepresented, having sent a unit of its Ordnance Corps. If to all these be added the Arab Army under the Emir Faisal, and the British and French naval squadrons which cooperated, an idea may be gained of the mixed character of the forces the Turks had to face.

There had been no alterations of special importance in the staff and leaders in the field since General Allenby first succeeded to the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Sir J. L. Bols, a soldier of Belgian descent, remained Chief of Staff; Sir Philip Chetwode and Sir Edward Bulfin were the commanders of the two principal infantry

* The Italian detachment returned home in February, 1919.

corps, Sir Harry Chauvel of the Desert Mounted Corps, and Sir Edward Chaytor of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division. Col P. de Piépage commanded the French Detachment. The moral of the force was excellent; British and Indian regiments brigaded together worked in a fine spirit of comradeship and emulation.

In the earlier fighting of 1918 it had been demonstrated that the Turks could greatly embarrass the British operations in Eastern Palestine by transferring troops from the west to the east bank of the Jordan. It was

on first-class roads. Consequently, considering what it was hoped to accomplish, the opening operations could not safely be postponed to later than mid-September, this notwithstanding that several of the Indian battalions had had very little chance to get familiar with conditions prevailing on the Palestine front. It may here be noted that any apprehensions felt concerning the Indian and other newly raised battalions were soon set at rest; they all showed good fighting qualities, though naturally they lacked the skill of the veteran troops.



ARAB CHILDREN.

Waiting their turn to be clothed and fed by the British.

highly desirable, on political as well as military grounds, that the Turk should be cleared from Moab and Gilead, that Medina should be entirely cut off from any chance of succour, and that no enemy force should be left between Palestine and Mesopotamia. General Allenby realized that this could best be done by a successful offensive in Western Palestine. Moreover, the destruction of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies—that is, the enemy forces west of the Jordan—appeared to the British commander “to be within the bounds of possibility.” Accordingly he decided to strike at them. The time for opening the offensive was partly dictated by weather conditions. The rains usually begin in Western Palestine at the end of October, rendering the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon (otherwise Armageddon) impossible for transport except

The plan of campaign was drawn on bold and simple lines. The main feature was that the cavalry were to pour through a gap made for them by the infantry in the enemy lines, and, getting behind the Turks, cut off their retreat by seizing all vital points in their line of communications. It was obvious that this manoeuvre would have more chance of success in the coast sector than in the hill country north of Jerusalem, though even on the coast sector the cavalry, to cut off the Turks, would have to cross the western spurs of the hills of Samaria. Allenby therefore made his main attack in the coast plain. The command of the attacking force fell to General Bulfin, whose corps, the XXIst, had continuously formed the left wing of Allenby’s army. This corps, besides the 54th Division (Maj.-Gen. Hare) and 75th Division (Maj.-

Gen. Palin), which had fought their way up from Gaza, now included the 3rd (Lahore) Division (Maj.-Gen. Hoskins)* and the 7th (Meerut) Division (Maj.-Gen. Fane). In addition the 60th (London) Division (Maj.-Gen. Shea), from the XXth Corps, the French Detachment, the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Onslow), two brigades of mountain batteries, and 18 heavy and siege-gun batteries were placed at Sir Edward Bulfin's disposal. This was rendered possible by withdrawing the reserves from the front north of Jerusalem and by reducing to a minimum the forces in the Jordan valley.

The composition of General Bulfin's force was as follows :

54TH DIVISION.

161st Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. ORPEN-PALMER.

1/4th, 1/5th, 1/6th, and 1/7th Battalions Essex Regiment.

162nd Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. MUDGE.

1/5th Bedfordshire Regiment.

1/4th Northamptonshire Regiment.

1/10th and 1/11th London Regiment.

163rd Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. MCNEILL.

1/4th and 1/5th Norfolk Regiment.

1/5th Suffolk Regiment.

1/8th Hampshire Regiment.

Divisional Troops.

270th, 271st, and 272nd Brigades R.F.A.

7TH (MEERUT) DIVISION.

19th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. WEIR.

1st Battalion Seaforths.

28th, 92nd Punjabis.

125th Napier's Rifles.

21st Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. KEMBALL.

2nd Battalion Black Watch.

1st Guides Infantry.

20th Punjabis.

1/8th Gurkha Rifles.

28th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. DAVIES.

2nd Battalion Leicester Regiment.

51st Sikhs.

53rd Sikhs.

56th Punjabi Rifles.

Divisional Troops.

261st, 262nd, 264th Brigades R.F.A.

121st Pioneers.

75TH DIVISION.

232nd Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. HUDDLESTON.

1/4th Wilts Regiment.

72nd Punjabis.

2/3rd Gurkha Rifles.

3rd Kashmir I.S. Infantry.

233rd Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. COLSTON.

1/5th Somerset L.I.

29th Punjabis.

3/3rd Gurkha Rifles.

2/154th Indian Infantry.

234th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. MACLEAN.

1/4th Duke of Cornwall's L.I.

123rd Outram's Rifles.

125th Napier's Rifles.

Divisional Troops.

37th, 172nd, and 1st South African Brigades R.F.A.

60TH DIVISION.

179th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. HUMPHREYS.

2/13th London Regiment.

3/151st Punjabi Rifles.

2/19th Punjabis.

2/127th Baluch L.I.

180th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. WATSON.

2/19th London Regiment.

2nd Guides Infantry.

2/30th Punjabis.

1/50th Kumaon Rifles.

181st Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. DA COSTA.

2/22nd London Regiment.

1/30th Baluchis.

2/97th Deccan Infantry.

2/152nd Punjabis.

Divisional Troops.

301st, 302nd, 303rd Brigades R.F.A.

3RD (LAHORE) DIVISION.

7th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. DAVIDSON.

1st Battalion Connaught Rangers.

2/7th Gurkha Rifles.

27th and 91st Punjabis.

8th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. EDWARDES.

1st Battalion Manchester Regiment.

47th Sikhs.

59th Scinde Rifles.

2/124th Baluchistan.

9th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. LUARD.

2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment.

1/1st Gurkha Rifles.

93rd Indian Infantry.

105th Mahratta L.I.

Divisional Troops.

4th, 8th, 53rd Brigades R.F.A.

1/34th Sikh Pioneers.

Altogether some 35,000 infantry and 383 guns were at Bulfin's service, while the enemy strength opposed to him was estimated at not more than 8,000 rifles and 130 guns. But if the Turks were weak numerically, they had, under German instruction, constructed very elaborate and strong defences. Their coast sector ran from Jiljulieh (*i.e.* Gilgal*) to the sea, a distance of some 10 miles. The railway from the north, skirting the foothills of Samaria,

* Major-General Hoskins had been recalled from East Africa to take up command of this Division (see Chapter CCLXXVI).

* But not the Gilgal of Joshua, where the twelve stones were erected as a memorial to the crossing of the Jordan by the Israelites *drivshod*.

is built in a slight depression close to the hills, and in this depression lies Jiljulieh.

To the west of this depression the Turks [wrote Sir E. Allenby] had constructed two defensive systems. The first, 14,000 yards in length and 3,000 in depth, ran along a sandy ridge in a north-westerly direction from Bir Adas to the sea. It consisted of a series of works connected by continuous fire trenches. The second, or Et Tireh system, 3,000 yards in rear, ran from the village of that name to the mouth of the Nahr Falik. On the enemy's extreme right the ground, except for a narrow strip along the coast, is marshy, and could only be crossed in few places. The defence of the second system did not, therefore, require a large force. The railway itself was protected by numerous works and by the fortified villages of Jiljulieh and Kalkilieh. The ground between our front line at Ras El Ain* and these villages was open, and was overlooked from the enemy's works on the foothills round Keft Kasim.

These were the systems Bulfin's force was to attack. Behind, awaiting the breaching of the enemy's line, were the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps, the Australian Mounted Division being, for the time, absent.

These cavalry divisions were made up as follows:

4TH CAVALRY DIVISION.

Maj.-Gen. BARROW.

10th Cavalry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. HOWARD-VYSE and Brig.-Gen. GREEN.

1/1st Dorset Yeomanry.

2nd Lancers.

38th Central India Horse.

* The Antipatris of Herod the Great, the Mirabel of the Crusaders.

11th Cavalry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. GREGORY.

1/1st County of London Yeomanry.

29th Lancers.

36th Jacob's Horse.

12th Cavalry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. WIGAN.

1/1st Staffordshire Yeomanry.

6th Cavalry.

19th Lancers (Fane's Horse).

Divisional Troops.

20th Brigade R.H.A.

5TH CAVALRY DIVISION.

Maj.-Gen. MACANDREW.

13th Cavalry Brigade.

1/1st Gloucester Yeomanry.

9th Hodson's Horse.

18th Lancers.

14th Cavalry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. CLARKE.

1/1st Sherwood Rangers.

20th Deccan Horse.

34th Poona Horse.

15th Cavalry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. HARBORD.

Jodhpore I.S. Lancers.

Mysore I.S. Lancers.

1st Hyderabad I.S. Lancers.

Divisional Troops.

Essex Battery R.H.A.

It was hoped to take the Turks by surprise, but the difficulty was to conceal from the enemy knowledge both of the withdrawal of two cavalry divisions from the Jordan valley and of the concentration of a large



A GERMAN SCOUT PLANE SHOT DOWN IN SYRIA.



NAZARETH: THE WELL OF THE VIRGIN.

force on the coast. There was not, as was the case in Mesopotamia, a great danger from spies *on foot*; in Western Palestine German airmen were the eyes of the enemy, and they had been very daring. Sir E. Allenby wrote:

The concentration in the coastal plain was carried out by night, and every precaution was taken to prevent any increased movement becoming apparent to the Turks. Full use of the many groves round Ramleh, Ludd and Jaffa was made to conceal troops during the day. The chief factor in the secrecy maintained must be attributed, however, to the supremacy in the air which had been obtained by the Royal Air Force. The process of wearing down the enemy's aircraft had been going on all through the summer. During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this number had decreased to 18. In the next few days a number were shot down, with the result that only four ventured to cross our lines during the period of concentration.

When Nazareth was captured a number of enemy aeroplane reports were found, in which constant reference was made to the destructive accuracy of the British anti-aircraft service. As a result German scouting machines, when they did come over, flew very high, at 14,000 feet or so, relying upon their powerful photographic apparatus for information rather than the eyes of their observers. In consequence of this the enemy observers were unable to detect any signs of the concentration in Sharon, and even failed to identify General Allenby's great Headquarters camp at Bir Salem, which was

reported to be an "infantry camp, two battalions."

Further to mislead the enemy, General Chaytor was ordered to carry out a series of demonstrations to induce the enemy to believe that another advance east of the Jordan, either on Amman or Madeba, was intended. At this time (about September 10) part of the Emir Faisal's army, accompanied by British armoured cars and a French mountain battery, was assembling at Kasr el Azrak, 50 miles east of Amman, so that had its rendezvous been discovered (it was not) the Turks would have been strengthened in their belief that an attack on Amman was impending. In any case Liman von Sanders was deceived; he did not move an additional man to the defence of the coast sector, and he believed that no alteration had been made in the disposition of the British forces. He certainly was expecting the British to move, but apparently anticipated an attack in the hill region north of Jerusalem. Daring bombing raids on Der'aa by the R.A.F., and equally daring raids by the Arab Camel Corps on the railway, north and west and south of Der'aa (September 16-19), must have caused the enemy perturbation, as they completely severed railway communication with Palestine, and when on the night of September 18-19 the



NABLUS, THE ANCIENT SCHECHEM.

Official photograph.

53rd Division (Maj.-Gen. Mott) of the XXth Corps (Sir Philip Chetwode's) swung forward its right east of the Bireh-Nablus road,* the Turks probably thought that they had to meet the real offensive on that sector. Chetwode's operations were, however, subsidiary to those of Bulfin, his immediate object being to block the Turks' exits to the lower valley of the Jordan. With one exception the Welshmen captured all their objectives. There was stiff hand-to-hand fighting and over 400 prisoners were taken. The campaign had begun well.

The hour had come for Bulfin to strike. At 4.30 a.m. on September 19 his artillery opened an intense bombardment of the enemy lines, the destroyers Druid and Forester helping by bringing their fire to bear on the coast road. Under cover of the bombardment, which lasted only 15 minutes, the infantry left their deployment positions. The enemy artillery (partly served by Austrians) replied energetically to the British guns, "but in most cases his barrage fell behind the attacking infantry," and the Turkish lines all along the Sharon front were ablaze with the green and white lights sent up by the enemy infantry to ask for artillery help.

Shortly afterwards, as soon as the light was good enough to enable objectives to be clearly distinguished, General Allenby launched an air attack for the express purpose of destroying

by means of bombs all enemy signal stations, headquarter telephone and telegraph exchanges, and advanced wireless installations. This was so successfully carried out that the enemy was entirely deprived of all means of communication other than visual signalling, and for days was unable to ascertain the nature or magnitude of the disaster in which he was involved.

Going from east to west, the attacking troops were the French Tirailleurs and the Armenians (in the foothills), next the 54th Division (in the foothills overlooking the railway at Jiljulieh), then the Lahore Division, the 75th Division, the Meerut Division, and finally, along the shore, the 60th (London) Division. In the foothills the enemy put up some opposition; on the left the Londoners, the Meerut and the 75th Divisions overwhelmed the enemy in their first defensive system and pressed on, without a pause, to the Et Tireh position. The Londoners reached and passed the Nahr (river) Falik and turned inland towards Tul Keram. The battle of Sharon had been won and a road cleared along the coast for the cavalry. Elsewhere the infantry met resistance more or less stubborn, but by 11 a.m. that resistance was everywhere broken, and disorganized bodies of Turks began to stream north across the plain, pursued by the 60th Division and the 5th Australian L.H., to which brigade was attached a composite regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique and Spahis.

Meantime the Desert Mounted Column had

* That is, the Jerusalem-Shechem road. The British had built a light railway north from Jerusalem to Bireh, which became the advanced base on this sector

begun that amazing ride which at once became famous. It was not their business to take a direct hand in the fight in which the XXIst Corps was engaged, but to press north and east and cut off the retreat not only of the VIIIth Turkish Army, with which Bulfin was engaged, but also that of the VIIth Turkish Army, still facing Chetwode astride the Jerusalem-Shechem road. Before Bulfin's divisions attacked, both the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions had moved out from the concealment of the orange groves around Sarna and had formed up in the rear

from Ludd (Lydda), 10 miles behind the front line. The story of the exploits of the cavalry may be, however, postponed while the fortunes of the XXIst and XXth Corps are followed.

In some places, as already indicated, the resistance of the Turks to Bulfin's divisions had been not inconsiderable. Thus at the strongly fortified village of Et Tirch the 75th Division met with determined opposition, while Jiljulieh and neighbouring points were "defended with stubbornness" against the



A PACK WIRELESS STATION.

These wireless outfits could be taken anywhere on horses, quickly erected and put in operation within ten minutes. They had a range of about a hundred miles.

of the Meerut and 60th Divisions—that is, behind the divisions nearest the coast. They had had the order to fall in about 2 a.m., and it required some manœuvring to get all in readiness in the darkness and contracted space. Impatiently the men waited the moment when they could advance, many of them being echeloned along the beach under the steep cliffs of Arsuf. The order came sooner than they could reasonably have expected, but to the eager men it seemed an ago. As soon as the Londoners had broken through the second Turkish system the command to start was given to the cavalry. The men rode hard and by noon had covered 18 miles. They had then reached Jelaneh and Hudoira, and thereafter effectively carried out the task assigned them. Behind them came the Australian Mounted Division, which early in the morning had started out

assaults of the Lahoro Division. But when by 11 a.m., these places had been captured the enemy thought of nothing but flight. Tul Keram, towards which the Turks made, is on the railway at the point where it debouches into the plain from the pass leading up to Samaria and Shechem, and was an advanced enemy base. As General Allenby succinctly put it, "great confusion reigned at Tul Keram," confusion which grew continually worse as the 60th Division and the 5th Australian L.H. Brigade pressed on, the Londoners occupying Tul Keram itself during the afternoon. By this time large forces of the enemy were trying to escape by the road leading east from Tul Keram to Messudieh and Nablus (Shechem):—

This road, which follows the railway up a narrow valley, was already crowded with troops and transport. The confusion was added to by the persistent attacks of the Royal Air Force and Australian Flying Corps, from

which there was no escape. Great havoc was caused and in several places the road was blocked by overturned lorries and vehicles. Later in the evening an Australian regiment, having made a detour, succeeded in reaching a hill four miles east of Tul Keram, overlooking the road. As a result, a large amount of transport and many guns fell into our hands. (Allenby.)

While the enemy in that direction was already demoralized, the VIIth Turkish Army in the hills still stood firm. They were now dealt with by the XXth Corps and the right wing of the XXIst Corps. Of the troops of the last-named corps, after the morning's fighting, the Meerut, Lahore and 54th Divisions had turned east into the hills of Samaria and by nightfall had made good progress. The main attack on the enemy hill positions was made that night by the XXth Corps. In anticipation of the success of the attack on the coast sector, the two divisions—the 53rd and 10th—had been concentrated in readiness, and as soon as Bulfin's men had broken through Sir Edmund Allenby gave Sir Philip Chetwode his orders to attack. The 53rd Division was on the right, that is east of the Jerusalem-Shechem road; the 10th Division (Maj.-Gen. Longley) on the left, in the neighbourhood of Kefr Ain and Berukin, places on either side of the Wadi Deir Ballut, where the 52nd Division

(Maj.-Gen. Hill) had had much hard fighting in the spring before leaving for France.

The following are the details of the composition of Chetwode's two divisions:

53RD DIVISION.

158th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. VERNON and Brig.-Gen. WILDBLOOD.
5/6th Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
4/11th Gurkha Rifles.
3/153rd Rifles.
3/154th Indian Infantry.

159th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. MONEY.
4/5th Welsh Regiment.
3/152nd, 1/153rd, 2/153rd Punjabis.
160th Infantry Brigade.
Brig.-Gen. PEARSON.
1/7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
1/17th Infantry.
1/21st Punjabis.
1st Cape Corps.

Divisional Troops.

265th, 266th, 267th Brigades R.F.A.

10TH DIVISION.

Maj.-Gen. LONGLEY.

29th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. SMITH.
1st Battalion Leinster Regiment.
1/101st Grenadiers.
1/54th Sikhs.
2/151st Indian Infantry.

30th Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. GREER.
1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment.
1st Kashmir I.S. Infantry.
38th Dogras.
46th Punjabis.



[Official photograph.]

THE MAIN STREET OF TUL KERAM.



AUSTRALIAN CAVALRY RESTING.

Official photograph.

31st Infantry Brigade.
Brig.-Gen MORRIS.

2nd Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
2/101st Grenadiers.
74th Punjabis.
2/42nd Deoli Regiment.

Divisional Troops.

67th, 68th, 263rd Brigades R.F.A.

From the night of the 19th to the evening of the 20th the VIIth Turkish Army fought hard. The enemy here was neither disorganized nor demoralized, and the attacking troops in this the third battle of Mount Ephraim had a stiff task. For one thing, the hill country, as has been sufficiently shown in previous chapters dealing with the Palestine campaign, is very broken and rugged, and it is impossible for field guns to keep pace with the infantry. Roads, in fact, had to be improvised behind the advancing infantry before the guns could be brought up. Again, the enemy had long been expecting attack astride the Jerusalem-Shechem road, and to meet it had built defences of great strength on successive ridges. The 10th Division, through whose sector this road lay, was directed to avoid a frontal attack and to make its stroke north-easterly. Even so, its work remained difficult.

Chetwode's objective was Shechem, the modern Nablus, a city closely associated with the history of the Jews from the days of the Patriarchs and to-day the home of the remnant of the Samaritans. It lies in a valley between Ebal and Gerizim, the mounts of cursing and blessing, and has not the commanding position or the strategic importance of the neighbouring Samaria, once the capital of the

kingdom of Israel, now a small village in the midst of many remarkable ruins. But possession of the high ground north-east of Shechem would enable Sir Philip Chetwode effectually to deny to the Turks the roads leading to the lower valley of the Jordan. All difficulties notwithstanding, good progress was made in the night attack on September 19 and during the succeeding day.

The 53rd Division captured Kh.* Abu Malul, and advanced their line in the centre. On their right Khan Jibeit was heavily counter-attacked on the morning of September 20. The Turks succeeded in regaining the hill, but were driven off again after a sharp fight. This incident, and the necessity of making a road to enable the guns to be brought forward, caused delay.

The 10th Division advanced in two columns, and by midday on September 20 the right column, after a hard fight at Furkhah, had reached Selfit and was approaching Iskaka, which was strongly held by the enemy. The left column reached Kefr Haris, which was only captured after heavy fighting. The 10th Division had already driven the enemy back seven miles. The artillery, however, had been unable to keep up with the infantry, and little progress was made during the afternoon.

On the left of the 10th Division the XXIst Corps had continued its advance in three columns. On the right the Lahore Division advanced up Wadi Azzun. In the centre the Meerut Division moved on Kefr Sur and Beit Lid. The 60th Division and the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade advanced along the Tul Keram-Nablus road on Messudieh Station. By evening the line Baka-Beit Lid-Messudieh Station-Attara had been reached.

The 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions encountered a determined and well-organized resistance, which stiffened as the Meerut Division approached Beit Lid.

Up to the evening of this day (September 20) the commander of the VIIth Turkish Army appears to have been unaware that Allenby's cavalry had already blocked his line of retreat, but he had been withdrawing his transport on

* Kh. = Khirbet = ruin.

Shechem all day and his resistance had been virtually broken, notwithstanding the stoutness with which his troops fought. During the night the enemy learned the bitter truth about the British in his rear, and now the VIIth, like the VIIIth, Army took to flight. The enemy rearguards were driven in early in the morning of the 21st, and all organized resistance ceased. Later in the day the 5th Australian L.H. Brigade, consisting of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Australian L.H. Regiments, with the French

will be recalled, was to seize the vital points in the enemy's line of communications with Damascus. These were, first, the railway, which from near Samaria ran north to El Afule on the plain of Esdraolon (and seven miles almost due south of Nazareth), thence went south-east along the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan,* where it turned north and followed the Jordan Valley to the south end of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias). There it crossed the Jordan, going east up the Yarinuk Valley to Der'aa, the



TURKISH PRISONERS.

[Official photograph.]

cavalry leading, entered Shechem from the west, the 10th Division entering the town from the south. By the evening the XXth Corps had reached Mount Ebal, while the line of the XXIst Corps ran through the ruins of Samaria.

The part played by the cavalry* in the rout of the Turks may now be told. By midday on September 19, as has been stated, the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were already 18 miles north of what had been Bulfin's front line at 4.30 a.m. After a short halt the two divisions went forward again, taking, however, separate routes. Their object, it

junction with the Damascus-Hedjaz line. Secondly, there were the roads. Those running north all converged either on El Afule or Beisan. Thence they went by Nazareth, the western shore of the Sea of Galilee and by Rosh Pinah to the old caravan track to Damascus which crosses the Jordan by the famous bridge of the Daughters of Jacob (Jisr Benat Yakub), south of the Waters of Merom. In addition there were the roads leading south-east by the Jordan crossing at Jisr ed Damieh to Es Salt and Amman, roads by which the enemy, if beaten, would be certain

* That is, not including the mounted troops just mentioned attached to the XXIst Corps, who afterwards rejoined the Australian Mounted Division in time to take part in the advance on Damascus.

* The Beth-shean (House of Quiet) of the Old Testament, a place whose history belied its name. On its walls the Philistines exposed the body of Saul after his defeat and death at the neighbouring field of Gilboa.

to try to escape. Of the places mentioned Der'aa had already been dealt with by the Emir Faisal's Arabs; the task of the cavalry was primarily to capture El Afule and Beisan. They did that and much more.

In the morning ride very little opposition had been encountered; practically every Turk met by the horsemen as they galloped on at



GERASA, EAST OF THE JORDAN: THE TEMPLE OF THE SUN.


once surrendered. When, in the afternoon, the 5th Cavalry Division (Maj.-Gen. MacAndrew) moved on north, the 13th Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Kelly) leading, there was still no serious resistance. Presently the division turned east and entered the hills of Samaria at about their narrowest part, near where they join Mount Carmel. After a few hours they were given a rest, getting water, food, oranges and a little sleep. Before long the division was off again, but a good many of the horses were already done up and had to be left behind. The two brigades of the division now separated, the 13th making for Nazareth, the 14th for El Afule.

The 4th Cavalry Division (Major-General Barrow), which had also gone north after the midday halt on the 19th, turned east into the hills at a point south of that taken by the 5th Division. It took the valley of the Wadi Arah, which gradually narrows to the pass of Musmus, beyond which the road crosses the northern slopes of the hills to Megiddo, disguised by its modern name of El Lejjun, and thence across the Plain of Esdraelon to El Afule. Awaking to their danger, the Turks had hastily sent a battalion from Afule to man Musinus. The advanced guard only had reached the pass when the 4th Division rode up and their opposition was quickly overcome.

All through the livelong night [wrote one officer] we had shoved on, sometimes at a gallop, halting only for brief intervals. I snatched a moment's sleep with the

reins in one hand, my horse meanwhile grazing. All along the road we encountered abandoned Turkish transport, guns, wagons and horses higgledy-piggledy all over the place. A Turkish officer hiding in a tree fell down and was taken prisoner. The poor man, who wore a splendid fur coat, was terror-struck at the thought of being left in the custody of Indians. He expected to be murdered at sight, and was astonished to find that some of the Indians were of the same religion as himself. . . . Eventually by a miracle in the morning we reached the entrance to the plain of Armageddon. Had the Turks succeeded in getting to the pass with a few machine-guns, they would have held us up for hours.

The cavalry encountered the rest of the battalion at Megiddo, the scene of many great battles in the history of the Jews, and the Armageddon of the Apocalypse. There was no great fight here in this campaign, but what there was to do was done neatly and successfully. The 2nd Lancers charged over exposed,



Official photograph.

LAYING A TELEPHONE CABLE.

uneven ground, and in face of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and rode through the enemy, killed 46 with the lance and captured the remainder, some 470 men. At Megiddo the 4th Division rested, but early on the 20th was again in the saddle, making for Afule. But the 14th Brigade (Brig.-General Clarke) of the 5th Division beat them by half an hour. They captured Afule at 7.30 a.m., taking the garrison, about 1,500 men, prisoners. At the railway station were found eight locomotives, two complete trains, 40 lorries and a vast quantity



BRITISH BOMBING MACHINES LINED UP READY TO START ON A RAID.

of stores, among them "lump sugar, cigars and champagne galore." Shortly afterwards an enemy aeroplane tried to land, ignorant that Afule had been taken. It was shot down.

The 4th Division, which arrived at Afule at 8 a.m., rode down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan, which it reached by half-past four in the afternoon, having covered 80 miles in 34 hours—a fine record. About 1,000 of the enemy surrendered at Beisan.

The Australian Mounted Division (Major-General Hodgson) was some distance behind the two cavalry divisions when the great ride began. It was made up as follows: 3rd A. L. H. Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Royston) 8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments A.L.H.—4th A.L.H. Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Grant) 4th, 11th, and 12th A.L.H. Regiments—5th A.L.H. Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Onslow) 14th, 15th, and 16th Regiments of A.L.H. The Australians had followed the line of the 4th Division into the Plain of Esdraelon and were now sent south-east to Jenin (En-Gannim = Fountain of Gardens), where the road from Shechem to Nazareth leaves the hills. Jenin was the headquarters of the enemy air force, and a considerable number of German troops were stationed there. The aerodrome had been incessantly patrolled by British and Australian airmen on the 19th in order to prevent the enemy from making use of his machines to supplement his disorganized telephonic and telegraphic communications. It was also of the first importance to prevent him from getting any news of the advance of the cavalry; consequently it was necessary to prevent enemy machines from leaving the ground. With this end in view two scouts at a time patrolled over Jenin aerodrome, each carrying four bombs, with which any sign of enemy activity was discouraged. Each pair was relieved while still patrolling over the aerodrome, and on

relief came down and fired machine-guns into the hangars, with the result that enemy aircraft were prevented from taking any part in the battle.

The Australians had little difficulty in capturing Jenin. The following account of their enterprise is from the pen of Mr. H. S. Gullett, the Official Correspondent with the Australian Forces in Palestine, under date September 21:*

Last night two regiments of Australian Light Horse, Victorians and Western Australians, about 600 strong, moving rapidly, suddenly enveloped Jenin. Galloping at dusk with drawn swords upon the old stone-built hillside town, they were astonished to meet shouting droves of Turks advancing and crying for mercy and waving white flags of all sizes. The only resistance was from a detachment of German machine-gunners, but this was quickly silenced.

The Australians captured nearly 7,000 prisoners, including 700 Germans, and a substantial cavalry force, with 900 horses; also two aerodromes and a huge quantity of war material, including rolling stock, guns, and machine-guns, and complete trains of motor and horse transport.

The Germans had fired great dumps of ammunition, petrol, and the hangars and workshops on the aerodromes at our approach. But one plane was seized intact, and close by was found a big cave containing thousands of bottles of champagne and other wines and spirits.

To-day Esdraelon Plain presented a wonderful war spectacle. From daylight to dusk interminable columns of prisoners came winding across the valley from Nazareth, Beisan, Afule, and Jenin.

While these events were happening the 13th Cavalry Brigade had accomplished much farther north. They had started for Nazareth at 6 p.m. on the 19th and had 42 miles to go to reach their objective. The troops hoped to arrive in time to catch Liman von Sanders napping. The city of the Nazarene, with its sacred memories, had been chosen by the Germans as convenient headquarters, and its numerous hospices, schools, and even the churches were turned to military use. And however badly the Turks fared, the Germans had seen well to their own comfort. On this point the testimony of many witnesses might

be given, but the following extract from a statement by an officer who took part in the operations will suffice. Writing in the *Kia Ora-Coo-ee* he said :

You saw evidence of German super-comfort, super-equipment, super-feeding and super-accommodation everywhere. It struck you first and most forcibly on seeing the droves of prisoners come in. Where Turkish officers walked, German officers were riding on donkeys, on camels, in gharries, or any vehicles; you can fairly safely infer that at the time of capture all these means of locomotion were available equally to Turk and German. . . . Take the matter of food alone. I lived in — for three days. There was much captured provender there, Turkish and German. I lived chiefly on German M. & V. and German tinned sausage and dried fruits. I had often heard of this ration in Franco, but had never tasted it. To taste it was to spurn bully. . . . All the Turkish food consisted in spare supplies of dried legumes. If you base your comparison on quantity alone you will see how well the German fed by comparison with "Joe Burke." [Here follows a paragraph on the German wine stores, the quantity and variety of liquor found showing "with what resolution the Hun had set out to 'do himself well' at any cost." . . . Captured lorries and motor cars are German. Captured Turkish transport is the miserable little wagons that a Newfoundland dog could almost drag. . . . Of clothing and equipment little need be said. The Turk is in rags of greater diversity than any slum can show. It is the more pathetic beside the comparative splendour of the German uniform.

With a guide to lead, the 13th Brigade—the Gloucestershire Hussars, 9th Hodson's Horse, and 18th (Bengal) Lancers—travelled by rough tracks through the hills and across small valleys until, about 2 a.m. on the 20th, they reached the Plain of Esdraelon, "wonderfully fertile." Riding across the plain, they stopped to blow up a section of the narrow-gauge railway to Haifa, thus cutting off the garrison of that port. Then on again, the advanced guard (the 18th Lancers) surprising and capturing the garrison of a village, about 250 men, who were asleep in barracks. At 5.30 a.m. the brigade trotted up a steep hill which overlooks the little basin in which the town lies, and entered Nazareth with swords drawn. A scene of great confusion ensued. There was some stiff street fighting, and the brigade had also to face persistent fire from machine-guns posted on high ground north of the town. A troop was sent to find von Liman; it was led to the wrong house, and when the right house was reached it was to find that von Liman had got away by car—in his pyjamas, according to an eye-witness—and with him the notorious von Papen, formerly German military attaché at Washington, who had, however, left behind various incriminating documents respecting the plots carried out against the United States while Germany was

still at peace with that country. Von Liman's flight had been so hurried that he, too, left all his papers behind. These and some members of his staff fell into the hands of the British.

Von Liman hurried to Damascus and then on to Aleppo and Constantinople, leaving the German Asiatic Corps as well as the Turks to their fate. His conduct was bitterly criticized in Germany, criticism which found public utterance after the revolution of November:

The English were not so far wrong [said a writer in the *Vossische Zeitung* of November 24] when they said "The German commander is much in advance of his troops." General Liman von Sanders had sent his daughters to a seaside place, and it seemed that his chief concern at the beginning of the *débâcle* was to get these ladies to a place of safety. On the morning of the 20th main headquarters were taken by surprise, officers, nurses and men being caught in bed and led into captivity. . . . There were hardly any orders issued, and when they reached the troops they could not be executed, and the watchword was *Sauve qui peut!* The German troops gathered in small groups and attempted to fight their way through. . . . The army rescued four guns and its commander and his daughters rescued their baggage.

Though deserted by their commander, the troops at Nazareth showed fight, giving a good deal of trouble to the Yeomen and Indians. Over 2,000 prisoners, among them many



JOSEPH'S WELL, ON THE ROAD FROM JENIN TO AFULE.

German telegraphists, mechanics, and other technical troops, were taken by the Brigade; but as it had ridden 62 miles in 22 hours, it was not called upon to attack the hill positions north of the town. It was, at 11 a.m., withdrawn from Nazareth and sent to El Afule, taking with it the prisoners, the captured papers and considerable loot, including £8,000 in gold, and "much brandy, hock and champagne, of which every man had a bottle that night." The



[Australian official photograph.]

AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE AT NAZARETH, AFTER ITS CAPTURE BY THE
13th BRIGADE.

brigade had no intention of not completing its work, and the next day (September 21) went back to Nazareth. Going up a very steep track under Mount Tabor, they approached the place from the north, and this time met with no opposition. Some time was spent in hunting out small enemy parties still sheltering in the houses.

The enemy resistance on the whole front attacked had by now been overcome. Within 36 hours of the opening of the offensive both the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies had been defeated and all their main outlets of escape closed. September 21 saw the enemy forces west of the Jordan employed solely in seeking to escape by the only possible routes left to them—the crossings of the Jordan. It was now that the Air Force distinguished itself by what was in fact an outflanking movement. In his dispatch General Allenby shows clearly both the plight of the enemy and the value of the work of the airmen. He writes :

Since the early hours of the morning [of September 21] great confusion had reigned in the Turkish rear. Camps and hospitals were being hurriedly evacuated; some were in flames. The roads leading north-east and east from Nablus to Beisan and the Jordan Valley were congested with transport and troops. Small parties of troops were moving east along the numerous wadis. The disorganization which already existed was increased by the repeated attacks of the Royal Air Force; in particular, on the closely packed column of transport moving north from Balata to Kh. Ferweh, where a road branches off, along the Wadi Farah, to Jisr ed Damieh. Some of the transport continued along the road to Beisan, where it fell into the hands of the 4th Cavalry Division. The greater part made for the Jordan along the Wadi Farah. Nine miles from Kh. Ferweh, at Ain Shibleh, a road branches off to the north to Beisan.

A mile beyond this point the Wadi Farah passes through a gorge. The head of the column was heavily bombed at this point. The drivers left their vehicles in panic, wagons were overturned, and in a short time the road was completely blocked. Still attacked by the Royal Air Force, the remainder of the column turned off at Ain Shibleh, and headed for Beisan.

The destruction of the enemy column retreating along this road was an example of the high value of the aeroplane as an offensive weapon. It was impossible for troops to move along the surface of the country in time to stop the retreat of the enemy unless his progress could be delayed. The Royal Air Force not only delayed the progress of the column as required, but almost entirely destroyed it as well. All available machines were mobilized for the attack, and departures from the Ramleh aerodrome were so timed that two machines should arrive over the objective every three minutes, and that an additional formation of six machines should come into action every half-hour. After discharging its bombs every machine then raked the retreating column from a low altitude with machine-gun fire before returning to Ramleh for more bombs and trays of cartridges. These attacks were maintained from 8 a.m. until noon on September 21, by which hour the troops had come in touch with the remnant of the enemy. The road by this time was completely blocked with the corpses of men and animals and the debris of 87 guns, 55 motor lorries, 4 staff cars and 932 wagons.*

* A considerable proportion of the abandoned enemy stores never reached the British commissariat. Some were set on fire by the Turks in their retreat, much was looted by the natives, for it was impossible to guard

The Turkish hold of both banks of the Jordan from Umm es Shert northward—little use as it was to them in consequence of the air attacks—did not last beyond the day. While the scenes described in the extract given from Allenby's dispatch were being enacted, General Chaytor's force * in the Jordan Valley advanced north on a route west of the Jericho-Beisan road, and early in the morning of September 22 the 38th (Jewish) Battalion Royal Fusiliers captured the bridgehead at Umm es Shert—the first piece of work of note of these Hebrew soldiers. Meantime the New Zealand Mounted Rifles got astride the road by the Wadi Farah

more than a fraction of the stuff. When Jenin, Afule, and other places fell "the Beduin came from every camp and village within 20 miles, and with him came his women and children, his parents and grandparents, and camels and horses and asses. To his credit it should be said that he was not shy of risks. At Jenin I watched hundreds of these people scrambling around a huge burning dump fired by the Germans. They went boldly on to the edge of the flames, careless of the frequent explosions and showers of debris as the fire reached shells and bombs. The temptation there was a great supply of German tinned fresh beef, and they laughed and shouted as they ventured their lives for it." (Mr. H. S. Gullott.)

* Chaytor's Force was as follows:

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

Maj.-Gen CHAYTOR.

1st A.L.H. Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. COX.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd A. L. H. Regiments

from Shechem to Jisr ed Damieh, and a few hours later the two battalions of the British West Indies Regiment, in a fine bayonet charge, stormed the bridgehead at Jisr ed Damieh, taking 514 prisoners. The bridge itself was undamaged.

The disorganization of the units of the Turkish Armies was even more marked on September 22, and from an early hour parties of Turks began to come into Beisan and surrender, but the greater number continued their efforts to escape

At 08.00 [8 a.m.] a column with transport and guns, 10 miles long, was reported by the Royal Air Force to be moving north along the Ain Shibleh-Beisan

2nd A. L. H. Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. RYRIE.

5th, 6th, 7th A. L. H. Regiments.

New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.

Brig.-Gen MELDRUM.

Auckland, Canterbury, and Wellington M.R. Regiments.

Divisional Troops.

18th Brigade R.H.A.

A/263rd Battery R.F.A.

195th Heavy Battery R.G.A.

29th, 32nd Indian Mountain Batteries R.G.A.

No. 6 Medium Trench Mortar Battery R.A.

Nos. 96, 102, and 103 Anti-Aircraft Sections R.A.

38th and 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers (Hebrew Troops).

20th INDIAN BRIGADE.

Brig.-Gen. MURRAY.

Alwar, Gwalior, and Patiala I.S. Infantry.

110th Mahratta L.I.

1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment.



[Official photograph.]

THE BLACK WATCH MARCHING THROUGH BEYRUT

road, its head being nine miles south of Beisan. The 4th Cavalry Division was ordered to send detachments towards it, and also to patrol the road which follows the Jordan on its east bank, to secure any parties which might escape across the Jordan. At the same time the Worcester Yeomanry of the XXth Corps, supported by infantry, was ordered to advance northwards from Ain Shibloh, and the infantry of the 10th Division along the Tubas-Beisan road, to collect stragglers, and to drive any formed bodies into the hands of the 4th Cavalry Division. The Royal Air Force had proceeded to attack the Turkish column, which broke up and abandoned its guns and transport.

It was now only a question of "collecting" the fragments that remained of the enemy armies west of the Jordan. The process went on during September 23 and 24, the Turks now coming in to surrender in large numbers. Opposition was but occasional and fitful. One column of Turks with guns trying to get over the Jordan at a crossing a little south-east of Beisan was caught up by the 11th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General Gregory), but not before some of the Turks had crossed the river at Makhadet Abu Naj. These were followed, charged, and broken up by Jacob's Horse, few escaping. The others were charged by the 29th Lancers and Middlesex Yeomanry, who killed or captured the whole party, taking also 25 machine-guns from the Turks, who put up a stout resistance, as is shown by the fact that when the Hants battery came into action

against them in the open every gun was hit. Over 3,000 prisoners were captured on this occasion.

By the evening of the 24th—that is, in a period of six days—the two Turkish Armies west of the Jordan had ceased to exist. Over 40,000 men were prisoners in the hands of the British. The victory, too, was not costly in lives. "Our total casualties," said the War Office report of September 26, "amount to less than one-tenth of the number of prisoners captured."

The 5th Cavalry Division, which had not taken part in the "collecting" operations, during the same period was employed in occupying the seaports of Haifa and Acre (Akka). Part of the Haifa garrison, realizing that they were likely to be trapped, had set out to march across country to Tiberias, on the Sea of Galilee. They were marching through the night and at 1.30 a.m. on September 22 "bumped into" the outposts of the 13th Cavalry Brigade outside Nazareth. The brigade at first took the affair to be an attempt of the enemy to recapture that town. The 18th Bengal Lancers charged the Turks by the moonlight, killing a large number and capturing over 300. Few escaped. The next day the 13th Brigade spent quietly, but were



DAMASCUS: THE FORTRESS AND TOWN.

ordered to go on the 23rd and capture Acre, the last spot in Palestine held by the Crusaders. This city of many sieges, attacked in vain by Napoleon, who there was forced to give up his Palestine expedition, fell easily enough to the 13th Brigade. Starting from Nazareth at 3 a.m. (September 23), they had a 25-mile ride, partly through the fertile valley of the Kishon with its pomegranate gardens. Making a detour over the flat plain around the port, the horsemen got to the north of the town to cut off an attempted retreat, and at 2 p.m. received the submission of the small garrison of some 150 men.

Haifa garrison, or what was left of it, offered some opposition. Relations here, as at many other places, between Germans and Turks were strained. The Germans were for surrender; the Turks bade them fight. The position of the town favoured the defence, and a battery of armoured cars which made a daring reconnaissance on September 22 found the enemy on the alert. The road into the town was barricaded and the cars were met with machine-gun and rifle fire at point-blank range. The cars, returning, marched the 100 or so prisoners they had made before them, fighting the while a rearguard action. On the 23rd the 5th Cavalry Division (minus, that is, the 13th Brigade) marched out from Afule, following the road past Harosheth of the Gentiles, which as it nears Haifa is confined between the marshes of the Kishon and Mount Carmel. "When the 5th Cavalry Division reached this point on September 23 it was shelled from the slopes of Mount Carmel, and found the road and the river crossings defended by numerous machine-guns. Whilst the Mysore Lancers were clearing the rocky slopes of Mount Carmel the Jodhpur Lancers (Imperial Service troops), charged through the defile, and, riding over the enemy's machine-guns, galloped into the town, where a number of Turks were speared in the streets. Colonel Thakur Dalpat Singh, M.C., fell gallantly leading this charge."

In the capture of Haifa 1,350 prisoners and 17 guns were taken. The townsfolk gave a very hearty welcome to the victors; even the German colonists—at Haifa is one of the largest of the German colonies in Palestine—were pleased to be rid of Turkish exactions. Of Palestine west of the Jordan only the northern part of Galilee remained unoccupied by the British, and that fell to General Allenby in the advance on Damascus, an advance

which he now ordered General Chauvel to undertake with the Desert Mounted Corps.

Before, however, describing the advance on Damascus, the fate of the IVth Turkish Army, the army east of the Jordan, may be told. It was concentrated opposite the British forces in the lower Jordan Valley, with its base at Amman on the Hedjaz railway. As has been seen, up to September 22 it held the east bank of the river at Jisr ed Damieh and other



A HEDJAZ ARAB.

crossings. On that day the IVth Army realized that its position was no longer tenable, and it retreated to the tableland of Moab on the 23rd, making for Es Salt and Amman. General Chaytor sent his Australian and New Zealand Mounted troops in pursuit, while the enemy was liberally bombed by the airmen. At 4.30 p.m. the New Zealanders captured Es Salt (making the sixth time the town had changed hands in 1918), taking 380 prisoners and three guns. The pursuit continued, and after two days' obstinate resistance by enemy rearguards Amman was reached and captured on September 25. The Turks now fled north in disorder, harassed by the airmen and the Arabs and pursued by the Anzaes. Over 5,000 men and 28 guns were captured—the greater part of the IVth Army. The rest of the IVth Army fell a prey to the Emir Faisal. As it streamed north the Arabs issued from the Hauran, forcing the Turks to abandon guns and transport. Next the Arabs entrenched themselves north of Der'aa and barred the enemy's line of retreat. The two forces met on September 27 and sharp fighting went on all day. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the enemy—among whom were many Germans. Having completely broken up

what was left of the IVth Army, the Arabs the same day seized Der'aa.

After his rapid conquest of Moab General Chaytor's force again concentrated at Amman in order to deal with the 2nd Turkish Army Corps, which held the Hedjaz railway line from south of Amman to south of Ma'an. This corps had not realized the changed situation in time, and it was only on September 23 that the Turks evacuated Ma'an. That place, which had long been an objective of the Arabs, was at once occupied by the Hedjaz force under the Emir Zeid, who continuously worried the rear of the retreating Turks. Five days later the 2nd Turkish Army Corps had reached Leban, a station on the railway 10 miles south of Amman. Here they came into contact with Chaytor's force. The Turkish commander, Ali Bey Wahabi, saw that he could not escape and he had no mind to fight to a finish. The next day, September 29, he surrendered to Chaytor with 5,000 men, who gave up their arms as soon as their safety had been assured by the arrival of the 2nd Australian L.H. Brigade (Brig.-General Rylie) at Kastal, as the Turks were in great peril from the Hedjaz Arabs and the fellahin of the district.

The advance on Damascus was purely a cavalry affair. Sir Henry Chauvel had for this operation the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions and the Australian Mounted Division, and he received the help of the Emir Faisal's Arab Army. The advance was in two columns; one column, the 4th Cavalry Division, crossed Jordan at various places south of the Sea of Galilee and marched through the land of Gilead on a route parallel to the Yarmuk river to join the Arabs, who were advancing from Der'aa. It started from Beisan for Damascus—a 120-miles march—on the afternoon of September 26, and two days later joined hands with the Arabs near Er Remte, west of Der'aa. It had had a trying march and twice had had to meet considerable opposition, first at Irbid and again at Er Remte.

Chauvel's second column, the 5th Cavalry Division and the Australian Mounted Division, was directed to go along the west side of the Sea of Galilee, cross the Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub (the Bridge of the Daughters of Jacob) and advance then direct on Damascus by the ancient caravan route—the route which from the earliest dawn of history had formed the highway from and to Egypt. Semakh, where

the railway to Damascus touches the south end of the Sea of Galilee, had been captured on September 24 by the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Brig.-General Grant), after a fierce hand-to-hand fight. The enemy, including a large proportion of Germans, had built a "laager" of engines and other rolling stock defended by machine-guns, and made a stout resistance. It was only ended by a determined charge, in the course of which many Germans were driven into the Sea of Galilee and there lanced or drowned. The 4th A.L.H. took 350 prisoners. Tiberias—the city built by Herod Antipas and named in honour of his patron, and whose Palace of the Princes of the Galilee is still in part habitable—was occupied the next day, and it is hardly to be expected that the troopers escaped the visitation of the fleas, whose king, say the Arabs, holds his court here! At Tiberias the Australian Division concentrated on the 26th. On the same day the 5th Cavalry Division, which had had three days of rest and sea bathing at Acre and Haifa, was marching to join them *via* Nazareth.

On September 27 the two divisions started from Tiberias, having to cover 90 miles to reach Damascus. The Australian troops led, and on reaching Jisr Benat Yakub found the passage of the Jordan disputed. The bridge (*jisr*) here consists of four stone arches, and the Turks, who knew the strategic importance of the crossing—the connecting link with Syria by the route from Egypt—had blown up the centre arch. They had also sent down from Damascus in motor lorries a mixed Turco-German-Circassian force of about 1,000 men, together with field and machine-guns. The enemy were posted on the steep eastern bank of the river, and they opened a hot fire as the Australian horsemen rode up. A crossing by the bridge was impossible, but the Australians were not baulked. The 5th A.L.H. Brigade swam the river a mile south of the bridge, worked round the enemy's flank and attacked before the rearguard could get away in their lorries. Fifty Germans, 200 Turks, three field and some machine-guns were captured.

After this episode the whole column moved forward, climbing up on to the plateau on the way to El Kuneitra, the centre of the Circassian settlements planted in Syria some time ago by the Ottomans in an endeavour to keep the Desert Arabs in check. The Circassian villagers freely sniped the column as it passed, and at

El Kuneitra itself opposition was encountered, and quickly overcome. From that place the march was continued. It was a great test of endurance. The elevation of the region—well over 3,000 feet—made the nights cool, and the troopers were in their summer clothing. As far as possible both men and horses lived on the country, but much of the land they were now traversing was desolate and rock-strewn. Later they came into undulating pasture land, intersected by many of the streams coming down from Mount Hermon, whose dome-shaped summit, over 9,000 feet high, towered on the left of the column. The marches were neces-

sarily long, the object being to reach Damascus before the Turks there, with such remnants of the armies from Palestine as had escaped, should have the chance of pulling themselves together. One squadron of the Gloucestershire Yeomanry were in the saddle for 33 hours out of 36, and the record of other squadrons was equally striking. Many horses were worn out, but, as one officer wrote, "we have to carry on till they fall." Many, indeed, had to be left behind to die, though the wastage was by no means excessive. But the men, both of the 5th Cavalry and the Australian Division,

kept fit and well. The supply service worked excellently, the men's rations never failing.

On September 29 the column met enemy rearguards at Sasa, where a bridge crosses a stream which is thought by some authorities to be the upper course of the Pharpar, one of "the rivers of Damascus" of Naaman the Syrian. The Turkish rearguards were driven back after a brisk little fight, and by 10 o'clock on the morning of September 30 the Australians had reached Katana, which is on the Roman road from Casarea Philippi to Damascus, a road running some miles north of and parallel to the more ancient road. The Australians



TIBERIAS : THE BAZAAR.

had diverged with the object of closing the exits from Damascus on the north-west, while the 5th Cavalry Division kept to the caravan route in order to close on the city from the south. This the 5th Division successfully accomplished. They entered the verdant oasis in which Damascus lies, a large plain with many streams and gardens and groves, and encamped for the night. The Australians, however, had found a fairly strong force posted at Katana to oppose their progress, and for the moment they were checked. Turks and Germans in Damascus were quarrelling and

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*(Official photograph.)*

JISR BENAT YAKUB: AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS INSPECTING THEIR FINISHED REPAIRS.

fighting one another, but the main anxiety of both bodies was to get away, and retreat was only possible by the roads on which the Australians were advancing. But after some two hours' fighting the Turks at Katana were beaten; the Australians continued their march and by the evening had blocked the roads leading from Damascus towards Aleppo and the coast.

The 4th Cavalry Division and the Arab Army, which had been marching directly north since their junction near Der'aa on September 28, also reached the outskirts of Damascus on the evening of the 30th. The 4th Cavalry Division had followed the track of the dismantled French railway from Damascus, "a weary, desolate road," with the Arab Camel Corps and others who rode sturdy ponies, on its right flank, still "pressing on the heels" of what remained of the IVth Turkish Army. "In this way a column of Turks some 1,500 strong was driven at noon on September 30 into the arms of the 14th Cavalry Brigade at Sahnaya." To the Turkish stragglers who fell into their hands the Arabs showed no mercy.

No attempt to resist the British and Arab forces was made at Damascus itself. The entry of the Desert Mounted Column was made at

6 a.m. on October 1, and at 6.30 a.m. a detachment of the 10th Australian L.H. Brigade (Brig.-General Wilson) under Major Olden reached the Serail, being the first Allied troops to enter Damascus. The Sherifian Camel Corps was only about half an hour behind them.* This, the most ancient city in the world still inhabited, did not make a very favourable impression on the British troops—"a dirty, dull town, and evil-smelling" was the general verdict—and by the time their "triumphal march" was over (it covered some 20 miles, start to finish) they were glad to get back to the olive and palm groves in which they encamped. But even while the ceremonial occupation of Damascus was taking place the 3rd Australian L.H. Brigade had been sent to try to overtake those enemy forces which had left the city before the cordon closed and some troops which had avoided it by a detour to the east. The Australians succeeded, on October 2, in overtaking an enemy column 17 miles north-east of Damascus. They attacked, captured 1,500 prisoners and three guns, and dispersed the rest of the column.

General Allenby's bold policy had succeeded

* See further for the entry into Damascus Vol. XVIII, Chapter CCLXVIII.

completely, and of the 104,000 enemy troops in Palestine and Southern Syria on September 18 over 80,000—including 3,000 Germans or Austrians—were prisoners of the British or Arabs by October 2. The remnant which had escaped numbered no more than 17,000, “of whom only 4,000 were effective rifles.” As General Allenby said, this body of 17,000 men “fled northwards a mass of individuals, without organization, without transport, and without any of the accessories required to enable it to act even on the defensive.”

The Egyptian Expeditionary Force now entered on the last phase of its strenuous campaigning, which had already lasted over four years and had seen an advance from the Suez Canal to Damascus. General Allenby took full advantage of the destruction of the Turkish hosts, and his subsequent operations expelled the Ottomans from the rest of Syria. Throughout the war the Syrians—of whom the large majority are of Semitic race and of Arabic speech and culture—had suffered great persecutions, notably at the hands of the notorious Vali, Djemal Pasha. He had spared neither Moslem nor Christian, nor Jew nor Druse. Many notables had been hanged, thousands had suffered imprisonment or confiscation of goods,

or both, and, as a result of the deliberate withholding of food, famine and disease had had full play. In the Beirut and Lebanon districts only over 200,000 people had perished of starvation. Save for some of the alien plantations, such as those of the Kurds and Circassians, the Turk had not a friend in Syria. The Syrians themselves, inspired by the newly realized Arab solidarity, desired freedom, and they looked to Britain and France for help. Both nations, as far as Ottoman rule permitted, had done much to develop the material resources of the country and to spread education. The French, moreover, ever since in 1860 they had intervened in the Lebanon to put a stop to Turkish atrocities, had maintained political claims in the Levant, and an Anglo-French agreement, made in 1916, had recognized the special position of France. The country where so many interests were involved was now to be freed from one of them—that of the Turks.

Syria is a land of high mountain ranges and narrow valleys. These run in lines parallel to the coast, which has few good harbours, the chief being Beirut in the south and Alexandretta in the north. The conquest of the country, if held by a resolute foe, would have involved much hard fighting. But the Turks had no



[Official Photograph.

BRITISH MOTOR LORRIES BRINGING FOOD FOR TURKISH PRISONERS IN DAMASCUS..

resolution left, and Allenby's army had more marching than fighting before it. The occupation of Syria was carried out by two distinct forces. The Desert Mounted Corps marched north from Damascus, following the line of the railway to Aleppo, while another column, chiefly infantry, marched north along the coast from Haifa.

For the coast operations the 7th (Meerut) Division, which had been already brought to Haifa, was ordered to march on Beirut, and later the advance, in conjunction with other troops of the XXIst Corps, was continued to Tripoli.

Leaving Haifa on October 3, the Meerut Division marched past Acre along the Phœnician plain and crossed "the Ladder of Tyre," great steps cut in the rock where a spur of the Lebanon runs seawards. In three days Indian Pioneers turned the "Ladder" into a road fit for wheeled traffic. The appearance of guns and lorries coming from the south amazed the inhabitants, who were accustomed to regard the "Ladder" as an impassable barrier in that direction to all save the very lightest of wheeled vehicles. The division, which was followed up by Yeomanry, met with no opposition, and at Tyre, "whose merchants were princes, whose traffickers were the honourable of the earth," and at Sidon they

were most heartily greeted. The glory has indeed departed both from Tyre and Sidon, but Tyre has still some 5,000 inhabitants and Sidon, which shows some remains of its former greatness, about thrice that number. When the British approached Saida, as Sidon is now called, "the people rushed to tear down palm leaves, built triumphal arches, decorated the houses, and hung out carpets." The infantry could not pass through the narrow streets until the people were induced to betake themselves to the balconies and roofs of their houses, "where they stayed all day, cheering deliriously and tirelessly." This may be regarded as a sample of the way in which the dwellers in the ports welcomed the troops—when Sir Edward Bulfin a little later entered Beirut "the people threw flowers and sprayed perfumes in front of his car."

After a truly remarkable march the Meerut Division reached Beirut on October 8. Ismail Hakki Bey, the governor, had on the fall of Damascus received orders to retire, and had handed over the government to the municipality, to whom also the Turkish troops who were left in the place surrendered. These troops, some 60 officers and 600 men, were at once handed over to the Meerut Division. The infantry had been preceded at Beirut by some armoured cars and by ships of the



DAMASCUS: ARAB REGULAR SOLDIERS' EXAMINING BEDUIN

[Official photograph.]



[Official photograph.]

SIKH PIONEERS ROAD-MAKING ON "THE LADDER OF TYRE."

French Naval Division of Syria, under Admiral Varney. Early in the morning of the 7th French ships, together with British destroyers, had entered the harbour and landed a detachment of marines.

From Beyrut the cavalry of the XXIst Corps was sent forward, together with batteries of armoured cars. The Meerut Division had earned a brief rest.

The march from Haifa was a splendid achievement [said Mr. W. T. Massey, writing from Beyrut on October 9]. The Division of Scottish and English and Indian troops which was first in Baghdad [i.e., the Meerut Division] was the first infantry in Beyrut. The Hertford and Lancashire Yeomanry entered the town yesterday, and French warships were in the port.

In seven days the infantry marched the 100 miles from Haifa, making roads half the way, joining the metalled highway north of Tyro. Only those who have been with the infantry can appreciate the magnitude of their performance. The division's last day's march was 20 miles. Their condition was wonderful.

Bulfin's cavalry (the Lancashire and Hertfordshire Yeomanry) and armoured cars entered Tripoli, over 40 miles north of Beyrut, on October 13.* They found some of Admiral

Varney's ships in the harbour. A note in the *Journal des Débats*, on the French naval co-operation with Allenby's force, said :

On October 12 the division arrived off El Mina [on the promontory which forms Tripoli harbour] and landed Marines there. The same day our ships reached Tripoli. The chief of the admiral's staff and Governor of Raud Island landed with detachments of sailors. Accompanied by a crowd numbering several thousands, he visited the public offices, the railway station and the port. On the 13th our destroyers and small boats organized a sea-police service and took part in the operations between Tripoli and Latakia [some 75 miles farther north], where Marines were disembarked.

Tripoli (Tarabulus, the ancient *Tripolis*, so-called because it was the seat of the federal council of Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus) was of special use to General Allenby, as there is a good motor road connecting it with Homs,* a town roughly half-way between Damascus and Aleppo, which was occupied by the Desert Mounted Corps on October 15.

Sir Henry Chauvel for his advance from Damascus had not the services of the whole of his corps. The greater number of his troops, who had been in the El Afule-Beisan area a fortnight before, were now suffering from malaria; there were also many cases of influenza contracted in Damascus. The Australian Mounted Division remained behind in the neighbourhood

* The railway from Homs to Tripoli, only completed in 1911, was taken up by the Turks during the war.

* Later, on the 18th, the following troops of the Meerut Division arrived: Under Brig-Gen. Weir:—the Seaforths (19th Brigade) with the 28th and 92nd Punjabis and the 125th Napier's Rifles. Under Brig-Gen. Davies:—the Leicesters (28th Brigade), with the 51st and 53rd Sikhs and the 56th Punjabi Rifles. The Seaforth Highlanders marched in headed by their pipers, whose music and appearance stirred the Tripolitans to great enthusiasm.

of that city. The rest of the corps had started out on October 5, the immediate objectives being Rayak and Zahle, both in the valley between the Anti-Libanus and the Lebanon ranges. Traversing the pass through the Anti-Libanus followed by the railway, the cavalry occupied without opposition both places on



ISMAIL HAKKI BEY.
Turkish Governor of Beyrut.

October 6. Rayak is the town where the standard gauge railway from Aleppo joins the metre gauge railways which lead west and east, to Beyrut and Damascus respectively, and Zahle is a station on the line to Beyrut west of Rayak. The last Turkish train north for Aleppo, containing the garrison of the place and also German troops who had abandoned Beyrut, had left Rayak before the cavalry arrived. Besides being an important railway junction, Rayak was also an enemy aerodrome base. It had been heavily bombed by British airmen on the 5th, and when the horsemen arrived on the 6th they found the remains of 30 aeroplanes which the Germans, not daring to try to save, had burned. Much rolling stock—mostly damaged—and large quantities of stores were also found there. A day or two later the Transport Department had a motor service running from Beyrut to Damascus. The railway could be worked only part of the way, as a big bridge high up on the Lebanon had been destroyed by the enemy. For the first time Allenby had a sea base worthy of the name nearer than Port Said.

Having (with the help of the Meerut Division) opened up communication between Damasens and the sea, the Desert Mounted Column was ordered on October 9 to turn north for Homs. That same day armoured cars had gone ahead and had occupied Baalbek—where the Venus-Astarte cult in the temple of Jupiter-Baal caused no small scandal to the Christian Church 16 centuries ago. To-day Baalbek, owing to the building of the railway, is known to tourists as well as travellers, who come to see the vast ruins on the Acropolis, ruins cleared from large accumulations of debris through the agency of German archaeologists. Here the armoured cars gathered in 500 Turks who had surrendered to the inhabitants. On the 11th the 5th Cavalry Division, which led the advance, also reached Baalbek. The official reception of the General had taken place the day before—the country was already perfectly safe even for civilian



TEMPLE RUINS, BAALBEK.

travellers. Mr. Massey, the correspondent of the London press, who had come up to Baalbek from Beyrut, wrote: "Over nearly 40 miles of mountain road which I traversed not a British soldier was to be seen, yet an Englishman was as safe as in Piccadilly," notwithstanding that every man in the Lebanon was fully armed—if only to be able to meet the Turkish tax-gatherer.

The General [adds Mr. Massey] was received by the Mayor of Baalbek with much heartiness, and an improvised band of half a dozen old instruments played

"God Save the King." A party of young girls sang an ode of welcome in English. (It should be remembered that large numbers of the tourists who go to Baalbek are British and that many of the inhabitants have lived in America.) The arrival of a fine body of horsemen has completed the people's feeling of security.

The 4th Cavalry Division now came up and was stationed at Baalbek. Much reduced in strength by sickness, it needed a period of rest. Meantime the 5th Cavalry Division went forward again, and, crossing a watershed, entered

the road, but it could hardly arrive in time. For hours were precious. The Ottoman Government had at last realized its helplessness, and was already asking the Allies for terms. It was, however, highly desirable that Aleppo should be wrested from the Turks before hostilities ceased. The Emir Faisal had declared Aleppo an Arab city to be redeemed, and a mobile Arab force was even now on its way to Aleppo. As the 4th Cavalry Division



[Official photograph.]

STREET SCENE IN JUNIE: SIX MILES NORTH OF BEYRUT.

the Valley of the Orontes. Riding up that valley, it reached Homs (the ancient Emesa) on October 15—over 80 miles from Rayak. The Turks, who had been bombed by the Australian Flying Corps, had been gone three days, having burnt the railway station before leaving for Aleppo. Homs commands the great north road from Egypt, Palestine and Damascus, and from remote antiquity, when Rameses II. fought the battle of Kadesh, invading armies from the south had been opposed on its plain. The latest invaders found, however, none to bar their way.

With Tripoli in his hands, and thus a short route for supplies available, General Allenby determined to go on to Aleppo at once. The difficulty was to find the men to send forward. The Australian Mounted Division was 100 miles away, by Damascus. It was ordered to take

was making a compulsory halt at Baalbek, the only British force immediately available was the 5th Cavalry Division, together with the Armoured Car Batteries. Sir E. Allenby judged that the division would be strong enough for the purpose. Of the 20,000 Turkish and German soldiers then (October 15) believed to be in Aleppo not more than 8,000 were combatants, "and they were demoralized." An enemy cavalry detachment had been located by the airmen at Er Restan, 11 miles north of Homs, but they were gone when the armoured cars pushed forward. The cars went on, meeting no opposition, and on October 20 entered Hama, once a royal city of the Hittites and the Hamath of the Old Testament. It is built on the banks of the Orontes, here spanned by four bridges. A considerable city, and a great mart for the Syrian Beduin, it had been bombed by

Australian airmen and the enemy fled incontinently.

The next day, October 21, the 5th Cavalry Division started out from Homs. The armoured cars did not await the arrival of the cavalry. They and the column of the Arab Army on their right made straight for Aleppo. On the 22nd the cars overtook an enemy rearguard at the village of Khan Sebil. The Turks were just moving off in motor lorries when the British cars dashed up, and after a long stern-chase captured a German armoured car, a lorry and some prisoners. After this little scrap the cars on October 23 engaged enemy cavalry near Khan Tuman, only 10 miles south of Aleppo. These were scattered and Aleppo summoned to sur-

render at 10 o'clock. The Turks refused to comply with the summons and the cars withdrew, only to reoccupy Khan Tuman on October 24, and again engage cavalry in the direction of Aleppo and Turmanin. These were dispersed and the cars pressed on. But when five miles from their goal the cars were checked by strong Turkish rearguards, and they halted to await reinforcements. These did not arrive till the afternoon of the next day, October 25, when the cars were joined near Turmanin by the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade.

That night Aleppo fell. By the evening a detachment of the Arab Army had reached the eastern outskirts of the city, and during the night the Arabs forced their way into the central quarters, slaughtering many Turks and Germans. Those of the enemy who could escape fled north and north-west and were joined by the troops who had held up the armoured cars. The 5th Cavalry Division on entering Aleppo in the morning found only 50 Turks left to capture, but they also secured 18 guns.

Meantime the Armoured Car Batteries and the 15th Cavalry Brigade had not entered the city, but early in the morning (October 26) followed up the enemy, gaining touch with him



ALEPPO: TWO VIEWS OF THE CITADEL.



THE CORN MARKET, ALEPPO.

south-east of Haritan, on the Aleppo-Katma road. Then followed the last fight in Allenby's campaign

The Turkish rearguard consisted of some 2,500 infantry, 150 cavalry, and eight guns. The Mysore Lancers and two squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers attacked the enemy's left, covered by the fire of the armoured cars, the Machine Gun Squadron and two dismounted squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers. The Mysore and Jodhpur Lancers charged most gallantly. A number of Turks were speared, and many threw down their arms, only to pick them up again when the cavalry had passed through and their weakness had become apparent. The squadrons were not strong enough to complete the victory, and were withdrawn till a larger force could be assembled. That night the Turkish rearguard withdrew to a position near Deir el Jemel, 20 miles north-west of Aleppo.


The loss of Aleppo was a great blow to the Turks. Though the city has long ceased to be, as it had been for many centuries, the centre for trade between India and Europe, it is still the emporium of northern Syria and, as Mr. D. G. Hogarth has pointed out, the Ottomans had regarded it "as one of the strongholds of their dominion and faith and a future capital of their empire should they be forced [entirely] into Asia." Ten or 11 miles north of the city, at Muslimie, is the junction of the Baghdad railway with the Syrian lines, and, *via* Muslimie, railway connexion had during the war been established between Aleppo and its seaport Alexandretta. Aleppo, with a population ap-

proaching 150,000, was therefore a great prize for the victors. The 5th Cavalry Division lost no time in seizing Muslimie Junction and thus cutting off the earliest means the Turks had of communication with Mesopotamia. It was



RUE BAB-EL-AHMAR, ALEPPO.

awaiting the reinforcement of the Australian Mounted Division to advance on Alexandretta when the armistice concluded between the Allies and Turkey came into force and put an end to hostilities. As it was the record of this division was remarkable. It covered 500 miles between September 29 and October 26, captured



[Official photograph.]

ARMoured CAR IN ALEPPO RAILWAY STATION.

11,000 prisoners and 52 guns, and lost only 21 per cent. of its horses.

Clause XVI. of the Armistice provided for "the surrender of all [Turkish] garrisons in the Hedjaz, Asir, the Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander," and under that clause Alexandretta was occupied by British and French troops on November 10. Destroyers belonging to the French Naval Division under Admiral Varney had appeared off Alexandretta on October 14 and had fired on the Konak, whereupon the Turkish flag was lowered. Crowds of townspeople gathered on the quays and waved a welcome to the French sailors. But as the *pourparlers* for the armistice had already begun Admiral Varney was ordered not to take Alexandretta by force. While awaiting its surrender French ships cruised before the port and proceeded to clear the Gulf of Alexandretta of enemy mines.

Some little delay occurred in the occupation of the rest of Syria, but it was completed by the middle of December. At Antioch, "where the disciples were called Christians first," mutiny and pillage by enemy soldiery had to be suppressed. It was not till December 10 that General Allenby made his formal entry into Aleppo, when as was fitting, the 5th Cavalry

Division lined the streets. After receiving the heads of the religious and civil communities, General Allenby addressed a great crowd which had gathered in the Serail Square. His promise of security and personal freedom for all was enthusiastically acclaimed.

There is no need to dwell upon the brilliance of General Allenby's campaign nor the gallantry and determination of all ranks and all arms. "With such men," Sir E. Allenby declared, "any general could win victories." But mention should be made of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, whose fine work was of the utmost value. General Allenby's tribute to the Administrative and Medical Services, which overcame all difficulties, was fully deserved. In particular, "the Signal Service, strained to its utmost, maintained uninterrupted communication with units of the army as far east as Amman and as far north as Aleppo."

The task of the Political Department, which was under Brigadier-General Clayton, was arduous and delicate. In accordance with Mr. Balfour's declaration, full support was given to the Zionist organization; at the same time the legitimate interests of the Moslem and Christian communities had to be adjusted and safeguarded. To deal with the vast and intricate work involved in administrative and economic questions a Provisional Military Administration under Major-General Sir Arthur Money was created to control the occupied territory and create order out of chaos. One of the most pressing tasks was the feeding of the people, and large quantities of wheat, maize, millet and rice were imported from Egypt. Even when the people had money want was felt, for the Turks had seized the crops and practically no seed had been left to the cultivators. Cattle, fuel and labour were also scarce. And while the army fed the people, and met the expense out of its own funds, taxes were remitted over large areas. While, too, the people had to be cared for, the needs of commerce had to be considered, and one phase of the duty of the Political Department was to deal with the requests for concessions, so that in the future Palestine should not be shackled in the development of its resources. In January 1919 it was found possible to authorize a general resumption of trade with Palestine and Syria. Nor were the wider interests of the army neglected. In March, 1918, appeared the first issue of *The Palestine News*, a weekly newspaper which kept the army in-

formed not only about its own doings but of the news of the world. Edited by Lieut.-Colonel H. Pirie-Gordon, D.S.C., and generously supported with literary contributions by all ranks of the army, it was published in English, Arabic and Hebrew, and occasionally issued, to meet the needs of the Indian soldiers, in Hindi, Urdu and Gurumukhi. "Set up," by Greeks, Arabs and Italians, *The Palestine News* was in form and contents worthy of the troops for whose benefit it was published.*

One political problem in which the administration was deeply interested was the relation of the Entente Powers to their Arab Allies. This was a matter in which the final decision did not rest with the men on the spot, but their advice was sought. In 1916 Britain, France and Italy had all recognized the independence of the Hedjaz, and in October, 1918, immediately after the fall of Damascus, formal official recognition of the belligerent status of all the Arab tribes (not those of Arabia alone) who were aiding Allenby's army was given. This was followed the next month by a joint Franco-British declaration that they were "at

* Col. Pirie-Gordon also issued excellent guide books to Palestine and Syria for the use of the army, and with the help of many other officers compiled an official record of the campaign.

one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia." * That these Governments would need, for some considerable period, the help of their Western Allies was, however, clearly recognized by the Arabs themselves.

On October 24 (1918), on which day General Allenby's advanced troops were only five miles from Aleppo, General Marshall renewed operations in Mesopotamia. They lasted exactly a week, resulting in complete victory and the surrender of 8,000 Turks on the morning of October 30, the day on which the armistice was signed. There had been little change on the Mesopotamian front since the close of the Mosul Road operations described in Vol. XVII, Chapter CCLVI. The general situation in the country occupied by the British was satisfactory. The incident at Nejef, one of the sacred cities of the Shi'ites, where the political officer, Captain Marshall, had been murdered in March, 1918, had ended in a moral as well as a material victory for Sir William Marshall, owing to the great tact displayed by Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilson, D.S.O., the Acting Civil

* *Morning Post*, November 8, 1918.



EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE PALESTINE NEWS.

A journal published in English, Hebrew, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu and Gurumukhi, at General Headquarters, March-December, 1918.



BAGHDAD TO ALEPPO AND JERUSALEM.

Commissioner, by Brigadier-General G. A. F. Sanders, in command of the troops, and by Captain F. C. Balfour, M.C., the local political officer, who gave practical demonstration of the respect of the British for what the Moslems held sacred.* "The dwellers in Mesopotamia,"

* The incident of the murder of Captain Marshall is given on pages 279, 280 of Vol. XVII. In his dispatch of October 1, 1918 (published on February 20, 1919), General Marshall gives an account of the measures taken to exact reparation, and their result. The crime had been traced to enemy agency, and, fostered by Gorman gold, a conspiracy controlled by "The Committee of Rebellion" was organized. To put down the conspiracy and punish the murderers without injury to the city, which contains one of the most holy shrines of the Shi'ites, and is surrounded by a very high wall, was a difficulty. However a strict blockade was established and gradually the blockade line closed in until the bastions of the walls and the entrance gates were held. Two attempts of the insurgents to break out were stopped. "Every consideration was shown to the holy Ulema and to the theological students (most of whom were Persian subjects), and had it been necessary to proceed to extremities all these would have been given an asylum. The loyal inhabitants, under the guidance of the Ulema, determined, however, to rid themselves and their sacred city of these evil-doers, and eventually by April 13 the proscribed persons had been handed over and the blockade was raised. The instigators of the murder and the actual murderers were brought before a military court . . . eleven were . . . executed; seven others were sentenced to transportation, and three were deported; in addition a number of undesirables were sent out of the country. The firmness with which the situation was handled, the fairness with which the law-abiding inhabitants were treated, and the scrupulous care which was taken to avoid damage to holy persons and places created a most favourable impression on all the surrounding tribes." Subsequently Sir William Marshall visited Nejeef and was received with every token of honour.

on the Persian side as well as on the Syrian side, were, in short, never more in sympathy with the British than they were when General Marshall struck his last blow at the Turks. A bountiful harvest, which yielded 475,000 tons of grain, had been gathered in under army superintendence; trade with India was brisk and trade with Persia reviving. In many directions the resources of the country were being developed, and in the resultant prosperity the people largely shared.

An advance up the Tigris from Samarra to Mosul had hitherto been out of the question because of the length and tenuity of the line of communication. Now there was a regular rail and steamer service from Basra to Samarra and the railway by the beginning of October had been completed to Tekrit, 35 miles from Samarra and 120 miles north of Baghdad. In the middle of that month the advanced troops of the Mesopotamian Force were in touch with the enemy outposts 18 miles north of Tekrit. Farther east, on the main Baghdad-Mosul road, which goes via Kirkuk, the advanced British posts were somewhat south of Tauk, over 120 miles south-east of Mosul. On both river and road fronts the Turks were entrenched in strong positions, and Ismail Hakki Pasha, the commander of the Turkish Army in the Mosul Vilayet, was not a man to throw away his chances. He had, too, at his disposal seasoned troops who fought

hard and well. But, completely outmanœuvred, Ismail Hakki was compelled to surrender with his whole force. The total Turkish casualties were over 10,000. The following is General Marshall's own account of the Tigris operations. Victory, it will be seen, was attained, as in earlier operations on this front, by bold out-flanking movements of the cavalry :—

Operations commenced on October 24 with an attack on the strong Turkish position at Fathah, where the Tigris flows through the Jebel Hamrim. This was carried out by the 17th and the 18th Indian Divisions west and east of the Tigris respectively, assisted by the 7th Indian Cavalry Brigade on the east bank of the Tigris, and the 11th Indian Cavalry Brigade on the west bank. The latter by a march of over 50 miles forced a crossing over the Lesser Zab in face of opposition, and by a further march of about 50 miles got right round the Turks and astride their

Brigade joined the 11th Indian Cavalry Brigade, and the 53rd Indian Infantry Brigade, moving up the east bank after a march of 33 miles, was able to support the cavalry in preventing any Turks breaking through northwards. On October 28 the 17th Indian Division successfully assaulted the Turkish Shergat position, and on the 29th, though exhausted by their continuous fighting and marching through the rugged hills, pushed forward and attacked till nightfall the Turks, who were now hemmed in. [Part of the enemy force which tried to escape during the night was cut off by the cavalry and about 1,000 prisoners and much material were captured.]

On the morning of the 30th the Turkish Commander surrendered his total force, consisting of the whole of the 14th Division, the bulk of the 2nd Division, and portions of two regiments of the 5th Division, with all their artillery train and administrative services. [Altogether some 7,000 men, besides the 1,000 already captured.]

The fortitude and courage displayed by all the troops was beyond praise and was the main factor in the



GENERAL ALLENBY ADDRESSING THE POPULACE AT ALEPPO.

lines of communication at Hurwaish, where they were joined by our Armoured Car Brigade.

Outmanœuvred on the east bank and driven back on the west bank the Turks fell back to their second line at the confluence of the Lesser Zab, a position of great natural strength. On October 25 the 18th Indian Division forced a crossing over the Lesser Zab and drove back to the west bank of the Tigris all Turks who were east of that river, while the 17th Indian Division closed up to the enemy, who were now all on the west bank.

The fighting which ensued was of a very severe nature. The hilly ground, indented with ravines and previously prepared for defence, was all in favour of the Turks, who fought with the greatest stubbornness. Our difficulties were increased by the sandy nature of the soil, which delayed transport, and by absence of water except the Tigris itself.

After continuous fighting the 17th Indian Division forced the Turks to fall back on their third position on the hills covering Shergat [50 miles due south of Mosul] on the morning of the 27th. All that day Turkish reserves tried to break through the 11th Indian Cavalry Brigade, who barred the road to Mosul, but without success, though the arrival of the Turkish reinforcements from Mosul forced that Brigade to draw back its right in order to cover its rear.

On the night of October 27-28 the 7th Indian Cavalry

defeat of a stubborn enemy holding carefully prepared positions in a rugged and difficult country.

On the Baghdad-Mosul road the operations were of a subsidiary character. They had begun on October 18, when an enemy cavalry detachment was driven out of Tauk, and Kirkuk was captured on the evening of October 25 after slight resistance. The retreating enemy was followed up to Altun Keupri by armoured cars which caused many casualties among the Turks. On the 27th the main column was in touch with the enemy troops covering the crossing of the Lesser Zab. These hastily retreated when they learned of Ismail Hakki's fate.

Thus ended the Mesopotamian campaign. The remaining Turkish garrisons on the Euphrates above Hit, those on the Tigris and along the line of the Baghdad railway, all bowed to their fate. Mosul itself was surrendered on November 14. General Marshall



HIT, ON THE EUPHRATES.

received the notabilities of the town, who may or may not have remembered that their city was the modern representative of Nineveh, and lectured them on the municipal shortcomings. "I intend to work until it is in a passably clean state. At present the dirt and filth are worse than I have seen anywhere in the world." On wider subjects Sir Edward told them that "the British Government, as

you know, makes no distinction between sects and classes but treats all alike," and he called upon them to work loyally with Colonel Leachman, who had been appointed civil administrator. The Nakib, an Arab, replied, saying the presence of the British troops gave them a feeling of security, and he thanked God "who has given us [Arabs] liberty to speak our language after being dumb." And the ceremony ended with the Chaldean Patriarch calling for the blessing of God upon, and the intercession of the prophets and saints for, the flag of Britain, which, he said, "wherever it is flown is a sign of justice, civilization and well-being."

The Armistice terms also required the surrender of the Turkish garrisons remaining in the Hedjaz, Asir, and the Yemen. The two last-named regions lie south of the Hedjaz, and geographically the western half of the Aden Protectorate forms the southernmost part of the Yemen. Since July, 1915, Ali Said Pasha, Governor of the Yemen, and part of the 39th Turkish Division, had been encamped in the fertile valley of Lahej, in places little more than a dozen miles from the port of Aden. Since July, 1916, in consequence of the revolt of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, Ali Said had been cut off from reinforcements from Turkey.* The situation was anomalous. The enemy was comfortably settled down in a British protectorate, and living on the country, but showed a wise disinclination to attack the strong defences of the Aden Peninsula. The British garrison for its part was too weak to undertake a serious offensive,



COUNTRY BETWEEN ADEN AND JERUSALEM.

* For the early Aden operations, see Vol. X, pages 400-404.

and was, in practice, content with the line it held, which formed an arc about 11 miles from Aden. Moreover, as the Arabs of the Yemen were giving the Turks much trouble, such minor operations as were carried out were partly designed to hinder Ali Said giving help to his comrades. During 1916, Major-General J. M. Stewart, C.B., who had returned to India from East Africa, took over the command at Aden, the troops under him including Punjabis, Carnatic Infantry and Malay States Guides. In December (1916) an attack was made on Jabir, 15 miles north-east of Aden. Besides inflicting some 200 casualties on the enemy,

The next news from this forgotten corner of the war came from the Turks, who managed to get occasional information. It was dated March, 1918, and was significant in that it admitted fighting with "rebel tribes" in Asir and the Yemen, though it was claimed that the Iman of the Yemen sided with the Turks, "who behaved with indescribable gallantry." "Sorties attempted by the British from the fortress of Aden to escape from the state of siege established by us completely failed," as did also, the Turkish public were informed, an attempt to land near Hodeida, the chief port of the Yemen. Only one more glimpse, officially,



ADEN : THE MARKET.

this action "prevented the withdrawal towards the Yemen of Turkish troops." Nearly a year then passed before anything more than outpost skirmishes happened, and the capture of Jabir on November 22, 1917, was hardly a greater affair. Apparently, the captors withdrew to their original line, for, on January 7, 1918, the War Office announced that, two days earlier, "a strong reconnaissance was made towards Hatun and Jabir." On that occasion the Turks had a sharp lesson, for "aeroplanes co-operated with our artillery, who did great execution on the enemy's infantry in the open with direct observation at effective range." The gunners, that is, had just the target they liked.

was afforded of the operations. On July 30, 1918, at Bir Saleh, some 20 miles west of Aden, British cavalry discovered a body of the enemy, charged, and scattered them. "Twenty Turks were killed, and five men and 12 camels captured."

Such is the scanty chronicle of two years' warfare. Both sides were in reality marking time, and a sort of *modus vivendi* appears to have been established. There was even, through Arab intermediaries, a trade in the vegetables grown in the Lahej Valley. It was with natural reluctance that Ali Said Pasha obeyed the instructions he received after the conclusion of the armistice on October 30. It was not, indeed, until December 11 that he and his



MOSUL.

staff surrendered to the Governor of Aden. There were difficulties, too, in getting the enemy forces in Asir and the Yemen to yield, but before the end of 1918, "after a certain amount of peaceful persuasion," they had all laid down their arms. So, also, had the small Turkish posts in Northern Hedjaz.

At the beginning of 1919 there remained in Turkish hands in all the Arabic vilayets one place only, but that place was Medina. The Turkish Government had sent orders to the commandant, Fakhri Pasha, to surrender, but he saw fit to disobey. He and his troops had been isolated for months by the Arabs under the Emir Abdulla. The Turks had retreated to the centre of the city, and were posted round the great mosque. In this mosque is the tomb of Mahomet, and the Emir Abdulla would not order an assault for fear of injury to the holy place. The situation could not be permitted to last indefinitely, and the Turkish Cabinet was informed early in January that unless Medina was surrendered in a few days the forts of the Dardanelles would be destroyed. For all Fakhri Pasha cared, the forts might

have been razed. But some of his officers were less obstinate. Many of their men were ready to desert, and early in January a party of officers gave themselves up. Others were ready to follow their example, and Fakhri Pasha saw that the end had come. On January 8 he dispatched his chief of staff to Abdulla, who insisted on unconditional surrender. On January 10, the formal submission of Fakhri Pasha took place at the Emir's headquarters; on the 13th, at eleven in the morning, the Emir Abdulla made his ceremonial entry into Medina. He at once went to the tomb of the Prophet, where he offered the mid-day prayer, from which the name of the Sultan of Turkey was omitted; the customary sign of a change of dynasty.

The last act in the drama, as far as Ottoman sovereignty in the Arabic vilayets was concerned, had been played, and the age-long feud between Turk and Arab had come to its fitting end. Whatever their destiny, neither Syria nor Mesopotamia nor any part of Arabia was likely again to fall under the blighting power of the Turk.



MOSQUE OF HOSEIN, KERBELA.

CHAPTER CCLXXXI.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: JULY, 1914—NOVEMBER, 1916.

THE MEANING OF THE WAR FOR THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN STATE—THE GERMAN AUSTRIANS AND THE WAR: THE MAGYARS; THE AUSTRIAN POLES—THE SUBJECT NATIONALITIES AND THE WAR: THE YUGO-SLAVS; THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS; THE LITTLE RUSSIANS—SCHEMES OF CENTRALIZATION AND GERMANIZATION; RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AUSTRIAN CABINET; PROPAGANDA IN FAVOUR OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNION—THE MAGYARS, AUSTRIAN CENTRALISM AND MITTEL-EUROPA—THE POLISH QUESTION—DEMAND FOR REASSEMBLING PARLIAMENT—THE MURDER OF COUNT STÜRCKH AND THE DEATH OF THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH I.


THE first declaration of war by the Austrian Government was directed against its own people. On July 25, 1914, trial by jury in political cases was suspended by an Imperial Order and civilians were placed under military jurisdiction. The Order was unconstitutional, and every single one of the thousands of death-sentences carried out under it was murder. At a time when other governments were striving to lead their nations, the Austrian Government drew the reins tighter; when other belligerent States convened their Parliaments, Austria instituted courts-martial. The act was symbolic, and it was logical; for the Hapsburg Monarchy was not a nation, and not even a State, but a government, and its aggressive action was primarily based on considerations arising from internal policy. On the battlefields of Serbia and Russia, of Italy and Rumania, it hoped to defeat its own Jugo-Slav, Czecho-Slovak and Little Russian, Italian and Ruman subjects. The leading ideas of those early days of the war were put on record by an authoritative writer when, in 1918, on the failure of the last offensive stroke on the Piave, Baron Conrad von Hötzendorff, Austria's invariably unsuccessful Ludendorff, retired into private life. "He had hoped that

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the hammer-blows which were to have knocked down Austria's enemies in war would re-forge her inner life." The war was necessary because otherwise the Great-Serbian propaganda "would have infected the Slav elements in the Austro-Hungarian Army," declared General Conrad himself in an article published in January, 1919. It was directed against an internal enemy, no less than against foreign Powers.

The political forces whose action and inter-action made up Austria-Hungary's internal history during the War may be divided into five main groups: the dynasty and its immediate following, the Supreme Army Command and the bureaucracy, the dominant nationalities, the submerged nationalities, and, lastly, the grey mass of people to whom war meant nothing but untold suffering. The first three groups wished for victory, the fourth for Austria-Hungary's defeat, the fifth for peace at any price and on any terms.

The Hapsburg interest was purely proprietary. Their desire was to possess, to retain that which they possessed, and to acquire. As it was said by one of those who knew Austria best, "the key to the Hapsburg heart lay in the words 'more acres.'" The Army Command



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE.

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and bureaucracy were their servants and partners; the German-Austrian and the Magyar nationalists were their allies, for in the dynastic inheritance of the Hapsburgs these nationalities saw their own Imperialist possessions and were therefore prepared to defend them to the last. The dynasty favoured also the Poles, hoping as a result of the war to join Russian Poland to their own Polish possessions and thus to build up a new kingdom under their sceptre. At times they dreamt even of an Ukrainian secundogeniture, and a junior member of the dynasty, the son of the Hapsburg candidate to the Polish Throne, put on an embroidered Ukrainian shirt, uniforms being the only expression of national ideas comprehensible to German princelings. Within sufficient distance from reality not to offend the Magyars, the Hapsburgs dallied even with schemes for a Jugo-Slav kingdom. They were omnivorous, tolerant, versatile and patient. To them the World-War was a mere incident of their dynastic history; they wished to turn it to the best account.

The servants, military and civilian, naturally had an interest in the Hapsburg possessions, but their interest was not necessarily identical with that of their masters—a fact which accounts for many otherwise inexplicable turns of Austrian policy and diplomacy in the war. To the Hapsburgs it was a matter of comparative indifference whether they ruled Hungary as Emperors of Austria or as crowned descendants of St. Stephen, whether they held Galicia through Austria or as Kings of Poland or the Ukraine, whether Dalmatia and Bosnia were theirs by Jugo-Slav State right or because subject to administrative officers in Vienna. But these were not matters of indifference to the Vienna bureaucracy and to the exponents of Austrian military centralism. The high officials and generals were truer exponents of Austrian official patriotism than the Hapsburgs themselves. Whereas the Hapsburgs could have been monarchs over nations, their servants could tolerate nothing but subjects. The Pastoral Letter issued by the Vienna Church Synod on June 17, 1849, continued to express their views in 1914: "The national State is a survival of paganism, and the differences of speech are but the result of sin and apostasy from God."

Still, German being the language of command in Austria, the centralists were Germanisers. Also most of the places in the Army Command

and the high bureaucracy were held by Germans or Germanized Slavs. A large proportion of the German population of Austria shared the centralist interest—Vienna, which shared it as capital, alone comprised one-fifth of all the Germans of Austria. An unbroken chain extended from the Hapsburg following, comparatively indifferent to nationality, to the extremest Pan-Germans. The war drew them still closer together. It was fought in defence



BARON CONRAD VON HÖTZENDORFF.
Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

of the Hapsburg inheritance, and yet was a war between Germans and Slavs in Europe as well as in Austria-Hungary itself. Germany upheld Austria, Austria opened up the road to Baghdad for Germany. Serbia had been singled out for attack because, since the close of the Balkan wars, the Jugo-Slav Irredenta presented the most immediate danger to the Hapsburg Monarchy, but Serbia was at the same time an obstacle in Germany's path to the East. Some 20 years earlier the Austrian Pan-Germans had agitated in favour of breaking up the Hapsburg Monarchy and of joining Western Austria to Germany; during the war they learnt to appreciate the advantages which the Hapsburg Monarchy secured for Germany. "We wish for Austria's existence because it is of vital necessity for Germany," Herr Iro, one of their leaders, wrote, in 1915. "Hitherto the Pan-Germans have denied this. Herein lies the difference between the past Pan-German and the future German-Austrian policy. . . ." The "Great-Austrian" patriots, on the other hand, had learned to see that without Germany's support Austria-Hungary

could no longer exist, and that the Germans and Magyars were the only reliable supporters of the Hapsburg Monarchy; the centrifugal endeavours and Pan-Slav sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs and Little Russians led the Hapsburg following towards a German



DR. KARL RENNER,
German-Austrian Socialist Leader, and subsequently First Chancellor of the German-Austrian Republic, 1918.

nationalism no less violent and oppressive than that of the Pan-Germans.

The German Austrians greeted the outbreak of war with almost hilarious excitement. War, at last! No more tiring discussions or wranglings with the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs, but short, sharp orders. The Germans were to be masters in Austria once more. On July 29, 1914, a patriotic demonstration was arranged under the auspices of the Vienna Town Council, "enthusiastic manifestations of sympathy for the war" (*begeisterte Sympathie Kundgebungen für den Krieg*), as they were described in a Vienna paper. Crowds traversed the streets, yelling with joy. "The time has come at last for settling accounts with the meddlesome, faithless, plotting and greedy Serbia," ran a resolution unanimously adopted on August 1, 1914, by the Christian Socialist (Clerical) members of Parliament, then the strongest party among the German Austrians. "The adherents of my party," Prince Alois Liechten-

stein declared in their name, "thank your Majesty from the depths of their hearts for giving them an opportunity to defend the greatness and integrity of the Monarchy with their blood and treasure." And with those of the unwilling subject races, he might have added, but naturally did not. As, however, the courts-martial and the censorship were already at work, his party could presently claim to speak for other nations also. "His Majesty, our most gracious War Lord, has called his nations to the Colours. With flaming enthusiasm have the nations of Austria heard the call. . . . A compact phalanx which no power on earth will be able to break, the nations stand together." And on September 20, 1914, the Prince-Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Piffl, spoke as follows, when addressing a congregation of children in St. Stephen's Cathedral: "Never in your life should you forget the great time through which you are passing as children! . . . You see the nationalities of Austria united in their love for the Emperor and country. You see once more a great, united Austria-Hungary!"

Different in tone but no less enthusiastic and aggressive were the declarations of the German-Austrian Nationalists. The war was to be fought shoulder to shoulder with Germany. There had been men who had dared to compare the Triple Alliance to a venerable, played-out clavichord, a piece of furniture which one cherishes but does not use any longer. What a noise they were going to make on that instrument! At last the German-Austrians could learn the true Berlin manner and drill it into the subject nations—in good German: *es ihnen einpauken*. Austria had not been sufficiently conspicuous in the past. It was absorbed by internal struggles. It had few dreadnoughts, no colonies, no *Weltpolitik*. But now it proved its existence. "I set the world ablaze, *ergo sum*"—a much more convincing proof than Descartes's thinking. Looking across the faded pages of old papers and reviews one can still feel the touch of Vienna's midsummer madness of 1914.

The Socialists were less affected than the other German Austrians by the war frenzy. Still, even their official party-organ, the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* published an article on August 5, 1914, under the heading "The Day of the German Nation," which began with the sentence, "This day of August 4, we shall not forget." And during the first 2½ years their

leaders tacitly supported Austria's war policy and her German orientation. They professed to see in the war a struggle of German civilization against Tsarist autocracy, and declared it to be waged by Austria-Hungary in self-defence. In quasi-Socialist terms they argued Austria's right to existence. National postulates were described as a survival, if not of a pagan, then at least of a "dead age," and nationality itself, if not the result of sin and apostasy from God, then at least was the product of a ruthless bourgeois hankering after cultured luxuries. The idea of making it the basis of State organization had been developed by the *Homo sapiens* of the age of literature and art, but now the age of the *Homo economicus* has begun, wrote Dr. Karl Renner, an Austrian quasi-Socialist and subsequently the first Chancellor of the German-Austrian Republic. The interests of labour are in the first place economic. Economic development points towards empires, and Austria-Hungary is a natural product of geographical and economic laws, not a mere dynastic inheritance. Composed of many different nationalities, it is in reality a model in miniature of the future International. After Austria had broken down, the same men, when demanding a partition of Bohemia, argued that

uniform national States alone offer a proper basis for international socialism. More moderate in tone, more elaborate in argument than their bourgeois opponents, the leaders of the German-Austrian Socialists were at bottom German Nationalists and Austrian Imperialists.

After the Hapsburg Monarchy had collapsed and Germany also, the German Austrians were at pains to repudiate the spiritual and legal inheritance of the Hapsburg State and to disclaim Austria's personality and wars. "The state of war in which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been," declared the government of the German-Austrian Republic at the New Year of 1919, "has no more passed on to German-Austria than it has to the Czecho-Slovak State or any other national State arisen on the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. . . . German-Austria claims the position of a friendly Power towards all the States of the world, of a neutral Power towards all belligerents." In reality the German-Austrians had been one of the main moving forces in the war, and this professed indifference towards the Hapsburg Monarchy and the war was merely an ingenious literary after-thought.

The Magyar Nationalists, no less than the



GREAT PATRIOTIC MEETING OUTSIDE THE WAR OFFICE, VIENNA.

Addressed by officers from the balcony.

German-Austrians, had their interest and heart in the war. It was to have preserved the Magyar *imperium* in Hungary and upheld their dominion over subject races. They had no immediate interest in fighting against the Western Powers and naturally regretted their having, by coming into it, spoiled the chances of a German-Magyar victory, but the war against Serbia and Russia, and subsequently against Rumania, was their own war, which they had desired and provoked. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, and one of the main authors of the war, directed Magyar policy with a clear eye and a firm hand, and, however hostile different minor politicians may have been to his person, practically all of them stood solidly behind his Imperialist policy and the German

1916. "These laws have formed the kingdom of Hungary and have produced the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. . . . The final result of this natural and necessary development is the alliance with Germany, which in this war has given proof of a force such as the world has never seen before."

In August, 1914, the Magyar hatred flamed up against Serbia and Russia. There was not the hysterical frenzy through which Vienna passed in the early days of the war nor its subsequent dull apathy and listlessness, but the cold and yet energetic determination of a dominant race fighting for the maintenance of its dominion, whatever price that might cost to the world :—

One must visit Budapest in order to get a clear con-



BUDAPEST: THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.

Alliance. Hungary's integrity was for them the Law and the Prophets, and Germany's power its safeguard against the Slavs and Rumanians. "I cannot see the future of the Magyar nation in any other connexion but that with the German race," declared Count Apponyi, a leader of the so-called opposition, in the Hungarian Parliament on June 14, 1916, "for it is the only one which does not aim at reducing Hungary's territory." "Like nature itself, Hungarian policy remained and still remains under the influence of positive and permanent laws, and no one who acts against them can escape punishment," declared Count Julius Andrássy,* in a lecture delivered at Munich on May 16,

* An eternal candidate for the post of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. He reached the goal of his continuous strivings and intrigues in October, 1918, just in time to propose a separate peace to the Allies.

ception of how popular a war can be [wrote a neutral observer in *The Times* of February 26, 1915]. No one there will greet you with the words, "We did not want the war. . . . We did not begin the war," which I invariably heard in other cities. On the contrary, they are eager to have you know that this is their war, and that they began the conflict. That the conflagration spread over all Europe and has become the greatest war the world has ever known seems to fill every Magyar heart with pride. This exuberance seems to the visitor like a breath of mountain air after the dull atmosphere of Vienna. For the Magyars are proving themselves to be the one strong element in the whole Hapsburg realm. . . .

Crude, ruthless, domineering, the Magyars, who are a minority in their own country, net forming even one-half of the total population of 20 million people, are displaying in the present crisis all the resource, all the strength that they have been storing up for this great event.

"We are second only to Germany in moral force." "Germany is our ally." "We feel ourselves in accord with German ideas and ideals." Such phrases as these were repeated to me often, and appear to express accurately the state of mind of the ruling class, though



BUDAPEST : THE ROYAL PALACE.

it seems probable that their professed friendship for Germany is based more on policy than on understanding or real sympathy.

"There is no other nation which can be such a faithful friend to the Germans as the Magyars, provided confidence is shown to them," declared Count Julius Andrassy, in 1916.

A world war, in which the partitioning Powers would be ranged against each other had for a century been considered the one chance of Poland's political resurrection. The Polish schemes for the coalition which was to restore Poland's independence and her dominion over the Lithuanian, White Russian and Little Russian peasant nations, ranged the entire gamut from the Vatican to Garibaldi, from a Roman Catholic League to Young Europe. Austria was usually included among Poland's allies and an "historic mission" was ascribed to her. Between 1867 and 1873 the Poles had established a satisfactory *modus vivendi* with the Hapsburg Monarchy; within its borders their interests were nowhere contrary to those of the Germans and Magyars. In the Austrian Parliament they held the balance between the Germans and the Slavs, and, at the price of dominion over the Little Russians of East Galicia (otherwise called Ruthenes or Ukrainians), they abandoned the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs to the Germans. Moreover a common religion formed a link between them and the dynasty with which, about 1870, they shared the hostility against Prussia and Russia. For those two were invariably treated as Poland's arch-enemies. Polish policy within Austria remained unchanged even after the international regrouping of Europe which occurred about 1879—the compromise with the Hapsburgs

secured tangible advantages for the Poles which they had no reason to give up, in fact it was continued until Austria collapsed. But after 1879 the Poles no longer worked for war, and when, beginning with 1909, the danger of a world conflagration arose once more, they found themselves in a most embarrassing position. Were they to come out on the side of Austria and therefore also of Germany, or were they to trust their fate to Tsarist Russia?

Russia declared her Polish policy in the Grand Duke's manifesto of August, 1914. Austria was prevented by Germany from making any public pronouncement, and in



PROFESSOR T. C. MASARYK.

Leader of the Czech Revolutionary movement; subsequently the First President of the Czechoslovak Republic.

private conversations only were promises made to the Polish leaders from Galicia. But so persuasive proved the power of prophets who had the means to enforce faith, that, whilst in Russian Poland public opinion declared for Russia, in Austrian Poland the representatives



MEMORIAL AT SERAJEVO

Marking the spot where the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated.

of all Polish political parties gathered in Cracow on August 16, 1914, and declared unanimously for war against Russia and in favour of raising volunteers for it. Millions of crowns were voted for these Polish Legions by the municipalities of Cracow and Lemberg and by other Polish self-governing bodies in Galicia. It was not until after the great Russian victories of September, 1914, that one section of Polish public opinion in Galicia began to waver.

The subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary

were no more politically prepared for the War than the Entente. It had been part of the Austrian scheme to take everybody by surprise. How could the leaders of the Czecho-Slovaks or Jugo-Slavs have assumed the responsibility for striking out a revolutionary line of policy with regard to Austria-Hungary when they did not know what the attitude of the Entente was going to be? Moreover, in the early months of the war no one expected that it would last sufficiently long for political action or revolutionary movements to take effect. The war was looked upon primarily as a struggle between armies and States already in existence, not as a fight in which every group and every individual would have to play a part.

The Austrian and the Hungarian Governments, which a few months before the war had tried to prepare some kind of compromise with the subject nationalities by means of negotiations with the tamest among their politicians—men without authority or backing—immediately on the outbreak of the war tried to paralyse all possible opposition by an unparalleled reign of terror. This attempt at repression soon brought home the meaning of the war to the masses of the people, and their determination, which in the course of the following years hardened into political action, showed their leaders the true line to follow. "It was clear to me that I could not continue to serve Austria-Hungary," declared Professor Masaryk, the first President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, when reviewing his activities during the war, in his address of December 22, 1918. "To begin with, however, I had not decided to act. I felt the enormous responsibility and counted the consequences; but when our soldiers refused to do military service, when they surrendered to the Allies, when mass executions became our daily fate, I found myself forced to take a decision. I consulted my political friends, for political parties had been suppressed. I went to Vienna to speak to the Austrian Germans and to learn what it was which they expected from the war, in case of victory. I was twice in Holland and traversed Germany trying to get my bearings. In December, 1914, I went to Italy, and later on to Switzerland. I thought of returning to Prague in order to transmit the information, but this was no longer possible." His exile began, and with it his revolutionary activity abroad. This statement, clear and simple gives a typical account of the position in which the leaders of the subject nationalities had

found themselves. They had to study, to seek, and to wait for the mandate which they obtained from their people themselves.

Worst of all was the position in the Jugo-Slav provinces and especially in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The assassination of the Archduke at Sarajovo, the indignation which it was alleged to have caused, and the proximity of the Serbian front, supplied exceptional opportunities to the Austro-Hungarian Army Command which had planned the war, as a crusade, or rather as a penal expedition, against the Jugo-Slavs. The anti-Serb riots organized by the Austro-Hungarian authorities immediately after the murder were a mere prelude to the campaign of extermination which started on the outbreak of the war. A military dictatorship was established in Bosnia and the Herzegovina under General Potiorek, a special political police, the so-called "Safety Corps" (*Schutzcorps*), was formed with notorious criminals in its ranks, and a packed military tribunal was set up, the judges on it cooperating with the public prosecutors. In the summer of 1917, in a joint declaration of the Croat members in the

Hungarian Parliament, the president of the Provincial Court of Bosnia was quoted as saying that "conviction had hitherto followed the accusation of the State Prosecutor in every case." The slightest sign of sympathy for the Jugo-Slav cause was considered a crime, and frequently baseless denunciations were deemed sufficient proof. When the fatal "p.v." (*politisch verdächtig*—politically suspect) was put against a name, imprisonment usually followed and imprisonment only too often resulted in death. In a speech delivered in the Austrian Parliament on October 19, 1917, Dr. Tresić Pavičić, the member for the Island of Lesina, gave numerous examples of the methods adopted at those trials. Thus, early in the war, a certain Captain Hadzija, a Jugo-Slav serving in the Austria-Hungarian Navy, was called upon to give evidence against the ship's engineer, Srzentić, who was accused of having expressed Serbophil sentiments. He denied having heard the incriminating words, but added that "at one time or another at table they had criticized the biased attitude of the Austrian Government towards the Southern Slavs." Thereupon the accusation was extended to the witness also, and both were convicted and executed within



THE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND, WITH HIS WIFE, THE DUCHESS OF HOHENBERG, AND FAMILY.

three hours. In some cases the military authorities subsequently discovered that their hasty verdicts had lacked justification, even by their own standards, and then tried to atone for it in their peculiar manner. Over the grave of Onisim Popović, a Bosnian peasant executed "by mistake," the regimental band was ordered to play the Austrian Imperial Hymn.

Still worse than the judicial murders were the mass massacres, deportations and internments carried out by military commanders even without pretence of legal proceedings. The Serb districts of Bosnia and the Herzegovina near the Serb frontier suffered most. In his speech on October 19, 1917, Dr. Trosić-Pavičić went on enumerating village after village, an endless series of bare facts of which the sum-total formed an impeachment such as has seldom been raised against a government.

In Samirovac the soldiers in November, 1914, by order of their officers, killed sixteen notables. . . . In Celebić . . . the entire male population from 14 to 60 were killed without any form of trial. In the neighbourhood of Zubac 82 persons were hanged, in Trebinje, 103 in all, for the conclusive reason that they were local notabilities; 71 persons were hanged in Foca for the same reason. I cannot tell you the number of

persons hanged in Sarajevo, Bjelina, Srebrenica, Zvernik, Avtovac, Višegrad, Bilek, etc., as I have not been able to make inquiries. What I do know positively, however, is that there, too, the halter has not been spared. A single Hungarian battalion was supplied with a thousand yards of rope when it was sent from Sarajevo to the frontier.

Besides, tens of thousands of Bosnians were deported and imprisoned in different gaols or internment camps. They were ill-treated by their guards, the surroundings in which they had to live were unspeakably filthy, spotted typhus soon broke out and the prisoners died off practically without any help being tendered to them. A large proportion died before their cases had ever been examined. According to Dr. Biankini, a Croat member of the Austrian Parliament, 4,300 Bosnians died in the prison of Arad (Hungary) alone. Equally notorious was the prison of Mostar in the Herzegovina, where the gaoler was in the habit of beating the prisoners with an iron crook which he facetiously named *Kronprinz*. "Hostages (from among the prisoners) were selected at night," said Dr. Trosić-Pavičić in the speech quoted above. "The loathsome face of the gaoler, set in a frame of bayonets that gleamed like mortuary candles, entered silently, when, like a tiger, he sought and pounced upon his



MOB DESTROYING THE HOUSES OF SERBIANS.



DEPORTATION OF SERBIANS.

victims. . . . The hair of more than one of his victims was bleached in one single night with terror. . . . Such as desired to prolong their miserable life for a few days longer indicated by gestures how many banknotes they were prepared to sacrifice." To be taken as a hostage was equal to sentence of death; hundreds perished in this way.

Whilst the selected victims were thus exterminated in prisons or internment camps the population of Bosnia at large was condemned to starvation. Constant requisitions were carried out for the Austro-Hungarian and German Armies in the Balkans, and no regard was taken of the needs of the population. According to German-Austrian sources between 1914 and 1917 the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reduced from 1,800,000 to 1,300,000, and this, though there had been practically no fighting within its border. "Our own authorities have wilfully ravaged our country; they have raged against everything bearing the name of Slav . . .," declared a Jugo-Slav member of the Vienna Parliament. "Since Kossovo our nation has not seen or experienced such a catastrophe."

Equally severe were the persecutions of the Serbs in Hungary proper. Nor did Croatia escape them because of the show of autonomy which had been left to it in peace time.

The activities of the Hapsburg authorities in Croatia are well illustrated by the fact of their having, at the outset of the war, planned the murder of the most prominent members of the Serbo-Croat Parliamentary Coalition in the Diet, including its President, Dr. Medaković. On August 10, 1917, Dr. Ivan Frank, usually a tool of the Austrian Government, whilst defending himself in the Croatian Diet from accusations levelled against him, stated that five days before the ultimatum to Serbia was presented, the Chief of Police in Zagreb (Agram), had telephoned to him requesting him to consider carefully a proposal of a gentleman who would call on him that day; he added that he himself (the Chief of Police) approved of it. "As a matter of fact the gentleman did call at five o'clock—giving a false name, as I subsequently ascertained—and laid before me a scheme to murder the aforesaid members of the Croato-Serb Coalition." There seems reason to believe that the Zagreb Chief of the Police was merely carrying out the instruction of the military Command.

But not even the peasantry were safe from persecution: "Our prisons are always packed with political offenders, both convicted and accused," declared S. Radić, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party in the Diet on July 12, 1916. "People are thrust into prison regard



AN AUSTRIAN FIELD COURT-MARTIAL ON A PEASANT ACCUSED OF GIVING INFORMATION TO THE ENEMY.

less of age or sex, not excepting the peasant class." Women and girls were sentenced to years of imprisonment "for a mere word or a suspicion that they had spoken in favour of Russia or Serbia."

The outbreak of the war was a signal for similar persecutions against the Jugo-Slavs even in Austria, where in the past they had been comparatively best treated. All their leaders, in fact most of their *intelligentsia*, were arrested and deported. One single convoy which started from Dalmatia by way of Fiume to Marburg in Styria included four deputies to the Vienna Parliament (among them Dr. Tresić-Pavičić), five deputies of the Dalmatian Diet, 16 priests, 17 barristers, six doctors, etc. They were treated in the most brutal way both by the guards and by the Magyar and German population at the stations through which they passed. When after three months of imprisonment Dr. Tresić-Pavičić was brought before a judge, the latter said to him: "I do not know what the charge is against you, and you will easily understand this when you consider that in Dalmatia, Istria and Carniola alone we have arrested more than five thousand people." The part which the German *intelligentsia* of the Jugo-Slav provinces of Austria played in these persecutions was especially shameful. Most of them, eager Pan-Germans, were at last able to give free vent to their hatred of the Jugo-Slavs. "Most especially we blame the Germans for this," said Dr. Ribar, another Jugo-Slav member of the Austrian Parliament, on October 7, 1917, "that their intellectual classes have permitted themselves to be used as spies and informers, and in this respect the educated Germans in our country do not differ from their countrymen elsewhere. Teachers, officials, business men, etc., spied upon their neighbours, their friends, and denounced them." "A hint from the German *Volksrat*, the denunciation of a spy, is sufficient—and neither protest nor explanation nor appeal is of any avail," stated another Jugo-Slav member, Dr. Ravnihar, on June 6, 1917. "At that time an abyss opened between ourselves and our countrymen of different race" (the Germans), declared yet another Jugo-Slav member in the Austrian Parliament. "This abyss can no longer be bridged." Nevertheless, after Austria had broken down, the Germans of the southern provinces tried to disguise themselves as "victims" of the *ancien régime* of which they themselves had been the backbone. A memo-

randum sent by the Carinthian Germans to the Jugo-Slav authorities at Lubliana (Laibach) in January, 1919, claimed that they were no more "legal heirs of the past Imperial Austrian Government and of the military Commands than the Jugo-Slavs," and that they had "to protest in the most decisive way against being made responsible for the acts committed by those authorities during the war." And they went on to state with calm effrontery that "the Germans in Carinthia had been ill-treated by the late military authorities in exactly the same way as the Slovenes." Possibly some Socialists or pacifists among them may have been, but never the German politicians, late members of the German *Volksrat*, the organ of anti-Slovene propaganda and espionage, who, after the Revolution, under new names, continued to rule Carinthia.

A few weeks before the outbreak of the war the Austrian Premier started private conversations with some very unrepresentative Czechs belonging to a party which held exactly one out of 108 Czech seats in the Austrian Parliament. A list of grievances was presented to the Government and redress was promised. Not even to these tamest of all Czech politicians was anything said about the war into which the Austro-Hungarian ruling circles were about to draw the Czech nation.

Once the war had broken out all idea of conciliating the Czechs was naturally abandoned. The civilian Governor of Bohemia, Prince Thun, a feudal aristocrat and therefore a faithful adherent of the dynasty, was personally an honourable man, averse from persecuting the Czechs. But he had now to retire into the background; the line of policy to be adopted was dictated by the military. The frequent mutinies in the Czech regiments supplied the Army Command with an excuse for increasingly severe repression. The Czech nation, which had no illiterates and of which practically every single member was strongly conscious of his nationality and its interests, was resolved not to fight for its German and Magyar enemies and against its natural Slav allies, the Russians and the Serbs. In September, 1914, the 8th Regiment of the Czech Landwehr, when ordered to the Russian front, refused obedience and attacked its German officers; the revolt was put down by German soldiers. In the autumn of 1914, the 95th and the 11th Infantry Brigades from Prague and the 11th from Jičín had been

assigned to garrison the fortress of Cracow but had to be removed, having been found highly unreliable. On October 20, 1914, parts of the 36th and of the 30th Regiments, both from Bohemia, voluntarily surrendered to the Russians. During the very first invasion of Serbia the 21st Landwehr from Prague "suffered a defeat" (to use the words of a secret Austrian military report), and "remarkably many un-wounded prisoners were taken by the enemy"



PRINCE FRANZ THUN-HOHENSTEIN.
Governor of Bohemia, 1913-1915.

owing to the "by no means self-sacrificing or patriotic attitude of the men." During the Serbian campaign of December, 1914, several regiments—the 102nd from Benešov, for example—crossed over to the enemy side. Of the 70,000 Austrian prisoners taken by the Serbs in 1914 about half were Czechs who had voluntarily surrendered. Similar incidents occurred on the Russian front, where special arrangements had been made to safeguard the crossing of the lines for Czech mutineers. The 28th Regiment from Prague and the 35th from Pilsen went over in a body. These are a few examples of a movement which went far to disorganize and defeat the Austro-Hungarian Armies. The attempt to check it by adding at least 40 per cent. of Magyars or Germans to every Czech service battalion was not altogether successful.

It rendered wholesale desertions more difficult, but tended to lower the *moral* of the entire army.

The Supreme Army Command answered by demanding more and yet more repression. On November 26, 1914, Archduke Frederick, as Commander-in-Chief, addressed a memorandum to the Austrian Premier and a report to the Emperor dealing with Czech disloyalty. Stronger measures were proposed. The Archduke complained of "the slowness of the military courts which (at home) have to keep to the peace procedure" instead of adopting the practice of drum-head courts-martial. "The postal censorship . . . seems to be insufficiently severe. . . . The general order should be issued admitting only open letters to be handled by the post office. The activities



COUNT COUDENHOVE.
Governor of Bohemia, 1915-1918.

of associations, even if no political tendencies can be traced, should be suppressed, or at least very stringently circumscribed, unless they pursue undeniably patriotic aims [*i.e.*, loyal to Austria]. Public meetings should not be allowed at all unless in pursuit of such aims. . . . Jingo rags hostile to the State should be suppressed altogether. . . . It would in many cases be advisable to dissolve the town and county councils and to replace

them by government commissaries. . . " The memorandum ends with a demand that the entire political administration of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia should be put under the Supreme Army Command, -because thus alone "could I secure for myself the influence on all administrative measures which is needed for the safeguarding of military interests." Frederick returned to this subject on December 5 and again on March 28, 1915, urging his proposals with increasing emphasis. Still the civilian bureaucracy headed by the Premier, Count Stürgkh, hesitated, quite prepared to carry out the proposals of the military but unwilling to renounce all power in its favour. Prince Thun, the Governor of Bohemia, was dismissed from office, and, on April 1, 1915, was replaced by Count Coudenhove, a bitter enemy of the Czechs, who in spirit, though not in form, enforced the proposals of Archduke Frederick.

About 20,000 Czech civilians were interned as politically suspect, and 5,000 were hanged by the military tribunals. The number of political persecutions grew rapidly. To possess a copy of the Russian proclamation to the Czechs or even the mere fact of having read it was considered sufficient proof of high treason, and a number of people were executed or sentenced to hard labour on that ground. Most of the verdicts in political cases were simply grotesque—these were not judicial trials but incidents in a war waged against an entire nation. On September 28, 1915—*i.e.*, at the time of the most severe censorship—the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* reported the following case, which obviously did not strike the censor as extraordinary or unreasonable and therefore as one to be withheld from the public:—

"A Letter to America."—Francisca Sefcik, 23, daughter of a cottager, had to answer before the military tribunal of Prague for interference with public peace and order (paragraph 67, lit. a). In July, 1914, she had sent a letter to a friend, Rosa Kasanda, in Chicago; the letter was stopped by the censor and was handed over to the Military Court. The accused was condemned to eight months' hard labour.

A letter written to Chicago interfered with public peace and order in Bohemia! Or again, the tailor Šmejkal in Vienna was sentenced to six months' hard labour for saying "the Government does not want to give us Czech schools in Vienna," or the private Čipera from Moravia to three years' hard labour for saying "the German Kaiser is responsible for the war." And yet, again and again, military judges were reproved by their superiors for "insufficient energy," their bearing, if they let

themselves be restrained by lack of evidence, was described as unmanly and unsoldierlike (*unmilitärisch*), and they were even threatened with disciplinary measures should they prove incorrigible.

Of public political activity there could naturally be none. Three political parties, those of the National Socialists, the Radicals



THE ARCHDUKE FREDERICK.
Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian
Army.

and the Realists, were dissolved. About three-fourths of the Czech press and all the Slovak papers were suppressed, about 90 papers, to count but the more important ones. The surviving journals were compelled to publish articles supplied to them by the official Press Bureau as editorial without being allowed to indicate their origin in any way. Thus on March 25, 1916, the Czech press had to publish an article directed against the Czech leaders abroad under the heading "In Foreign Pay"; on April 18, 1916, the article, "The Czechs in America against Masaryk's Agents"; on January 16, 1917, "Our Answer to the Quadruple Entente," etc. At first all papers had to publish such articles on the same day and in the same wording; later on the Director of the Police, who obviously had to be taught the stupidity of that procedure by actual experience, ordered each article to be published in one paper and to be quoted by the rest. Even



PRAGUE, AND THE KARL II. BRIDGE.

after the so-called constitutional era had recommenced, in 1917, these practices were continued in spite of repeated protests from the Union of Czech Journalists.

The leading Czech Members of Parliament were imprisoned. M. Klofač, subsequently the first Minister of National Defence in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, was imprisoned on September 14, 1914, and not until May, 1917, was a charge formulated against him. Dr. Kramarz was at first merely put under strict supervision. He was a statesman of European fame and enjoyed great prestige in Russia. Whilst Russia was victorious the Austrian Government feared to touch him. But when the Russian front broke on the Dunajec (May 2, 1915) the Austro-Hungarian Army Command took courage, and on May 21 ordered Dr. Kramarz's arrest. Even the Berlin *Vorwärts* protested against the arrest as a compromising step because "the appearance itself that such a comparatively numerous nation as the Czechs is not doing its duty to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should be avoided." "Should he indeed be guilty of an offence or a crime the Austrian Government will do well to inform the public about the facts and thus prevent the rise of an unnecessary legend. . . . If, on the other hand, there is no good reason for suspicion we hope this conspicuous arrest will shortly be

cleared up in a satisfactory manner." It never was. "The military party," said Dr. Kramarz in an interview with *The Times* published on January 23, 1919, "were determined to hang me, but they knew that the Emperor Francis Joseph would never consent to sign the death warrant. Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Prime Minister, who had been for many years my Parliamentary colleague and personal friend, also worked to save me, as did Count Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister." But such was the power of the supreme Army Command that these attempts proved of little avail. After Count Stürgkh had been assassinated, and when the Emperor was dying, the military party decided to force the trial of Dr. Kramarz, hoping to have the warrant signed by the Emperor "when his faculties were failing." "The court-martial was composed of renegade Czechs with the object of making it appear that I had been condemned by my fellow-countrymen," continued Dr. Kramarz. "This manœuvre defeated itself. The national consciousness of one of these men was awakened by the persecution to which I was subjected, and he insisted upon giving a minority verdict in my favour against the majority verdict that condemned me to death. Under Austro-Hungarian military procedure this entails a further report upon the sentence

by a higher military authority. Before this report could be written the Emperor Francis Joseph died." The case did not come up for judgment again until the first days of 1917, when Dr. Kramarz was duly condemned to death. In support of the charge against him there was nothing more serious than that he had communicated before the war with men who during the war became leaders of the Slav cause, articles in his journal which gave prominence to news favourable to Austria's enemies, the possession of a copy of *La Nation Tchèque*, the fact of his having had a conversation with the Italian consul at Prague, Sabretta, in April, 1915, and a letter written at the New Year of 1915 to Prince Thun, the Governor of Bohemia, in which he admitted that, always faithful to his political principles, he refrained from anything which might appear as approval of the war. He was condemned not because of any particular act done during the war, but as leader of the Czech nation, which refused its support to the cause of the Central Powers. The Austrian authorities never dared to carry out the sentence.

A number of other Czech members of Parliament were arrested at the same time as Dr. Kramarz, among them Dr. Rašin, later on Bohemia's first Minister of Finance. A significant note appeared in the *Neue Freie Presse*, the leading Vienna daily, on January 22, 1916: "CZECH MEMBERS PERMANENTLY RESIDENT IN VIENNA.—Last week a few more Czech deputies, this time Choc, Burzival and Vojna, members of the National Socialist party, who have hitherto lived at Prague, moved to Vienna and, like other Czech deputies who have been in Vienna for some time, have for the present taken up their permanent domicile in Vienna. The rumour that one of these three members has broken his residence, which is expected to be permanent, lacks confirmation." One could hardly have wished for a finer and yet more explicit account of their internment. A similar fate befell the most important Czech financiers because the Czech banks and the Czech community had refused to take up Austrian war loans. It has been calculated that to the first loan the Czech majority in Bohemia contributed only about one-tenth of the sum subscribed by the German minority.

Die Schule ist ein Politikum (the school is a political institution) was a famous saying of the Empress Maria Theresa. The war reminded the Austrian Government of it. In the Czech

provinces the Czechs had gained a considerable influence over the Czech schools. These had bred Czech patriots, not Austrian subjects. A change was necessary. "The imperatively necessary strengthening of the State authority and of the military power is unthinkable without the movements hostile to the Hapsburg Monarchy being destroyed among the nationalities and without their being educated in an Austrian spirit," wrote Archduke Frederick in a memorandum dated September 25, 1915. Accordingly in Moravia alone 300 Czech teachers were interned and most of the school books used in the Czech provinces were suppressed, even printers, so that reading and writing had to be taught without them. The *Deutsche Schulbuchverlag* in Vienna was entrusted with the preparation of proper handbooks. "I am an Aus-



DR. KRAMARZ.

A Czech leader; subsequently the First Prime Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

trian" replaced such an objectionable sentence as "The Czechs are Slavs," and "Our Emperor is a Hapsburg" was substituted for a phrase in which the lion—which, incidentally, happens to be the national emblem of Bohemia—was described as "the king of the animal world" The handbooks of Czech national history were now provided with a frontispiece of the Imperial palace at Schönbrunn, and with the Austrian Imperial Hymn on the opposite page. Then followed in word and picture the entire gallery of feeble-minded princes and half-witted peasants who constitute Austria's special

claim to glory—not a word, of course, about John Huss or Zizka, the grim Czech fighter. Seventy years had passed since the fall of Metternich, but the spirit and methods of the Austrian bureaucracy had remained the same nor had it lost any of its unconscious humour.

The Little Russians inhabiting East Galicia, the north-eastern counties of Hungary and parts of the Bukovina, were divided into two political camps, one might almost say into two nations. Whilst one branch considered themselves part of the Russian nation, the other deemed itself a completely separate nationality, and in order to eliminate the compromising root of "Rus" from its name no longer called themselves Ruthenians, or Little Russians, but Ukrainians. It had always been an aim of Polish policy to break up the national unity of Russia—the establishment of the so-called Uniat Church in White Russia and the Ukraine in 1596 was, in so far as the Polish Government was concerned, a manœuvre calculated to separate those Russians who were then subject to Polish dominion from the main stock of the Russian nation. The fact that the Ukrainian national movement, having grown strong in East Galicia, turned against the Poles with even

greater bitterness than the free Russians ever had done—for now it was a movement of a subject race—cannot change anterior history. As the Central Powers, no less than the Poles, wished for Russia's disruption, they in turn began to favour and support the "Ukrainian" movement; and that it was possible to use it against the Poles as well, was only a further advantage from the German point of view. The Poles meantime, equally hostile to, and hated by, both these groups, the Russophile and the Ukrainian, were playing them off against each other, infusing a poison into East Galician politics which threatened Russia's national life.

On the outbreak of war the Ukrainian party organizations declared against Russia, demanding the separation of all Little Russian land from Great Russia, whilst the leaders of the Russian party, who were known to wish for a reunion with Russia, were promptly arrested by the Austro-Polish authorities. But on entering East Galicia the Russian Armies were received with joy even by the so-called Ukrainian peasantry. Historical sophistry could not kill in them the consciousness of Russian national unity, and they, moreover, recognized that they could not free themselves from



PRAGUE: ENTRANCE TO THE ROYAL PALACE OF HRADCANY.



THE IMPERIAL PALACE OF SCHÖNBRUNN.

Austrian and Polish dominion in any other way than by reunion with Russia. Exasperated by defeats, the Austrian military authorities wreaked their vengeance on the helpless Little Russian population wherever they were able to reach it. The following passages from an Order issued to Staff officers and Post Commanders well illustrates the methods adopted by the Austrian authorities:—

Lemberg, August 16, 1914.

The constables still always suffer from narrow-minded peace ideas (*engherzigen Friedensvorstellungen*) concerning making arrests and the use of arms. It still always happens that in cases of open propaganda or even of well-founded suspicion of treason, reports are made, questions are asked or information is given, mostly for fear of responsibility or because of the position held by the suspect.

Constables! Mark what I tell you, and I say it to you for the last time! Wake up from your narrow-mindedness. Free yourselves from the cramping, petty, limiting juridical considerations! There is now but one justice, the welfare of the State, and this you have to support with all your strength, whether or not this is in accordance with cranky, legal tomfoolery! . . . Mark it well, death to every traitor!

In some encounters Russophile peasants and also priests have betrayed the position and strength of troops under fire to the enemy. The constables were able to arrest a few, but some of those escaped during the retreat when careful guarding was impossible. In these cases the constables themselves ought to have immediately executed the traitors. In similar cases where treason is obvious short shrift should be given, and no considerations applying in peace time should be entertained.

(Signed) HAGAUEK,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Another Order signed by the same man followed on August 20. It recounted again acts of treason committed by the Little Russian population, and concluded as follows:—

No measure is too severe against traitors. Nowadays there is no time for handing over these wretches to military courts. There is to be a short examination of the accused and of witnesses, a short protocol is taken down, and the accused are shot as deterrent examples for the population. That is how it ought to be done if in one's

own country one finds oneself in a worse position than the enemy, and thus alone shall we be able to defend ourselves against traitors.

The third Order of the same date, shorter and still more trenchant, prescribes the immediate execution of "anyone suspect of treason in the face of the enemy" (*angesichts des Feindes ist jeder des Verrats Verdächtige kurz niederzumachen*).

Similarly, in an Order dated Stanislaw (East Galicia), August 14, 1914, the well-known Austro-Hungarian commander, General Kövess, insisted on the necessity of the troops, in dealing with the Russophile population, "divesting themselves as soon as possible of peace habits," because "inclination to leniency is here perfectly inadmissible and a downright crime against one's own army!"

These Orders did not remain a dead letter. They were applied during the retreat, and they were applied still more whenever the Austro-Hungarian troops reoccupied Little Russian country. The following case, reported in the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, in December, 1918, may serve as example: "As to a father I want to tell my woe to you in this letter," wrote in August, 1915, Bombardier V. Handiuk, of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, to the deputy representing his constituency in the Diet. His parents were good Ukrainians, and when the war broke out and he was called up they told him to be brave and do his duty. But then he heard that his father was hanged and his mother had during the past year been dragged from one prison to another. He was willing to fight, but he was sorry for his poor mother, who only once in every 24 hours got some soup and boiled maize. On inquiry it was found that his father, a village elder of Hliboka, had been executed

because he was alleged to have said on the entry of Russian troops into the village on September 12, 1914, "Thank God that we have lived to see the things for which we have waited long," and "Now everything will be Russian, we shall be able to live." But it was not by court-martial that Alexa Handiuk was condemned, not even by a drum-head court-martial. He was condemned to death by a corporal of the constabulary, Eugen Klappa, and the verdict

trian Parliament, and of five associates of theirs. On August 23, 1915, a military court condemned all seven to death for high treason, though most of them had been in prison since the outbreak of the war and could not therefore have committed acts coming under the jurisdiction of that court. But then the argument of the verdict passed in A.D. 1915 (a document extending over 49 folio pages) started with the words, "About the year 1000," and



RUE DE PRINCE MICHEL, BELGRADE.

was carried out by his orderly for a payment of five Austrian crowns (about 4s.). The corporal, moreover, admitted having acted in the same way in three other cases. On further inquiry it was found that his action was justified by orders received from his superiors. It was thus that "Central European culture" fought against Tsarist barbarism. When on the breakdown of the Russian revolutionary armies in July, 1917, the Austrians were once more advancing into East Galicia, the Vienna Socialist paper, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, published a leading article under the significant heading, *Nicht hängen!* (Do Not Hang!).

The judicial trials were not much better. It will suffice to mention the trial of Markov and Kurylovitch, Russophile members of the Aus-

trian Parliament, and of five associates of theirs. analysed the history of East Galicia since that date.

The defeats suffered in Galicia and Serbia in 1914 killed German Austria's original enthusiasm for war. It was succeeded not by despair or grim determination, but by a cold, lifeless indifference. The Viennese watched what seemed to portend the impending destruction of the realm in leisured nonchalance, vacant-eyed, unconcerned. There was no regret for the lost provinces, no sympathy for the homeless refugees from Galicia who by tens of thousands were crowding into Vienna, no faith in Austria's cause and no confidence whatsoever in her Government and army. The total absence of positive qualities in the Austrian ruling classes



“WAR PRAYER PROCESSION” IN VIENNA.

was brought out with an appalling clearness. But when the Germans broke the Russian front in Galicia, advanced into Poland and Lithuania and conquered Serbia, the story was told once more about Austria's greatness, vitality and future. Hermann Bahr, a leading Vienna *littérateur* (to give one example from among many), expatiated on *The Miracle of Austria*: “The greatest of all surprises of the war is that Austria, so frequently declared dead, is still alive, more so than ever. The most stupid of all the cant talked before the war was that concerning Austria's coming disruption. It was assumed for certain that Austria's nationalities wished to part and were kept together by external pressure alone. . . . And now? What a different picture! All Austria is at one, in will and in its readiness for sacrifice. Germans, Slavs, and Magyars are brothers; no more squabbles, harmony everywhere—Austria exists once more! It seems a miracle. Who would have believed it?” And the quasi-Socialist, Dr. Karl Renner, in the Socialist daily, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, echoed this same sentiment in quasi-scientific language: “Austria-Hungary has proved its vital strength and thereby its right to existence.”

If the German victories had made Austria's continued existence possible, internal victory and reconstruction were to make it German. “The northern, eastern and southern irredenta in Austria and international republicanism have been defeated,” wrote in December, 1915, Dr.

Franz Klein, one of the most prominent German Austrians, who was subsequently to become Minister of Justice. “An open and clear acknowledgment of true loyalty is to be demanded from all the citizens and a renunciation of all connexion with foreign countries. . . .” Archduke Frederick, in a secret memorandum dated September 25, 1915, explicitly demanded that “the organization of the Hapsburg Monarchy, of its States and provinces, be adapted to the results of the military campaign.” Administration, schools and army were all described as in need of drastic reform. But, however much Count Stürgkh's Government had tried to act in accordance with directions received from the Army Command, it had not succeeded in satisfying its expectations. It was frankly described as incapable of carrying out the required changes. “The Government which had not known how duly to appreciate the numerous signs that tendencies hostile to the State were germinating and growing rapidly in almost all provinces with a Slav or Italian population, and which has proved incapable even in the decisive hour of successfully fighting the destructive consequences of these movements, will hardly be equal to the incomparably higher demands of the future.”

Ever since September, 1914, the German Nationalist parties of Austria, gathered in the so-called German National Union (*Deutscher Nationalverband*), had been at work preparing

their own programme for reconstruction—i.e. for the Germanization of Austria. Recourse seems to have been frequently had to Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador at Vienna; occasional conferences were held with representative members of the German Reichstag, and, as the leader of the Austrian Pan-Germans, Herr H. K. Wolf, admitted in a speech at Teschen in March, 1917, he and some other German Austrian leaders went even so far as to submit their schemes for Austria's reconstruction to the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, and other prominent German politicians. According to this account, the scheme was approved by "authoritative circles" in Berlin, with the remark that the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, in order to be powerful, required in future strong and firm discipline within Austria (*es muss in Österreich eine stramme und strenge Zucht kommen*). By the spring of 1915 the German national parties had drafted their list of proposals and demands and communicated them to the leading German party of the Upper House, the so-called *Verfassungspartei*, to the Christian Socialists (the German Clericals) and to the Austrian Government itself. After the

proposals had been discussed between the different parties a common programme was agreed upon, and its final draft was signed on September 28, 1915, by Dr. Gross, a German member from Moravia, for the German Nationalists; Dr. Weisskirchner, the Mayor of Vienna, for the Clericals; and Dr. Fuchs for the Germans in the Upper House. A common memorandum was thereupon presented to the Austrian Premier, Count Stürgkh, and also to the Common Austro-Hungarian ministers. But not a word about these developments was allowed to be published. Parliament was not sitting, and an exceedingly severe censorship prevented even the German Austrian press from discussing delicate problems of internal policy. Like most of Austria's history during the first two years of the war, the negotiations which now followed between the Austrian Cabinet, the Supreme Army Command, and the German parties had to remain shrouded in darkness.

When on December 1, 1915, a change supervened in the ministries of the Interior, of Finance and of Commerce, it was not considered necessary in any way to explain them to the public. "At present we are unable to answer the question why sufficient courtesy has



A SITTING OF THE AUSTRIAN REICHSTAG.

Dr. Gross speaking. (The sitting of the Reichstag was suspended during the period covered in this chapter.)

not been shown to the public to explain to them the reasons of these changes, be it at least in a few words," wrote the leading Vienna daily, the *Neue Freie Presse*, "and why events of such importance are allowed to pass without comment." "New ministers, but no new Cabinet The policy of the Cabinet remains unchanged," had been the official announcement. Still this was not a mere change of persons. The old ministers had all three been of the purely bureaucrat type, men who had never considered it their duty, and who had never been expected, to develop a policy of their own, but had taken their orders from the Court, the Army Command or even the Hungarian Government. They had been in office since 1911, chiefs of the Civil Service rather than ministers of the West European type. The new men were decidedly more prominent personalities, especially the Minister of the Interior, Prince Konrad zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, a brother of Prince Gottfried, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin. In social questions rather radical, he was an extreme centralist in internal politics and every inch an exponent of the Austrian *Staatsidee*. From 1888 to 1903 he had served in the political administration of different Austrian provinces, among others of Bohemia. In 1903 he was appointed Governor of the Bukovina, and from 1904 to 1906 was Governor of Trieste, where he excelled in fighting the Italian irredenta. Appointed Prime Minister in April, 1906, he resigned at the end of two months, perhaps the only Austrian Premier during the last 25 years of her existence who was known to have resigned on a question of political principle. He then returned to the governorship of Trieste and embarked on an even sharper, almost provocative anti-Italian policy—it was about 1910 that General Conrad von Hötzendorff, as Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, was pressing for immediate war against Italy. When in February, 1915, frantic attempts were made by the Central Powers to keep Italy out of the war, Prince Hohenlohe had to vacate his post and, although a man of about 50, took a commission in the army. It seems more than probable that the Supreme Army Command and General Conrad von Hötzendorff, who was once more at the head of the General Staff, had chosen Hohenlohe for the work of recasting Austria's internal policy and administration. The meaning of his appointment was rendered still more obvious by the choice he made of an assistant.

On January 27, 1916, Baron von Handel, Governor of Upper Austria, was seconded to the Ministry of the Interior as Chief of the Legislative Department, "to help in preparing the different bills and reforms in the administration of the State rendered necessary by the events of the war." As the *Neue Freie Presse* pointed out, it was now for the first time officially stated that "the war and the conditions created by military events necessitated internal reconstruction." The ostentatious way in



HERR HEINRICH VON TSCHIRSCHKY.
German Ambassador in Vienna.

which the announcement was made was probably meant to prepare public opinion for far-reaching transformations. About the same time the first measure of so-called "reform" was enacted. In the last days of January, 1916, Count Coudenhove, the Governor of Bohemia, published an order excluding the Czech language from internal use in the Civil Service of the Czech provinces. One of the most contentious language problems in Austria was thus arbitrarily settled in the German sense.

The changes in the Ministries of Commerce and Finance were not connected with internal reform, but with the coming negotiations for a new commercial treaty with Hungary (the so-called *Ausgleich*, which, according to the Settlement of 1867, had to be renewed every 10 years) and for an economic *rapprochement* with

Germany. "The three new Ministers have one thing in common," wrote the *Neue Freie Presse* on December 1, 1915. "In the different phases of their careers all of them have formed numerous connections with Germany and her political and economic leaders." The new course to be steered was to be German.

In December, 1915, after the changes had been made in the Austrian Government, the joint programme of the German parties was passed for publication. It was part of the new movement for "Central European Union," of which Friedrich Naumann was the chief prophet. In the German programme of September, 1915, one of the first paragraphs ran as follows: "The alliance with the German Empire, which has proved of such great value



BARON VON HANDEL.

Chief of the Legislative Department, Austrian Ministry of the Interior, 1916.

in the present hard times, must be adhered to. We must accordingly aim at an intimate economic *rapprochement* between Austria-Hungary and Germany, a commercial and tariff union which is to be established gradually with due regard to economic development. Commercial treaties with other States are to be concluded in common with the German Empire." The demand of the German Nationalists for a constitutional union with the German Empire thus suddenly took on the guise—or rather disguise—of a question of economics. The

blessings of Free Trade, or at least of freer trade, became obvious to case-hardened Protectionists—but yet these blessings were discerned only in relation to Germany. About November, 1915, the *Neue Freie Presse*, notoriously in the service of Berlin, started a regular campaign in favour of a Central European Customs Union, part of the new German course signalled



PRINCE KONRAD ZU HOHENLOHE-SCHILLINGSFÜRST.

Austrian Minister of the Interior, 1915-1916.

by the changes in the Cabinet. Old diplomats, late Cabinet Ministers, university professors—all were mobilized to discourse on the question. By the end of the year *Mittel-Europa* acquired such prominence that the Christmas numbers of the leading Vienna papers published regular symposia on Central-European Union. However much economic questions were kept to the fore, only to the blind could the cloven hoof of political considerations remain hidden. In the *Neue Freie Presse* Dr. Marehet, a late Austrian Minister of Education, having repeated a certain amount of economic platitudes, openly blurted out that there was a connexion between the future relations of the Central Powers and the settlement of the nationality problem in Austria. . . . "Austria will have to be formed into a centralized State, in which something higher is put above the different component parts. This is the idea of the Austrian State which . . . has to be enforced with energy. The connexion with the development of our future relations to Germany is clear; the idea of German culture precludes one-sided oppression, but demands that particular interests be subordinated to the good and interest of the whole"—*i.e.*, the national

interests of the non-German nationalities to those of the German alliance. And again in the Christmas number of the *Vienna Zeit*, it was thus that Herr Ernst Bassermann, leader of the National Liberals in the German Reichstag, pleaded warmly in favour of economic union: "Special importance seems to attach to the general political meaning of the matter. The nations expect . . . as close a union as possible and have little understanding of formal difficulties. . . . There would be disappointment if after the war things were to remain what they were before. This is especially true of Austria-Hungary, where great things are expected from an economic union with the stronger German Empire."

How "great" these "expectations" were in the commercial circles of Austria is best shown in the same issue of the *Zeit* by an article from Herr Günther, director of the Austrian Mining Union.

When two great and equally strong parties join in an economic union, then this may be of profit to both sides. But the weak cannot bear such community with the strong without succumbing, unless he can gain by the community all the advantages which the strong one uses in fighting other people. . . . We cannot, however, expect help from without, not even from the best friend, because economic union in itself does not bring any help, at least not at first. It does not give us the advantage of low taxes, it does not reduce the freight on our railway lines, it does not bring us closer to the sea, and it does not do away with quarrels which national antagonisms and a petty spirit have so often caused in the past. We can expect help only from ourselves. . . .

The closer economic union with the German Empire can be bought finally only at the cost of complete or partial sacrifice of our own production. . . .

As Count Tisza put it in a speech delivered on January 4, 1916, in which he threw cold water on the wild political propaganda in favour of Central Europe, economic problems were discussed by three types of men—doctrinaires, politicians, and practical business men, who have to pay for the mistakes made by the other two types. In Austria the politicians were most prominent of all.

The union with Germany was to have served as an excuse for Germanizing Austria and as a safeguard for its remaining German once it had become so. It was argued that before Germany could commit herself to such a close alliance, Austria-Hungary had to be made fit to conclude it—*bündnissfähig*; its determination to adhere to the alliance was to be placed above all doubt, which could be done in no other way than by establishing an absolute German predominance within Austria. On the other hand, through such an alliance Germany would have acquired an interest in upholding the new distribution of power within Austria. In an interview given to the *Neue Freie Presse* in June, 1918, the German Vice-Chancellor, Herr von Payer, openly hinted at the salutary effects of such a "deepened" alliance: "Many a worry can be saved to Austria-Hungary, which is frequently torn by its internal national struggles, if it is known that a faithful ally stands by it, interested in its existence as a State and in its welfare."

"The changes which have been found



VIENNA: THE FRANZENSRING, WITH THE PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS ON THE LEFT.

necessary shall be made in the constitution, as also changes in the standing orders of Parliament" was another paragraph of the Austrian-German programme of September 1915. "For the Germans in Austria the position has to be secured which the interests of the State demand. . . . German is to be made the official language to an extent fully satisfying the needs of the State and of a properly organized administration. The central administration is to be reformed and the provincial autonomy is to be developed. The German character of the German provinces and districts (*Länder und Landesteile*), and especially of the Imperial capital Vienna, must be safeguarded." In the thirteenth month of the war not a word was said by the Parliamentary representatives of the German Nationalists and Clericals about the need of summoning Parliament, which had not met since March, 1914. In fact, they did not want it to meet. Had the Government wished to summon it they would have tried to prevent such a "premature" reassembling. Those unacquainted with the political jargon of German Austria would have hardly guessed

what an abundance of schemes lay hidden below the elaborately dark phraseology of the German-Austrian programme.

"Necessary changes" were to be made in the constitution. What were they? Galicia, and possibly also Dalmatia, outlying provinces which contained no German minorities and in which, therefore, the German nationalists had but a secondary interest, were to have been excluded from the Austrian Parliament, so that a decisive majority could have been secured in it for the Germans as against the Czechs, Jugoslavs and Italians. Then at last would the Germans have been able to introduce the same degree of discipline in Austria which the Magyars enforced against their subject nationalities in Hungary. The exclusion of Galicia could have been most easily carried out by joining it up to Russian Poland—*i.e.*, through the so-called Austrian solution of the Polish Question. For this reason the German national parties of Austria supported the scheme.

Whilst there was a possibility of the Germans finding themselves in a minority in the Austrian Parliament, *e.g.*, by the Poles crossing over to the Slav side, they were averse from changing



VIENNA: ENTRANCE TO THE HOFBURG (IMPERIAL PALACE).

the standing orders of the Austrian Parliament, which rendered effective obstruction possible. It was the German Nationalists who in 1897 had for the first time successfully defied the rule of the majority and killed Parliamentary life and government in Austria. But holding most of the posts at Court, in the high bureaucracy, and in the Army Command they preferred unparliamentary government to the possibility of a Parliamentary Slav government. Still had the Galician members been removed from the Vienna Parliament and a German majority been established in it, it would have been to their interest to curb the power of minorities and even to deprive them of legitimate rights. That is why a change in the standing orders of Parliament was to have followed on the "necessary changes" in the constitution.

The demand for making German the official language did not envisage exclusively æsthetic considerations of harmony and uniformity within the State, but was essentially to the interests of the job-hunting German Nationalist *intelligentsia*. Powerful in the central offices, they were unable to monopolize the smaller posts in the non-German provinces as long as the use of the vernacular was admitted, which the Germans were too proud or too lazy to learn.

Once Austria's central Parliament was Germanized, it would have been easiest to Germanize the country by a centralization of the Government and by limiting the powers of local non-German majorities. This, however, could not have been done because of a family feud in the German camp—the German Clericals who were dominant in the Diets of the backward Alpine provinces looked upon local autonomy as a bulwark against any possible anti-Clerical majority in the central Parliament. The German interests in the provinces had therefore to be covered by the peculiar sentence demanding that the German character of the "German provinces and districts" should be secured. Could anything have sounded more reasonable? But its meaning was this: that in provinces where the Germans formed a majority the complete dominion of the majority should be established; in provinces where the Germans formed a minority the German districts should be exempted from the rule of the non-German majority. When in 1918, after the final collapse of Russia, an Indian summer came for the Germans in Austria, this principle was put into practice; by an Imperial Order of May 19,



A MAGYAR PEASANT IN NATIONAL COSTUME.

1918, the districts of Bohemia inhabited by the German minority were separated from those inhabited by the Czech majority, but in Styria and Carinthia, where the Slovenes were in a minority against the Germans, a similar division was declared "inadmissible because of the conditions of settlement."

Of the reforms demanded by the German parties none could have been carried through Parliament. Galicia could not have been excluded because changes in the constitution required a two-thirds majority, which the

Germans together with the Poles did not possess, especially as the German Socialists could not have been relied upon. But with the constitution unchanged it would not have been safe to change the standing orders of Parliament. And under the old standing orders even those legislative proposals which required merely a simple majority could not have been carried. Moreover, the Poles, as long as they remained part of Austria, had an interest in preventing a crushing defeat and the final muzzling of the Czechs, otherwise they would have lost their value as an ally to the Austrian Germans, just as the German Austrians had to keep the



THE NAIL-DRIVING CULT IN AUSTRIA. The Archduchess Marie Valerie (daughter of the Emperor) hammering a nail into a wooden figure of a Crusader. Each nail represented a small subscription to the Austrian Red Cross Fund.

Galician Ukrainians alive in order to have a check on the Poles.

What the German Nationalists needed was a strong Austrian Government prepared to carry out the desired *coup d'état* in their favour in the manner they desired. But the Government, led by the Supreme Army Command, though no less keen to crush the rebellious subject nationalities, saw its ideal in a centralized Great-Austrian State, not in a small

Germanized Austria. In one direction its ambitions went farther than those of the Germans. In his memorandum of September 25, 1915, Archduke Frederick had demanded a change in the organization of the *Hapsburg Monarchy*, not of Austria alone, and had mentioned its *States*, not merely its pro-



ANOTHER WOODEN FIGURE FOR NAILING.

vinces. In other words, he did not step short of Hungary and the Settlement of 1867. Austria-Hungary was no longer to be *eine Monarchie auf Kündigung*—an Empire which could be terminated by giving notice—as embittered centralists described it because under the Settlement it was necessary to renew the agreement with Hungary every 10 years. And as far as the mere question of extending the *Ausgleich* (economic agreement with Hungary) over longer periods was concerned, the Great-Austrians had the support of the German Nationalists. Here again the scheme of *Mittel-Europa* supplied a convenient excuse for change—before a close commercial alliance could have been concluded with Germany the mutual relations of the two States of the Hapsburg Monarchy would have had to be placed on a mere permanent basis. As the German-Austrian historian, Herr Friedjung, put it in an article published in the *Vossische Zeitung* on March 6, 1916, there had been a difference of opinion with regard to Central-European union between the Austrian and the Hungarian Governments. “The Austrian Cabinet was immediately prepared to negotiate for a commercial treaty with Germany extending over a long period of years; among other considerations it was moved by the fact that thereby the commercial and political relations between Austria and Hungary would be placed on a permanent basis. This would be an advantage of very considerable import-

aneo for the Monarchy. A different view was taken by the Hungarian Cabinet. . . ."

The Magyars were a nation of nine millions, one of the smallest nationalities in Europe. Nevertheless their power in Central Europe was second to that of Germany alone. The Magyar State in which their dominion extended



COUNT STÜRGGH.

Premier of Austria, 1911-1916.

over a non-Magyar population more numerous than they themselves, the Austro-Hungarian Settlement of 1867 which made them a dominant factor in the Hapsburg Monarchy, and the German alliance of 1879 through which they became the partner of the strongest Empire on the European Continent, were wheels and levers in a most marvellous political machine which enhanced enormously the strength of the Magyar nation. The slightest dislocation could have destroyed its working power. Count Tisza, the Calvinist Ironside, knew it as no other Magyar of his day seems to have known—he watched developments with a deep understanding of the governing forces and of the unavoidable issues, and he watched men with a grin sense of humour.

Hungary had to be sovereign and independent, because thus alone could the Magyars maintain their full power over the subject races. A Hapsburg Empire, a *Gesamtmönarchie*, raised above the Hungarian State, would have enabled the Vienna Court to play out the subject races against the Magyars and in time to break the Magyar power. A connexion with Austria, if kept within the limits of a constitutional alliance as formed in 1867, was

necessary to the Magyars because, without Austria, Hungary would not have been a Great Power. Moreover, Hungary contained the torn-off limbs of several nations of which Austria held other parts. New life was not to arise in the Czech, Jugo-Slav or Ukrainian provinces of Austria or they might have become centres of action against Hungary. The Magyars therefore wished to see the Germans dominant in Austria, but only up to a certain point. The conflict between the Austrian Germans and their subject races was in turn useful to the Magyars because it weakened Austria and secured a predominant position within the union to the strongly centralist Magyar State. The German alliance was necessary to the Magyars, for Hungary, having been made a prison-house for other nationalities, was bound to remain a besieged fortress. But Austria was not to be merged into Germany or the Magyars would have got for neighbour a united empire of eighty millions instead of a mongrel State only slightly superior in numbers to Hungary. The war-aim of the Magyars was to defeat Russia, Serbia and Rumania, to gain strategic advantages against these States, but



DR. VON SPITZMULLER.

A leading member of the Cabinets of Count Stürgkh and Count Clam-Martinić.

not to annex any extensive new territories. This might have suited the Hapsburgs, but Hungary as a Magyar Imperialist State was saturated, if not over-saturated, with foreign elements. A defeat of the Central Powers was certain to mark the end of Hungarian Imperialism, but an excessive victory of Germany, and still more of the centralist Austrian Army Command, also threatened the Magyars with serious



AUSTRIAN MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY IN THE IBAR VALLEY, SERBIA.

dangers. What they wanted was a glorified *status quo ante bellum* safeguarded by the defeat of their enemies.

Throughout the war a silent struggle proceeded between Count Tisza on the one hand and Archduke Frederick, Conrad von Hötzen-dorff and the military Camarilla on the other. The position of a united Army Command for two separate sovereign States and collaborating with two independent Governments was anyhow anomalous. It was still more difficult to work, as memories of lost power and the desire for re-establishing it haunted the Austrian military commanders.

On January 1, 1915, Count Tisza spoke as follows alluding to the firmness and vigour which the Magyars had shown during the war: "Hitherto we used to answer those who tried to rob the Magyar nation of its position of equality as against Austria that before 1867 centralism had brought the Monarchy to the verge of ruin, from which the Magyar nation saved it. But now we have proved in a positive manner the value which this nation presents for the Monarchy once it has regained its independence."

He returned to the subject in his New Year address of 1916:—

As far as Austria is concerned, is it not to be hoped that this war has done away with everything which has invariably impeded harmonious cooperation for common aims? For three-and-a-half centuries the Monarchy tinkered with the difficult problem of how the full force of the Hungarian nation could be made serviceable to its own purposes as a Great Power. . . .

The attempt was made to subjugate this nation to a centralist Empire raised on the ruins of our national independence, but never as long as a Magyar lives shall we allow ourselves to be pressed into such a formation.

And then, turning to the Austrian Germans, he continued:—

. . . The national policy of Hungary is always willing to cooperate in the strengthening and the inner consolidation of the Austrian State, if for no other reason, because it is also our vital interest that the Austrian State be strong and capable of action. Also in our own interest we must strengthen the centripetal forces over there, as against the forces of disruption. . . . The Hungarian nation has tried in the past to fulfil this mission. And in the past complete success was lacking. The reason of that was that Austrian patriotism had not known as yet how to free itself from the old ideas and ambitions of a State including both Austria and Hungary (*Gesamtreichstendenzen und Gesamtreichsbestrebungen*).

On January 5, 1916, he delivered one more warning to the Austrian centralists that he was watching them: "Whoever does not want to play the game of the ostrich cannot but see that such currents have existed and still exist in Austria."

He never neglected an opportunity of defying and defeating the Austrian centralists. In January, 1915, he succeeded in replacing Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, by his own nominee, Baron Burian. With Germany he negotiated about military matters directly, above the heads of the Austrian commanders. In repeated conferences he taught the German-Austrian politicians the principles of Magyar statesmanship. These years of struggle and danger convinced Count Tisza of the need to withdraw the military

forces of Hungary from under the common command and to form them into an independent Hungarian Army—in 1918 the Vienna Court and Supreme Army Command conceded the demand in principle. Nor was Count Tisza prepared to surrender any part of Hungary's constitutional, military or economic independence to the Central European Union any more than to the Hapsburg Monarchy.

The negotiations for Central European union, difficult as they were, were still further complicated by being linked up with the Polish Question. The Hapsburgs might have given in to the German demand for Central European union at the price of Germany's admitting the union of Russian Poland with Galicia as a third kingdom under their sceptre. It has been alleged that in the summer of 1915 Austria-Hungary might have obtained Germany's consent to such a scheme, but that the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Burian, under Count Tisza's influence, deliberately neglected to do so. Whether or not this allegation was true, it is certain that Tisza,

alone among the Magyar statesmen, was at that time opposed to the scheme, and that it took him a long time to get reconciled to it—even then he never more than tolerated it. He never publicly explained his reasons. He may have considered the economic and military concessions to be made to Germany an excessive price. He may have feared that the inclusion of Poland in the Hapsburg Monarchy would have upset the basis of its foreign policy with



COUNT STEPHEN TISZA.
Hungarian Prime Minister, 1913-1917.



COUNT JULIUS ANDRÁSSY
(on left), Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1918.

regard to Germany and Russia—an apprehension shared by the leading statesmen of Germany; that the inclusion of a large agricultural country such as Poland might have injured the interests of the Magyar big landowners whom he represented: lastly, that in the tripartite combination Hungary might not have been able to preserve that predominance which it had established over Austria under the Dual System.

Germany's opposition to the Austrian scheme hardened as time went on. She would have liked best either to hand back Poland to Russia at the price of separate peace or, failing this, to partition it with Austria. In December, 1915, the division of the country into a German and an Austrian sphere of occupation, which up to then had been covered by the conception of the spheres of their respective Army Commands, was put on a more regular basis. Simultaneously, however, Germany officially abandoned the idea of partitioning Russian Poland. In an answer to a memorandum presented by Baron Burian, Herr von Bethmann

Hollweg wrote as follows: "Your Excellency has brought forward a number of arguments which demonstrate that to partition Russian Poland between our States would be against their interests even during the continuance of the war, and after the war would give rise to constant trouble, and would involve a serious danger to our eastern frontiers. I therefore waive that idea." Then, a few more attempts at getting Russia to conclude separate peace having failed, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, in his speech of April 5, 1916, publicly committed himself to the statement that Germany would never of her free will surrender Poland to Russia. This declaration, precluding the second of the two alternative schemes hitherto ascribed to Germany, greatly raised the hopes of the champions of the Austrian solution. On April 23 Count Julius Andrassy, the most prominent among them, who had repeatedly spoken and written in support of it, published two more articles on it, one in the *Neue Freie Presse*, the other in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. Burian, who by that time was working strongly

in favour of it, hurried to Berlin, convinced that he would now be able to clinch the matter. He failed completely. Germany could afford to go slow in settling the Polish question. It seems likely that the idea of setting up Russian Poland as a separate State under a joint Austro-German protectorate was already considered in Berlin.

Austria's fresh defeats in the summer of 1916 and the entry of Rumania into the war rendered her absolutely dependent on Germany. It has been alleged that, with a view to blackmail, Germany delayed sending troops into Transylvania, and did not do so until she had extorted the consent of the Hapsburgs to her own Polish scheme. At the end of October, 1916, certain Warsaw politicians were invited to Berlin and Vienna officially to present the wishes of the Poles to the Central Powers, and on November 5 a joint manifesto of the two Emperors was published promising that the Polish territories conquered from Russia would be formed into "an independent State with a hereditary monarch and a constitutional form of



A GROUP OF POLISH POLITICIANS.

Left to right, Gustav Simon (League of the Polish State), Professor Parczewski (Centre Party), Count Adam Ronikier (Centre), Marian Zbrowski (National). Count Ronikier was a member of the delegation which went to Vienna and Berlin in October, 1916.



AUSTRIAN WAR-LOAN POSTERS.

government.' Its frontiers were not defined as yet, but its future dependence was clearly marked. "In the union with the two allied Powers, the new Kingdom will find the guarantees which it needs for the free development of its forces."

By this settlement of the Polish question the Germans had intended finally to close the door on the Austrian solution and also to estrange the Poles from the Hapsburgs. For Galicia, if it remained an integral part of Austria after a kingdom of Poland had come into being, would have become for the Poles a *terra irredenta* like the Polish provinces of Prussia. The Hapsburgs would have been in the same boat with the Hohenzollerns. With a view to foiling the German scheme, the ruling circles in Vienna decided, simultaneously with the proclamation of the new Kingdom of Poland, to address an Imperial rescript to the Austrian Premier instructing him to prepare proposals for a wide enlargement of Galician autonomy. By decreeing a semi-independent Galicia, the Hapsburgs signified that even now they did not insist on the Galician Poles being subjects of a centralized foreign State. Moreover, a semi-independent Galicia side by side with the new semi-independent Polish State was bound to render the German settlement untenable. Austria counted on it, that the movement in favour of union,

which was bound to arise in these two parts of Poland, would revive the Austrian solution.

The autonomy of Galicia further promised to establish the desired German majority in the Austrian Parliament, and this, of course, was another reason for the rescript concerning enlarged autonomy for Galicia. But whilst these preparations were being made, the period of autocratic rule under which alone the transformation of Austria could have been effectively carried out, was fast approaching its end

In the autumn of 1916 a strong movement in favour of reassembling Parliament made itself felt in Austria. Some of the leading politicians counted on Parliament to provide a safety-valve for the growing dissatisfaction in the days of defeat. The manufacturers and business men wished it to meet, because they were afraid that the new economic settlement, the *Ausgleich*, which was at that time negotiated with Hungary, if enacted without reference to Parliament, would be even more disadvantageous to Austria than it usually was. According to the Settlement in 1867 Hungary had a right to demand that the *Ausgleich* should be enacted in a constitutional manner. If the Austrian Government proposed to do so without Parliament it would have had to pay for it to the Magyars in new concessions. The actual details of the

new agreement, of which the outlines were settled whilst Count Stürgkh's Government held office in Austria, were never published, but it was known that it was to have run for 20 instead of 10 years, so as to enable Austria-Hungary to negotiate an economic *rapprochement* with Germany; that the agrarian tariffs were to have been further raised—which would have meant further taxation of the Austrian industrial population for the advantage of the Hungarian landowners,—and that the financial arrangements concerning common expenses, which had always been unfair to Austria, were to have been changed

still more to her disadvantage. Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Premier, declared on one occasion that "considering the importance which attaches to continuing the *Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary, it does not matter whether the *Ausgleich*, as expressed in figures, results to one side or the other in a profit of a few millions a year. The war has proved the bigger imponderable value of the *Ausgleich*, and has through it established the international importance of the Monarchy for all future time." Still the Austrian business men, who were to have footed the bill, did not look upon new economic concessions with the same equanimity,



AUSTRIAN-POLISH REFUGEES IN GALICIA RETURNING HOME AFTER THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES.

and now for the first time were calling out of Parliament. Lastly, Count Tisza's opponents, who were powerless against him in the Hungarian Parliament, clamoured for a meeting of the so-called Delegations, the committees of the Austrian and the Hungarian Parliaments which had to deal with joint affairs; they wished to attack Tisza's nominee, Burian. The Hungarian Parliament had clearly a right to demand that the commissions in charge of foreign affairs should meet, but these could not have met without the Austrian Parliament being summoned. Failing their reassembling, the Hungarian Parliament demanded that the Joint Foreign Minister should appear before it, and Tisza was prepared to accede to that

different parties in a conference. But it was in a different way that the unparliamentary "*Eva Stürgkh*" was destined to come to an end.

On October 21 Count Stürgkh was shot by Dr. Friedrich Adler, the son of the distin-



DR. VICTOR ADLER,
Socialist Leader; afterwards First Foreign Minister
of the German-Austrian Republic.



COUNT APPONYI,
A leader of the Hungarian "Opposition."

demand. But this would have been yet a further encroachment by the Hungarian Parliament on joint affairs and yet a further step towards completing Hungary's independence. Another link would have snapped between the two parts of the Hapsburg Monarchy. It was this danger which made the greatest impression on the Austrian centralist circles, even on the autocratic Supreme Army Command. In October permission was given openly to discuss the question of reassembling the Austrian Parliament. On October 22 the President of the Lower House, a German Nationalist who had hitherto complacently watched its eclipse, was to have met the leaders of the

guished Socialist leader, and subsequently first Foreign Minister of the German-Austrian Republic, Dr. Victor Adler. The deed was a passionate protest against the cruelty and tyranny which the autocratic Austrian Government had exercised during the past two years of war and against the indifference and cowardice with which the people had tolerated it. The shot was against the system, rather than against Count Stürgkh's person. For this had been altogether insignificant. Not even the "Liberal" Austrian Press, however unctuous it was in its usual manner, found it possible to mourn Count Stürgkh as a statesman. "The life of individual men," wrote the *Neue Freie Presse*, "counts for less in these days of serious changes than in peace time. We must advance, and, now that historic tasks await us, must not look back after those whom fate scatters at the side of the road." Certainly a remarkable obituary notice for the man who had been Austria's Premier at the outbreak of the war and during the first 27 months of



THE DEAD EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.

its duration! "Since the outbreak of the war the activity of Count Stürgkh and his Cabinet," said another article in the same paper, "has come to be purely administrative. The great political events develop elsewhere." "Another Premier will come," was a further priceless remark of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

On November 21, exactly a month after Count Stürgkh's assassination, followed the

death of the Emperor Francis Joseph. During the last months of his life he had hardly played any considerable part in the government of his Monarchy; the removal of the old Emperor and the Prime Minister was important only in so far as it opened the way for the new men upon whom it would fall to deal with the problems which the new, the revolutionary, period of the war was going to unroll.



CHAPTER CCLXXXII.

THE AIR ARM: LAST WAR YEARS.

AIRSHIP RAIDS—A METEOROLOGICAL MISTAKE—ZEPPELIN LAIRS—AEROPLANE RAIDS BY DAY-LIGHT—FLYING IN FORMATION—MOONLIGHT RAIDS—GROUP ATTACKS—GIANT GOTHAS—NORTHERN LIGHTS RAID—PROTECTIVE MEASURES—THE QUESTION OF WARNINGS—TAKING COVER—PRECAUTIONS AGAINST FIRES—METROPOLITAN OBSERVATION SERVICE—INSURANCE—ACTIVE DEFENCE—ANTI-AIRCRAFT CORPS—THE GUN BARRAGE—BALLOON APRONS—GROWTH OF AEROPLANE DEFENCE—ARMAMENT OF AEROPLANES—INCENDIARY BULLETS—NIGHT FLYING IN FAST MACHINES—RAIDS ON GERMAN MILITARY OBJECTIVES—THE INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE—DISPERSTION OF EFFORT—BERLIN'S ESCAPE.

IN Chapter CLVII. the story of the German air raids on Great Britain was brought down to November 28, 1916, when for the first time a German aeroplane dropped bombs on London; and it was asked whether this incident, coupled with the fact that by that date an incendiary bullet had been invented which could be, and was, used with dire effect for the destruction of Zeppelins, presaged the abandonment of the lighter than air machine in favour of the aeroplane. The event proved that though aeroplanes were resorted to in ever-increasing numbers, the use of airships continued nearly to the time when air raids on England came to an end.

The first Zeppelin raid in 1917 was made on March 16-17, when some airships passed over Kent and Sussex; but in spite of the usual grandiloquence of the German official account, which stated that bombs had been successfully dropped on London, there was no case of personal death or injury and practically no damage was done. The next airship raid happened on May 23-24, and was of but little more consequence. Four or five airships wandered, apparently rather aimlessly, over a considerable area of Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex and dropped both explosive and incendiary bombs; but only one man was killed and the

damage was insignificant, though the German account spoke of successful attacks on the "fortified places of Southern England—London, Sheerness, Harwich and Norwich."

A month afterwards, on June 14, L43 was shot down in the North Sea off Vlieland, and in the early hours of June 17, another raid was carried out which was more serious than those just described, though only two airships actually crossed the coast. One of these made its appearance over Suffolk about 2.30 a.m., and for nearly three-quarters of an hour was subjected to heavy gun fire. Finally aeroplane attack brought it down in flames near Theberton. Two pilots, Capt. Saundby and Lieut. Watkins, claimed the honour of this feat. The account of the latter was as follows:—

I was told by Major Hargrave there was a Zeppelin in the vicinity of Harwich, and I was ordered to go up on B.E. 12, 6610. I climbed to 8,000 feet over the aerodrome, then struck off in the direction of Harwich, still climbing. When at 11,000 feet over Harwich I saw the A.A. guns firing and several searchlights pointing towards the same spot. A minute later I observed the Zeppelin about 2,000 feet above me. After climbing about 500 feet, I fired one drum into its tail, but it took no effect. I then climbed to 12,000 feet, and fired another drum into its tail without any effect. I then decided to wait until I was at close range before firing another drum. I then climbed steadily until I reached 13,200 feet, and was then about 500 feet under the Zeppelin. I fired three short bursts of about seven rounds and then the remainder of the drum; the Zep



THE WRECK OF ZEPPELIN L48, BROUGHT DOWN IN FLAMES IN SUFFOLK.

burst into flames at the tail, the fire running along both sides. The whole Zeppelin caught fire and fell burning.

Practically the only damage done in connexion with the visit of this airship, L48, was to itself and its crew. Three of the latter, however, escaped alive; of the remaining 14 five were killed by falling and nine by burning. But the case was different with the other airship which crossed the north-east coast of Kent about 2 a.m. The official *communiqué* credited it with dropping six bombs, and these were responsible for an enormous amount of broken glass as well as for the demolition of two rows of cottages. Two men and one woman were killed, and there were 16 cases of injury.

On the morning of August 21, when a Zeppelin was destroyed by British light naval forces operating off Jutland, a squadron of airships appeared off the Yorkshire coast and attacked the mouth of the Humber. Only one, or at most two, of them, however, ventured to come overland. At three small villages near the coast 12 high explosive and 13 incendiary bombs were dropped, a chapel was wrecked, some houses were damaged, and one man was injured. The German account, however, claimed that bombs were "lavishly dropped" on our outpost vessels (it was officially denied that any of these was damaged), that good incendiary and destructive effects were observed from large quantities of explosives dropped on Hull,

and that bombs were discharged on Lincoln and also on brightly illuminated factories and sheds on the south bank of the Humber near East Grimsby.

A raid on Yorkshire and Lincolnshire on September 24-25, in which, although a considerable number of bombs were dropped, only one woman was injured and the material damage was trifling, was followed by another on October 19-20, which was perhaps the most interesting of the whole series and the most disastrous—to the Germans. Under the command of Capt. Baron Preusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels, a squadron of 11 naval airships crossed the Norfolk and Lincolnshire coasts, with the intention of raiding the North Midlands, and, according to the German Admiralty Staff, attacked, "with special success," London, Manchester, Birmingham, Nottingham, Derby, Lowestoft, Hull, Grimsby and Mappleton. The precision of these details is delightful, for in the light of subsequent events it became obvious that most of the airships had completely lost themselves.

On this occasion the weather conditions were very unusual, and certainly baffled the prophetic skill of the German meteorologists. At levels up to 10,000 feet over England and the North-Sea there were only light breezes from the north-west, but above that height the wind suddenly increased to 35-45 miles an hour, and at 20,000 feet a gale was blowing

from the north and north-west. In addition there was a great deal of mist, and the acoustic conditions were very peculiar. Sounds did not carry far, and the consequent inaudibility of the engines gave rise to the erroneous idea that the airships were drifting with their engines cut off, in order to escape notice. In fact they could not have afforded to adopt such an expedient, because at the heights at which they were navigating the cold is so intense that their engines, if stopped, would have frozen up.

What happened was that as they reached our coasts they had to rise in order to avoid our defences; none of them was at less than 16,000 feet, and some, it is believed, attained 20,000 feet. The consequence was that they were caught by the strong winds at the higher elevations and blown to the south—in many cases, it would appear, without being aware of the fact. Owing to the mist they could not see the ground, their crews were troubled with height sickness, and their wireless went wrong, so that they could not profit by directions from their bases. Only one got anywhere near

the objective aimed at, and that was the L41, which managed to drop five bombs, three of which did not explode, on the Austin motor works, near Birmingham. Of the whole number, one reached home straight across the North Sea, three found their way along the Dutch coast or across Belgium, three crossed to France and entered their own country across the Allied lines between Ypres and Lunéville, and four failed to get back.


All the last four had an eventful Odyssey. Passing over Boston, Bedford, Hatfield, Gravesend and Maidstone, L44 left the English coast between Dover and Folkestone, crossed the Channel to Boulogne, and was carried on to Reims and Bar-le-Duc, to be shot down in flames about six o'clock next morning at Chenevières, in the commune of St. Clément.

Another machine, the L45, passed over London without knowing that it had done so. The mist shrouded the lights of the city, and incidentally hampered our airmen in going up, and those in charge of the defences, though well aware of the presence of the Zeppelin, purposely refrained from turning on the searchlights, in



SKELETON OF THE ZEPPELIN BROUGHT DOWN AT BILLERICAY.

Photographed from the air.



L49 FORCED TO DESCEND, AND CAPTURED INTACT, NEAR BOURBONNE-LES-BAINS, AFTER RAIDING THE EASTERN COUNTIES.

order not to give it any indication. In passing, it may be mentioned that seven Zeppelins came within view of the London area searchlights, which, if shown, would in all probability have attracted a shower of bombs. As it was, of the total deaths caused by the raid, the majority were due to three bombs dropped at random by L45 in London—at Swan & Edgar's in Piccadilly, at Camberwell, and at Hither Green. This airship came in at Withernsea, and after being worried by our aeroplanes passed over Grimsby, Louth, Leicester, Northampton, Watford, and Hendon, where it dropped bombs; then across London from north-west to south-east to Sidecup, and on to the mouth of the Medway, finally leaving England about midnight at Hastings, pursued by an aeroplane. It was seen at Amiens about 3.30 a.m., at Macon about 7.30, and at Sisteron about 10. Finally, as it came down at Lagagne, its port gondola was wrenched off. Thus lightened, it rose again, but was caught by the wind and dashed against the side of the valley, where it was set on fire by its crew.

Another airship, L49, wandered over Norfolk, and shortly before 10 set off from Thanet for Belgium or Holland. But the wind carried it over Folkestone, Hythe and Sandgate, the crew imagining they were crossing the Belgian coast. Cap Grisnez was reached about 11.40 and thence the vessel passed over Arras, St Quentin, Reims, Bar-le-Duc, and Epinal, French aircraft finally forcing it to land near Bourbonne-les-Bains at 8.45 a.m. The crew tried to set it on fire but failed, and it was captured intact.

The L50 also cruised over Norfolk, and after dropping bombs at Thetford, left the coast at Hollesley Bay. Its navigators thought they got well out to sea, as probably they did; but what they did not know was that they were being blown to the south. About 11 they saw a well lighted port, but did not recognize it as Dunkirk. Then passing over Dixmude and Ypres, they actually crossed into territory in German occupation, without guessing that they could have descended among friends—a mistake that had perhaps some excuse, since there is reason to suppose that they had been fired at by their own anti-aircraft guns. They next recrossed the French lines in Champagne, passed Châlons about 2 a.m., and wandered about, with a thick fog over the country, until the commander perceived L49 on the ground and thought he had better land too. When,

however, he was received with rifle shots and saw French aeroplanes, he realized he was over hostile territory and went up again. Then he changed his mind, and came down about mid-day at an extreme angle a few miles west of Bourbonne-les-Bains. In the descent the forward ear was torn off by trees, and altogether 16 men left the ship. In consequence it shot up, and was carried over Besançon (12.30), Dijon (12.55) and Lons-le-Saulnier (1.15). About 4 it drifted over Sisteron, where it provided German officer prisoners, for the second time in one day, with the spectacle of one of their airships at the mercy of its enemies. About 5.30 it was seen near Fréjus, drifting out to sea, and no doubt it foundered in the Mediterranean during the night.

In the following year (1918), three airships visited the Yorkshire coast on March 12-13. Two of them cruised for some hours over remote country districts, dropping bombs on sparsely inhabited areas, and only one ventured to attack a defended place, Hull, where four bombs were discharged and one woman died from shock. Next night a single raider did much more execution at Hartlepool, killing eight persons and demolishing six houses, besides damaging about 30 others. In another raid a month later (April 12-13) five large airships of a new type were employed. Some of them confined their attentions to Lincolnshire, but one got as far as Warwickshire and another crossed England to Lancashire, almost reaching the north-west coast. They travelled at a great height, calculated at 16,000 to 20,000 feet, and the weather conditions made visibility in general very bad, and hampered the action of our aeroplanes. In all 100 bombs—11 of 300 kg., 30 of 100 kg., and 59 of 50 kg.—were dropped, for the most part at random on open country. There was not much to show for such a lavish expenditure of ammunition; seven persons were killed and 20 injured, and the material damage was inconsiderable.

This was the last airship raid actually suffered by England. On August 5, however, an abortive attack was made on the Norfolk coast with five Zeppelins, but although it was under the leadership of Fregatten-Kapitän Strasser, whom the Germans described as their "best Zeppelin commander," the only result was that one airship was destroyed and another had a narrow escape. Strasser, who was in command of L70, one of the newest and most powerful types then produced, was attacked

near Yarmouth at a height of 16,600 feet by Major Cadbury, who delivered his assault head on, slightly to port. Concentrating his fire on the bow, he blew a great hole in the fabric; flames quickly ran the whole length of the ship, which plunged blazing into the sea eight miles north of Wells. He next attacked another of the raiders, L65, his observer, Captain Leekie, opening fire within 500 feet, and causing a fire to break out in the midships gondola. Unfortunately Leekie's gun jammed, and the crew were able to extinguish the fire, else L65 would probably have shared the fate of L70.

The discontinuance of airship raids was probably attributable to the fact that the Germans had been brought to realize that, in face of the means of defence we had developed, the game had become too risky and not worth the candle. After June 19 there was a disposition in some quarters to explain our immunity as due to a raid carried out on that date by Royal Air Force machines dispatched from vessels of the Grand Fleet, which resulted in the practical destruction of the airship station at Tondern in Schleswig. Tondern was generally believed to be at least one of the chief lairs from which the Zeppelins sallied forth to the attack of this country, and doubtless it was occasionally used for the purpose; L45, for example, which bombed London on October 19, came from it. But when the Allied Naval Commission visited Germany after the armistice it learned that the Zeppelin raids were mainly launched from a huge airship station at Nordholz, near Cuxhaven, Tondern being rather a centre for scouting operations over the North Sea. At Nordholz the sheds were ranged in pairs round a circle $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles in diameter, and as each shed held two airships and four pairs had been constructed, the capacity was 16. In addition there was at the centre of the circle another shed which held two and which could be revolved by electrical apparatus, so that the machines in it could be launched directly into the wind and thus could be used in weather that would prevent them from leaving or entering an ordinary shed of the fixed type.

As already recorded, the first aeroplane raid on London was made about noon on November 28, 1916. Thereafter the metropolis was free from visitations of the sort for over five months. In the interval, however, several attempts of a tip-and-run character were made on the

north-east corner of Kent, on March 1, 16 and 17 and April 5; the damage was unimportant, though the German public was cheered by imaginative tales about bombs being dropped with good effect on railways and fortresses and on ships lying in the Downs.

About midnight on May 6-7 a single raider reached North-East London without being seen, and dropped five bombs between Hackney and Holloway, killing one man and injuring one



FREGATTEN-KAPITÄN STRASSER.
Killed in Zeppelin L70.

man and one woman. Later in the same month, on the 25th, a much more serious attack was made on Kent, and particularly Folkestone. Like the five raids that followed it it was the work of the 3rd Battle-Plane Squadron, probably 18 strong, which was attached to the IV. German Army and was commanded by Capt. Brandenburg. About six o'clock on a beautiful sunny evening a squadron of aeroplanes suddenly appeared in a cloudless sky. They were described as advancing in regular formation, in three flights of five, with an additional machine acting as scout or leader and another flying by itself in the rear. They kept at a great height, and their plan was apparently to drop bombs promiscuously without any very definite aim along a broad line. Some of the bombs fell in the middle of the town, and in one street, which was thronged with people

AIRSHIP RAID CASUALTIES.

Date.	Locality.	Civilians.								Sailors and Soldiers.	
		Killed.				Injured.				Killed.	Injured.
		Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.		
Jan. 19-20, 1915	Norfolk	2	2	—	4	9	4	2	15	—	1
April 14-15 ..	Northumberland ..	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	2	—	—
April 15-16 ..	Essex and Suffolk ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April 29-30 ..	Suffolk	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
May 9-10 ..	Southend	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	1
May 16-17 ..	Ramsgate	1	1	—	2	—	1	—	1	—	—
May 26-27 ..	Southend	—	2	1	3	3	—	—	3	—	—
May 31-June 1 ..	E. London	1	2	4	7	13	13	7	33	—	2
June 4-5 ..	Kent, Essex, E. Riding ..	—	—	—	—	3	4	1	8	—	—
June 6-7 ..	Hull, Grimsby, E. Riding ..	5	13	6	24	18	15	7	38	—	2
June 15-16 ..	Northumberland and Durham	18	—	—	18	72	—	—	72	—	—
Aug. 9-10 ..	Goole, E. Riding, Suffolk, and Dover	1	10	6	17	5	6	7	18	—	3
Aug. 12-13 ..	E. Suffolk and Essex ..	4	2	—	6	5	10	9	24	—	—
Aug. 17-18 ..	Kent, Essex, London ..	7	2	1	10	16	20	12	48	—	—
Sept. 7-8 ..	E. Suffolk and London ..	6	6	6	18	9	15	13	37	—	1
Sept. 8-9 ..	N. Riding, Norfolk, London	15	3	6	24	50	32	10	92	2	2
Sept. 11-12 ..	Essex	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sept. 12-13 ..	Essex and E. Suffolk ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oct. 13-14 ..	Norfolk, Suffolk, Home Counties and London ..	31	17	6	54	71	27	9	107	17	21
Jan. 31, 1916 ..	W. Suffolk and Midland Counties	29	26	15	70	43	50	19	112	—	1
March 5-6 ..	Hull and E. Riding, Lines, Leicester County, Rutland, and Kent ..	9	4	5	18	22	22	8	52	—	—
March 31-April 1 ..	Lines, Essex, Suffolk ..	6	7	4	17	2	3	4	9	31	55
April 1-2* ..	Durham County and N. Riding	13	7	2	22	67	43	18	128	—	2
April 2-3 ..	E. Suffolk, Northumberland, London, and Scotland	10	—	3	13	6	13	5	24	—	—
April 3-4 ..	Norfolk	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April 5-6 ..	Yorks and Co. Durham ..	—	—	1	1	3	1	5	9	—	—
April 24-25 ..	Norfolk, Lines, Cambs, and Suffolk	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—
April 25-26 ..	E. Suffolk, Essex, Kent, and London	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—
April 26-27 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
May 2-3 ..	Yorks, Northumberland, Scotland	4	3	—	7	16	8	1	25	2	5
July 28-29 ..	Lines, and Norfolk ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July 31-Aug. 1 ..	Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambs., Lines, Notts, and Kent ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Aug. 2-3 ..	Norfolk, E. Suffolk, Kent ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Aug. 8-9 ..	Northumberland, Durham, E. Riding, N. Riding, Hull, and Norfolk	2	4	4	10	5	5	5	15	—	1
Aug. 23-24 ..	E. Suffolk	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Aug. 24-25 ..	E. Suffolk, Essex, Kent, and London	3	4	2	9	9	11	5	25	—	15
Sept. 2-3 ..	E. Riding, Lines, Notts., Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambs., Hunts., Essex, Herts., Beds., Kent, & London ..	1	2	1	4	6	5	1	12	—	—
Sept. 23-24 ..	Lines., Notts, Norfolk, Kent, and London ..	24	12	4	40	57	44	25	126	—	4
Sept. 25-26 ..	Lanes., Yorks., Lines. ..	14	17	12	43	7	13	11	31	—	—
Oct. 1-2 ..	Lines., Norfolk, Cambs., Northants, Herts, and London	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	—
Nov. 27-28 ..	Durham, Yorks., Staffs., and Cheshire	1	3	—	4	16	14	7	37	—	—
Mar. 16-17, 1917 ..	Kent and Sussex	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
May 23-24 ..	Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk ..	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
June 16-17 ..	Kent and Suffolk	2	1	—	3	5	7	2	14	—	2
Aug. 21-22 ..	E. Riding	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—
Sept. 24-25 ..	Lines, and Yorks.	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	3	—	—
Oct. 19-20 ..	Midlands, Eastern Counties and London	3	12	16	31	24	17	11	52	5	3
March 12-13, 1918 ..	E. Riding	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
March 13-14 ..	Durham	2	2	4	8	11	19	9	39	—	—
April 12-13 ..	Lines., Lanes., Warwickshire	2	4	1	7	10	0	4	20	—	—
Totals, airship raids ..		217	171	110	498	587	431	218	1,236	58	121

* The relative proportions of men, women, and children injured in this raid are not known exactly. The best available estimate has been given.

shopping, the slaughter was very great. In all 77 civilians were killed and 94 injured, and in addition 18 soldiers and sailors were killed, and 98 injured. A feature of this raid that caused a great deal of indignation locally was the apparent absence of adequate counter measures. Except for the anti-aircraft guns at Dover the raiders worked their will with little or no molestation until on their return flight they were attacked by fighting squadrons of the R.N.A.S. from Dunkirk. One of them was destroyed in mid-Channel and two others



CAPTAIN BRANDENBURG.

Commanded the German Third Battle-Plane Squadron in raids on England.

—large twin-engined machines—were brought down off the Belgian coast.

The next raid, on June 5, was again carried out in daylight, at about 6.30 p.m., and again the number of machines engaged was large, officially estimated at 16 or 18. On this occasion the raiders came in over the Essex coast, and after dropping bombs on the open country and on several small towns in Essex, attacked the naval establishments on the Medway. There a considerable number of bombs were dropped, and some damage was done to house property, though little of military importance. The casualties also were not very large—13 killed and 34 injured. The enemy, attacked by gun-fire and pursued by aircraft, lost two machines before they started on their journey homewards. That, however, was not the end of their misfortunes. At 5.30 four Royal Naval Air Service pilots patrolling off Dunkirk had perceived them well out to sea off Ostend,

steering to the north-west, on their way to England, and had given chase, though without decisive results. On their return journey from this country the German raiders were attacked by a naval pilot from a station on the Kentish coast, and two of them were driven down, the pilot afterwards landing at Dunkirk. They were also harried by other Royal Naval Air Service machines from home stations over the Thames estuary. Later 10 naval pilots from Dunkirk engaged them, destroying two, probably destroying two others, and driving down a third pair out of control. Thus this expedition cost the Germans 10 machines, yet they pretended such satisfaction with their exploit that a few days later one of the Berlin papers announced in heavy type that the British Government was seriously thinking of moving to some safer place than London.

Wednesday morning (June 13) in the following week saw the first aeroplane raid in force on London. In all 18 machines crossed the Essex coast, but one was detached to bomb Margate and three others left the main body a little later. The remaining 14 proceeded up the Thames in a diamond formation to London, and in the space of about 15 minutes unloaded over 100 bombs, nearly three-quarters of which fell within a radius of a mile from Liverpool Street Station. One bomb went through the roof of a large County Council school at Poplar, killed a girl on the top floor and a boy on one of the lower floors, and finally exploded on the ground floor in a room where a number of infants, none over six years of age, were receiving instruction. About 18 children were killed in this school, some of them being blown into unrecognizable fragments, and many more were injured. At Liverpool Street Station a train standing at a platform and another outside the station were badly damaged, and the fact that some of the wreckage took fire added to the casualties, which were estimated at about 24. Altogether 162 persons were killed and 432 injured in this raid, all but four of the deaths and seven of the injuries being to civilians. Even in Germany there was at least one paper (the *Volkswacht* of Breslau) that openly deplored this massacre, but it was rewarded for its unorthodox opinions by being suppressed. A semi-official telegram from Berlin to Amsterdam professed that the grief was not less in Germany than in Great Britain that so many civilians, particularly children, should have fallen victims to "this attack for

military objects"; but in a telegram of equal authority a couple of days later, England was told that if she wanted to spare civilians she could remove them from places like Sheerness, Dover and London, which were storhouses for military requirements. The leader of the raid, Captain Brandenburg, received the distinction of the *Ordre Pour Le Mérite*.

The next raid, which seemed to have a really definite military objective, was made on Harwich at about 7 o'clock on the morning of July 4. A squadron of 12 or 14 aeroplanes came in from the north-east, and discharged their bombs on the town without making any attempt to penetrate inland. They were attacked by anti-aircraft guns and also by aeroplanes, and in spite of low-lying clouds which interfered with visibility were apparently forced to break up their formation, though none was actually brought down over the land. On their return journey, however, they were intercepted by naval aircraft from Dunkirk, and in an engagement that took place a considerable distance from the Belgian coast two of them were shot down, while a third was damaged. The casualties in this raid were mainly military; of the 17 persons killed only

three were civilians, while all of the 30 persons injured were soldiers or sailors except one.

What was, perhaps, the most daring daylight raid on London followed three days later, on July 7. A squadron of about 22 aeroplanes, probably in two parties, appeared over the coast of Essex and the Isle of Thanet about 9.30 in the morning, and after dropping some bombs in the neighbourhood of Margate and pursuing a train on the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway made for London along a course roughly parallel with the north bank of the Thames. They approached the metropolis from the north-east; then, changing their direction, they proceeded north and west and crossed the city from north-west to south-east, dropping bombs as they went. The morning was bright and sunny, but in the east a light haze gave the sky a leaden tinge. It was out of this haze that observers saw them emerge about 10.30. From a distance they were described as looking like a score of swallows. Each machine kept its station accurately as it advanced, and the formation was so regular and the altitude of flight seemed so low that people who had received no warning thought a number of British machines were carrying out a manœuvre, until the noise of guns and



THE FOLKESTONE RAID: CHILDREN WITH FLOWERS FOR THE GRAVES OF THEIR DEAD PLAYMATES.

exploding bombs convinced them of their mistake. It was afterwards explained, however, on "high authority" in an official *communiqué* that the idea that the machines were flying low was a delusion, due to the fact that the Gothas which were employed were three times larger than the single-seater machines with which the public were familiar, and therefore looked as large as the latter though they were at a much greater distance. It was stated that in fact their altitude was never less than 12,500 ft., as was shown by instruments on the ground and corroborated by the instruments carried on our own machines.

The invaders were vigorously attacked by artillery and some of them were engaged by our own airmen over London. The result was that their formation was broken up and for a time they seemed to be scattered in confusion. They, however, managed to rejoin each other, and started off towards the coast in a fairly compact if irregular bunch. None was brought down in the metropolitan area, but one, attacked by the Royal Flying Corps, fell into the sea off the mouth of the Thames. Royal Naval Air Service machines continued the chase from

this country, and engaged the retreating raiders 40 miles out to sea from the East Coast: two were seen to crash into the sea, and a third fell in flames off the mouth of the Scheldt. Dunkirk too was on the alert, and five squadrons went up thence in the hope of intercepting them. In this hope they were disappointed, but they encountered and destroyed three hostile seaplanes and drove down two others. They then returned to their base in order to replenish their petrol, and meeting another patrol brought down one enemy aeroplane in flames and forced another to descend in a damaged condition on the seashore near Ostend.

The casualties were much lighter than in the preceding raid on London, but were still sufficiently serious, 57 persons being killed and 193 injured. Two of our machines were lost on this occasion. In one case the pilot, Second-Lieutenant W. G. Salmon, apparently lost consciousness owing to being wounded, and his machine came down, spinning sideways, out of control. In the other Second-Lieutenant J. E. R. Young flew into the middle of the 22 enemy aeroplanes and received the concentrated fire of their machine-guns; his



SCENE IN A SPECIALLY PROTECTED ROOM AT THE ROYAL WATERLOO CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL DURING AN AIR RAID.

The Matron handing out chocolates supplied by Queen Alexandra.

machine then put its nose right up in the air, fell over, and went spinning down into the sea from a height of 14,000 ft. A naval vessel rushed to the spot as quickly as possible, but the pilot's body was so badly entangled in the wires that it could not be extricated before the machine sank. The observer's body, however, was recovered. The Germans claimed in their

were made on the coast. The first of these was on Sunday morning, July 22. About 8 o'clock, 16 aeroplanes approached Felixstowe and Harwich from the north-east, flying, according to one account, in two flights, one slightly behind the other. Some bombs were dropped, but the heavy fire from the anti-aircraft defences disarranged the form-



THE DAYLIGHT RAID ON LONDON, JULY 7, 1917.

The raiders, owing to their great height, had the appearance of a flock of birds.

official report that bombs were "freely dropped on the docks, harbour works and warehouses on the Thames," fires and explosions being observed, and semi-officially that Charing Cross Station was hit several times and that London Bridge was struck by a bomb. They admitted the loss of only one of their machines, "which was compelled to make a descent into the sea and could not be saved by our naval forces."

For two months after this raid no aerial raider reached London, but several attacks

ation, and some of the machines incontinently turned tail and made for home. The remainder proceeded south down the Essex coast, harassed by gun-fire as they went, and finally also departed out to sea. They were pursued by British aeroplanes, but without success, visibility being low in the morning haze and observation very difficult. Later, however, some of them were encountered on their way to Belgium by a Royal Flying Corps patrol, and one of them was

brought down into the sea. The damage to property was insignificant, but 13 persons were killed (only one a civilian) and 26 injured, three of them civilians.

The objective of the next raid, on August 12, was clearly London, but the intention of the raiders was foiled by our defences, and Southend was the chief sufferer. About 5.15 in the afternoon about 20 enemy machines were reported off Felixstowe. They skirted the



SECOND LIEUT. J. E. R. YOUNG.

Killed while attacking, single-handed, twenty-two enemy aeroplanes.

coast to Clacton, and then divided into two parties. Of these one continued south to Margate, where four bombs were dropped on the eastern end of the town, without causing personal injuries or more than trivial damage to property. The other party crossed the coast and went south-west towards Wiekford, a village eight miles from Chelmsford. Here they evidently concluded that the large numbers of aeroplanes sent up against them presented too heavy odds; they, therefore, turned to the south-east and made for home, dropping some of their bombs on Rochford, Leigh, Westeliff, and Southend, and unloading the remainder at sea. At Southend one bomb, which fell in Victoria Avenue, then crowded with holiday makers and churchgoers, killed or injured a score or two of people, and at Leigh 17 houses were destroyed. The total casualties were 32 killed and 46 injured. The German official report boasted of military works being bombed with visibly good results;

the military character of the damage done may be judged from the fact that all those killed, and all but two of those injured, were civilians.

Though our aeroplanes undoubtedly prevented the raiders from reaching London, they did not succeed in bringing any of them down over land. Over sea, however, the case was different, and in particular one pilot, flying a land machine, had a remarkably strenuous time. He first pursued an enemy machine, flying at 12,000 ft., from the North Foreland to a point about 15 miles off Zeebrugge, where he lost it. Returning to the mouth of the Thames he noticed anti-aircraft gun fire in the neighbourhood of Southend, and accordingly flew in that direction, climbing as he went. He then saw eight aeroplanes of the Gotha type, followed by four British machines, steering north-east. When he reached the enemy machines they were about 2,000 ft. above him, but climbing to 18,000 ft. he started off in pursuit, and attacked them about 30 miles out to sea, though unfortunately without result. Then he perceived a single enemy machine 4,000 ft. below the others but flying with them; and attacking it from the front drove it down into the water, where it turned over. As one of the occupants was hanging to the tail, he threw him a lifebelt, and also endeavoured to communicate the position of the wrecked machine to the British destroyers. A hostile seaplane was also destroyed off the coast of Flanders at about the same time.

Ten days later, about 10.15 on the morning of August 22, 10 Gotha machines approached the coast of Kent near Ramsgate, but, being met by anti-aircraft gun-fire as well as by aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, they were unable to penetrate far inland. A few of them travelled west as far as Margate and then turned homeward; the remainder skirted the coast to the south as far as Dover, and then departed. At Margate there were no casualties, but Ramsgate and Dover were less fortunate, and in all 12 persons were killed and 25 injured. Three of the Gothas were brought down by gun fire and aeroplane attack. One fell in flames behind Margate, and another plunged headlong into the sea; one of the crew of the latter, who was said to have descended in a parachute, was rescued by a patrol boat, but the other two were drowned. A third Gotha was shot down from a height of between 11,000 and 12,000 ft. by

Royal Naval Air Service machines near the coast at Ramsgate. On the other side of the channel a patrol of 10 machines from Dunkirk engaged a flight of about 25 enemy escorting scouts, who were off the coast awaiting the return of the raiding squadron, and drove down at least five of them completely out of control.

The aeroplane raids so far described were carried out by daylight, but it would seem that owing to the excellence of our defences the Germans were now finding this method too costly, and therefore determined to see whether bright moonlight nights would not serve their purpose better. A trial trip was accordingly made about 11.15 on the evening of September 2, when the moon was full, and a couple of aeroplanes dropped seven heavy bombs on Dover, killing one officer. Encouraged by this experiment, the enemy on the following evening sent half-a-dozen machines up the Thames estuary. They dropped a few bombs near Margate with practically no effect, but in the Chatham district they were more successful, owing to the fact that they hit the Drill Hall at the Royal Naval barracks, in which a number of men were sleeping in hammocks. Here the death-roll was very high, 131 sailors being

killed, while 90 were injured, but, although the raiders stayed for nearly an hour over the district and unloaded about a dozen and a-half bombs, the civilian casualties were only one woman killed and six persons injured.

Next evening, September 4, another raid was made, and this time London was reached. Enemy aeroplanes crossed the South-East Coast over a wide area between 10.30 p.m. and 2 a.m. They apparently travelled singly or in groups of two or three, and it was therefore difficult to count them, but probably they numbered about 26. The first bombs were dropped in the London district at 11.45, and from that time until 1 a.m. about 40 were dropped, together with some at several places on the coast. The damage was surprisingly small, considering the severity of the raid, but 19 persons were killed and 71 injured. On this occasion a tramcar was wrecked on the Thames Embankment and Cleopatra's Needle scarred. One enemy machine was brought down in the sea near Sheerness.

For the next three weeks, until the moon again served, the country enjoyed freedom from air attacks, and then for a week of beautiful still autumn weather, with a harvest moon,



UNDERGROUND SHELTER IN THE CHALK AT RAMSGATE.

Accommodating some 400 persons.



WRECKAGE OF A GOTHA BROUGHT DOWN IN FLAMES IN THE ISLE OF THANET, AUGUST 22, 1917.

there were raids on every night but two. On September 24 hostile aeroplanes to the number of 21 came in at different points in Kent and Essex soon after 7 o'clock, and a few of them, following the Thames, attacked London about 8. They stayed for about an hour trying to penetrate the defences, but only one or at most two succeeded in doing so. Nevertheless they killed 21 persons and injured 70. Bombs were dropped, among other places, on the Royal Academy of Arts and near the Ritz Hotel in Piccadilly. Next evening the visit was repeated, with about half as many machines. In fact there was a double raid. The first group that approached London were turned back by gun fire, and not more than two actually penetrated the defences. These machines dropped a number of bombs in the south-eastern outskirts about 7.45. A second group which came up half an hour later were driven off. Nine people were killed and 23 injured, most of them by a single bomb.

No attempt was made on September 26 and 27, but on the 28th 20 raiders crossed the coast at various points in Suffolk, Essex, and Kent in a succession of relays. Many of them were turned back by the coastal batteries, and the few that persevered in their attempt to reach London failed to penetrate the outer defences. Two were shot down, one in the Thames estuary and the other off the coast. No casualties were reported. On the 29th a determined and simultaneous attack was made

on London by 19 raiders, approaching in three groups from different directions. All, however, were broken up by gun fire, but four machines managed to get through and drop bombs in the north-eastern and south-eastern districts. A fourth group which attempted to approach London later were driven off. The casualties, 14 killed and 87 injured, were remarkably light, considering that the bombs fell in thickly populated areas. One machine was brought down by the Dover guns. On Sunday evening, September 30, two groups of enemy machines, followed by others flying singly, 25 in all, crossed the Kent and Essex coast between 6.40 and 8, and made for London. About 10 penetrated the outer defences, and four or five got through to London itself. Yet the material damage was not great, and of the 14 deaths only two were in London. The number of injured was 38.

The last of this series of raids, that on October 1, was in some ways the most determined of all, lasting for about three hours. Four distinct groups of machines, perhaps 18 in number, took part in the attack. The first group, crossing the Essex coast about 7 o'clock and proceeding across Essex towards London, delivered the first attack on the Metropolis from the north-east about 7.45. Most of the raiders were driven back, but one or two succeeded in piercing the defences and dropped bombs in the south-western area about 8.15. The second group, at an interval of about a quarter of an

hour, followed the same course and attempted to enter at various points in the north and north-west. They, however, had no success until shortly after 9 p.m., when a few of them crossed over London and dropped bombs, again in the south-western district. Meanwhile the third group came in over Kent and dropped bombs at various places, but did not get far westwards. The fourth group crossed the Essex coast about 8.50, and arrived near London about an hour later, but failed to penetrate beyond the north-eastern outskirts. Again the casualties were light—11 killed and 41 injured.

The next full moon saw three raids. Two of them—one in the evening of October 29 with about 10 machines, and the other at 4.30

in the morning of the 31st with only two—were insignificant and were completely repulsed, but the third, on the evening of the 31st, was of the most elaborate and persistent character. Seven distinct groups of machines were employed, each consisting of three or four, and, in addition, individual raiders attacked the Kentish coast between midnight and 1.30 a.m. The first group came over the Kentish coast about 10.45, but did not get far westwards, and had to content themselves with bombing various places on and near the coast. Simultaneously the second and third groups steered towards London along the south bank of the Thames. Low, thin clouds, covering half to three-quarters of the sky, rendered observa-



[Official photograph. Crown copyright reserved.]

A BOMB ON THE THAMES EMBANKMENT: DAMAGE AT THE BASE OF CLEOPATRA'S NEEDLE.



THE CAPTURED PILOT OF ONE OF THE RAIDERS OF DECEMBER 6, 1917.

He wears the ribbon of the Iron Cross.

tion difficult; yet their altitude was correctly calculated, and just before midnight they

were broken up by gun fire, on the south-eastern outskirts of London, where they dropped some bombs. A fourth group coming along the Thames estuary was turned back about halfway to London. Meanwhile a fifth group, followed at an interval of about a quarter of an hour by a sixth, came over the Essex coast, and flew in the direction of London along the north bank of the Thames. Some machines out of both these groups managed to get through to the south-eastern district, and discharged some bombs, and one or two machines also dropped bombs on the south-western outskirts. The seventh group, which approached along the south bank of the river, were dispersed by gun fire before reaching the outer London defences. Thus, although the weather conditions were not favourable for the defence, our guns and aircraft prevented all but about three of the assailants, which numbered 24 in all, from reaching the heart of London. Ten persons were killed and 22 injured.

Five weeks elapsed before the next raid, and when it came, on December 6, it reached London at the unpleasant hour of 5 in the morning and roused people out of their sleep. It started on the Kent coast about 1.30, when the first group of raiders dropped bombs at various points on and near the coast. An hour and a half later a second group made the land, and proceeded up the Thames and some distance into Kent. Possibly both these attacks were merely feints, intended to draw the gun fire and exhaust the



WRECKAGE OF RAIDER BROUGHT DOWN IN ESSEX, JANUARY 28, 1918.



FUNERAL AT BRIXTON OF SPECIAL CONSTABLE KING.

Killed while on duty in the air raid of December 18, 1917.

defences, for the real serious attack did not begin till an hour later. Between 4 and 4.30 two groups of hostile machines crossed the Essex coast and three the Kent coast, and proceeded towards London on converging courses, apparently with the idea of delivering five simultaneous attacks from the north-east, east, and south-east. The scheme, however, failed. The whole of one group were turned back by gun fire, and of the others only some five or six machines were able to make their way into London. Most of the bombs dropped in this "cock-crow" raid were of the incendiary kind, and a number of fires were started but were quickly got under control by the Fire Brigade. Eight people were killed and 28 injured, and two of the Gothas were brought down by anti-aircraft guns, the six men who formed the two crews being captured alive.

The group system of attack was again adopted in the next raid, which was made under a young moon on December 18. Between 6.15 and 6.25 in the evening three groups of raiders crossed the coast of Kent, and three other groups the coast of Essex about the same time. All made for London, but most of them were turned back by gun fire at various points, and of the whole number of 16 or 20 only about five actually

reached the metropolis and bombed it between 7 and 8. Later, about 9, a single machine made its way in over London. At least one of the raiders was hit by machine-gun fire from one of our aeroplanes over London, and was ultimately brought down into the sea off the coast of Kent; two out of the crew of three were rescued by an armed trawler. Fourteen persons were killed and 85 injured, the majority of the casualties occurring in London.

The last raid of the year, on December 22, was an ineffectual affair, in spite of the assurance of the German report that bombs were dropped freely on Sheerness and Dover. There was a double attack. The first was attempted on the Kent coast soon after 6 o'clock in the evening, when, owing to a fresh north-east wind and rain and snow squalls, the weather conditions did not seem at all favourable for such an enterprise. The only result was that one raider was forced to descend close to the coast, its crew of three being captured alive. The second attack, about 9.30, was no more successful; a few bombs were dropped in Thanet, but caused no damage, material or personal.

For the first four weeks of the following year (1918) the country was left in peace; then on January 28 and 29, when the moon was full,



[Official photograph. Crown copyright reserved.]

THE DAMAGED PRINTING WORKS IN LONG ACRE.

two serious air attacks were made on London. On the first occasion four groups of raiders, each composed of two or three machines, or 10 in all, crossed the coast at different points at about 8 o'clock. The two machines of the first group, which came in at Felixstowe, entered London through Romford, and while one dropped bombs in the east at Stepney and Poplar, the other attacked Lambeth and Wandsworth in the west. The second group, also of two machines, came over by the North Foreland and travelled along the south bank of the Thames; both got through to London, but while one dropped bombs in Hackney and Holborn, the other apparently did nothing. Of the three machines in the third group, which came over the coast at Walton and Clacton, one was turned back and one bombed the neighbourhood of Camden Town. The third attacked West Hampstead, and then flew back eastwards, pursued from the east of London by two scouting aeroplanes, which finally brought it down in flames at Wickford in Essex. The officers to whom the credit of this feat was due were Captain G. H. Hackwill and Lieutenant C. C. Banks, both of the R.F.C. The fourth group of three machines, which came in at Rainsgate, made no attempt on London, but contented themselves with dropping bombs on Thanet and

Sheppey. A good deal later, about 10.25, a single giant raider crossed the coast at Hollesley Bay. Its course was repeatedly changed by aeroplane and gun attacks, but, after passing over Ipswich, Chelmsford and Chingford, it won its way to London, and after midnight dropped bombs in Bethnal Green and in the neighbourhood of Waterloo Bridge and the Savoy. The ordeal of London thus lasted four or five hours; and the total of casualties was heavy—67 killed and 166 injured. Nearly 40 of the deaths were due to a single 50 kg. bomb, dropped by the giant raider on a printing works in Long Acre, where a large number of people had congregated for shelter.

On January 29 the attack was again prolonged, and was delivered by three giant and three or four smaller machines. The first batch came over the coast at different points about 9.30, and was followed by a second batch an hour or more later. The results were scanty. The casualties—10 deaths and 10 cases of injury—were all caused by a giant raider of the first batch, which after passing Hertford and Potter's Bar about 11, visited Isleworth, Kew, Richmond, Chiswick, Barnes, Wandsworth and Camberwell, in its vain efforts to make its way into the centre of London.

It was about this time that the Germans were

kind enough to explain, *à propos* of a savage onslaught on Paris—the first aeroplane attack in force on that city—which they made with about 25 machines on January 30, that the object of the raids on London, though partly to cause damage, was chiefly to force us to maintain an enormous barred aerial zone on the East Coast, at the expense of the services at the front. On the other hand, the attack on Paris was merely by way of reprisal for French attacks on open German towns.

In February, aeroplane raids were reported on three successive nights—the 16th, 17th, and 18th—in favourable weather with the moon in her first quarter; but they were not on a large scale and were for the most part frustrated by our defences. The last of the three—if it ever took place, which is by no means certain—was a complete fiasco, and no one was killed or injured. On the 17th a single giant aeroplane crossed London from Lewisham to Mildmay Park, dropping a number of bombs as it went. Its methods seemed more scientific than was usual with the raiders, and the culmination of its attack, by which much damage was done to the St. Pancras Hotel, appeared a well-calculated piece of work. It was responsible in all for killing 21 persons and injuring 32 others. On the 16th there were three giants.

One ventured just to put its nose over the land at St. Margaret's Bay, and unloaded 18 bombs, which caused no casualties, and another ranged over Essex with equal ineffectiveness. The third came up the Blackwater, and, after turning south-west to the Nore and Gravesend, entered London by Woolwich. There it damaged the Garrison Church, and later it dropped a bomb at Chelsea Hospital, wrecking an old house and killing an officer, his wife, her sister, and three children. Finally it showered eight 50 kg. bombs on some allotments at Beckenham.

In March there was only one aeroplane raid, on the night of the 7th, but it covered a wide area, including Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire and London. Six giant machines started, but one did not cross the coast. Of the remaining five three reached London. One bombed Hampstead and St. John's Wood, and another left its marks on Golder's Green, Finchley, Mill Hill and Whetstone. The third flew right across London from east to west, and dropped a 300 kg. bomb at Warrington Crescent in Paddington, where it damaged 20 houses seriously and 400 slightly. This was the only bomb of that size dropped in the raid, but there were eight of 100 kg. and 25 of 50 kg., five of the former and 10 of the latter falling in the London area.



[Official photograph. Crown copyright reserved.]

WRECKED HOUSE IN THE ROYAL HOSPITAL, CHELSEA.



THE WHIT-SUNDAY RAID, 1918: A CRASHED BOMBER.

Showing an unused bomb, indicated by the arrow.

This raid was of special interest owing to the peculiar meteorological conditions under which it was carried out. Just as moonlight was generally regarded as a certain protection against the visit of Zeppelins, so the belief was widely held that if there was no moon nothing was to be feared from aeroplanes. There were, it is true, prophets who averred that time would show this comfortable faith to rest on an unsound basis, but, in fact, so far no aeroplanes had come except on nights when there was some moon, and the no-moon no-raid theory had been justified. On March 7, however, there was no moon, yet the exception did not disprove the rule, for there was something better, in the shape of a remarkably brilliant display of the Aurora Borealis, the light of which, being practically monochromatic, gave even better visibility and definition than bright moonlight. The Germans promptly seized the opportunity, and possibly they cherished the hope that in the absence of the moon our defences would be lulled to false security, though if they did, and expected that our aeroplanes would not be ready for them, they were sadly disappointed.

In April the enemy essayed no aeroplane

attack on this country, but in May, on the evening of Whit-Sunday, the 19th, they made what proved to be the final effort, for, although on three subsequent occasions (June 17, July 18 and July 20) single aeroplanes appeared by day over the Kent coast, these transient visits did not deserve to be called raids. The Whit-Sunday attack was carried out, in clear still weather, a few days before full moon, with 33 or 34 machines. Of these 13 reached London. They came by divers routes from the coast and lavished their attention not only on Kent and Essex but also on widely separated districts of London—from the City to St. James's, from Stratford and East Ham to Regent's Park and Kilburn, and from Catford and Sydenham to Haringay and Kingsland. They dropped five bombs of 300 kg., 35 of 100 kg., and over 100 of 50 kg., and they killed 49 persons and injured 177. But they by no means escaped scot-free. Going up in large numbers our airmen got into touch with several of them and brought down three; three were shot down by anti-aircraft guns, at Dover, North Foreland and Southend; one crashed owing to engine failure; and three more are said to have crashed in Belgium.

The loss of at least 20 per cent. of their raiding force was calculated to increase the Germans' respect for our defences, and it is significant that after this raid, which, as it happened, coincided with a particularly effective one carried out by the Allies on Cologne, they began to talk about the "senseless murder of women and children" and to suggest international agreement for stopping it. What is perhaps still more significant is that they never ventured on another raid against London, whereas Paris, which was no easier for them to reach as a matter of flying, continued to suffer their attacks.

We may now turn to the defensive measures that were adopted against air raids, and deal in the first instance with those which may be classed as protective rather than as counter-offensive.

In the case of airships which came by night when there was no moonlight, darkness was recognized as a valuable ally. The illumination of the streets of London and other places was therefore reduced as much as possible, or even abolished altogether, and the exhibition of bright lights from the windows of shops and houses was prohibited, though occasionally acetylene flares were exposed in open places where bombs could do no harm, with the idea

of drawing the enemy's fire. This policy of concealment was of distinct benefit. So far as London was concerned, no doubt the Thames provided a finger-post that could not be hidden artificially, and it may or may not be true that the crews of Zeppelins, as one of their commanders averred, felt by instinct when they were near a large mass of human beings; but it is quite evident that the raiders were often bewildered and without knowledge of their whereabouts, else so much of their ammunition would not have been wasted on uninhabited country. In at least one instance a town suffered severely through prematurely relighting its street lamps, and thus revealing itself to a Zeppelin which was wrongly supposed to have departed.

When air raids were a novelty they were treated as a kind of spectacle, and people crowded into the streets and upon the roofs of houses in order to watch the attacks. Increasing familiarity, however, bred caution, not contempt. Gradually it came to be realized that it was safer to be at home or under cover, and that although the inmates of an ordinary house stood a poor chance in the event of a direct hit, still the blast and flying splinters from exploding bombs, not to mention shrapnel and fragments of shell cases from our own guns, made the open streets on the whole more



SALVING A GOTHA WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN IN A RAID AND FELL IN THE SEA.

AEROPLANE RAID CASUALTIES.

Date.	Locality.	Civilians.								Sailors and Soldiers.	
		Killed.				Injured.				Killed.	Injured.
		Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.		
1914.											
Dec. 24 ..	Dover	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dec. 25 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1915.											
Feb. 21 ..	Essex	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April 16 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July 3 ..	East Suffolk	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sept. 13 ..	Margate	—	2	—	2	2	4	—	6	—	—
1916.											
Jan. 22-23 ..	Dover	1	—	—	1	2	1	3	6	—	—
Jan. 23 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Feb. 9 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	3	—	—
Feb. 20 ..	Kent and E. Suffolk	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—
March 1 ..	Broadstairs, Margate	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
March 19 ..	Deal, Dover, Margate and Ramsgate	1	3	6	10	4	3	8	15	4	11
April 24 ..	Dover	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
May 3 ..	Deal	—	—	—	—	3	1	—	4	—	—
May 19-20 ..	Kent and Dover	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	1
July 9 ..	Kent (N. Foreland)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July 9-10 ..	Dover	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Aug. 12 ..	Dover	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
Sept. 22 ..	Kent and Dover	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oct. 22 ..	Sheerness	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oct. 23 ..	Margate	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	—	—
Nov. 28 ..	London	—	—	—	—	4	6	—	10	—	—
1917.											
March 1 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	1	5	6	—	—
March 16 ..	Kent and Margate	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
March 17 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April 5 ..	Kent and Ramsgate	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
May 6-7 ..	London	1	—	—	1	1	1	—	2	—	—
May 25 ..	Kent and Folkstone	17	34	26	77	28	51	15	94	18	98
June 5 ..	Essex and Kent	3	—	—	3	3	4	1	8	10	26
June 13 ..	Margate, Essex, London	90	25	43	158	213	110	102	425	4	7
July 4 ..	Essex and Suffolk	3	—	—	3	1	—	—	1	14	29
July 7 ..	Margate and London	38	9	8	55	95	45	50	190	2	3
July 22 ..	Essex and Suffolk	1	—	—	1	1	2	—	3	12	23
Aug. 12 ..	Essex and Margate	10	13	9	32	13	19	12	44	—	2
Aug. 22 ..	Kent	6	1	1	8	4	2	7	13	4	12
Sept. 2-3 ..	Dover	—	—	—	—	—	4	2	6	1	—
Sept. 3-4 ..	Kent	—	1	—	1	1	3	2	6	131	90
Sept. 4-5 ..	Home Counties and London	7	8	1	16	20	29	10	59	3	12
Sept. 24-25 ..	Kent, Essex, London	5	4	2	11	24	24	2	50	10	20
Sept. 25-26 ..	Kent and London	6	2	—	8	9	9	3	21	1	2
Sept. 28-29 ..	Home Counties	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sept. 29-30 ..	Kent and London	4	5	4	13	41	34	7	82	1	5
Sept. 30-Oct. 1 ..	Kent, Essex, London	5	4	—	9	17	13	3	33	5	5
Oct. 1-2 ..	Do.	7	4	—	11	18	19	4	41	—	—
Oct. 29-30 ..	Essex	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oct. 31 ..	Kent and Dover	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oct. 31-Nov. 1 ..	Kent, Essex, London	4	3	1	8	8	9	4	21	2	1
Dec. 6 ..	Do.	1	5	1	7	13	8	6	27	1	1
Dec. 18 ..	Do.	5	5	4	14	42	23	14	79	—	6
1918.											
Jan. 28-29 ..	Do.	22	26	17	65	79	50	31	160	2	6
Jan. 29-30 ..	Do.	2	3	5	10	7	2	1	10	—	—
Feb. 16-17 ..	Do.	1	5	3	9	3	—	3	6	1	—
Feb. 17-18 ..	Do.	16	4	—	20	17	9	—	26	1	6
Feb. 18-19 ..	Do.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
March 7-8 ..	Kent, Essex, Herts. Beds. and London	8	9	4	21	9	28	2	39	2	—
May 19-20 ..	Kent, Essex, London	17	20	6	43	57	67	26	150	6	27
June 17 ..	Kent	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Totals, aeroplane raids ..		282	195	142	619	741	585	324	1,650	238	400
Totals, airship raids ..		217	171	110	498	587	431	218	1,236	58	121
Grand Totals ..		499	366	252	1,117	1,328	1,016	542	2,886	296	521

Total casualties, civilian and military, AIRSHIP RAIDS, 1,913 (556 killed, 1,357 injured).

Total casualties, civilian and military, AEROPLANE RAIDS, 2,907 (857 killed, 2,050 injured).

Total casualties, civilian and military, ALL RAIDS, 4,820 (1,413 killed, 3,407 injured).

dangerous. This lesson was driven home by the Folkestone raid of May 23, 1917, when many casualties occurred in a street crowded with people marketing, and thereafter the demand for public warnings, to give time for shelter to be found, gathered intensity.

Warnings of hostile aircraft reaching the coast were, of course, sent to the military and police authorities in London and other inland places, but for long the Government resisted the proposal to circulate them among the public generally. It was pointed out, not

with that object. This proposal brought to light another difficulty—that of making the warning effective—for in refusing to adopt it the Cathedral authorities pointed out the undoubted fact that the bell would be audible only to a very few people. A few days later the Home Secretary, after receiving a deputation of London mayors, stated as the definite decision of the Cabinet that it was not desirable, in existing circumstances, to give public warnings of air raids in London. But circumstances apparently changed rather rapidly in the official



MOBILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS
Used in the defence of London.

without force, that many more raids were threatened than actually took place, and that to give public warning of every possible raid would merely be to cause unnecessary alarm. Another official point of view was that the result of giving notice would actually be to bring people into the streets. The public feeling was, however, in favour of warnings. After the London raid of June 13, 1917, the Lord Mayor announced that he intended to give the citizens immediate notice when he received warnings of impending air raids, and that he was in communication with the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's as to the practicability of ringing the great bell of the Cathedral

view, and on July 13 the Commissioner of Police issued the announcement that when he received intelligence that enemy aircraft were flying towards London, police, both regular and special, would be sent through the streets exhibiting a placard with the inscription, "Police Notice. Take Cover." Warning was given in this way for the first time on July 14, but there was no raid, and even before the police had time to leave some of the stations with their "Take Cover" notices, the "All Clear" signal was received. Three days later a test of sirens as a means of giving warnings was made, but proved quite unsatisfactory. Experiments were then tried with two other devices—one a rocket

which, bursting at a height of 150 feet, set free a parachute from which was suspended a smoke flare or a series of calcium lights, and the other a sound signal which detonated with a loud report at a height of 200 feet. As the second method seemed the most suitable of all that had been suggested, it was adopted and put in operation with a precipitancy that contrasted curiously with earlier hesitation. The official decision was published on Saturday, July 21, too late for most people to hear of it, and next day London was awakened at 8.30 from its Sunday morning slumbers by the sound of 237 rockets fired from 79 fire stations. Not unnaturally it imagined that it was hearing the sound of guns which denoted that a raid was in progress, but in fact there was no raid nearer than Harwich.

The arrangement finally adopted was that two sound signals or maroons should be fired at intervals of 15 seconds from fire-brigade stations so selected as to cover the area of the County of London, while outside the County, but within a 10-mile radius of Charing Cross, two signals were to be fired from local police stations. Simultaneously constables on foot and on cycles were to circulate through the streets exhibiting a placard with "Take Cover" in red letters, while similarly at the end of the raid they were to show "All Clear" placards in black letters. This method applied to the London area only, the local authorities in other places being left to make their own arrangements, and the sound signals were used only for raids by day, from half an hour before sunrise to half an hour after sunset, though at other hours the police circulated their "Take Cover" notices. Demands were made from time to time that the maroons should be fired when night raids were impending, only to be countered by official statements that the whole question was being reconsidered; and except hal illuminated motor cars were employed, when available, to carry the "Take Cover" notices through the streets, and bugles were introduced to give the "All Clear," little change was made till January, 1918. It was then announced that the maroons would be fired as late as 11 p.m., but that from that hour until sunrise they would be fired only if there was not time to mobilize constables to carry round the warning placards. Finally, in March it was decided to give maroon warnings at all hours of the day and night.

Since the object of these warnings was to

clear people off the streets and induce them to get into shelter, it was an obvious corollary to provide places in which they could take cover. Voluntary effort led the way. The Corporation of London arranged for the crypt of the Guildhall and portions of the Central Criminal Court in the Old Bailey to be available for the purpose, and the Lord Mayor affixed outside the Mansion House the notice, "During an air raid persons may take shelter in this building at their own risk"—an example which was extensively followed by the occupiers of other large buildings. Police stations, public libraries, galleries, churches, schools, were thrown open. The stations of the tube railways proved especially popular, and even when no raid had been announced or was at all likely were so crowded with people from flimsy houses that the problem of maintaining them in decent sanitary condition threatened to become serious. In October 1917, when it was estimated that the shelters already available would accommodate about a million persons, a regulation was made under the Defence of the Realm Acts ordering everybody in possession of suitable shelter to place it at the disposal of the public if required. The Government arranged to give sandbags free of charge to local authorities who agreed to provide sand and labour and to place the filled bags in the windows and apertures of shelters, and some local authorities also decorated their street lamps with arrows pointing in the direction of the nearest shelter. Many people sought a more permanent form of cover from night raids by removing themselves and their families from London to the encircling country districts, and one result was that their daily journeys up to London for their business purposes congested the railways to such an extent that the issue of season tickets had to be restricted.

Concerted measures were taken to deal with the outbreaks of fire which it was one of the objects of the enemy to cause. In May 1915 it was decided to reinforce with motor pumping engines from other districts those areas in which under normal conditions fires were most frequent and serious, since through the regular interchange of information between the fire brigades of London and Berlin and Hamburg the Germans were well aware of those areas and might be expected to pay special attention to them if their aircraft could locate them. The fire brigade, which had been depleted by about 300 Reservists at the outbreak of war, was

strengthened by volunteers, turncocks and others, and in order to make the existing resources go as far as possible it was arranged that only one engine should attend a call, instead of the three or more that would be sent out under normal conditions. These dispositions were soon put to the test. In the Zeppelin raid of May 31, 1915, about 40 calls were received within 10 minutes, but an engine was dispatched immediately on receipt of each call, and though 25 explosive and 68 incendiary bombs were

December 6, when 276 incendiary bombs fell in the London area, motor engines from points so far distant as Twickenham and Wembley were used for extinguishing a fire in Shoreditch, these and other engines having been previously closed in on the hazardous areas in the centre of London. Public authorities, private firms and the London Salvage Corps alike placed their resources at the disposal of the Fire Brigade, and most valuable assistance was rendered by the London Volunteer Rifles, who for 3½ years



ONE OF SEVERAL FORMS OF NOTICE TO "TAKE COVER."

dropped only four or five fires were greater than could be dealt with by one engine. When the positions in which the bombs fell were plotted on a map it appeared that the track followed by the Zeppelin had been chosen so as to pass over the area which experience indicated was the most dangerous one for fires.

After the daylight raid of July 7, 1917, it was thought advisable to coordinate 90 fire brigades in an area of about 750 square miles and to arrange that they should attend in London during air raids and act with the London Fire Brigade under the direction of Lieut.-Commander S. Sladen. From September 1917 to the end of the war engines from outside came into London on 19 occasions, and on

maintained a detachment at Fire Brigade Headquarters, attending all large fires and sharing the dangers of regular service.

Another body which had an important place in the arrangements for meeting attack from the air was the Metropolitan Observation Service. Established in October 1914 by the Commissioner of Police, under arrangement with the Admiralty, it was intended in the first instance for the detection of suspicious and conspicuous lights within the Metropolitan Police District, but it soon developed into an efficient agency for giving immediate information of the outbreak and position of fires and of the movements of aircraft during a raid. Its headquarters were at the County Hall,

Spring Gardens, where it was accommodated by the London County Council, and it received information from a number of observation posts distributed over a wide area within the County. It contained 1,200 officers and men selected from the Metropolitan Special Constabulary, members of the L.C.C., ex-members of the R.N.V.R., members of London clubs,



BADGE GRANTED TO LONDON TELEPHONE OPERATORS (GIRLS)

Who volunteered for duty during air raids.

and volunteers from the large factories on which some of the observation posts were situated. All were ineligible for military service.

A Government scheme of insurance against aircraft and bombardment risks was inaugurated on July 19, 1915, the fire insurance offices acting as agents. The rates varied from 2s. per £100 for private houses and their contents up to 7s. 6d. for such risks as merchandise at docks, timber in the open, and oil tanks; but they were reduced by half on March 1, 1917—a reduction which it was generally believed the State could very well afford. A further concession was granted as from September 1 of the same year, when the Government accepted liability up to £500 without the payment of any premium. Arrangements were also made to assist the victims of air raids by providing shelter, food and financial assistance from the National Relief Fund.

Put at the highest, the defensive measures

so far described were merely palliative, and could do no more than mitigate the effects of an attack from the air. To stop the advance of airships or aeroplanes that had reached our shores, or to prevent them from crossing the coast, or, best of all, to establish such conditions that they would not dare to make the attempt, was a military problem the solution of which would have rendered passive protective measures unnecessary. The main elements of such a military solution were perfectly familiar before the war began. Anti-aircraft guns had been mounted on our warships; searchlights had long been employed to illuminate an objective it was desired to assail; and the idea of using armed aeroplanes had been expressed, picturesquely if with some excess of optimism, by Mr. Churchill in March, 1914, when he said that any hostile aircraft reaching our coast during the coming year would be promptly attacked in superior force by a swarm of very formidable hornets. Yet at the outbreak of war all these material elements were deficient alike in quantity and quality—at any rate, so far as the defence of the land against aerial attack was concerned. It followed that, with no material with which to practise, the supply of men properly trained to use these elements not only singly but in combination with each other was also deficient; and further, there was no adequate system of controlling the action and operation of the human and material factors and coordinating them for the attainment of the end in view. The success achieved ultimately, as measured by the discontinuance of air raids on England after May 1918, though the Germans made many on other less well defended areas after that time, did not come so much from the invention of any single new super-terrible device (though various new devices were brought into use, such as incendiary bullets, sound-locating appliances, balloon aprons and wireless telephones) as from the gradual improvement in the amount and quality of the equipment, the systematic training of the men, and the centralized direction of the whole machine so as to ensure the harmonious cooperation of all its parts.

The guns provided for the defence of London, which, not only as the first city of the Empire but also from the ease with which it could be found, its nearness to German aircraft stations, and the hugeness of the target it presented, always remained the chief objective of the enemy's attack, at first consisted for the most

part of 1-pounder pom-poms, and the largest was the 6-pounder Hotchkiss. They were mounted on various elevated points in the middle of London, such as the Foreign Office, the Admiralty Arch, Lloyd's Bank in St. James's Street, Cannon Street Station, Waterloo, Blackfriars, and Nine Elms, and each roof station had its searchlight. Later the pom-poms were replaced by heavier weapons—13-pounders, 3-in., and, for a time at least, some French 75 mm.—which were placed on the ground instead of on the roofs. Admiral Sir Percy Scott did much to bring about an improvement in the size and number of the weapons supplied for the defence, of which he was put in charge in September, 1915, and he also recognized that the attempt to defend London merely by guns actually in London was a mistake. As, therefore, the number of guns available increased they were mounted at points selected on a wider perimeter outside, and this process went on until London was ringed with artillery. Nearer the coast there were other defences, such as those of the Thames and Medway and of Dover, and the consequence was that a raider coming in from the sea had to face a number of successive

zones of fire from fixed guns, not to mention mobile batteries, on its way to the capital.

The London guns and searchlights were manned by the R.N.V.R. Anti-Aircraft Corps, raised by the Admiralty in October 1914, and composed of City and University men who gave up part of their time, by day or by night, to the duties of the service. At first the corps was on a purely volunteer basis, but in 1916 "combing out" began, and at the beginning of 1917, when the Admiralty handed over the defences of London to the War Office, it became a conscriptive unit of the Regular Home Forces. As such it persisted to the end of the war, presenting in its later stages the anomaly of a naval unit serving under Army generals. At first its training was carried out by old naval gunnery instructors and torpedo hands, who combined a rigorous course of squad drill and rifle manual with a very elementary knowledge of anti-aircraft gun-drill. When, towards the end of 1915, the Naval Gunnery School at Chatham had begun to add anti-aircraft problems to its curriculum, officers and men were sent down there to qualify as gun-layers, and they returned from their courses, which were followed by real gun practice at sea, with



MOTOR AMBULANCE

Built by Inspector Jolly, of the Special Constabulary at Edmonton, for use during air raids.

the naval rank of "gunlayer III." or "seaman gunner." Under the Army the Navy drill gave way to Army drill, and the officers and men went for their periodical training to Shoeburyness, not Chatham, and worked under military conditions.

The corps came into being at a time when scientific high-angle anti-aircraft gunnery scarcely existed, but it contained mathematicians and mechanical engineers who evolved for themselves the first principles of the art, and virtually laid the foundations of the elaborate systems that grew up subsequently. In the earlier days of the corps the idea was to aim at and hit an individual raider held in the beams of the searchlights, and if the guns that were first provided seem rather puny weapons it must be remembered that aircraft then flew at much lower elevations than afterwards became common. Later, as the number of guns increased, barrage fire was introduced. In its fullest development as a "box barrage," this plan would have meant that London would have been encircled and closed in with a curtain of bursting high explosive shell, calculated to daunt the most determined pilot. But it must not be forgotten that as compared with an army marching on the ground an aeroplane in the air has an extra degree of freedom of movement, and can choose its point of entry not only horizontally but also vertically. Hence, if its passage is to be barred completely, there must be shells bursting continuously at every elevation up to the highest it can attain. Such a barrage entails a prodigious expenditure of ammunition, and moreover, if the attack is prolonged, the continuous firing wears out the barrels of the guns and renders them useless, with the consequence that the defence must break down, unless there is a large reserve of new guns. It is quite possible that the Germans calculated on bringing about this result when they attacked night after night in the last week of September, 1917.

There is, however, an alternative in the shape of a partial barrage put up at the point where, and at the time when, a hostile aeroplane is expected, not after it has actually arrived. If those in control are successfully to predict the position of the raider, this method evidently requires that they shall receive prompt information from the observers who are watching the course of the machine; and, in view of the importance of the telephone as a rapid means of transmitting such information, the reason

why the public were repeatedly urged to use the telephone as little as possible during air raids becomes obvious. The partial barrage also explains why in certain of the later raids the gunfire seemed so slight that some people rashly jumped to the conclusion that the defence was being neglected.

Another device which reduced the space that had to be covered by the barrage was the balloon apron. A row of kite balloons was sent up, and their mooring cables were joined by cross cables from which depended wires kept taut by small weights at their ends. Thus a screen was formed extending from the ground up to the height at which the balloons were moored, and *pro tanto* reducing the space available for the flight of a raider. Whether or not a machine could in fact fly through such a screen without serious damage, there was an element of mystery, of unknown possibilities, about the arrangement that effectually deterred a pilot from making the attempt, except by inadvertence. Apart from limiting the area that had to be covered by our guns, and also by our aeroplane patrols, the aprons had the additional advantage of eliminating the chance of a raider flying low and shooting people in the streets at close range; for even if he dared to come in over their tops and then descend to a low level the risk to which he would be exposed in climbing to get out again would be too great to be faced. The device was the answer—or part of the answer—which Major-General E. B. Ashmore, who was appointed to the command of the London Air Defence Area on August 8, 1917, made to the enemy's new policy of big aeroplane raids by night. The idea was originated by him independently, and was not borrowed or imitated from anything done by the Italians at Venice or elsewhere.

The other great arm of the air defence, the aeroplane, for many months existed rather in talk than in fact. Our shortage of machines at the beginning of the war was notorious. Practically all we had were required for use across the Channel, and only a few could be spared for home defence. The performance of those few was in general not good enough to enable them to cope with airships, nor were they adequately armed for the attack. But even if large numbers of good machines had been immediately forthcoming, that would not of itself have been sufficient. Aeroplanes require stations where they can be housed and looked after, and, if they are to fly by night, lighted



[R.A.F. official photograph.]

BALLOON APRON.

landing places where they can alight; all these were lacking, as may be judged from the fact that in the middle of 1914 we had just seven aircraft stations in England and one in Scotland. Further, supposing we had had aeroplanes, aeroplane stations and all the necessary material equipment, to repel aircraft by night obviously implies flying by night; yet we had no pilots trained in night flying. Practically, therefore, the air defence of the country had to be built up from nothing, so far as aeroplanes were concerned.

Until the war had lasted about a year and a half little could be done, owing to the output of aeroplanes being absorbed by requirements overseas, in the direction of providing machines of a kind suitable for home defence purposes, and although in that period a few aeroplanes had gone up to the attack of airships they had damaged themselves rather than the enemy. Early in 1916, however, about the time when the Anti-Aircraft Land Defences of the country were committed to the charge of Viscount French, a fair number of machines were

stationed in the London area, capable of rising to such a height that they could tackle the type of airship then being employed by Germany for raids on this country, and the events of the latter part of the year showed that we had machines which could attack Zeppelins with success. They were not, however, good enough to grapple with raiding aeroplanes, and



MAJOR-GENERAL E. B. ASHMORE, C.B.
In command of London Air Defence Area
from August, 1917.

for this and other reasons our aeroplane defence did very little in the first great daylight aeroplane raid on London in June, 1917. But reinforcements were obtained, and, as has already been recorded, it was the appearance of a squadron of our machines, on August 12, that decided the enemy to abandon his intention of attacking London and to unload his bombs on Southend instead. The phase of night aeroplane raids that opened in September showed that still better machines were necessary—fast single-seater fighters of the highest standard of performance. To fly such machines at night had at one time been considered impracticable, but it was successfully accomplished when the need came, and, in combination with searchlights systematically directed by the aid of sound-locating instruments instead of being swept at random across the sky, proved an effective antidote to the night raiders. It may be mentioned that as a result of the piecemeal

manner in which the machines were got together, and as a reflection of our policy of indulging in the manufacture of a large number of different types, there was a troublesome heterogeneity in the equipment of the London defence squadrons. During 1918 steps were taken to remove this defect, and by the time of the armistice a large measure of uniformity had been achieved, Sepwith Camels, with 110 h.p. Le Rhône engines, being the most favoured type.

The machines allocated to the defence of London were at first scattered in small separated detachments under the command of the officers commanding different training squadrons; but concentration was seen to be advisable, and in the spring of 1916 they were formed into a Home Defence Squadron, with aerodromes to the east of London—the direction from which hostile attack was most likely. A little later more squadrons were added under the Home Defence Wing (which successively became the Home Defence Group, the Home Defence Brigade, and finally the 6th Brigade, R.A.F.), and there were also detachments allocated to the defence of important towns in the North. The next development was the decision to establish a chain of aerodromes from the north to the south of the country, a Flight being stationed at each and patrolling between its own aerodrome and those on each side of it. Every three Flights formed a Squadron, under a commander who had separate headquarters about equidistant from each of the three aerodromes under his charge, though afterwards this arrangement was modified and the headquarters placed at the central aerodrome of each group of three. With the advent of day aeroplane raids in 1917 another change was necessitated in the South-Eastern Counties through the formation of additional squadrons, and to accommodate these the Flight aerodromes were raised to the status of Squadron aerodromes. The work of the aeroplane patrols in the London area was facilitated by the construction of the balloon aprons, because, the lower elevations being barred by these, they could confine their attention to the upper ones. Each squadron had attached to it a searchlight company, connected to the squadron headquarters by direct telephone lines.

At first the operations of the detachments round London were controlled from the War Office by direct telephone, but in 1916 the control was placed in the hands of G.H.Q. Home Forces, and orders were transmitted



A SOPWITH "CAMEL."

from a central operations room, not direct, but through the headquarters of what later became the 6th Brigade. This arrangement applied to the squadrons stationed in the southern half of the country; in the northern half the squadron commanders themselves ordered their machines to patrol, acting on information received from the Garrison Commanders of such areas as the Humber and the Tyne. When the London Air Defence Area was instituted in August 1917, its G.O.C. assumed control of the operations, together with the tactical training of machines with searchlights, so far as the southern service squadrons were concerned, his orders continuing to be transmitted through the headquarters of the 6th Brigade. A similar system was introduced for the northern squadrons on the formation of the Northern Air Defences in May 1918, the orders of the G.O.C. passing through the headquarters of the 24th Group at Leeds.


A pilot in the air cannot hear the noise of another machine because of the noise of his own; practically, therefore, he is deaf. By night he is also blind, apart from artificial help; hence the need, in night flying, for the most careful and systematic cooperation of the searchlights with him, if he is to spot and attack his quarry. By way of helping him in this task the plan was suggested of projecting searchlight beams horizontally close to the ground so as to form a carpet of light against which he would see an enemy machine silhouetted, if he were above it; but trials made in 1917 were not very effective even on a fine night, while ground mist would defeat the method, which at best would have been very ex-

pensive. Another suggestion was, instead of keeping the searchlight beams concentrated, to spread them out into wide bands; it was supposed that during the few seconds an enemy machine would take to fly through these bands (if it dared to do so at all) it would be observed and then could be picked up by the ordinary searchlights. When tested, however, this plan also proved unsatisfactory, and it was found best to rely on ordinary searchlights, the successful manipulation of which was greatly helped by the adoption of the sound-locating apparatus. It may be mentioned, too, that with the introduction of wireless telephony the pilot in the air no longer remained a lonely and isolated unit cut off from all communication with the earth, but could receive orders by word of mouth.

In the early part of the war the aeroplanes engaged in anti-aircraft work carried no gun. Experimentally, it is true, machines had been provided with rifles firing tracer bullets, but it is very doubtful whether these were ever used in action. As armament against airships reliance was at first placed on high explosive and incendiary bombs, and a couple of each of these were to be found in aeroplanes early in 1916. Later an apparatus for firing explosive darts was provided. The theory was that the airman would climb above the airship and drop his bombs or darts upon it. But apart from the indifferent performance of the aeroplanes then at the disposal of the home defences, which rendered it unlikely that they would be able to get above the airship, there was the difficulty first of seeing it and then of hitting it, while in the probable event of a miss the bombs

and darts would be exceedingly unwelcome visitors to the people on the ground below. It must be recorded, however, that Lieut. Brandon used explosive darts when he brought down L 15 in flames on April 1, 1916.

The next step was to add a Lewis machine gun. The bombs and darts were retained for a time, but were ultimately dispensed with, not only because they were realized to be of little value, but also to relieve the aeroplanes of unnecessary weight. In the first instance the guns fired ordinary ammunition, a few drums of which, it was hoped, would cause such a leakage of gas from a Zeppelin as to prevent it from getting home, if it had been hit. In the middle of 1916 explosive and incendiary bullets were brought into use, with the idea of inflaming the gas. The Brock and Buckingham forms were




ROLLS-ROYCE EAGLE 360-h.p. ENGINE.

the first, and the Pomeroy quickly followed. The last had the defect that it would not detonate readily at low temperatures such as prevail at high altitudes and it is doubtful whether it ever had a share in bringing down a Zeppelin. The Brock had the opposite fault of being too sensitive, giving trouble through premature explosions, but it continued in use till the early spring of 1917, when it was superseded by the Buckingham, the incendiary character of which had meantime been improved. The R.T.S. bullet, invented by Sir Richard Threlfall in August of that year, combined the merits of the Buckingham and the Pomeroy, being more sensitive than the one and more effective than the other.

In addition to the Lewis, Vickers guns were also employed, with different forms of mounting to suit different types of aeroplane. With explosive and incendiary bullets unsynchronized firing through the propeller was evidently


inadmissible, and therefore either synchronizing had to be adopted or the guns arranged so that they did not fire through the propeller. A great deal of attention was given to the design of sights, especially for night use, and another



NAPIER LION 450-h.p. ENGINE.

detail that was worked out was a device for eliminating the flash of the Lewis gun, which the pilots found troublesome.

From what has been said it will be seen that the key to success in dealing with hostile aircraft attack on this country was found in night flying, coupled with an adequate supply of efficient machines and minute attention to every detail of the subsidiary equipment. Night flying in fast aeroplanes, in fact, became a distinctively British art, and the specialist exponents of it were the 6th Brigade R.A.F., in which was vested the aerial defence of the country over land, the R.N.A.S., down to the



MERCEDES 180-h.p. ENGINE.

time when, on April 1, 1918, it was combined with the Royal Flying Corps to form the Royal Air Force, taking its share in the work by patrolling on the coast and over the sea. But



HANDLEY PAGE MACHINE,
Built for the bombing of Berlin.

the 6th Brigade was responsible for more than manning the home air defences; it formed in effect a great school of night flying, and the system of training it elaborated enabled it to provide pilots not only for its own requirements but also for work in France. Thus it furnished the men and machines for a light night-bombing squadron which went out to the B.E.F. in March 1917, and by June of the following year eight such squadrons had been sent out, the pilots and observers and the wastage being supplied by it. Later, after the air raid on London of May 19, 1918, it raised the personnel for a night-flying squadron which did excellent work in France in countering the attacks of hostile night-bombing machines. From its arrival in France towards the end of June until the date of the armistice this squadron shot down 16 hostile night-bombing machines on the British side of the lines and 10 on the enemy's side, five of the latter being definitely confirmed and five not. During that period not one of its pilots or observers was killed or wounded by enemy action.

The raids on this country gave rise to constant demands that similar treatment should be meted out to Germany, whether by way of retaliation and reprisal or in pursuance of the



TWO OF THE FOUR ENGINES (PORT SIDE) OF THE HANDLEY PAGE MACHINE.

policy of destroying the raiders in their nests. The systematic bombing of military objectives by Royal Air Force squadrons began in October 1917, but bombing expeditions into enemy territory were by no means unknown before that time. For instance, in the previous July a Handley Page bombing machine with Rolls-Royce engines had flown from England and attacked Constantinople—a feat which involved flying a total distance of nearly 2,000 miles, the machine being in the air for just over 31 hours. In the same month there was a raid into Westphalia, which evidently proved very annoying to the enemy, who tried to make light of it, while admitting "numerous attacks on the German homeland." About the middle of September the French dropped 15 tons of bombs on Stuttgart and other places in Germany, and about the same time British airmen dropped 143 bombs on a German aerodrome and hostile billets and scattered a body

of 2,000 German infantry, from a height of 100 feet, with machine-gun fire. At the end of the same month British airmen repeatedly bombed, by day and by night, the aerodromes at Gontrode and St. Denis-Westrem, near Ghent, the lair of the 3rd Battle-Plane Squadron



LORD WEIR, AIR MINISTER, AND
BRIGADIER-GENERAL CRITCHLEY, D.S.O.

of the IV. German Army, which carried out the great raids on England in the previous May and June; at St. Denis-Westrem it is believed that they destroyed 15 Gothas.

Military exigencies, and the inability to spare machines from other duties, were offered as the official reason why raids on German towns had not been more numerous; but in October the difficulties were apparently disappearing, and the word reprisals began to have a sweeter savour on official lips. By October 11 the 8th Brigade R.A.F., with three squadrons, had been established in the Nancy area under Sir Douglas Haig; a fourth squadron was added in May, 1918. Two of these squadrons were equipped only with short-distance machines, but one of them, whose machines had an air endurance of only 3½ hours, succeeded in improving matters by adding extra petrol tanks, which

increased the endurance to 5½ hours. Down to June 5 this small force carried out 142 raids, 57 of which were made in Germany, and included day and night attacks on Cologne, Stuttgart, Mannheim, Mainz, and Coblenz. Long-distance attacks were also made on Namur, Charleroi and Liège.

These four squadrons formed the nucleus of the Independent Force, R.A.F., which in May, 1918, it was decided to constitute in order to undertake the bombing of the industrial centres of Germany. This force was criticized as a dispersion of effort, but Lord Weir turned the point very neatly when he said that he thoroughly agreed, but that the effort which had been dispersed was Germany's; nothing in the war had caused such a gigantic dispersion of Germany's effort, of Germany's man-power, as the moral and destructive influence of the work done by the Independent Air Force. Major-General Sir H. M. Trenchard was put in



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. M. TRENCHARD,
K.C.B.

Commanded the Independent Air Force.

command, taking over the tactical command from Sir Douglas Haig on June 5, 1918, and the administrative and complete control on June 15. The anti-aircraft defences and searchlights also came under him.

On taking up his position he at once set

about providing accommodation for a force in the neighbourhood of 60 squadrons. Owing to the nature of the country this was a heavy task, and considerable engineering works were required for the construction of aerodromes to carry large machines and large bomb loads and for the installation of electrical power. The work was practically completed by November 1, 1918, but the number of squadrons to be housed never exceeded 10.

The object with which the Independent Air Force was formed was to strike the German Army at its most vital point—its sources of supply, and the question arose how this result was best to be achieved. There were two broad alternatives: one was to make sustained and continuous attacks on one large centre after another until each had been destroyed or the industrial population dispersed, and the other to attack as many of the large industrial centres as could be reached. The latter policy was adopted, because the force at disposal was not sufficient for the former, and also because such "dispersal of effort" was calculated to create the most widespread moral effect. It was also decided that the number of day-bombing squadrons should be rather greater than that of night-bombing squadrons, because the greater part of the value of night bombing, without day bombing, would be lost through the enemy making arrangements to work by day and live at a distance by night. Railways were regarded as the target of chief importance, blast furnaces coming next.

The total weight of bombs dropped by the Force between June 6 and November 10 was 550 tons—160 tons by day and 390 tons by night. Of this weight over 220 tons were dropped on aerodromes, the object being to prevent the enemy's bombing machines from attacking our aerodromes and to destroy large numbers of his scouts, which could not be dealt with on equal terms in the air. The remainder of the bombs were distributed over 40 or 50 places. A few of the more notable expeditions may be mentioned. On June 29–30 the chemical works at Mannheim were attacked, though owing to the weather only one machine reached its goal. On July 5 a dozen machines attacked the railway sidings at Coblenz, and on July 31 a squadron on its way to Mainz encountered 40 enemy scouts south of Saarbruecken and lost four machines. The remainder dropped their bombs on Saarbruecken station, but on their way back were again set



[Official photograph.]

RAID ON STUTTGART, March 10, 1918.
Bomb bursts (indicated by black brackets) are shown on the railway and the river bank.

upon by hostile scouts and lost three more of their number. Immediately after their return another squadron started off to Saarbrücken, where it bombed the factories and sidings without loss. On August 11 a big explosion was caused in Karlsruhe railway station; one of our machines was brought down, and three of the enemy's driven down out of control. Next day it was the turn of Frankfurt, and on their way the 12 machines employed were attacked over Mannheim by 40 scouts, two of which were destroyed and three driven down. On the night of August 21-22 two Handley Page machines dropped just over a ton of bombs on Cologne station, and next day 12 machines made a raid on Mannheim. Two of them had to land under control about five miles over the lines, after driving away eight hostile machines. Immediately before the objective was reached 15 hostile machines made a determined onslaught on the formation, which came down to 6,000 feet, following its leader, who was shot down under control; 10 of our machines, nevertheless, succeeded in dropping bombs on their objective. Three German machines were destroyed.

Another daring raid was made on Mannheim on the night of August 25-26. Two machines, in spite of searchlights and anti-aircraft gun barrage, descended among the chimneys of the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik's works, dropping bombs and sweeping the factories, guns, and searchlight works

with machine-gun fire. Another attack was made on the same chemical works on September 7 almost simultaneously by two squadrons, or 21 machines in all, which succeeded in dropping over two tons of bombs on the town, though they were almost continuously attacked on both the outward and return journeys by hostile aircraft in superior numbers. On one night—September 16-17—seven Handley Page machines were missing, and on the 25th four machines did not return from a raid in which Frankfurt received over $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons of bombs. On the night of October 21-22 two squadrons, in very bad weather, dropped several 1,650 lb. bombs on the railways of Kaiserslautern. The Independent Air Force had to write off in all 109 machines as missing.

The longest distances flown out and back were 330 miles by day and 342 miles by night, both in August. But the Force was balked of the chance of essaying a still longer flight for which it was making preparations. A Group—the 27th—was established in England for the purpose of bombing Berlin, but it did not receive machines that were capable of undertaking the expedition until the end of October, and in spite of all its efforts could not get them ready for the attack before the armistice was signed on November 11. So Berlin escaped a taste of the aeroplane bombs it had lavished so freely on Paris and London—until its own people gave it the experience in March 1919.



CHAPTER CCLXXXIII.

THE ALLIED ADVANCE: AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1918.

THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME CONTINUED—THE FIGHTING ON THE OISE—THE BATTLE OF THE SCARPE—THE DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE BREACHED—THE FRENCH ADVANCE ON THE BRITISH RIGHT—DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIED PLAN—THE AMERICAN PART IN THE BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL—GERMAN VIEWS—AVIATION RECORD.

WHILE the British force had been advancing, as described in Chapter CCLXXIX., the French on their right had also been making progress. Lassigny had been captured on August 21, and the Third French Army had made considerable progress. Still more important was the forward movement of Mangin with the Tenth Army, in the region between the Oise, the Ailette and the Aisne. In the evening of August 21, the Germans had been thrust out of the forest of Ourseamp and the wood of Carlepoint. The Oise was reached at Sempigny and Pontoise, while a little more to the south Cuts and Camelin were taken. To the north of Soissons the Germans were pushed still farther back from the Aisne and Laval was captured, some thousands of prisoners being taken in the course of the fighting. Blérancourt had been taken, and thus the road from Noyon to Coucy-le-Château was cut. The French forces were closing round Noyon, and, on the left of the Tenth, the Third Army had pressed through the Orval wood and had reached the edge of Chiry-Ourseamp.

On August 22, Mangin continued to press the Germans and occupied Quierzy, on the south bank of the Oise, and extended his right along the road Blérancourt-Coucy by capturing St. Aubin. In the immediate neighbourhood of Soissons, Pommiers, on the northern bank of the Aisne, was occupied. On the next day the Oise was held as far as its junction with

the Ailette, and the course of the latter river was occupied as far as the railroad from Coucy-le-Château to the east of Selens. French troops also reached the outskirts of Guny and Pont St. Marc.

On August 25, the line from Chavigny to Crecy-au-Mont was reached, and thus the out-flanking effect of Mangin's advance became greater and greater.

The next day the Germans endeavoured to attack west of Chavigny, but were not only driven back with a loss of 26 prisoners and many killed and wounded, but were also compelled to yield ground, so that the French advanced 1,200 yards east of Domaine Wood on a front of over 1,000 yards.

On August 26 Debeney's army again advanced and captured Fresnoye-les-Roye and St. Mard and the neighbouring villages. The environs of Roye were reached in the evening. During the night the Germans abandoned the town and the French patrols, following on the heels of the retreating enemy, completed its occupation.


There was considerable artillery activity towards Sempigny. Malhotel farm was occupied, and on the Vesle the Americans succeeded in getting a footing in Bazoches.

We must now return to the front with which the British were more immediately concerned. On August 25, north of the Somme, British troops pressed on from Albert towards Bapaume, reached the outskirts of Le Sars and captured Contalmaison and Warlencourt-Eaucourt.



[Canadian War Records.

CANADIANS ADVANCING ON REMY.



[Canadian War Records.

CANADIANS NEAR MONCHY WAITING TO GO FORWARD.

The 2nd Division captured Sapiignies and Behagnies, taking a considerable number of prisoners, while the 62nd Division mastered Mory. We crossed the Albert-Bapaume road along its whole length south of Bapaume and captured Martinpuich, also Le Sars and Le Barque on the Bapaume-Albert road. To the north of Bapaume, in spite of a strenuous resistance on the part of the Germans in the neighbourhood of Favreuil and Croisilles, our troops were enabled to make good their advance at these points and also farther north at Neuville-Vitasse.

During the day, the counter-attacks were continued, being mostly conducted by recently arrived German reinforcements. None of these were successful, and our armies were, indeed, enabled to make further progress, and took many prisoners. North of the Somme Australian troops early in the morning carried the enemy's lines on the high ground east of Bray; on their left London and Eastern County Divisions continued their advance towards Carnoy and took Mametz, while Welsh troops seized the wood of that name.

Farther north the Germans also tried a counter-attack against our new positions in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, south of Lens, but were driven back with loss.

During the early part of the night August 25-26, the enemy made strenuous efforts against the British position south and north of Bapaume in the neighbourhood of Eaucourt-l'Abbaye and Favreuil, but without any success. North of the latter point our men advanced against the Germans with the bayonet and beat them back with heavy loss, taking many prisoners. Another counter-attack was attempted against us in the same section, but was also defeated. We consolidated ourselves in Favreuil and made further progress beyond the village, while to the north of it, our positions south-east of Mory and to the west of Croisilles were improved.

On August 26 the First Army began to take part in the general advance. It stood on the left of the Third Army, and its front extended from north-east of Festubert to Neuville Vitasse. It comprised three army corps. There were, commencing from the north, the I. Corps, composed of the 55th, 16th, and 15th Divisions; then the VIII. Corps, 24th, 20th and 8th Divisions; then the Canadian Corps, with the 51st Highland Division, the 3rd and 2nd Canadian Divisions. The attack was made only by the right wing—viz., the two Canadian

divisions south of the Scarpe—the 51st Division north of it. The object of the First Army was to turn from the north the western end of the Hindenburg line and thus force the Germans to retire from this their great bulwark. The point selected was the junction of the Hindenburg and Drocourt-Quéant lines, near the latter village. Penetration here would completely turn both lines.

On August 26, our troops attacked at 3 a.m. on both sides of the Scarpe river from Croisilles to the neighbourhood of Gavrelle. On the south bank of the river, the Canadian Divisions, attacking vigorously, passed through the front line of the enemy's defences without much difficulty and captured at one rush the high ground known as Orange Hill. The attack was the more notable inasmuch as a heavy storm of rain was raging for the greater part of the morning, though later on the weather cleared. The Canadians reached Wancourt and Monchyle-Preux, completed the occupation of these villages and advanced farther beyond them. Now Scottish troops on the north side of the Scarpe, passing over the same ground on which they had fought in 1917, carried the German front defensive system of trenches south of Gavrelle, reached the outskirts of Roeux and captured the chemical works north of that place. On the right of the Canadians, from the Third Army, Scottish and London troops continued their advance from Croisilles and Heninel. They met with strong resistance, chiefly from machine-gun nests, aided by some German infantry; but in spite of this, they made considerable progress and captured the high ground between Croisilles and Heninel. Here a good many prisoners were taken. On the more southern portion of the front of operations, the British advance was continued on both banks of the Somme. Australian troops took Cappy and advanced to the east of it. North of the Somme, Suzanne was captured. Farther to the north, English troops advanced in the direction of Montauban and Welsh troops captured Bazentin-le-Grand. A good deal of desultory fighting took place at a number of points beyond those already mentioned, and some considerable ground was made.

Between Maricourt and Bapaume, and also to the north of that town, heavy engagements took place in the afternoon, and notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy, our line moved steadily forward. English and Welsh troops captured Montauban and then, working along



[French official photograph.]

ROYE: THE PRINCIPAL ROAD CLEARED FOR TRAFFIC.

the crest of the ridge, captured High Wood and proceeded against Longueval, which was entered. But our men were unable to hold the village, being counter-attacked with very superior forces, and were forced back towards Bazentin-le-Grand and High Wood. High Wood, it will be remembered, had formed the scene of very severe fighting in the battle of the Somme in 1916, in which the tide of war ebbed and flowed for some days. On this occasion, as on the former, the German counter-attack came from Longueval. As we have just seen, it had been retaken by the enemy and he continued the movement on High Wood, compelling our troops to fall back for a time. At High Wood, however, our troops turned, stopped the enemy's advance, and then again moving forward established themselves on ground well to the east of it. Still the Germans did not at once give up the struggle in this part of the field. Another counter-attack was made early in the night against the line our troops now held, but our rifle fire alone was sufficient to prevent the Germans reaching our positions, and they were driven back with heavy loss. They also attacked north of High Wood on the line Ligny-Thillois, not far from Bapaume, and forced our advanced troops to retire about a quarter of a mile;

then the counter-attack was held up and finally beaten back with considerable loss. The New Zealanders reached Bapaume itself in the afternoon and established themselves on the edge of the town, while farther north English troops progressed towards Beugnatre, thus advancing on the northern side of Bapaume, which was now closely threatened on the south, the west, and the north. There was also severe fighting about Croisilles, and more to the north Canadian troops captured the ridge east of Wancourt and advanced beyond Guémappe. North of the Scarpe Scottish troops continued their advance and made considerable progress towards Plouyain.

At the southern extremity of our line, the Australian Divisions continued their advance on both banks of the Somme, and made considerable progress towards Dompierre on the south bank and around Suzanne on the north.

These advances had inflicted further heavy losses on the German Army, which had been compelled to yield up 21,000 prisoners to our men since the morning of August 21. The strategic situation had now changed very much to the advantage of the Allies. They had pressed back the Germans so that all danger of an irruption between the French and British lines was over, and it would have been necessary

to recapture a great deal of ground before they could have been again in a position to threaten either Amiens or Hazebrouck. The result of the fighting had shown a considerable diminution of the German *moral*, and it was known that a large proportion of their reserves were used up. Moreover, it was plainly evident that they could no longer maintain the positions they were holding from the right of the French Third Army on the Oise to the Scarpe on the north; the troops of the Allies were demonstrably able to push the whole line still farther back. The German position facing the French Armies on the Oise and Aisne was, indeed, a very dangerous one. Mangin's advance threatened their left flank; moreover Bapaume and Peronne were in imminent danger, and it was a question whether they should be yielded up or their garrison taken prisoners.

On the night of August 26-27, the Germans began to yield ground, as the German High Command felt that their troops could not continue in the positions held in front of Chaulnes, Roye and Noyon. Roye was abandoned on the 26th and the Germans began to retire from both sides of the town on a front of about 12 miles. The French followed up the retreat and entered Roye and the neighbouring villages.

This was a very important gain to the French. Roye served as the pivot of the German defences

in that part; it had taken 10 days to capture the whole position, and from it roads ran in all directions north, south, east and west, and it is worthy of note, as showing the increased resistance offered by the Germans to prevent the capture of this important point, that although in the early days of the advance 12 miles had been won within two days thereafter the rate of progress was much slower, proving that the reinforcements brought up had considerably strengthened the German position. Its outlying defences, Fresnoy, Goyencourt, Laucourt, Beauvraignes had gradually been taken, and when these fell, it was practically impossible for the Germans to retain their position in the town itself, especially when the closer lying posts of Cæsar's Camp and St. Mard fell into French hands; but these points were taken at irregular dates, and this, no doubt, accounts for the Germans being able to hang on as long as they did. Cæsar's Camp had been in our Allies' hands since August 16; Goyencourt was taken on August 16; Beauvraignes on August 21; Fresnoy was not taken till August 26, on which day St. Mard was also captured. From the time that Beauvraignes was taken, Laucourt was under fire from it and was therefore valueless to the Germans, but it did not actually yield until the morning of the 27th.



[French official photograph.]

A FRENCH BATTERY IN ACTION EAST OF ROYE.

When all these positions were in the French power, it was evident that the Germans had either to surrender or retreat. They preferred the latter course, and Roye, as we have seen, was completely occupied on August 27.

The fighting which immediately preceded the occupation of the town showed the French troops at their best, full of vigour, and with that confidence which believes only in victory. Nor was the German resistance to be despised. But as the French troops began to encircle the town, the outlying defences fell with increasing ease, while the capture of the bridges over the Avre enabled General Debeney to transfer his troops north or south in accordance with tactical requirements. The Germans made many counter-attacks to drive back the French from the banks of this river, but all were unsuccessful, although very often the French had to fight with the water up to their waists. There can be no doubt that Roye was given up with reluctance, and although some of the near defences had been taken some days before, it was not until August 26, when Fresnoy was taken, that it became evident that resistance was slowly dying off. Fresnoy had been a point from which many counter-attacks had been delivered and it

had also formed a target for the French artillery, so much so that the village was practically non-existent. Indeed, the ground all round it had been simply swept clear by the heavy shell-fire directed on it. Even the trees on the Paris-Lille road had all been cut down. There was not a single one standing. When Fresnoy fell, therefore, the outlook for the German position to the north of Roye was very bad, so was it also on the south of the Avre, where St. Mard, which formed a formidable position, part of the original line of 1914-16, constructed in the usual careful ways of that period, protected by heavy barbed wire and numerous concrete forts, was in French hands.

A violent counter-attack was made against this point on the morning of August 27, but it was driven back and the French, continuing their advance, completed the capture of Laucourt by 8 a.m., and the result of this operation was to extend the French flank well to the south of Roye and to capture over 1,100 prisoners.

All these events had undoubtedly influenced the *moral* of the German troops and had given the German commanders serious cause to consider whether it was not time to retreat. Probably the final straw was the capture of



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH ENGINEERS SEARCHING THE STREETS OF NOYON FOR MINES.

St. Mard, which was taken on the afternoon of August 26 without great difficulty, after a very severe artillery fire, although the resistance from the machine-gun nests was, as usual, of a determined character.

The Germans also began to retreat on the north of Roye in the region of Hallu, and by the afternoon of August 27 their line ran approximately by Hattencourt, Carrepuis, past Roigtise and west of Verpillières.

The retreat also extended to the south of Roye on a line of over 12 miles, and the whole German

here had been held by General Humbert's army since August 22.

In the neighbourhood of Noyon the French occupied Pont l'Evêque to the south, Suzoy to the west and Vauchelles and Porquericourt. The advance to these points was swift and decisive; 500 prisoners were taken and a great deal of material, including three trains loaded with munitions. It was evident that Noyon was coming to the end of its resistance, and it fell the next day.

When the Germans had retired in 1917, they



[French official photograph.]

THE PLACE DE L'HÔTEL DE VILLE, NOYON.

line between Chaulnes and Noyon fell back in accordance with the arrangement which had been made several days before. The French followed up the enemy, and during the morning of August 28 reached a line which extended from Licoure-Potte-Mesnil-le-Petit-Nesles-Crapeaumesnil-Dives. Chaulnes and Nesle were taken and the pursuit was continued throughout the whole day. It was fairly evident that the enemy did not mean to stand until he reached the line of the Somme and the Canal du Nord. By the evening the French advance guards had reached this line and Cizancourt on the Somme was occupied, and at the southern extremity they were on the outskirts of Noyon. Both banks of the Divette

did no damage to the town beyond blowing a large hole in the main road leading into the city, along which the French came. On this occasion, apparently thinking they were not likely to return again, they determined to perform their usual reckless and reasonless destruction on the unfortunate city. Innumerable mines and traps of all kinds were placed about the town with diabolical ingenuity. The mines were arranged to be fired by electric leads going back to Crisolles, a little village somewhat over three miles to the north of the town, and it was only when this was captured that the constant explosions were brought to an end. Everything that could be blown down was destroyed, and the damage was added to after

the enemy had left by shell-fire, which was continued steadily for eight days from heavy guns to the east of the town. When these were compelled to retreat, the work of demolition was given a finishing touch by aeroplane bombing.

Noyon was a town of considerable historic interest with many fine buildings. The magnificent mediæval town hall was almost entirely destroyed, a mere fragment of the beautiful façade alone being left. The house where Calvin was born on the Place was reduced to a shapeless heap of stones. Not a prominent building was left except the Cathedral, which, although severely damaged, was not totally destroyed. The Mayor of Noyon, an octogenarian Senator, stated that not more than one-tenth of the houses in the town could be repaired. All these ravages, wanton and



[French official photograph.]
NOYON CATHEDRAL AS IT WAS BEFORE
THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE.

purposeless, were done out of the miserable spirit of German revenge. An excellent example of this was seen in the Cathedral, where a painting of Christ had evidently formed the target for some particularly brutal German's pistol practice.

On the 28th the general advance of the Allies was continued and their position was greatly improved. On the south side of the river Somme, Fontaine-les-Cappy and the woods between it and the river were taken and some hundreds of prisoners made. Vermandovillers

also was captured, while, north of the river, the ground to the east of Maricourt was taken, which gave into our hands dominating ground to aid a further movement eastward.

Meanwhile the British troops had been pressing forward, too, farther north. On August 27, severe fighting had taken place at Trones Wood, in which the 18th Division fought with great gallantry and finally succeeded in



[Swaine]
MAJOR-GENERAL T. A. CUBITT.
Commanded the 38th (Welsh) Division.

securing firm possession of the wood, notwithstanding repeated counter-attacks of the Germans, including one made by the 2nd Guards Division which came fresh into the fighting.

To the south of Bapaume, on the 28th English and Welsh troops made further progress, driving the Germans from Longuéval, Delville Wood and Bernafay Wood. These points had been the scene of much severe fighting in the Somme battle of 1916. Our advance met many counter-attacks in which the Prussian Guard took part, and, generally speaking, it may be said that south and north of Bapaume the resistance of the enemy was obstinate. Between Croisilles and Bapaume, South English and New Zealand troops repulsed a number of determined counter-attacks by German Divisions brought up specially for the purpose. But not one of these attacks was successful, nor indeed did they even stop the British advance. Very heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy

and he was gradually driven back. The village of Beugnotre was taken.

Between the Scarpe and the Sensée rivers there was heavy fighting, in which Canadian troops captured Cherisy, Vis-en-Artois and the Sart Wood, taking a considerable number of prisoners. On the south of the Canadians, Scottish troops crossed the Sensée and seized Fontaine-les-Croisilles, taking up a position on the spur south of the village. Here also more prisoners were taken. North of the Scarpe Scottish regiments took Roeux, Greenland Hill, Gavrelle and Arleux-en-Gohelle, which marked the point where the line held since the March retreat joined our former line of works. Part of the German front south of the village was also captured. The fighting all round Longuéval and Delville Wood, where were the 38th (Welsh) Division (Maj.-Gen. T. A. Cubitt) was particularly severe, both on August 27 and 28, and the same was the case with the 17th Division (Maj.-Gen. P. R. Robertson), which attacked north of these troops in the direction of Flers.

On the latter date the retreat of the Germans became more pronounced, and the whole Allied

line advanced from the Scarpe to above the Aisne. In the north, the Canadians had severe fighting all day. They drove back the Germans at many points, occupying their trenches, and captured Boiry-Notre-dame and Pelves. A little to the south Croisilles was taken by London troops after an obstinate resistance. Immediately on the north bank of the Somme British troops captured Hardecourt and Curlu and pressed still farther east towards Maurepas. Repeated hostile attacks forced us to withdraw the advanced posts which had been established west of Oppy. But this was a matter of small moment. South of the river, our troops reached the line Herbécourt-Fresnes. The Germans were still offering considerable resistance at the passages over the river at Péronne and at Brie to the south.

During the night of the 28th-29th there was violent artillery fire on the Somme front, which appears to have been largely employed to mask the retreat. August 29 saw the retreat of the Germans continued along the whole line from the Sensée river in the north to the Oise and the Ailette in the south. There had been some



GERMAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN CAPTURED BY CANADIANS.

A pigeon-carrier examines it as he passes.

(Canadian War Records.)

symptoms on the previous days of an intention of the Germans to stand on the ground to the east of Longuéval and along the villages to Guillemont, Ginchy, Lesbœufs and Guede-court to the east and south-east of that point, but on the evening of August 28, they seem finally to have abandoned all thought of making a stand at such an advanced position, which indeed was becoming more and more dangerous by the advance of the French in the south of the fighting line, where Mangin with the Tenth Army, wheeling up to the left, combined with the direct advance of the French Third Army, was threatening seriously the German troops on the line of the Oise.

Above the Sensée, where the right wing of the British I. Army Corps was acting, there was very little forward movement, which indeed was confined during the next few days to securing better positions for the attack to be directed against the Drocourt-Quéant line. To the south of Gavrelle, however, our troops advanced into a position more to the east than they had occupied since the war began. The XXII. Corps, consisting of the 11th Division and the 51st Division from the Canadian Corps, was now pushed in between the VIII. Corps and the Canadians so as to

cover the left flank of the advance of the latter in their eastward movement.

On this date the enemy evacuated Bapaume, which was occupied by the New Zealanders; the 18th Division entered Combles, while, to the north of Bapaume, the 56th and 57th Divisions penetrated the enemy's line as far as Riencourt lez-Cagnicourt. But although they were unable to maintain their footing in this village they held a line on the western and northern outskirts of Bullecourt and Hendecourt. On the south side of the Somme, the British made good their hold on the eastern side of the bend of the river and captured Hem on the northern side of it. From this point, the Allied line now extended down to the east of Noyon, and here the French took Happlinecourt to the north-east of it and advanced on the slopes of Mont St. Sineon, taking Landrinnont and Morlincourt; while General Mangin's army was across the Ailette in several places north and south of Champs in spite of vigorous resistance offered by the Germans.

The French progress continued up to the Canal du Nord, which was skirted along its whole length (except about Catigny and Sermaize), by the Bois du Quesnoy, north-east of Ecuville and Beaurains. In the neighbourhood of Noyon the contest was very



FRENCH ARMoured CAR.

French official photograph.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH TROOPS AWAITING THEIR TURN TO CROSS A CANAL UNDER FIRE.

severe, and it was only by dint of hard fighting that Noyon had been captured and further progress made north to the southern edge of Haplinecourt. In these operations several hundred prisoners were captured, together with some guns and machine guns.

On the extreme right of the French line there were some enemy raids in Lorraine, which were easily driven back, while the French made two similar minor attacks into the German lines in Champagne and brought back some prisoners.

August 30. On this date British troops crossed the Somme south and west of Péronne, while on the road from Arras to Cambrai the Canadians advanced to a point close on to the Quéant-Droecourt line and took Haucourt and a good portion of the German lines down towards Hendecourt with numerous prisoners. A little more to the south, however, we were not so successful. London and West Lancashire troops took Bullecourt and Hendecourt after severe fighting, but the Germans, being unwilling to give up points so near to their main lines of defences, attacked in great force, and by the evening had driven back our troops to the western outskirts of these villages and to the German trench line between them. Here, however, the enemy was brought up by our


fire, but still we had made considerable progress towards the immediate objective of our troops in this part of the field.

Round Bapaume, also, we were successful. The outskirts of Bougny, on the road to Cambrai, were reached, while, farther north Vaulx-Vraucourt was captured, and to the south of the road, Frémicourt, Bancourt and Riencourt-les-Bapaume taken.

More to the north, near to the much disputed point of Mount Kemmel, the town of Bailleul, on the road to Cassel, was occupied, the Germans having abandoned it, as also the line of the Lawe.

The French on the right of our line also made considerable advance. The Canal du Nord was passed by Debeney's army, and Chivilly and Genvry captured, while the French Third Army took St. Simeon to the east of Noyon and made further progress at Haplinecourt. Farther to the east, the Ailette was crossed and the village of Champs reached; while on the high ground to the north of Soissons Mangin's troops captured Chavigny and Cuffies and carried their line forward to the borders of Crouy.

On August 30, English troops also carried out a successful operation north of the Arras-Cambrai road, capturing the village of Eter-



NAVAL GUNS CAPTURED BY THE CANADIANS.

[Canadian War Records.]

pigny, on the east bank of the Sensée, and also an important strong point known as St. Servin's Farm. In the Lys region, British troops occupied Lacouture and the line of the Lawe river, including the villages of Vieille-Chapelle and Lestrem. They further pushed forward towards Doulieu, captured Bailleul station to the south of Bailleul, which was then abandoned by the enemy, and

the hill to the east of it known as Mont de Lille (in the bend of the road to Armentières). Our troops entered Dranoutre to the south of Kimmel Hill and also gained ground to the north of it.

By night of this day, the 30th, the line of our Fourth and the Third Armies north of the Somme ran from Clery-sur-Somme past the western edge of Marrières wood to Combles-Lesboeufs-Bancourt-Fremicourt and Vraucourt, and thence to the western outskirts of Ecoust-Bullecourt and Hendecourt. This position was such that any further advance would threaten the enemy's line south of Péronne on the east bank of the Somme, to which our progress to the north of the river had already forced them to retreat.

At this time there were indications that the enemy intended to make a further stand. His counter-attacks had increased in number and violence. On the night of August 30-31, however, a brilliant operation by Major-General C. Rosenthal with the 2nd Australian Division put a different complexion on affairs. It was specially directed to the capture of Péronne. This division had two brigades, the 5th and 6th. Prevented by floods and heavy machine-gun fire from crossing the Somme opposite Mont St. Quentin, the former passed the river at Feuillières, two miles to the west. Here the bridge had been destroyed by the Germans, but the engineers replaced it by temporary structures, and by 10.15 p.m. the brigade had captured



[Official photograph.]

A BRIDGE OF BARRELS.

the German trenches east of Clery, and assembled in them ready to turn the enemy's positions from the north-west.

At 5 a.m. on the 31st the assault was continued, and, notwithstanding the determined resistance of the enemy, Mont St. Quentin and Feuillaucourt were taken. The fighting was of a most severe character. Strong hostile counter-attacks were made on several occasions during the day and were continued during the night, but our troops managed to cling to the positions they had captured. Nearly 1,000 prisoners were taken in the operation. The fate of Péronne was now sealed.

On the same date Mangin's army was engaged in severe fighting in the region of the Canal du Nord and to the north of Soissons. Progress was only slowly made, the enemy fighting with the greatest stubbornness. On the side of the Canal du Nord, Campagne was captured on the eastern bank, and a severe action took place at Chévilley. Twice the Germans succeeded in pressing the French back from this village, which was an important point on the high ground between Bussy and Campagne on the eastern side of the canal dominating the loop made by the latter in this part of its course. Finally, however, it remained in possession of the French, who captured there about 200 prisoners. Lower down the canal, in the neighbourhood of Noyon, the French made

further progress to the north of Haplinecourt and to the east of Morlinecourt.

The French advance in the neighbourhood of Soissons was also continued; Juvigny (which was taken by the Americans) and Crouy were carried after a very severe struggle and progress was made to the western outskirts of Leully.

On the morning of August 31, the left of the Fourth Army, consisting of the 3rd Australian, the 58th, 47th and 18th Divisions attacked towards Bouchavesnes, Rancourt and Frégicourt, and our troops reached the outskirts of St. Pierre-Vaast Wood between Rancourt and Sailly-Saillisel. The resistance at these points had considerably hardened, and it was not till the next day that our troops became completely masters of them. To the north of the Fourth Army, the Third Army also, on both August 31 and September 1, had very severe fighting, but by the evening of the latter date the troops held Sailly-Saillisel, Morval, Beaulencourt, the high ground at Moeuvres and Rieucourt-les-Bapaume, and also the ridges east of Bancourt, Frémicourt and Vaulx-Vraucourt and Longatte, and had taken over 2,000 prisoners. Part of the XVII. Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir C. Ferguson, completed the capture of Bullecourt and Hendecourt, and following up their advantage took Rien-lez-Cagnicourt.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS BROUGHT UP BY MOTOR-LORRY.

In the north, the Canadian troops carried out a successful operation immediately south of the Arras-Cambrai road, inflicting many casualties on their opponents and capturing 15 machine-guns. Between the Sensée and the Scarpe, English troops made another advance, pushing forward some 1,500 yards to the Trinquis river. The enemy now abandoned completely the Lys salient, and we occupied Kemmel hill and reached the line of Voornzeele-Lindenhoek-La Crèche-Doulieu and the neighbourhood of Estaires, following closely on the retreating enemy and gathering in a number of prisoners.

During the day we also made considerable progress in the direction of Le Transloy to the north of Saily-Saillisel on the road to Bapaume, and during the night of September 1 cleared the enemy from the villages of Longatte and Ecoust-St. Mein to the south-east of Croisilles, taking 100 prisoners. Near Haucourt, in a successful minor operation, 50 more prisoners were captured.

On September 1, Australian troops captured Péronne. At an early hour of the morning, they took the German positions west and north of the town, while fierce fighting was still taking place among the ruined streets

of the eastern suburbs. By the evening we held the line Péronne-Flamicourt and St. Denis, and had pushed forward on the spurs north and north-east of St. Quentin.

On the Lys front progress was continued, Doulieu, Le Verrier and Steenwerck were taken, and the troops were in contact with the enemy about Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem

September 1 marks the close of the second stage in the British offensive. In the first part of the operations, the enemy had been driven back from the neighbourhood of Amiens by the brilliant success obtained in the east of that town, and thus all immediate danger of an advance on Paris had been brought to an end. The second period of our advance, which had commenced on August 21 and which is usually known as the battle of Bapaume, had been even more successful than the first. The Third and Fourth British Armies and part of the First, ably directed and fighting with their usual bravery, had persistently and relentlessly driven back Germans 50 per cent. more than their own strength, without a halt, in 10 days from one side of the old Somme battlefield to the other, thereby



[Australian official photograph

A BARRICADE AT THE ENTRANCE TO PERONNE
Which failed to hold up the Australian attack.

turning the line of the river Somme. They had inflicted on their opponents extraordinarily heavy losses in killed and wounded and had taken from them 34,000 prisoners and 270 guns. Altogether, in the month of August the British troops had captured 57,318 Germans, including 1,283 officers, and had taken 657 guns, including 150 of the heaviest calibres, more than 5,750 machine-guns, and over 1,000 trench mortars. Among other spoils were to be counted three complete trains and 9 loco-

capture of German guns with ample supplies of ammunition for them was of the greatest utility. On many occasions they were used with success against their former possessors. Altogether, the battle of Bapaume may be looked upon as the most successful enterprise which the Allies had undertaken since the war began.

Equally striking were the results which the French had gained. By able strategy Marshal Foch had been able to conduct strik-



[Australian official photograph.]

AUSTRALIAN SECOND LINE WAITING FOR THE FIRST WAVE OF THE ATTACK.


motives, and in addition, numerous ammunition and engineer dumps, containing many hundred thousand rounds of gun and trench mortar ammunition as well as cartridges for small arms and immense quantities of war material of every description. The French gains had been equally notable; they had taken 70,984 prisoners, including 1,191 officers, 1,412 guns, 734 trench mortars, 8,033 machine-guns. It will be seen that the German Army had been depleted at the rate of 20,000 men a week since July 18. These huge gains in material show that the German High Command had fully believed in its capacity to continue the advance deep into France and even to accomplish its aims against Paris itself, and had accumulated vast stores for the purpose. The

ing flank attacks against the enemy which had driven him back from the Marne to the Aisne; paralysed his progress in the direction of Reims and subsequently threatened the left flank of his troops which the British and French were attacking frontally. The military genius which had organized these movements was plainly of the highest character. The successful operations of both armies were due to the able staff which had directed their movements, notably among the British commanders, General Byng, the Commander of the Third Army, and, among the French, General Mangin. In the first flank attack which Mangin, in combination with General Degoutte and two American divisions, had delivered, his arrangements had been so well made, under the

superintendence of General Pétain (in supreme command of that portion of the French front), that they had completely surprised the Germans against whom they were directed. In the second attack, Mangin, acting on the right flank of Debeney's and Humbert's armies, had again by his persistent and strenuous attacks largely contributed to the German decision to fall back before them.

In the last few days of August, when the German Supreme Command appears to have felt the necessity for retreat (from about

necessary to support them, at points where our troops threatened penetration, by means of reserves pushed into the battle line where need required them. The consequence of all this was that the order of battle of the German troops had been much upset; this is easily proved by the captures made, which showed that units of the same division were fighting on widely separated parts of the battle-front—proof positive of the piecemeal way in which the German leaders had been compelled to employ their troops to stop at all



THE QUEANT-DROCOURT AND HINDENBURG LINES.

August 26 onwards), they had apparently endeavoured to take up a rearguard position covering the general retirement of their armies to the Hindenburg defences. The line of the Tortille river and the Nurlu plateau was favourable for such a process, and would have allowed them to secure their artillery and remove much of the ammunition they had collected in forward dumps. But our progress had been so rapid and our blows so heavy that they had resulted in a steady deterioration in the moral of their troops. Their rearguards had become incapable of determined stands, and it had been found

hazards an irruption of our forces through their fighting line.

The value of the pressure which we had applied to the enemy was particularly shown in the northern portion of the line in what may be described as the Lys front. It has been before pointed out in this narrative that the German troops in rear of their front line had for some considerable time been exposed for long distances to the rear to our artillery fire. At first they had doubtless hung on to this position because it threatened Hazebrouck and therefore the Channel ports, but it became evident to them that all possibility of

such a strategic success had vanished for the time, even although they might be unwilling to admit it had gone for ever. More to the south their line had also been thrust back; it was therefore common sense to retire from the Lys salient. The initial stage of the retirement had commenced as early as July 26, when the failure of the more southern advance had shown clearly to the German Command that they did not possess troops in sufficient



THE HÔTEL DE VILLE, PERONNE.

numbers to continue any further forward movement, and from the date in question they had begun the withdrawal of ammunition and stores collected for a further offensive.

As early as August 5, they had begun to effect local retirement on the southern flank of the salient, and this process was accelerated by the constant progress made on the southern side of the Allied advance. On August 18 we had been able to make a considerable advance opposite Merville, and the next day this place was taken and our line advanced on the whole front from the Lawe river to the Plate Beeque. The nibbling process on the German lines had been continued against the southern and western faces of the German salient, but without inducing any corresponding withdrawal on the northern side. On the night of August 29-30, however, the notion of any adherence to this projection, which was now becoming a

source of great weakness, only to be justified as forming the base of an immediate offensive, was given up. As we have seen, on August 30 our troops had found Bailleul unoccupied, and the next day the enemy had given up Mont Kemmel and Steenwerck, and the following day Neuve Eglise was captured. It was the beginning of the end.

At the end of August from Kemmel down to Noyon, with the exception of a small space from Givenchy to Lens, the Allies had pressed back the Germans along the whole length of their line. To the east of Noyon, the French out-flanking force was advancing northwards, threatening the whole of the German position back to St. Quentin. Moreover, the enemy had not merely been driven back, he was still retiring except at the point just mentioned, and he had practically lost the gains which



[Elliott & Fry.]

MAJOR-GENERAL C. A. BLACKLOCK.
Commanded the 63rd Division.

he had made in the spring and early summer. Our troops had reached a position where they threatened the main defence of Germany, the Hindenburg line, and that at its most dangerous point, viz., at the salient where it joined the Drocourt-Quéant line to the north. To penetrate here was effectively to turn both lines of defence, and would necessarily have had a great effect on the German general situation.

On September 2, the decisive blow was struck

by troops of the First and Third Armies. To the former belonged the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions and the 4th English Division; to the latter the XVII. Corps with the 52nd, 57th, and 63rd Divisions. At 5 a.m., the Canadians were sent on a front of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles against the enemy's position south of the Trinquis brook. They were aided by 40 tanks of the 3rd Tank Brigade and by a mobile force of motor machine-gun units, Canadian Cavalry and armoured cars. The attack was eminently successful, and after seven hours' fighting the Drocourt-Quéant line was completely penetrated and in our possession. On the right of the Canadians, the attack was conducted by the XVII. Corps, with the 52nd and 57th Divisions in front line. It was directed against the junction of the Hindenburg and Drocourt-Quéant lines, north-west of Quéant village. This movement was equally successful. The 52nd Division was engaged in very severe fighting in the elaborate German trench system both north and south of Quéant, and the progress they made greatly assisted the advance of the Canadians on their northern flank. The 57th Division on the right was also severely engaged. Early in the afternoon the 63rd Division (under Maj.-General C. A. Blacklock) passed through our front line and proceeded to improve the success already gained.

As the day progressed and our troops advanced, they met with considerable resistance from machine-gun nests at Etaing and on the reverse slopes of the ridge on which Dury was situated, and there was specially hard fighting on the front of the 63rd Division, now joined by the 4th Division (under Maj.-General L. J. Lipsett). By nightfall the 63rd Division had reached a point on the Douai railroad east of Quéant, while the 52nd Division, wheeling round on the north of Quéant, threatened both that village and Pronville from the north. Altogether our troops had made an advance which measured over three miles along the Arras-Cambrai road, and had reached the outskirts of Buissey south of the Arras-Cambrai road. Eterpigny, Villers-lez-Cagniecourt, Cagniecourt and Dury had been captured.* Many guns and 8,000 prisoners had also been taken. The victory gained was a very important one, as the penetration of the German lines of defence turned the whole of his organized positions both to the south and in great measure to the north. We were in fact behind his main Hindenburg line. South of this special movement, the troops of the Third and Fourth Armies prolonged the line of attack down to Péronne and made important progress in the face of severe resistance. Moreuil and Villers-au-Flos were

* Dury was taken by 8 a.m., and the German town-major was found in bed asleep!



QUEANT.

[Official photograph.]



[Canadian War Records.]

CANADIANS IN THE SUPPORT LINE WATCHING THEIR COMRADES' ADVANCE.

taken, and further progress was made towards Lens.

On the French front troops passed over the Canal du Nord to the east of Nesle, while between the Oise and the Aisne others which had crossed the Ailotte near Champs continued their progress in the direction of Couey-le-Château. Leully and Terny-Sorny were occupied, and ground was gained on the north of the Aisne and at Crouy.

The result of the fighting up to September 2, especially on the Scarpe, where the British had thoroughly beaten 13 German divisions, taken 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns, had now finally convinced the German Commanders that the position they had hitherto held was become untenable, and it was better to retire from it. During the night of September 2-3, along the whole line of battle from the right of the First Army, on the left of our line, to the right of the Third Army, a general retirement of the enemy took place, and on September 3 the general line occupied by him ran along the Canal du Nord from Péronne to Ytres and thence east of Hermies-Inchy-en-Artois-Ecourt-St. Quentin to the Sensee east of Lecluse, and on September 4 the withdrawal was continued from the east bank of the Somme south of Péronne. On the night of September 8, the Germans held a line from Vermand-Epéhy-Havrincourt, and thence along the east bank of the Canal du Nord.

During the night of September 2-3, the result of the Allied victories became more and more evident. Quéant had fallen into our hands, and also Barralle, eight miles from Cambrai, for south of the Canadian attack, the XVII. Corps had taken Quéant and Pronville, and reached Inchy and Moeuvres. The German retreat was particularly rapid between Quéant and Moeuvres. Between Quéant and Péronne our troops made considerable progress to the Hindenburg line east of Beaumetz and Ytres. In the centre our troops entered the western outskirts of Lens and on the Lys front Richebourg-St. Vaast was captured.

The French on the British right were engaged in fighting from Péronne to Noyon and from the Oise to the Aisne, holding the Germans and preventing the diversion of reserves to the more northern area of conflict. French troops crossed the Somme on September 3 and held their position on the eastern bank. To the north of Noyon they had crossed the Canal du Nord and had occupied Genvry. Saleney was taken and the road to Guiseard was thus open. The enemy was now retiring rapidly at this part of the line of battle on the northern side of the Oise to avoid further losses.

On September 4, General Humbert, following closely on their tracks, went forward over three miles between Libermont and Apilly,



THE CROSSING OF THE CANAL DU NORD.

APOLLON


and at the end of the day his troops occupied the line Libermont-Guiscard-Apilly. The French also closed on to the outskirts of Coucy-le-Château and Jumeneourt and advanced on the north of Soissons, and here their progress became so threatening to the line of German troops on the Vesle that they commenced to fall back from this river on a line of about 19 miles. General Mangin advanced with the 10th Army across the river and pursued the rearguards of the enemy, closing up in the evening to the line they held by Chassemy, Brenelle, Vauberlin, Blanzly.

The German retreat was over a long line and involved the abandonment of many important positions and great quantities of material of all kinds, including guns, of which considerable numbers fell into the Allies' hands. So closely did our troops follow up the enemy that many of his rearguards were captured, and our artillery was often able to come up to very forward situations whence they were able to bring a devastating fire to bear on the retreating columns and convoys.

North of Havrincourt, the Canal du Nord, behind which the enemy's line was now drawn up, formed a powerful obstacle against our troops, for the slopes up from the canal were open and swept by fire from the German line. Its capture was therefore an operation of considerable difficulty which had to be carefully organized. From Havrincourt to the south the enemy's main line of defence was the Hindenburg line, on which he had lavished enormous labour and great care in every possible means of defence. It ran from Havrincourt south-east across the Beaucamp-La Vacquerie and Bonavis ridges to the St Quentin Canal at Bantouzelle, along which it ran to St. Quentin. Strong positions were held by the Germans in advance of the Hindenburg line at Havrincourt and Epéhy. It was necessary to take these before the main Hindenburg line could be attacked with any prospect of success. The first object therefore of the British was to capture these advanced works so as to allow their whole force to get within striking distance of the main line.

September 12 marked the beginning of the necessary operations. General Byng directed the IV. and VI. Corps from the Third Army to attack on a front of about five miles against the Havrincourt segment. The troops employed were New Zealanders with the 37th, 67th and 2nd Divisions. The village of

Havrincourt was taken by the 62nd Division, while the 37th captured Trescault. Our troops consolidated the positions there, which were of the highest importance for further operations against the Hindenburg line. On the right of the British front, the 9th and the Australian Corps continued the forward movement, apparently without meeting with great resistance, as the forces employed were light in numbers. By means of skilful manœuvres and local attacks well driven home, they had by September 17 made themselves masters of



A GERMAN TRENCH MORTAR.

Holnon village and weed and Maissemy, and were on the confines of Le Verguier and Templeux-le-Guérard. These gains cleared the way for an advance on a larger scale, and on September 18, at seven a.m., the Fourth and Third British Armies attacked on a front of about 17 miles from Holnon to Gouzeaucourt, while the French First Army operated to the south of Holnon. The attack, which was made in a heavy rain was greatly aided by a small number of tanks which accompanied the infantry. Our troops were able to penetrate through the well-organized defensive belt formed by the old British and German lines to a depth of three miles. During the fighting, the 1st, 17th, 21st and 74th Divisions, the latter commanded by Maj.-General E. S. Girdwood, the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions, the latter, commanded by Maj.-General E. Sinclair MacLagan, fought with great distinction. On the extreme right of the attack and in the left centre about Epéhy, the enemy resisted with great determination. In these two parts troops of the 6th, 12th, 18th and

5th Divisions were obstinately resisted and had to fight with great vigour. When night fell, however, the last important centres of resistance in Epéhy were reduced; but both here, and about Gricourt on our right, small local fights continued during the succeeding days, before we secured finally the line we required as a stepping-off place for the further attack on the main Hindenburg defences. With the exception of these two points the whole of our objectives aimed at were gained in the first day's operations.

penetrated well into the forest of Coucy, the Germans retreating before them without serious resistance. The Americans, acting on the right of Mangin, crossed the high ground to the north of the Vesle and occupied the Aisne from Condé to Vieil Arcy. They advanced on the south of the Ailette as far as the line Neuville-sur-Margival and Vréigny on the western slopes of the Fort of Condé. On the west side of the Oise, the First and Third French Armies advanced up the road from Noyon to Ham and crossed the Somme at



THE AREA OF THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN ADVANCE, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1918.

In this fighting, which may be called the battle Havrincourt-Epéhy, 15 British Divisions defeated 20 German Divisions, capturing nearly 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns. The efforts of the British and the French Armies from the Scarpe to the Marne during the summer operations had now been so successful that it was possible to develop still further the strategic plans of Marshal Foch.

Meanwhile the French had been making further progress. On September 5, the 10th Army entered Coucy-le-Château, Coucy-la-Ville, Folembray, Pierremande and then

Falvy and Offoy. The rate of progress was rapid an advance of nearly four miles being made in places.

The next day, in spite of the German resistance, the advance was continued at an even greater pace, and the French reached the Aisne front at their old positions before Laffaux and Vauxaillon, and captured the whole of the lower forest of Coucy and took many large dépôts of ammunition there. The Americans reached the line Vieil Arcy-Revillon; their patrols attaining the south bank of the Aisne Canal.

The next day the pursuit was again very

*French official photograph.*

FRENCH TROOPS CROSSING THE ANIZY CANAL.

lively, large amounts of ammunition and materials of all kinds being captured, including depôts of coal and materials for road-mending, and other things which had evidently been got together for winter purposes. Tergnier was occupied and the canal of St. Quentin crossed at Saint-Simon and near Tugny, both these villages being captured. The French line now ran along Vaulx-Avesne-Jussy, the railroad from Ham to Tergnier-Barisis-Bassoles-Nanteuil-la-Fosse, the Fort of Condé and Condé itself.

September 8, round Laffaux and Saint-Simon, the Germans made strenuous attempts to stop the French advance and executed many counter-attacks, most of them without result, but they managed to retake Avesne, from which they were promptly turned out. Artemps, to the north-west of Saint-Simon, was also captured by our Allies.

During the next two days, the advance still continued. Mangin's army south of the Oise captured the station at Sérvais. Between the Oise and the Somme, the French Third Army, after taking the Fort of Liez, reached the line Travécy-Hinacourt and advanced parties pushed on as far as Essigny-le-Grand and Contescourt, thus connecting up with the French First Army on the north of the Somme, which had captured Roupy and Etreillers. Thus,

by September 11, the Allied Armies were facing the Hindenburg line, and the position was now much the same as it had been on March 20, 1918, before the German advance began. Indeed, on the left, the British Fifth Army had reached Marquion, a more advanced point; but facing the French, the Chemin-des-Dames was still held by the Germans.

The Germans were now resisting vigorously and the rate of progress was somewhat slower, still the French Tenth Army reached the foot of the St. Gobain height and the plateau of Malmaison. Holding on to the line Barisis-Bassoles, Mangin pushed his right between the Ailette and the Aisne on both sides of the road from Soissons to Laon, and on the next day further ground was gained in the neighbourhood of Nanteuil-la-Fosse. Fully understanding the danger of this out-flanking movement, the Germans made determined efforts to stop it. Two violent counter-attacks were delivered against Laffaux and the Moisy Farm. Both were driven back with heavy loss, and the next day the enemy abandoned the village of Allemant and the important observation point of the Mill of Laffaux, whence a large tract of country had been visible. On the right of the French progress was made to the east of Saney and to the north of Celles-sur-l'Aisne,

while to the south of the Aisne, near Merval, the French carried the village of Glennes.

Once more, on September 15, the Germans attacked vigorously against the French line of advance, only to be beaten back again, and the French troops, then advancing, took



[Committee of Public Information, U.S.A.]
FRENCH 155's FOR THE AMERICAN
ARMY.

Photographed at the Gare d'Orleans, Paris.

the plateau to the east of Vauxaillon, then the ridge to the north-east of Celles.

On September 16, the Mont des Singes, which dominated the valley of the Ailette, and the borders of the forest of Pinon were captured, as also was Vailly on the Aisne.

On September 17-18, notwithstanding strong counter-attacks, the advance was continued eastward of Allemant-Sancy and Jouy along the centre of the line, on the road to Laon. It will thus be seen that General Mangin was

now opposite the gap of the Ardon, was between the high ground of St. Gobain and Craonne, and was within striking distance of Laon.

The next point in the Allied plan was to attack the forward projection of the German line known as the St. Mihiel salient. This was entrusted by Marshal Foch to the American Army, which was to drive the enemy from the St. Mihiel salient on the east of Verdun, and then act west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezières; the French, west of the Argonne, were to act in close cooperation with this American attack and with the same objective; while the British, on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front, were to move in the general direction of Maubeuges, and the Belgian and Allied forces in Flanders in the direction of Ghent. The outcome of this scheme would be that important German forces opposite the French and Americans would be pressed upon the difficult country of the Ardennes, while the British advance would strike at their principal lines of communication. The movement in Flanders favoured by the weakening of the German forces on this front was intended to clear the Belgian coast by a surprise attack.

Success in any one of these offensives would very probably lead to the withdrawal of the German forces to the line of the Meuse, but the first point was to overrun the salient of St. Mihiel.

The Germans here were in a peculiar position. They held a prominent wedge, which came down into the French lines which surrounded it on all sides but the base, and was therefore



A CAPTURED GERMAN MORTAR.



GERMAN "BARRACK-LAGER" NEAR ST. MIHIEL.

particularly liable to capture by a determined attack directed against its sides. Hitherto it had not been thought worth while to meddle with it. It was held by about six divisions, including two Austro-Hungarian. It was impossible to make any advance from it, because the French position here was particularly strong and had been strengthened consistently and persistently since 1914. The main railway line from Nancy to Commercy was open, and it had been supplemented by many field railroads so that Allied troops, guns and ammunition could be brought up in large numbers whenever needed.

The town of St. Mihiel forms the junction of the roads which cross here over the Meuse and lead to Verdun on the north-east, to Vigneulles in the salient and to Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle towards the west. It is obvious that an advance up the left bank of the Moselle would cut off the Germans in France from all access to the Bavarian Palatinate, and if the Allies could push on would capture the very important mining basin of Bricy.

The American attack was undertaken by the American First Army under General Pershing, and it was the first one on a large scale which had been undertaken by him and his troops. It was divided into two parts; the principal one was delivered on the south side, while a less important one was sent against the eastern face of the salient. These

two attacks were connected by French troops, who advanced in between the two against the point of St. Mihiel and formed a connecting link which kept the two together. Among the divisions in the American First Army were the 1st, the 2nd, the 42nd, the 5th, the 89th, the 19th. The 82nd and another division were in support at Pont-à-Mousson: the 26th Division was on the western side acting with the French Colonials. The attack was timed for 5.30 on the morning of September 12, and some hours before the preliminary bombardment had been begun in all its intensity. On the south side of the salient, the Americans attacked on a 12 mile front between Xivray and Fey-en-haye, and by the afternoon they had advanced five miles at some points and had captured the important point of Thiaucourt and the villages of Pannes, Nonsard and Mount Sec, and their cavalry was moving on to Vigneulles. On the western salient, advancing from Les Eparges, they took Combres on the Vigneulles road. The French meanwhile advanced as far as the remaining camp. By the next day, the German salient had been flattened out and the enemy's line ran from the north-west to the south-east at the edge of the Woevre plain from the Moselle at Pagny back approximately to Bezonvaux. It was a great success. The enemy were severely defeated and lost over 13,000 prisoners and many guns and much warlike material, quantities of ammunition,



[American official photograph.]

AMERICAN MACHINE-GUNS AND SUPPLY WAGGONS AWAITING ORDERS
 In a shattered village of the St. Mihiel salient.

railway rolling stock and stores of all kinds, and about noon on the 13th the two American attacks had joined hands across the salient.

Let us now refer briefly to the German comments on the fighting. The usual fatuous reasoning was employed in the German official reports and also in the comments of military writers. Thus Gädke, in the *Bremer Bürger Zeitung*, damns with faint praise the operations initiated by Marshal Foch. He says: "One must do Foch the justice of saying that, in the four weeks from the middle of July to the middle of August, he has done his best with good generalship and strength of decision to put new ideas into the trench warfare which has lasted four years without bringing a decision, and to give a change of character which might be decisive to the situation in the West"; but he goes on to say "His plans have not succeeded. He has had just the same experience as all his predecessors. The difficulties of passing from trench to open fighting are tremendous and perhaps insuperable. . . The final failure of the Anglo-French attack on the Amiens-Montdidier front is also characteristic of the difficulty of the military problem which

Generals and their armies have to face. The successes of the first two days here, we must confess [which is really very good of him], but at the same time, they were not great enough and considerably damped the hopes of enemy Command. . . . Even the primary launching of Humbert's army on the third day, the 10th, between the Avre and the Oise, was a sign that the attack by the wing had not met the desired success. Purely frontal pressure was now exerted, which lacked the advantage of surprise. By promptly withdrawing their battle-line, the Germans had already taken the force out of the blow." Now, as we know, the real sober truth was that the enemy was driven helter-skelter back. So far for Herr Gädke.

General von Ardenne, who is well known to our readers, endeavoured to show in the *Tageblatt* of September 1 that for some time past the Allies had been in great numerical superiority. This, of course, we know was not the case, but it serves the General's purpose to say so. He therefore adds that the only way of equalizing matters was to inflict on the Allies the greatest possible losses. "This was done by a violent offensive wherein the elements of surprise were fully exploited. The great at-

tacking actions from March 25 to July 15 caused the Allies losses amounting to 1,225,000 men." This is, as we know, a ridiculous exaggeration.

The military correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of August 25 takes a somewhat less rosy view of the position. He admits that the Allies had succeeded in disposing of the threatening German wedge against Amiens, but he suggests, in a half-hearted, doubting manner, that it is doubtful whether the German High Command ever diverted the French from their line in the Avre—Somme—Ancre salient. However, be this as it may, he admits that the menace has been disposed of for the time by Marshal Foch, who had in addition "succeeded in forcing the German front to withdraw on a broad stretch from halfway between Albert and Arras to near Soissons. A not inconsiderable part of the French soil occupied by us in March has thus been given up." However, he solaces his readers by stating that this did not mean a serious failure in German strategy, for German strategy in the West did not aim at the capture of ground; its object was to weaken the enemy's forces as much as possible." He adds, naturally, being a German, "That there was no comparison between the advance which the Allies had now made and that which the Germans had made earlier in the year. However, he was kind

enough to say: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Entente has shown at last that he knows something of strategy, and the necessity of concentrating all available forces for a decisive blow is certainly nothing new to him. If his blows nevertheless seem to be less powerful in effect than the corresponding blows of the German Command, this can only be because he simply has not available the necessary numbers of attacking troops and reserves; or because it requires greater bodies of French and English troops to win a success equal to that won by the Germans. We expect that both are true." Now all this is in flagrant contradiction of Gädke's opinion. He goes on to say that "the enemy has no longer the possibility of carrying through the offensive of destruction or annihilation at which he aimed. At most he can gain ground, but this does not at all mean a corresponding loss to the German Command."

The Military Correspondent of the *Nord-deutscher Allgemeine Zeitung* boldly states on August 23 that the tanks were a complete failure during the last few days. "Over 500 of these monsters were put out of action in the fighting which took place between the Ancre and the Avre by the artillery, by the armour-piercing shells of the German machine-guns, and last, but not least, by the hand-grenades used



[American official photograph.]

GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY AMERICAN TROOPS

Passing through a village in the St. Mihiel salient.

by our valiant infantry." Our comment on this is that it is extremely improbable that any hand-grenade ever had the faintest effect on any tank. Certainly no great injury was done to them by this weapon; however, the Correspondent states "that the tanks lay great wrecks scattered over the ground where the French and English Divisions were attacking." And he goes on to say "if defensive attacks carried out by our valiant troops could work such havoc on inanimate war material, what must the losses have been among the divisions, both black and white, which were continually thrown into the fighting?" As the "black" divisions were limited to French Colonial troops, it is difficult to understand why the



ENTRANCE TO A FRENCH FIELD HOSPITAL.

adjective was used in this indiscriminate fashion.

"No wonder that the attacks began to die down and that the operations which in their initial stages were on a huge scale gradually declined into mere local attacks, which naturally could not cause any important change in the strategic situation." After some disparaging comments on the fighting on the Oise and

Aisne, he proceeds "this introductory fighting was followed on August 20 by the enemy's colossal attempt to break through, which we had been expecting for several days past. As the attack developed it attained a width of over 16 miles, and its objective was evidently to break through in the direction, roughly speaking, of Laon and La Fère. I need not enlarge,"



THE ALLIES' ADVANCE,
JULY 18—SEPTEMBER 18, 1918.

he says, "on the subject of the tremendous importance of this enterprise if it had succeeded. But for this very reason our Command was quite prepared for all eventualities. The battle which now broke out developed just as our Command had wished." [This was certainly a little premature, but military prophets on all sides have not been remarkable for the success of their prognostications in this war.] "The French leadership had met our wishes; in other words, we really dictated the course of the battle although they were attacking and we were defending." Even the abandonment of Noyon was, according to his account, really a German success! He then has to admit the success of the British attack which commenced on August 21, but he is quite equal to the situation.

A double battle is therefore now going on, but if General Foch is using these separate attacks as a means for united action, and if he still pursues the idea of squeezing the German salient and the forces it contains between his pincers on the north and south, he must have overlooked the fact that over 50 miles of territory lie between his outer wings of attack, and it would probably be a very difficult matter to maintain a strategic connection between the two sets of operations. They should really only be regarded as operations which happen temporarily to coincide, and which are only

connected operatively in so far as they both attract German reserves to the same front, a fact which does not disturb us in the least, as we have, in the first place, ample forces at our disposal, and in the second place, we are fighting entirely on the interior line. Moreover, the English attack which was commenced by violent artillery preparation and which was again preceded by several hundred tanks, was completely shattered at its first assault. When the English report states that they penetrated the German lines to a depth of three miles and took Courcelles and Achiet-le-Petit after an obstinate struggle, they are simply spreading lies for a special purpose. General Byng, the Commander of the Third English Army, who led the attack here, knows that for some time past our lines had been evacuated, and when his troops entered Courcelles and Achiet-le-Petit, not a single shot was fired. . . . When the English had sufficiently recovered from their astonishment, they attacked the new German positions, which are very strong, and suffered a real defeat along the whole front, which was all the more serious, as the German troops in their counter-attacks drove them back in many places beyond the territory which had been lately evacuated. . . . The enemy made tremendous efforts to force a passage across the Ancre in the neighbourhood of Hamel. In this, as in all his other attempts, he was completely frustrated. The enormous casualties and innumerable tanks he lost once more proved the accuracy of the German artillery and the power and confidence in victory of the German troops.

All comment on this farrago of nonsense in the face of indubitable facts is unnecessary. Intended for home consumption, it accounts

for the Prussian Guards on their return to Berlin at the termination of the war being received as victorious heroes, and the inability of the average German to believe that his armies had been defeated.

The superiority of the Allies in the air was becoming greater every day, and during the operations which have been described the services rendered by British and French aviators formed an increasing factor in the success obtained.

The last days of August were not favourable to aeroplane work. On August 28, for instance, bad flying weather very much hampered the work in the air. Photographing was almost impossible and observation difficult. However, one enemy machine was destroyed in air fighting and one by our anti-aircraft guns, against which we lost two machines. An interesting and novel feature was reported by Sir Douglas Haig—viz., the delivery of small-arm ammunition by parachute to British troops fighting in the front line.

On August 29 11 German aeroplanes were destroyed and 10 driven down out of control.



AUSTIN ARMOURD CAR, OR MOTOR MACHINE-GUN BATTERY.

A balloon was also destroyed, and during the day bombing machines dropped $15\frac{1}{2}$ tons of bombs on Bruges docks and other targets.

On August 30, as has been before mentioned, the Independent Air Force bombarded Conflans and Thionville with good success, in addition to which, in the fighting on the front, 12 German machines were crashed and five others driven down out of control.

On August 31 six were destroyed and three

driven down. Our losses on these two days amounted together to 11. American aeroplanes bombarded the railway yards at Barri-court and Conflans.

On September 1 the assistance rendered by our airmen to the fighting troops was very great. Acting at low elevations, they bombed and machine-gunned the enemy's troops. This was not without opposition from the German airmen, but we succeeded in destroying eight



SUPPLYING THE FRONT LINE WITH AMMUNITION FROM AN AEROPLANE.



[Official photograph.]

TANKS AWAITING ORDERS.

of their machines, besides driving down four others and six balloons were set on fire. Fighting of this character, especially close to the ground, cannot, of course, be carried on without considerable casualties, and altogether we lost eight of our aeroplanes.

After the heavy rain on the night of August 31 the weather improved considerably and our aerial service was enabled to carry on its work in a clear atmosphere, although with the disadvantage of high wind, which fortunately was in a favourable direction. The enemy machines, of course, endeavoured to stop our work, but in spite of this over 1,000 photographs were taken and many important reconnaissances were effected. Moreover, as usual, contact was maintained with our advancing troops and our observation balloons were pushed forward right up to the front, and they with the artillery observation aviators kept our batteries constantly informed as to the targets it was desirable to fire on. The whole area in which the Germans were retreating was brought under machine-gun and bomb-fire. The German infantry was severely dealt with as also was the transport. Many heavy casualties were caused and much confusion arose. Bridges and railway connexions likewise were heavily bombed far back in the enemy's area. In the actual fighting in the air 12 machines and six hostile balloons were effectually dealt with, against which we only lost eight.

The French also had some notable successes. Four German aeroplanes were shot down and one captive balloon was destroyed and numerous points were severely bombed in the region of La

Fère, and convoys on the roads on this point and the ridge of St. Quentin were subjected to machine-gun fire. During the night nearly 10 tons of bombs were dropped on various railway stations and bivouacks at Marles, Laon, Ham, Villers-Franqueux and on the railway stations of Maison Bleue and Cignicourt. In the latter case very heavy damage was done.

On the night of September 1-2 the zone immediately behind the battle-line and far back was heavily bombed, besides which a German aerodrome behind St. Quentin was attacked and direct hits observed. We only lost one bombing machine. During the 24 hours from the previous evening over 34 tons of bombs were dropped.

On the morning of September 2 the Independent Air Force attacked the hostile aerodrome at Bühl, south-west of Baden, with very good results, many direct hits were obtained on the hangars and a hostile machine on the ground was destroyed; and this was done without any loss to us. In the afternoon the bombardment was repeated, as it was again during the night of September 2-3. Altogether 17 tons of bombs were dropped, and the following targets in addition to Bühl were also attacked, viz., the Burbach works and the railways at Saarbrücken and Ehrang [north of Treves]. The effect of these three successive bombardments on Bühl was very great. Three hangars were totally demolished and direct hits were obtained on many others. Over 15 tons of bombs were dropped on this aerodrome in 24 hours, the majority of which were let loose from elevations varying from 300 to

900 feet. The railways at Ehrang were attacked from a height of only 90 feet and every bomb obtained a direct hit. At Burbach good bursts were observed and a fire started, and this was all done without loss to us.

During the month of August the British aviators brought down 750 German machines, with a loss of 218. The French accounted for 224 German machines, and the Americans six.

The following incidents, drawn from the records of the Royal Air Force, are good examples of the work of our airmen in France:—

A two-seater machine was engaged in special work when it was attacked by seven German machines, which surrounded it, firing at the British machine from all sides. The Germans used explosive bullets. Fighting gallantly against these crushing odds, the British pilot battled his way through the enemy formation. In the course of the fight, however, one of his legs was hit five times, so that the limb was all but severed, and fell among the controls. By a supreme effort the pilot clung grimly to consciousness, and somehow managed to disentangle his leg from the controls. Not only so, but he succeeded in landing the machine safely behind the British lines.

Another two-seater machine, while escorting a bombing formation, sighted 20 German fighting planes. The pilot instantly dived to the attack and selected his first victim. He closed, and, putting in a burst of machine-gun fire at a distance of only a few feet, saw the German pilot go down in flames. Alarmed by the suddenness of his attack, the other Germans had scattered somewhat, and the Englishman was able to dive on another. Just as he came within range, however, his gun jammed, and at the same moment several Germans attacked his machine from the rear. His observer now came into the running, and, opening fire, sent one of the following enemy machines spinning earthwards. Having cleared the jam the pilot, manoeuvring at great speed, succeeded in getting a third Hun across his front, where he opened fire at short range and sent his opponent whirling down, a burning mass.

The same day a highly successful raid was carried out on a German aerodrome by combined British and American squadrons. Successive formations, flying very low, released their bombs on hangars, machines on the ground, and hutments. By this bombardment the German petrol and oil store was set on fire, which, in turn, spread to the ammunition dump; six machines on the ground were destroyed by fire, and two more by direct hits; two large Gotha and several smaller hangars were enveloped in flames, as well as some living huts of the *personnel* of the German squadrons. The Germans rushed out and desperately endeavoured to put out the flames, whereupon the raiding planes immediately swooped down again to the attack, and plied the Germans with machine-gun fire scattering panic-stricken mechanics in all directions, and laying low many of them. Meanwhile, a supporting squadron of British machines unloaded their bombs on to a chateau used as officers' quarters, and completely destroyed it. In spite of the exceedingly heavy ground fire to which the attackers were subjected, every machine engaged returned safely.

Shortly afterwards a large scale raid was carried out by British and Australian squadrons, upon another German aerodrome, where—again from a very low height to ensure greater accuracy—a shower of bombs was released, as a result of which three large hangars containing machines were completely burnt out and others badly damaged. The German pilots'

mess was blown up, and several fires were started among the mechanics' huts. The airmen next turned their attention to a neighbouring station where German troops were entraining. Coming down in some cases to a bare 50 ft. from the ground, the raiders opened fire with their machine-guns, and did tremendous execution among the German soldiers crowded on the platforms. German Staff officers superintending the entrainment rushed to their waiting cars and attempted to escape, only to be pursued remorselessly. The drivers were apparently hit, for one car upset in a ditch, while the other ran up a steep bank and overturned. In this case again every machine engaged in the raid returned safely.

On September 3, our aviators, working all day in front of the advancing line of battle, did gallant service, notwithstanding that they were attacked by large formations of hostile machines. The positions of the retiring Germans were reported to our artillery, contact was kept up with the infantry and tanks and the concentrations of hostile troops and transport on the roads leading back from the German lines were treated to bombs and machine-gun fire; moreover, hostile anti-tank guns were silenced. Many aerial encounters took place and we accounted for 26 German machines, but the vigour of our attack necessarily involved considerable losses and we had 20 machines missing. Again, the supply of rifle ammunition to our infantry formed a feature of the aviators' work and our observation balloons followed closely behind the line of our advancing machines. Some idea of the energy of our aviators' work may be gained from the fact that 24 tons of bombs were dropped during the day and the following night.

American airmen successfully bombed the railway yards at Longuyon, Dommary, Baroncourt and Conflans.

On the night of September 3-4 the Independent Air Force again heavily bombed the aerodrome at Morhanges with good effect and also another aerodrome at Boulay and the blast furnaces at Esch, east of Longwy. In each case direct hits were obtained and considerable damage done and all our machines returned in safety. On the morning of September 4 Morhanges was again attacked, for the third time within 24 hours. Excellent practice was made by our bombers and several sheds received direct hits. One squadron also attacked Bühl aerodrome with good results, and all our machines returned in safety. During the daylight the Air Service, working more especially in connection with the troops, also did good work. In addition to their usual duties of reconnaissance and



THE RETURN OF A NIGHT BOMBER.

photography, 23 tons of bombs were dropped during the day on a number of favourable targets. The weather prevented any continuation of the attack after dark. On this day the Germans displayed a good deal more activity than they had lately done in the air, and the consequence was that they suffered great losses. Twenty-five German aviators were crashed down and 14 more driven down out of control; in addition nine observation balloons were sent down in flames. On our

side we lost 16 machines, against which may be set off the return of one which was reported missing on September 2.

In the course of the weeks which have elapsed since the commencement of our offensive on August 8, 465 enemy machines were brought down by our airmen, their destruction being in every case clearly established. In addition, the total of enemy machines proved to have been driven down out of control (many of which must have actually crashed) is exactly 200. The above figures are exclusive of the considerable number of enemy machines brought down by gun fire from the ground. Sixty-one German balloons were set on fire;



[Canadian War Records.]

A SMALL PORTION OF THE ARRAY OF GUNS CAPTURED BY THE CANADIANS-

911½ tons of bombs were dropped by us. Practically the whole of the air fighting has taken place on the enemy's side of the line, which is significant of the superiority of our service. The Germans were restricted to a cautious defensive.

The number of our machines which have failed to return during this period is 262.

September 5 was fine, though somewhat cloudy, and our aviators worked throughout the day both on observation and actively against the enemy's troops. There was considerable activity on the German side with their aircraft, especially in the neighbourhood of Cambrai. They were evidently desirous of ascertaining as far as possible what our line of advance was to be. A good deal of fighting took place, and 37 hostile machines were accounted for, as well as three observation balloons. Against this we had to set off 13 of our aeroplanes which failed to return. The night was too bad to allow of bombing.

On September 6 our men accounted for 23 German machines and one observation balloon, with a loss to ourselves of five aeroplanes. During the day and the following night 22 tons of bombs were dropped by our airmen round various points near the front of the German line.

On September 7 clouds and rain-storms limited the work, but our aviators destroyed eight German machines and one balloon. Three of ours were missing.

The early part of September the weather was bad, but nevertheless, as we have seen, our airmen were able to put in a great deal of good work. The Independent Air Force on the night of September 6-7 bombed two enemy aerodromes, and on the morning of September 7

they attacked the railways at Ehrang and the chemical works at Mannheim. The latter raid was not carried out without considerable opposition. Largely superior numbers of enemy aeroplanes fought ours both before and after they reached their objective. One of the squadrons had a continuous fight for a distance of 70 miles before reaching it, and the fight was continued for the same distance on the road back. Over two tons of bombs were dropped in Mannheim. Three enemy aeroplanes were accounted for, and we lost four of ours.

On September 8 the weather was very bad and the work much restricted. It may be well to give a rather more detailed account of the work which our men were doing during the early part of September.

During their retirement the Germans have made desperate efforts to remove as much ammunition as possible. A British pilot spotted a train of wagons engaged on this work, and descended to 50 ft. so as to make quite sure of his aim. Getting well into position, he opened fire on the rear wagon, knocking out two men on the box. Deprived of their drivers and terrified by the winged assailant, the horses bolted, and, coming into collision with a tree, upset the wagon. An extremely heavy fire was by this time being directed upon the airman, and it had already wounded him in the knee and severed the pressure feed pipe of his machine. He would not leave his job half done, however, and, again manœuvring into position, put in another burst, which resulted in the overturning of two more and the stampeding of the remaining wagons.

On the same day a British machine working in conjunction with the infantry was attacked by four German scouts. The British contact machine is not primarily designed for fighting purposes, but the pilot gave such a good account of himself that one of the attackers was speedily sent down out of control. During the fight the petrol tank of the British machine was pierced, bringing instant menace of its destruction by fire. Thereupon the English observer promptly climbed out on the lower plane and successfully plugged the hole with his handkerchief remaining on the plane until his pilot succeeded

in throwing off his pursuers and landing his machine safely behind the British lines.

A British two-seater machine hovering at night over an enemy concentration centre observed, easily distinguishable in the bright starlight, a column of transport consisting of about 20 wagons. Descending rapidly to 300 ft., he landed two bombs, a hundred-weight apiece, plumb in the centre of the column. The destruction was enormous, and the remnant of the column scattered wildly in all directions. The British pilot rose again and waited, giving time for the German transport to reassemble. Diving once more, he found it, together with two other large lorries, in a sunken road, where the Huns apparently hoped to escape further attack from the death-dealing raider. The British pilot released his remaining bombs from an altitude at which he could not miss his target, and then, diving lower still, opened fire with his machine-guns, putting about 250 rounds into the confused mass of wreckage.

German observation balloons have had a bad time recently. One British pilot, scouting behind the enemy's lines, pounced on two of these balloons in swift succession, and succeeded in setting fire to and destroying both. His petrol was beginning to run low at the time, so he returned to his aerodrome to refill. He set out immediately upon a second quest, sighted two more balloons, and, taking advantage of friendly clouds, carefully stalked them. When within a short distance of his prey, cloud cover failed him, and he was perceived. The Huns rushed to the winches and endeavoured to haul down both balloons. Putting down the nose of his machine, the British pilot sped earthwards after the swaying mass of fabric, and almost before the German mechanics had their winches working the hunter had secured his first quarry, which fell a blazing mass upon the Huns beneath. The other balloon was rather farther away, and the Germans hauled desperately and succeeded in getting it down almost to the ground before the British pilot

arrived above. In spite of furious fire from below, he dived low enough to pump in a burst of incendiary bullets, and had the satisfaction of increasing his bag for the day to four enemy balloons totally destroyed.

During the next few days the weather was so bad that the work in the air was extremely small. On September 12 there were some bright intervals, and during these the usual routine work was done, but at night no flying was possible.

On the night of September 12-13 the Independent Air Force acted in conjunction with the attack of the American First Army and bombed the railways at Metz-Sablons and Courcelles. Metz station, searchlight and transport were all attacked with machine-gun fire. On the night of September 13, in favourable weather, operations were conducted against Metz-Sablons and enemy transport on the battle-front. The weather on September 13 was very irregular, clouds and rain alternating with brighter intervals. During these a good deal of work was done, but contact patrol work had to be carried on at a very low altitude.

On September 14 the enemy, apparently aroused by the predominance which the Allied Air Force had obtained, made more effort than usual to overcome it. There was considerable air fighting. Four German machines were



LAYING A TELEGRAPH WIRE.

[Australian official photograph.]

driven down and four of their observation balloons destroyed. During the operations of the 24 hours from the evening of September 13 to the evening of September 14, nearly eight tons of bombs were dropped.

On September 15 the weather was much better, and the air service was therefore extremely active. The French paid particular attention to the German observation balloons and drove down 16 of them. In the efforts which the German aviators made to defend these, they lost 12 of their number, and during the night of September 15-16 the stations and cantonments behind the enemy's front were freely bombed and suffered important damage.

On the British front there was also a marked increase of aerial activity. German formations of considerable force were met with on their side of the line and active fighting took place; 36 of the enemy's machines were brought down and a large night-bombing machine was disposed of after dark.

On our side we lost 16 machines, including two of the night-flying aeroplanes. Four of the enemy's aerodromes were also heavily bombed, one by day and three by night, and altogether 30 tons of bombs were let fall by us. Much useful reconnoissance and observation was done both by our balloons and aeroplanes, and those engaged in observation for artillery fire carried out valuable work.

The Independent Air Force again did useful service on the night of September 15-16. Four hostile aerodromes were severely dealt with and a transport convoy was also hit. Distant raids dealt with the Mainz railway junctions and the docks and sidings at Karlsruhe. Altogether 350 bombs, totalling 16½ tons in weight, were dropped, without any casualties to our machines.

In the air, as on the ground, the Allies were surely gaining the upper hand over their opponents.



CHAPTER CCLXXXIV.

VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE WAR. (VIII.)

CLASSIFYING AWARDS—THREE COMMANDING OFFICERS—ENGINEERS' FINE DEEDS—CROSSES FOR COURAGEOUS "RUNNERS"—FARMHOUSE FIGHTS—TERRITORIALS' EXPLOITS—BACK TO LE CÂTEAU—TWO LEINSTER REGIMENT RECIPIENTS—SAVING THE WOUNDED—THE LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS ONCE MORE—TERRITORIALS AGAIN—A COMPANY-SERGEANT-MAJOR—FURTHER BRITISH AWARDS—OVERSEA SOLDIERS AND THE CROSS—THE AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE—OFFICERS' FINE ACTS—THREE POSTHUMOUS HONOURS—N.C.O.'S AND PRIVATES—ATTACKS ON MACHINE-GUN POSTS—A BOMBER IN A GERMAN TRENCH—MEN FROM ONTARIO—AN ARMY SURGEON'S CROSS—A WOUNDED FIGHTER—LIEUT. LYALL'S GREAT DEEDS—MORE CANADIAN HEROES—FURTHER CROSSES FOR ZEEBRUGGE—THE DECORATION AS A FIGHTING BAROMETER—A CASE OF NON-AWARD—AN ANALYSIS—THE TOTAL AWARDS.

DATES of formal announcements of Victoria Crosses became unimportant when it was again possible to publish names of places where Crosses had been won and the times of the achievements. In the awards which have still to be dealt with it will be preferable to analyse and classify the records, to give a better understanding of the special nature of the acts performed. With the removal of restrictions the stories became complete and clear; but in some cases names of heroic men who had been associated with deeds for which the Cross was given were not mentioned, and it had to be assumed that these helpers could not be definitely identified. This omission was noticeable in one or two of the splendid bridge exploits of which accounts were published.

In Chapter CCLXXII. some of the Crosses given for the closing days of the war were dealt with, and the story is continued here, dates of gazetting, for the reason just explained, being omitted.

The cases of three commanding officers illustrated the inspiring leadership and resolute

courage which characterized the final stages of the great advance. These officers were:—

Lieut.-Col. W. H. Clark-Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O., 24th Bn. Quebec Regt.

Lieut.-Col. Harry Greenwood, D.S.O., M.C., 9th Bn. K.O. Yorks L.I.

Lieut.-Col. D. G. Johnson, D.S.O., M.C., S.W. Bord., attd 2nd Bn. R. Suss. R.

The Canadian officer on August 27 led his battalion with great bravery and skill from Crow and Aigrette trenches in front of Wancourt to the attack on the Fresnes-Rouvroy line. The brigade, of which the 24th Battalion was a central unit, came under very heavy shell and machine-gun fire from the very outset, and there were many casualties, especially amongst the leaders. Units became partially disorganized and the advance was checked. The situation was one of many which arose and demanded instant and capable handling. Lieut.-Col. Clark-Kennedy was equal to the great emergency, and by sheer valour and leadership he inspired his men and led them forward; several times leading parties straight

at machine-gun nests which were holding up the advance, and overcoming these obstacles. He not only did these things with his own battalion, but he also controlled the direction of neighbouring units and collected men who had lost their leaders. The officer's disregard of his own life and his energy and resource had made it possible for his battalion by the afternoon to cross the Sensée River bed and occupy Occident Trench in front of the heavy wire of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line. It had been a strenuous and hazardous day for Lieut.-Col. Clark-Kennedy, but that he had plenty of endurance and spirit left was shown by the fact that under continuous fire "he went up and down his line until far into the night," improving the position, giving "wonderful encouragement" to his men, and sending



LIEUT.-COLONEL W. H. CLARK-KENNEDY, C.M.G.,
Quebec Regiment.

back very clear reports. On the next hard day he was not so fortunate. Soon after the resumed operations he was severely wounded, but refused aid, and dragged himself to a shell-hole "from which he could observe." He was now compelled to realize that his exhausted troops could not advance any farther, so he established a strong line of defence and prevented the loss of most important ground. He suffered intense pain and loss of blood, but for more than five hours he refused to be evacuated; and when he did consent

to go he had established the line in a position from which it was possible for the relieving troops to continue the advance.

Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood during two full days of hardest work and danger showed that he was made of the stuff which was expected of



Lalayette.

MAJOR (Acting Lieut.-Colonel) D. G. JOHNSON, D.S.O.,
South Wales Borderers, attached Royal Sussex Regiment.

a senior officer of the fine old 51st Foot. On October 23 the advance of his battalion was checked and a German machine-gun post was causing many casualties. Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood unhesitatingly and single-handedly rushed the post and killed the crew and so like magic cleared away the menace to his troops. After that brilliant achievement he again rushed a machine-gun post, this time at the entrance to the village of Owillers, and, with the help of two battalion runners, killed the occupants. When his command reached the objective west of Duke's Wood it was almost surrounded by German machine-gun posts, and his isolated force was at once attacked by the enemy. But no hostile effort was successful; the assault was repulsed and the courageous leader and his men swept victoriously forward and captured the last objective, with 150 prisoners, eight machine-guns and one field gun—a splendid and important haul. That was some of the work done on October 23 by Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood and his men, and the doings of the 24th were in

many ways a repetition of the acts. During the attack on the Green Line, south of Poix du Nord, the colonel again showed the utmost bravery in rushing a machine-gun post and once more proved, in the face of heavy fire, his good and resolute leadership and his skill in handling men in dangerous situations. He put a high finish to his two days' work when, on the afternoon of

the 24th, during the further advance on Grand Gay Farm Road, he handled his battalion with a skill and boldness which produced the most important results, not only in securing the flank of his brigade but also in safeguarding the flank of the division.

On November 4 Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson was engaged in the operation of forcing the



LIEUT.-COLONEL HARRY GREENWOOD, D.S.O., King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, Leaving the Palace after receiving his Victoria Cross.

Sambre Canal, his battalion forming part of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, which was ordered to cross by the lock south of Catillon. This proved to be one of the operations which in the very last days of the war gave such uncommon chances for the Engineers and those who worked with them to win distinction. The position was strong, and "before the bridge could be thrown" a steep bank leading up to the lock and a waterway about 100 yards short of the canal had to be crossed. The Royal Engineers' assaulting platoons and bridging parties on reaching the waterway were thrown into confusion by a heavy barrage and machine-gun fire, and severe casualties resulted. It was at this very critical moment that Lieut.-Colonel Johnson arrived and grasped the situation, its perils and its possibilities. He instantly collected men to man the bridges and help the Engineers, and then he personally led an assault on the Germans. It was a brave attempt, but in spite of all his efforts heavy enemy fire again broke up the assaulting and bridging parties. Unhesitatingly Johnson once more reorganized the platoons and bridging parties and led them at the lock. This time he triumphantly crossed—"after which all went well." During the whole of this period of strain and danger Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson was under a very heavy fire, but happily he was untouched, though it "nearly decimated the assaulting columns."

Some of the most courageous acts of the war had been performed by Royal Engineers, and several of these were in connexion with the peculiarly important and fascinating military question of bridges. From the earliest days of the war bridge makers and bridge wreckers had enjoyed amazing opportunities for the display of constructive and destructive genius, and repeatedly there were chances for brave, resourceful men to throw across rivers and canals light emergency structures which proved of vital service. Amongst the last of the sappers to receive the Cross were Major Arnold Horace Santo Waters, D.S.O., M.C., and Sapper Adam Archibald, of the 218th Field Company, R.E., the day of their distinction being November 4. Waters, already holding the Distinguished Service Order and the Military Cross, was with his field company bridging the Oise-Sambre Canal, near Ors. From the outset the task had to be attempted under intense close-range artillery and machine-gun fire. The bridge was damaged and the building party suffered severely. The major heard that all his officers had been killed or wounded, and

instantly went forward and personally supervised the completion of the bridge, working on cork floats under the point-blank fire. "It seemed impossible that he should escape being killed," but the officer did escape, the operation succeeding entirely through his valour and example. Archibald also was working on the cork floats, and showed himself a true companion for such a leader in such a time of stress and peril. He knew that the bridge was essential to the operations, and



LIEUT. (Acting Lt.-Col.) J. N. MARSHALL, Late Irish Guards, attached Lancashire Fusiliers.

inflexibly held to his duty until the bridge was finished. The sapper survived the actual missiles, but died from gas poisoning when his gallant work was done.

Bracketed with Waters was Lieutenant-Colonel John Neville Marshall, M.C., late Irish Guards (S.R.), attached 16th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, who also showed extraordinary courage and fine leadership in the attack on the Sambre-Oise Canal, near Catillon, on Novem-



SAPPER ADAM ARCHIBALD, R.E.

ber 4. When a partly constructed bridge came under concentrated fire and was broken before the advanced troops of the battalion could cross, Marshall at once went forward and organized parties to repair the bridge. The first party was soon either killed or wounded, but so inspiring was the officer's example and so perfect was the confidence of the men in him, that when volunteers were called for they were instantly forthcoming. The passage of the canal was of vital importance, and Lieut.-Col. Marshall encouraged and helped his men to the very utmost. Completely disregarding his own safety he stood on the bank, under intense fire, and when the bridge was repaired he tried to rush across, at the head of his battalion. In making that magnificent effort to maintain his leadership and example, he was killed.

There was nothing in the awards to connect the sappers' cases with that of Second-Lieutenant James Kirk, attached 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment; but presumably the heroes were associated in the same splendid enterprise. On November 4 the subaltern was attempting to bridge the Oise Canal, north of Ors, and to cover the bridging he took a Lewis gun. Under intense machine-gun fire Kirk performed a feat the like of which had not been indicated in any previous record of the Crosses of the war—he paddled across the

canal on a raft and at a range of only 30 feet expended all his ammunition. More ammunition was paddled across to him, and he continuously maintained covering fire for the bridging party from a most exposed position, never relaxing his heroic efforts until he was killed at his gun. But Kirk's resolution and self-sacrifice had been crowned with a great success, for he had prevented many casualties and had enabled two platoons to cross the bridge before it was destroyed.

On November 6 Major Brett MacKay Cloutman, M.C., 59th Field Company, R.E., T.F., after reconnoitring the river crossings at Pont-sur-Sambre, found that the Quatres Bridge was almost intact but prepared for demolition. Leaving his party under cover he went forward alone, swam across the river, and having cut the "leads" from the charges he returned the same way, although the bridge and all the approaches to it were swept by German shells and machine-guns at close range. Later in the day the bridge was blown up by other means,

LIEUT. (Acting Major) B. M. CLOUTMAN
R.E.

but the abutments remained intact. Major Cloutman's cool and highly successful adventure was rewarded with the Cross.

A desperate night enterprise at the Canal de l'Escaut, north-east of Cambrai, was carried out with remarkable success by Captain Coulson Norman Mitchell, M.C., 4th Battalion Canadian Engineers. On the night of October 8-9 he led a small party ahead of the first wave of infantry so that he might examine the various



CORPORAL JAMES McPHIE, R.E.

bridges on the line of approach and, if possible, prevent their demolition. When Captain Mitchell reached the canal he found that the bridge was already blown up. Under a heavy barrage he crossed to the next bridge, where he cut a number of "lead" wires. It was totally dark and he was not aware of either the position or the strength of the Germans at the bridgehead, but fearlessly taking all risks he dashed across the main bridge over the canal. This bridge was found to be heavily charged for demolition, and whilst the captain, helped by his non-commissioned officer (whose name was not mentioned) was cutting the wires, the enemy tried to rush the bridge in order to blow the charges. Thereupon Captain Mitchell instantly "dashed to the assistance of his sentry, who had been wounded, killed three of the enemy, captured 12, and maintained the bridgehead

until reinforced." Having done this rousing work the Canadian Engineer, still under heavy fire, continued his task of cutting wires and removing charges, which "he well knew might at any moment have been fired by the enemy." The official record stated that it was entirely due to Mitchell's valour and decisive action that this important bridge across the canal was saved from destruction.

A truly splendid tale of high courage and extreme devotion was put on record in the case of Corporal James McPhie, 416th (Edinburgh) Field Company, R.E., T.F. On October 14 McPhie was with a party of sappers maintaining a cork float bridge across the Canal de la Sensée, near Aubenchcul-au-Bac. The farther end of the bridge was not only under close machine-gun fire, but was also within reach of hand grenades. Just before dawn, when infantry were crossing the bridge, closing up resulted, and the bridge began to sink and break. Accompanied by a sapper McPhie jumped into the water and tried, but unsuccessfully, to hold the cork and timbers together. The corporal then swam back, and having reported the broken bridge started at once to collect material for repairs. Daylight came and with it one of the most dramatic episodes of the Crosses of the war. The corporal was perfectly well aware that the bridge was under close fire, and that the far bank was entirely in the Germans' hands; yet undaunted by any of the obvious and unseen perils he exclaimed, "It's death or glory work which must be done for the sake of our patrol on the other side!" With this the valiant sapper, axe in hand, led the way on to the bridge. He was at once severely wounded, and, falling partly into the water, he died after receiving several further wounds. But Corporal McPhie had not been sacrificed in vain, for his magnificent conduct enabled touch to be maintained with the patrol on the enemy bank at a most critical period.

Four runners in succession having been killed in trying to deliver a message to a supporting company during the attack on Marou on October 20, Private Alfred Wilkinson, 1/5th Battalion Manchester Regiment (T.F.), volunteered for the desperate duty. The journey which he undertook involved exposure to extremely heavy machine-gun and shell fire for 600 yards, yet he managed to escape all perils and to deliver the message, continuing throughout the rest of the day to do splendid

PRIVATE ALFRED WILKINSON,
Manchester Regiment.



during the war won renown in every conceivable emergency and situation, and individuals and sections who were armed with the weapon which had proved so deadly and efficacious found in the war's last phase full opportunity of using their powers, especially in mopping up and clearing out suspicious places. A case in point was the action of Sergeant Thomas Caldwell, 12th Battalion Royal Scottish Fusiliers, who, on October 31, in attack near Audenarde, was commanding a Lewis gun section to which had been given the dangerous



[Official photograph.]

**A RUNNER SETTING OUT ON HIS
PERILOUS ERRAND.**

work. Almost precisely similar was the achievement of Private James Towers, 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles (Preston), on October 6 at Mericourt. No fewer than five runners had failed to deliver an important message when Towers, well aware of their fate, volunteered for the duty. Some charm seemed to protect such men as these, who so clearly risked their all on one tremendous stake, for the Cameronian, like the Territorial, in spite of heavy fire opened on him the instant he moved, went straight through from cover to cover and at last triumphantly delivered the message.

The Lewis gunners had for a long period



PRIVATE JAMES TOWERS,
Scottish Rifles.

Awarded the Cross for his gallant work as
a runner.

task of clearing a farmhouse. While he was doing his work in a determined and gallant

fashion his section came under intense close-range fire from another farm; but the undaunted Fusilier rushed towards the farm and captured the position, with 18 prisoners, the most amazing part of the achievement being that, as in so many other similar cases, the desperate adventure was carried out single-handed



SERGT. THOMAS CALDWELL,
Royal Scottish Fusiliers.

Another splendid farmhouse exploit was that for which the Cross was given to Lance-Corporal William Amey, 1/8th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment (T.F.), whose fine courage and resource were fully proved on November 4 during the attack on Landrecies. Owing to a fog the leading troops missed many German machine-gun nests. Amey, on his own initiative, led his section against a hostile nest, under heavy fire, and after driving the garrison into a neighbouring farm he captured about 50 prisoners and several machine-guns. Subsequently he set to work single-handed, and scorning heavy fire he attacked a machine-gun post in a farmhouse, killed two of the garrison, and drove the rest of the Germans into a cellar and kept them there till help arrived. Still pursuing his independent policy, the lance-corporal, unaided, rushed a strongly held post and captured 20 prisoners, and throughout the day he maintained the "highest degree of valour and determination."

Another corporal of the Territorials—Lance-Sergeant William Waring, M.M., 25th Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers (T.F.)—showed re-

markable enterprise and resource on September 18 at Ronssoy. He began by leading an attack against German machine-guns which were holding up the advance of neighbouring troops. There was devastating fire on flank and front, but single-handed Waring, who had already won the Military Medal, rushed a strong point with so much energy and determination that he bayoneted no fewer than four of the garrison, and so filled the rest of the Germans with fear that he captured 20 of them with their guns. Waring's audacity had brought upon himself heavy shell and machine-gun fire; but, reorganizing his men, he led and inspired them for other 400 yards, when he fell, mortally wounded.

Single-handed also was the outstanding performance of Private Norman Harvey, 1st Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, on October 25, near Ingoyghen. His battalion being held up and suffering heavily from German machine-guns, Harvey on his own



LANCE-CORPORAL WILLIAM AMEY,
Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

initiative rushed forward and engaged the enemy alone, "disposing" of twenty Germans and capturing two guns. Later, his company being checked by another enemy strong point, Harvey again rushed forward single-handed and put the Germans to flight; crowning his achievements, after dark, by voluntarily carrying out, single-handed, an important reconnaissance and gaining valuable information.

In the memorable region of Le Cateau, on the morning of October 18, Sergeant Horace Augustus Curtis, of the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, came unexpectedly, with his platoon, under intense machine-gun fire, and saw at once that the assault would fail



LANCE-SERGT. WILLIAM WARING,
Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

unless the hostile guns were silenced. Accordingly the sergeant, without the slightest hesitation, rushed forward through our own barrage and the German fire and killed or wounded the teams of two of the guns, whereupon the remaining four guns surrendered. Having done this the sergeant turned his attention to a train-load of reinforcements and managed to capture more than 100 of the enemy before his comrades joined him. There was a touch of something like humour in the business-like way in which, single-handed, a Fusilier, even of an Irish regiment, having put some deadly weapons out of action, "turned his attention" to a "train-load of reinforcements." There was no evidence that Curtis was an Irishman—as a matter of fact he came from the

little English fishing village of Newlyn, hard by the Land's End; but at any rate he was undoubtedly filled with the combatant spirit of the famous old Indian fighters who, under



PRIVATE NORMAN HARVEY,
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

the Territorial system, became the Dublin Fusiliers.

Two members of the 2nd Battalion Leinster Regiment—Sergeant John O'Neill, M.M., and Private Martin Moffat—won the Cross on October 14, the sergeant near Moorseele and the private near Ledeghem. The advance of



SERGT. H. A. CURTIS,
Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

O'Neill's company was checked, not only by two machine-guns, but also by a German field battery which was firing over open sights, so that the position was as dangerous as could be desired. But Sergeant O'Neill had no hesitation in hurling himself into the very jaws



TURNING ONE OF THE ENEMY'S GUNS ON HIMSELF.

of death, and at the head of only 11 intrepid men he charged the battery, so overwhelmingly that no fewer than four field guns were captured, and two machine-guns and 16 prisoners also were taken. The sergeant had a genius for this special form of work, for on the morning of the 16th, with only one man, he rushed a German machine-gun position, routed about 100 of the enemy and caused many casualties. It was told of him that throughout these operations he displayed the most remarkable courage and powers of

leadership. Private Martin Moffat's exploit was on the same bold scale, though it differed somewhat in detail, for into his particular fighting there came the element of bombs. On the 14th he was advancing with a hardy little band of five comrades across the open when the party suddenly came under heavy rifle fire at close range from a strongly held house. Here was one of those cases of touch-and-go with death which did not allow of a moment's hesitation; and Moffat fairly rushed towards the house through a hail of bullets,



LANCE-CORPORAL W. H. COLTMAN,
North Staffordshire Regiment.

throwing bombs, and then worked to the back of the house and rushed the door single-handed, killing two and capturing 30 of the enemy. Nothing but sheer pluck, swiftness of action and initiative could ever have brought a man alive out of such a dangerous situation as this.

Noble work in tending and saving wounded under fire gave the Cross to Second Lieutenant James Johnson, 36th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, Lance-Corporal W. H. Coltman, D.C.M., M.M., 1/6th Battalion, North Staffordshire Regiment (T.F.) and Private W. E. Holmes, 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, all in the early days of October. On the morning of the 14th, during operations by strong patrols south-west of Wez Macquart, Johnson repelled frequent counter-attacks, and for six hours, under heavy fire, he held the Germans back. When at length he was ordered to retire, he was the last to leave the advanced position; but he carried a wounded man with him, and three times afterwards this courageous officer, who showed cheerfulness in very dispiriting surroundings, returned and brought in badly wounded men, doing this in spite of intense hostile machine-gun fire and with a disregard of danger which inspired all who saw him. Coltman was acting as a stretcher-bearer during the operations at Mannequin Hill, north-east of Sequehart, on October 3 and 4, and unceasingly, for 48 hours, he tended the wounded. Hearing that wounded had been

left behind during a retirement, he, on his own initiative, went forward alone in the face of fierce enfilade fire, found the wounded, dressed them and on three successive occasions saved comrades' lives by carrying them on his back to safety. The Guardsman sacrificed himself in fulfilling this high purpose; but not before he had been the means of saving the lives of several of his comrades. This was on October 9, at Cattenières. Holmes had already carried in two men under intense fire and was attending to a third case when he was severely wounded. In spite of his suffering he continued to carry wounded, and was shortly afterwards again wounded, this time mortally. Coltman came from Winhill, Burton-on-Trent, and the Grenadier from Didbrook, near Winchmere, Gloucestershire.

To the Lancashire Fusiliers' extraordinary roll of Crosses for the war was added Sergeant James Clarke, 15th Battalion, of Roehdale, his remarkable deeds being accomplished with the varied help of bayonet, Lewis gun and Tank and the exercise of uncommon valour and devotion. Clarke was commanding a platoon at Happegarbe on November 2, and was leading his men with great determination when heavy machine-gun fire held them up. The sergeant thereupon rushed forward through a thick ridge which was strongly held, captured four machine-guns in succession, and, single-handed,



SEC. LIEUTENANT JAMES JOHNSON,
Northumberland Fusiliers.

bayoneted the crews. He afterwards led the remnants of his platoon to the capture of three machine-guns and many prisoners. With seven machine-guns and numerous captives to his credit Clarke resumed operations later in the day, when his platoon was held up by machine-guns. This time he had managed to get control of a Tank, which he successfully led against the Germans over very exposed ground. On the following day the attack was continued,



PRIVATE W. E. HOLMES,
Grenadier Guards.

and Clarke gained his objective and took many more prisoners, at the same time most skilfully organizing his line and holding up the Germans. On November 4, in the attack on the Oise-Sambre Canal, Sergeant Clarke, under heavy fire from the canal bank, rushed forward with a Lewis-gun team in the face of an intense barrage, and having brought the weapon into action effectively silenced the German fire, and so enabled his company to advance and gain their objectives.

Three Territorials were amongst the winners of the Cross in the later days of October—Lieutenant William Davidson Bissett, 1/6th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (T.F.); Sergeant John Brunton Daykins, 2/4th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment (T.F.), and Private Francis George Miles, 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment (T.F.). Bissett distinguished himself on October 25, when commanding a platoon east of Maing. He had led his platoon to its objective with great dash. Later, owing to casualties, he took command of the company and handled it with great skill when his left flank had been

turned by a determined German counter-attack. The danger compelled a withdrawal to the railway, but by carrying out this movement Bissett temporarily saved the situation. His men had exhausted their ammunition and the Germans continued to advance in force, so that a critical situation was brought about. Bissett now, under heavy fire, mounted the railway embankment and called upon his men to charge with the bayonet. Such an order was very welcome to the Highlanders, and enthusiastically responding they swept upon the Germans with the steel and drove them back with heavy loss. That splendid triumph was followed by another charge forward, with the result that the subaltern established his line.

The church at Solèsmes was an objective on October 20, when Sergeant Daykins was carrying out operations with "12 remaining men of his platoon." In face of heavy opposition he worked his way towards the church. Through his prompt action his party were able to rush a machine-gun, and in severe hand-to-hand fighting which followed, the sergeant personally disposed of many Germans and secured his objective, his party taking 30 prisoners and inflicting many casualties on the enemy. So far Sergeant Daykins and his gallant dozen had done very well indeed, but that was only part of the day's good work, for another machine-gun, which was holding up a portion of his company, was located and had to be dealt with. Daykins now acted alone, and under heavy fire he worked his way to the hostile post, so successfully that shortly afterwards he returned with 25 prisoners, and an enemy machine-gun. "which he mounted at his post." Daykins belonged to Jedburgh, Scotland.

The performance of Private Miles was brilliant and successful in every way; it was, indeed, one of the finest of the achievements which had been credited to Territorials. On October 23, during the advance against the Bois L'Evêque, his company was held up by a line of German machine-guns in the sunken road near the Moulin J. Jacques. The situation was one of great danger and did not admit of any delay, and realizing this Private Miles, acting alone and on his own initiative, went forward under exceptionally heavy fire. Success attended his courageous conduct, for he located a machine-gun, shot the gunner and put the



BAYONET CHARGE ON A MACHINE-GUN POST.

weapon out of action. He now observed another machine-gun near by, and again advancing alone he shot the gunner, rushed the gun and captured the team of eight. Private Miles at last stood up and beckoned to his company, and the men, acting on his signals, were able to work round the rear of the line and to capture no fewer than 16 machine-guns with an officer and 50 other ranks. This excellent result was due to the courage, initiative and entire disregard of personal danger which Private Miles had shown. Miles was a native of Coleford, in Gloucestershire.

Company-Sergeant-Major Martin Doyle, of the 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, found himself on September 2, near Riencourt, in command of the company, owing to officer casualties, and he soon had exceptional opportunities of proving that he possessed great powers of command. Seeing that some of our men were surrounded by Germans he led a party to their help. By skill and leadership he worked his way along the trenches, killed several of the enemy and extricated the party, making his good work all the more praiseworthy by carrying back, under heavy fire, a wounded officer to a place of safety. Later in the day the sergeant-major saw a Tank in difficulties and he rose at once to the rare possibilities of the occasion. Rushing forward under intense fire, he routed the Germans who were trying to get into the Tank, and prevented the advance of another hostile party which was collecting for a further attack on the Tank. Such a prize was well worth fighting for, and the Germans were determined not to let it lightly go; the sergeant-major was as resolute that they should not have it, and so the contest

became hot and furious. The Germans managed to open a machine-gun on the Tank at close range and for the time being made it impossible to get the wounded away; but Doyle with perfect bravery rushed forward, and, single-handed, silenced the gun and captured it, with three prisoners. He then carried a wounded man to safety, under very heavy fire. Later in the day, when his position was counter-attacked by the Germans, he again proved his fitness to command, and drove them back, capturing many prisoners.



LIEUTENANT W. D. BISSETT,
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

Sergeant-Major Doyle came from New Ross, Co. Wexford.

Twice in September—on the 18th at Rossney and on the 21st—Corporal A. L. Lewis, 6th Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, shewed the utmost courage. On the first-named day, when commanding a section on the right of an attacking line he was held up by intense machine-gun fire. Seeing that two German machine-guns were enfilading the line he crawled forward single-handed and bombed the guns successfully. Later, by rifle fire, he caused the whole team to surrender, and so enabled the line to advance. On the 21st Corporal Lewis again showed great powers of command, but, having rushed his company through the enemy barrage, he was killed whilst getting his men under cover from heavy machine-gun fire.

The awards under consideration contained three more recipients belonging to British regiments—Lieutenant F. W. Hedges, Bedfordshire Regiment, attached 6th Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment; Sergeant F. C. Riggs, M.M., York and Lancaster Regiment,



PRIVATE F. G. MILES,
Gloucestershire Regiment.

and Corporal R. E. Elcock, M.M., 11th Battalion Royal Scots. Lieutenant Hedges, on October 24, during the operations north-east of Bousies, led his company with great skill towards the final objective. He maintained direction under the most difficult conditions, and when machine-gun posts held up the advance, the lieutenant, accompanied by one sergeant, and followed at some considerable distance by a Lewis gun section, again advanced with so much determination that he captured six machine-guns and 14 prisoners; his gallantry and initiative

enabling the whole line to advance. The honour to Sergeant Riggs was posthumous. On the morning of October 1, near Epinoy, he had led his platoon through strong uncut wire, under severe fire. He continued straight on, and although losing heavily through flanking fire he reached his objective, where he rushed and



SERGEANT J. B. DAYKINS,
York and Lancaster Regiment.

captured a machine-gun. Afterwards Riggs handled two captured guns with great effect and caused 50 Germans to surrender. It was while the sergeant, at a later stage, was cheerfully encouraging his men to resist an advance in force, and exhorting them to fight to the last, that he was killed. Corporal Elcock won renown when in command of a Lewis gun team on October 15, south-east of Capelle St. Catherine. Acting entirely on his own initiative, the corporal rushed his gun up to within 10 yards of two German guns which were causing heavy casualties and holding up the advance. He put both the hostile guns out of action, captured five prisoners and undoubtedly saved the whole attack from being held up; while afterwards, near the River Lys, he again attacked a German machine-gun and captured the crew.

A considerable proportion of the Crosses included in these lists were awarded to oversea soldiers, and the awards were an indication of the extent to which these troops had shared in the concluding operations and the manner



CORPORAL A. L. LEWIS,
Northamptonshire Regiment.

in which they had maintained their reputation for valour and resource. The Australian Imperial Force made a brave show in the records and the decoration was given to many officers and men who belonged to regiments from Canada. Nothing could exceed the daring and initiative of these oversea soldiers, many of whose exploits were on the grand scale and were attended with a success commensurate with the audacity which had marked their achievement. Included in the A.I.F. recipients were the following five officers:—Major Blair Anderson Wark, D.S.O., 32nd Battalion; Lieutenant Edgar Thomas Towner, M.C., 2nd Battalion Australian Machine Gun Corps; Lieutenant Lawrence Dominic McCarthy, 16th Battalion; Lieutenant Joseph Maxwell, M.C., D.C.M., 18th Battalion, and Lieutenant George Morby Ingram, M.M., 24th Battalion.

“His work was invaluable” was officially recorded of Major Wark, who showed the greatest courage, skilful leading and devotion to duty throughout the strenuous period, September 29 to October 1, in the operations against the Hindenburg Line at Bellicourt and the advance through Nauroy, Etricourt, Magny La Fosse, and Joncourt. Under heavy fire on September 29 the major personally reconnoitred a position, and having led his command forward at a critical period, restored the situation. He moved fearlessly at the head of his troops, and at times far in advance of

them, cheering them on through Nauroy and thence towards Etricourt. While still leading his assaulting companies Major Wark saw a battery of 77 mm. guns firing on his rear companies and causing heavy casualties. There was now an opportunity for the officer to distinguish himself, and he promptly took it. He collected a few of his men and made such an overwhelming rush on the battery that he captured four guns and ten of the crew. Having done that, he moved rapidly forward, accompanied by only two non-commissioned officers, and surprised and captured 50 Germans, the scene of this brilliant exploit being near Magny La Fosse. On October 1 Major Wark added to the fine reputation which he had made in action by again unhesitatingly dashing forward and silencing machine-guns which were causing heavy casualties.

Lieutenant Towner showed those great powers of endurance and resourcefulness which had been displayed in a marked degree by oversea troops to whom the Cross had been awarded. A prolonged strain in time of great stress was made upon him, and he bore it with unflinching fortitude. He was in charge of four Vickers guns on September 1 in the attack on Mont St. Quentin. Single-handed he located and captured, during the early stages of the advance, an enemy machine-gun which was causing casualties, and inflicted severe losses upon the Germans by turning it on them. He afterwards cut off



CO.-SERGEANT-MAJOR MARTIN DOYLE,
Royal Munster Fusiliers.

and captured 25 Germans by skilful and tactful handling of his guns, after which he gave valuable support to the infantry advance by fearless reconnaissance under heavy fire and by the energy, foresight and promptitude with which he brought fire to bear on various groups of Germans. There came a time when Lieutenant Towner ran short of ammunition, whereupon he secured a German machine-gun and, mounting this, courageously fired it in full view of the enemy, forcing them to retire



LIEUTENANT F. W. HEDGES,
Bedfordshire Regiment.

farther, and making it possible for our own infantry to advance. This lieutenant had the misfortune to be wounded, but that did not weaken his determination to hold on, and under intense fire he kept this gun in action at a very critical period. Towner's work was not yet done—during the following night he steadied a small detached post and gave it valuable support, the men being greatly inspired by the lieutenant's coolness and cheerfulness. Throughout the whole of this night he kept close watch on the enemy movements by personal reconnaissance, and it was not until he was exhausted, 30 hours after being wounded, that he was evacuated.

Lieutenant McCarthy's acts were of the

bravest and most resolute description, and they were conspicuous even amongst the many extraordinary single-handed exploits of the war. On the morning of August 23, in attack near Madame Wood, east of Vermandovillers, north of Chaulnes, his own battalion attained their objectives without serious opposition, but the battalion on the left flank was heavily opposed by well-posted machine-guns. Seeing what was happening, McCarthy at once engaged the nearest machine-gun post, but still the attacking troops failed to get forward, whereupon he determined to attack the nearest post. Leaving his men to continue the fire fight, the lieutenant, with two companions, dashed across the open and reached the block. He was now single-handed, as he had out-distanced his comrades, and there were serious obstacles and opposition to overcome; but McCarthy mastered them, and having captured the gun, he continued to fight his way down a trench, inflicting heavy casualties and capturing three more machine-guns. By this time the officer was about 700 yards from his starting point, and was joined by one of his men. This resistless pair now went up the trench together, bombing until touch was established with an adjoining unit. The amazing character of Lieutenant McCarthy's work during "this most daring advance" is best shown by the fact that, single-handed, he killed no fewer than 20 of the enemy, and in addition captured five machine-guns and 50 prisoners. It was recorded of him that his gallant and determined action saved a critical situation, prevented many casualties, and was mainly, if not entirely, responsible for the final objective being taken.

Throughout October 3 Lieutenant Maxwell set a high example of personal courage, excellent judgment and quick decision in attack on the Beaufort-Fonsomme line near Estrées, north of St. Quentin. Early in the advance his company commander was severely wounded, and Maxwell at once took charge. When, under intense fire, the enemy wire was reached it was found to be exceptionally strong and closely supported by machine-guns. The officer pushed forward single-handed through the wire, captured the most dangerous gun and killed three Germans and made four prisoners. Lieutenant Maxwell had enabled his company to penetrate the wire and reach the objective, and having done that, he again dashed forward and silenced, single-handed, a

German gun which was holding up a flank company. At a later stage, with only two men, he tried to capture a strong party of the enemy; he very skilfully handled a "most involved situation," and it was due to his resource that he and his comrades escaped.

Lieutenant Ingram "dashed out and rushed the post at the head of his men, capturing nine machine-guns and killing 42 enemy after stubborn resistance." Such was part of the work of this officer during the attack on Montbréhain, east of Péronne, on October 5. Early in the advance Ingram's platoon had been held up by a strong point and he unhesitatingly solved the difficulty by this triumphant rush. Later, when the company had suffered severe casualties from German posts, Lieutenant Ingram, many leaders having fallen, took control of things, and having rallied his men under intense fire he led them forward. He promptly did what so many of his oversea comrades had done: he himself rushed the first post, shot six Germans and captured a machine-gun, thus overcoming serious resistance. Twice afterwards the officer showed great dash and resource in capturing German posts, making the highly satisfactory bag of 62 prisoners and inflicting many casualties. Throughout the whole day Ingram fearlessly exposed himself and set the most inspiring example of bravery and leadership. Three Crosses were posthumously awarded to members of the A.I.F.: Private R. M. Beatham, 8th Battalion; Private R. Mactier, 23rd Battalion, and Corporal A. H. Buckley, 54th Battalion. Before he met his death, Beatham had inspired all ranks by his valour. During the attack north of Rosières, east of Amiens, on August 9, the advance being held up by heavy machine-gun fire, Private Beatham dashed forward, and helped by only one man, bombed and fought the crews of four German machine-guns, killing 10 of the enemy, capturing 10 others, and so facilitating the advance and saving many casualties. In performing his most useful work Beatham was wounded, but he insisted on carrying on and succeeded in reaching the final objective. Undaunted he again dashed forward and bombed a machine-gun, and it was while undertaking this daring enterprise that he was riddled with bullets and killed.

Mactier and Buckley won their Crosses on the same day, September 1. On that morning, during the attack on the village of Mt. St.

Quentin, before the advance of the battalion, it was necessary to clear up several enemy strong points close to our line. Bombing patrols which had been sent forward had failed to make the clearance, and so the battalion was not able to move. It was at this stage of deadlock that Private Mactier, single-handed, and in daylight, jumped out of a trench, rushed past the block and fearlessly closed with and killed the machine-gun garrison of eight men. This he accomplished with his revolver and



LIEUTENANT LAWRENCE D. McCARTHY,
16th Battalion A.I.F.

bombs, finishing this particular task by throwing the machine-gun over the parapet. Mactier now rushed forward about 20 yards and jumped into another strong point which was held by a garrison of half-a-dozen men. Probably these knew of the fate of their countrymen,

at any rate they immediately surrendered. Private Mactier continued through the trench to the next block and disposed of a hostile machine-gun which had been enfilading our flank advancing troops; he then, unfortunately, was killed by another machine-gun at close range. The great value of the private's



LIEUTENANT G. M. INGRAM,
24th Battalion A.I.F.

individual heroism and resolution was shown by the fact that, it was entirely due to him that the battalion was able to move on to its "jumping-off" trench and carry out the successful capture, a few hours later, of the village of Mt. St. Quentin.

Corporal Buckley lost his life in trying to save his comrades at Péronne, during the operations on September 1 and 2. After the first objective had been passed his half company and part of the company on the flank were held up by a German machine-gun nest, whereupon Buckley, with one man, rushed the post and shot four of the occupants and took 22 prisoners. Later on he reached a moat and found that another German machine-gun nest commanded the only available foot-bridge. Whilst this was being engaged from a flank the corporal tried to cross the bridge and rush the post, but he was killed in making the courageous effort.

The following nine non-commissioned officers and men of the A.I.F. were also awarded the Victoria Cross: Sergeant G. Sexton, 13th

Bn.; Sergeant A. D. Lowerson, 21st Bn.; Corporal A. C. Hall, 54th Bn.; Lee-Corpl. B. S. Gordon, M.M., 41st Bn.; Corporal L. C. Weathers, 43rd Bn.; Private G. Cartwright, 33rd Bn.; Private J. P. Woods, 48th Bn.; Private W. M. Currey, 53rd Bn.; Private J. Ryan, 55th Bn.

Sergeant Sexton neither faltered nor took cover during the operations in which he specially distinguished himself on September 18 in the attack near Le Verguier, north-west of St. Quentin. The advance was very seriously opposed and he performed great feats of bravery in dealing with hostile machine-guns and rushing German posts. When the advance had passed the ridge at Le Verguier his attention was directed to a party of Germans who were manning a bank and to a field gun which was causing casualties and holding up a company. Calling to his section to follow him, Sergeant Sexton unhesitatingly rushed down the bank and killed the gunners of the field gun; then, disregarding machine-gun fire, he returned to the bank and, after firing down some dug-outs, "induced" about 30 Germans to surrender. When the advance was continued from the first to the second objective, the company was again held up by machine-guns on the flanks; but, supported by another platoon, the sergeant disposed of the hostile guns, and at a later stage he again showed the "most conspicuous initiative" in capturing German posts and machine-guns, and when it came to digging-in he gave his company invaluable support.

Throughout a week of operations Sergeant Lowerson continually influenced the men serving under him by his example; his finest display of bravery and tactical skill being on September 1, during the attack on Mt. St. Quentin. Early in the attack very strong opposition was encountered and the Germans stubbornly contested every foot of ground. There was heavy machine-gun fire, but disregarding this the sergeant moved about fearlessly, directing his men and encouraging them to still greater effort, with the happy result that at last he led them on to the objective. Having reached this Lowerson saw that the left attacking party was held up by an enemy strong post which was manned with a dozen machine-guns. Under the heaviest sniping and machine-gun fire he rallied seven men, and with this mere handful as a storming party he rushed the post, having directed his band to attack the

flanks, and so effectively bombed and fought that the whole of the 12 guns were captured, with 30 prisoners. The sergeant had been severely wounded in the right thigh, but he refused to leave the front line until the prisoners had been disposed of and the post thoroughly organized and consolidated.

The region of Péronne, at the beginning of September, gave an extraordinary number of Crosses to members of the A.I.F., for in addition to the cases instanced there were those of Hall, Weathers, Currey and Cartwright, all of whom won fame at or near Péronne. During the attack on September 1 a machine-gun post was checking the advance. Hall, single-handed, rushed the position, shot four of the occupants of the post and captured nine other Germans and two machine-guns. Then he crossed the objective with a small party and gave excellent covering support to the rest of the company. Corporal Hall persisted in keeping continuously in advance of the main party, and this enabled him to locate enemy posts of resistance. Having made these discoveries he personally led parties to the assault, and in this way he captured many small bodies of prisoners and a number of machine-guns. The heavy work of the 1st was followed by a crowning act of courage by the corporal, who, during a severe barrage, carried to safety a dangerously wounded comrade who urgently needed medical attention; then Hall immediately returned to his post.

Weathers was with an advanced bombing party north of Péronne on September 2 when the attack was held up by a strongly held German trench. Corporal Weathers, alone, went forward under heavy fire and attacked the enemy with bombs. Then he returned to our lines for a further supply of bombs and again went forward, this time with three comrades, and attacked under very heavy fire. Scorning personal danger the corporal mounted the German parapet and bombed the trench, and with the support of his brave comrades captured three machine-guns and no fewer than 180 prisoners. This was a very splendid deed, and it resulted not only in the successful capture of the final objective, but also saved many of the lives of the corporal's comrades.

Dauntless rushes on machine-gun posts characterized the conduct of Private Currey in the attack on Péronne on the morning of September 1. The battalion was being badly punished by a 77 mm. field gun at very close

range, when Currey unhesitatingly rushed forward under intense machine-gun fire and captured the weapon single-handed, after killing the entire crew, an act which was something of a repetition of the performance against 77 mm. guns of Major Wark, though Currey's opponents were not so fortunate as the major's. A Lewis gun became Currey's choice at a later stage, when a German strong point checked the advance of the left flank. Creeping around the flank the resourceful private engaged the post with the Lewis gun, finally rushing it single-handed and causing many casualties. It was entirely through the soldier's gallant conduct that the situation was relieved and the advance enabled to continue. Private Currey subsequently volunteered to carry orders for the withdrawal of an isolated company, and he



SERGEANT A. D. LOWERSON,
21st Battalion A.I.F.

succeeded in doing this in spite of shell and rifle fire, returning with valuable information.

"Wonderful dash, grim determination, and courage of the highest order" were recorded of Private Cartwright, for his behaviour on the morning of August 31, during the attack on Road Wood, south-west of Bouchavesnes, near Péronne. His exploit was marked by a singularly direct simplicity. When two companies were held up by machine-gun fire from the south-western edge of the wood, Cartwright, without hesitation, moved against the

gun "in a most deliberate manner," under intense fire. He shot three of the team and, having bombed the post, captured the gun and nine Germans—a rousing deed which had such an inspiring effect on the whole line that it immediately rushed forward.

Corporal Gordon was another outstanding example of single-handed enterprises which were rewarded with very great success. On August 26-27, east of Bray, he led his section



PRIVATE G. CARTWRIGHT,

33rd Battalion A.I.F., congratulated by his friends.

through heavy shell fire to the objective, which he consolidated; then, single-handed, he attacked a German machine-gun which was enfilading the company on his right. So swift and skilful was this individual onslaught that the corporal killed the man on the gun and captured the post, which contained an officer and 10 men; then he cleared up a trench, seizing two machine-guns and making 29 more prisoners. Amazing as these deeds were, they were not the total of Gordon's achievements, for in clearing up further

trenches he took 22 prisoners, including an officer, and three machine-guns. Practically unaided, he captured, in the course of these operations, two officers and 61 other ranks, as well as six machine-guns, and throughout he showed "a wonderful example of fearless initiative."

Precisely the same courage and enterprise were displayed by Private Woods on September 18, near Le Verguier. With a weak patrol he attacked and captured a very formidable German post, and, with the help of two comrades, he held this against heavy counter-attacks. From all directions heavy fire was brought to bear upon him, but Woods was entirely disregardful of the danger, and jumping on to a parapet, he opened fire on the attacking Germans, with excellent results; and this fire he maintained until help arrived.

Completing this list of members of the A.I.F. was Private Ryan, who saved a particularly dangerous situation on September 30 during an attack against the Hindenburg defences. Ryan was one of the first to reach a German trench in the initial assault on the enemy's positions, and it was very largely due to "his exceptional skill and daring" that the hostile garrison was speedily overcome and the trench occupied. This promising beginning was followed by a counter-attack by the Germans, who managed to establish a bombing party in the rear of the position. The position now became critical, for there was fire from both front and rear, and very prompt action was imperative. Ryan quickly grasped the situation and its needs, and organized and led the men near him, with bomb and bayonet, against the German bombers, with the result that at last he reached the position; but so hazardous had been the undertaking that only three men were left with him. Again Ryan fell back upon the bayonet, and by skilful use of the steel the small party killed the first three Germans on the hostile flank. The private now acted alone and, moving fearlessly along the embankment, he rushed the rest of the enemy with bombs. Ryan fell wounded after he had driven the Germans back, punishing them severely as they retired across "No Man's Land."

Men from Ontario had established an uncommonly fine record in connexion with the Crosses, and to the roll of recipients the following were added:

Captain B. S. Hutcheson, Can. A. Med. Corps, attached 75th Bn. 1st Central Ontario Regt.



[French official photograph.]

A CAPTURED GERMAN MACHINE-GUN TEAM.

Captain J. MacGregor, M.C., D.C.M., 2nd C.M.R. Bn. 1st Central Ontario Regt.

Lieut. G. F. Kerr, M.C., M.M., 3rd Bn. 1st Central Ontario Regt.

Lieut. W. L. Algie, late 20th Bn. 1st Central Ontario Regt.

Lieut. G. T. Lyall, 102nd Bn. 2nd Central Ontario Regt.

Sergeant W. Merrifield, 4th Bn. Central Ontario Regt.

Private C. J. P. Nunney, D.C.M., M.M., 38th Bn. Eastern Ontario Regt.

Captain Hutchison, as a doctor, performed many brave acts by which many lives were saved, though only two or three of these were recorded in the official story. His particular displays of self-sacrificing courage were on September 2, when, with the battalion, he went through the Droocourt-Quéant Support Line under the most intense fire from artillery, rifles and machine-guns. The officer showed that utter disregard of his own safety which had become almost a characteristic of our Army surgeons, and he unhesitatingly and coolly remained on the field until every wounded man had received attention. "Under terrific machine-gun and shell fire" Captain Hutchison dressed the wounds of a seriously

wounded officer and, with the help of his own men and prisoners he evacuated him to safety, in spite of the fact that the bearer party suffered heavy casualties. Immediately after this exhibition of fortitude and humanity the captain, in full view of the Germans, and still under heavy fire from rifles and machine-guns, rushed forward to tend a wounded sergeant, and having placed him in a shell-hole, he dressed his wounds. "Captain Hutchison performed many similar gallant acts."

Captain MacGregor was another instance of a wounded fighter carrying on in spite of all difficulties and dangers, and of a man who, though *hors de combat*, yet succeeded in maintaining the high standard of leadership and devotion which he had set himself. His courage and endurance were shown near Cambrai, from September 29 to October 3. The whole of MacGregor's heroic work was done under heavy fire, with the added peril of acting in broad daylight. Although wounded he pushed on and located some machine-guns which were checking the advance. It was broad daylight and fire came from all directions, but with rifle and bayonet, and single-handed, the captain put the German crews out of action, killing four and taking eight prisoners, the result of

his energetic and successful action being that many casualties were saved and the advance was enabled to continue. Captain MacGregor reorganized his command and then performed the most valuable service of usefully supporting neighbouring troops. The Germans pulled themselves together enough to resist stubbornly,



CAPTAIN J. MACGREGOR,
1st Central Ontario Regiment.

whereupon MacGregor went along the line, organized the platoons, took command of the leading waves and continued the advance. Daylight dangers seem to have had some special charm for this Canadian officer, for later, after a personal "daylight reconnaissance under heavy fire," he established his company in Neuville St. Remy, the direct result of this intrepidity being that the advance into Tilloy was greatly helped.

The Crosses awarded to Lieutenants Kerr and Lyall were for their valour during the Bourlon Wood operations on September 27. Kerr was in command of the left support company in attack and handled it with great skill, giving timely support by outflanking a machine-gun which was impeding the advance. Afterwards, near the Arras-Cambrai Road, the advance was again held up by a strong point, and this critical emergency gave Lieutenant Kerr the chance to establish his reputation as a fighter of the utmost merit. "Far in advance of his company" he rushed the strong point single-handed and with such overwhelming impetuosity that he captured

four machine-guns and no fewer than 31 prisoners.

Lieutenant Lyall's deeds were such that of him it must be said, as has been remarked in previous chapters of extraordinary achievements of the Cross, that if it were not for the official records they would be regarded as incredible. He began showing his bravery and high power of command whilst leading his platoon against Bourlon Wood, giving invaluable support to the leading company, which was held up by a strong point. By a flank movement Lyall captured this point, with one field gun, four machine-guns and 13 prisoners. His platoon, much weakened by casualties, was held up by machine-guns at the southern end of the Wood. Lyall now surpassed his own gallantry, for collecting any men who happened to be available, he led them towards the strong point, and "springing forward alone," rushed the position single-handed and killed the officer in charge, afterwards capturing at this point 45 prisoners and five machine-guns. He made good his final objective with a further



LIEUTENANT G. F. KERR,
1st Central Ontario Regiment.

haul of 47 prisoners, and by consolidating his position protected the rest of the company. So much for that great day of September 27. There was a fine repetition of it on October 1, in the neighbourhood of Blecourt, when Lyall, although in command of only a weak company, so skilfully disposed matters that he captured a strongly defended position which yielded the large number of 17 machine-guns and 80 prisoners. During these two days' operations Lieutenant Lyall's total captures were three

officers, 182 other ranks, 26 machine-guns, and one field gun, "exclusive of heavy casualties inflicted." This officer's achievements, therefore, stood prominently out even in the wonderful deeds for which the Cross was given, and he consistently showed that amazing personal prowess which undoubtedly, by inspiring followers, did so much to demoralize the Germans and ensure the complete success of the last phase of the great advance.

Lieutenant Algie lost his life in winning his distinction. On October 11, north-east of Cambrai, he was with attacking troops which came under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from a neighbouring village. With nine volunteers he rushed forward and shot the crew of a German machine-gun, then, turning the weapon on the enemy he enabled his party to reach the village. Another hostile machine-gun presented itself as an irresistible target, and rushing at this also Lieutenant Algie killed the crew and captured an officer and 10 men, the result being that he cleared the end of the village. The subaltern now established his party and went back for reinforcements, but unhappily he was killed when gallantly leading them forward. His bravery had been shown in the face of intense fire, and it was the means of saving many lives and of enabling the position to be held.

Sergeant Merrifield had served with "exceptional distinction" on many former occasions, and throughout the attack near Abancourt on October 1 he showed the highest qualities of valour and leadership. His acts were marked by somewhat unusual circumstances, for having single-handedly attacked two machine-gun emplacements from which intense fire was holding up his men, he dashed "from shell-hole to shell-hole," an undertaking which demanded rare agility and pluck. He succeeded in killing the occupants of the first post, and, although wounded, he continued to attack the second post, the occupants of which he killed with a bomb. Sergeant Merrifield's indomitable spirit made him refuse to be evacuated, and he led his platoon until he was "again severely wounded."

The record concerning Private Nunney was notable because it did not specify any particular act of valour, but was a plain statement of an exhibition of cool, consistent fearlessness which was priceless as an example. The private won his fame during the operations against the Drocourt-Quéant line on September 1 and 2.

On the 1st, when his battalion was in the vicinity of Vis-en-Artois, preparatory to the advance, the Germans laid down a heavy barrage and counter-attacked. Nunney was at this time at company headquarters and he at once, on his own initiative, proceeded through the barrage to the company outpost lines, "going from post to post and encouraging the men by his own fearless example." The Germans were repulsed and a critical situation was saved. The private's dash during the



LIEUTENANT G. T. LYALL,
2nd Central Ontario Regiment.

attack on the 2nd continually placed him in advance of his companions, and his conduct undoubtedly helped greatly to carry the company forward to its objectives. Nunney carried on in this determined fashion until he was severely wounded.

The remaining six recipients to be dealt with came from various parts of the Canadian Dominions. They were:—

Lieut. S. L. Honey, D.C.M., M.M., late 78th Bn. Manitoba Regt.

Lieut. M. F. Gregg, M.C., Royal Can. Regt., Nova Scotia Regt.

Sergt. H. Cairns, D.C.M., late 46th Bn. Saskatchewan Regt.

Private W. L. Rayfield, 7th Bn. British Columbia Regt.

Private J. F. Young, 87th Bn. Quebec Regt.

Private T. Ricketts, 1st Bn. R. Newfoundland Regt.

Bourlon Wood was the scene of the operations in which, from September 27 to October 2, Lieutenant Honey played an important part. On the 27th, when all his company officers had become casualties, Honey took command, and under very severe fire skilfully carried out



SERGEANT MERRIFIELD,
Central Ontario Regiment.

reorganization. Continuing the advance with great dash he gained the objective. He now found that his company was suffering casualties from enfilade machine-gun fire, whereupon he followed the example which had been so often set—he located and rushed, single-handed, the machine-gun nest and captured the guns and 10 prisoners. Lieutenant Honey afterwards repelled four counter-attacks, and after dark, again went out alone, and having located an enemy post he led a party which captured it and three guns. There was no falling off in the high character of the work which Honey set himself to do. With great skill and daring he led his company on September 29 against a strong German position, and in the succeeding days of the battle he continued his display of heroism and devotion. This gallant officer died of wounds received during the last day of the attack by his battalion.

The honour awarded to Lieutenant Gregg was for his bravery and initiative during operations near Cambrai from September 27 to October 1. On September 28 the advance

of the brigade was held up by fire from both flanks and by thick, uncut wire, a combination which caused a dangerous situation. The prospect was not promising, but Gregg crawled forward alone and explored the wire until he found a small gap. Through this little opening he subsequently led his men and forced an entry into a German trench. A German counter-attack in force followed, and bombs having run short the situation became critical. Lieutenant Gregg was wounded, but in spite of this and "terrific fire," he managed to return alone and collect a further supply of these missiles. He then rejoined his party, which was much reduced in numbers by this time, and despite a second wound he reorganized his survivors, and, leading them with the greatest determination, he finally cleared the German trenches. Lieutenant Gregg's behaviour was of the most resolute and courageous kind, for he personally killed or wounded 11 Germans and took 25 prisoners, in addition to 12 machine-guns captured in a trench. Quite regardless of his



PRIVATE C. J. P. NUNNEY
Eastern Ontario Regiment.

wounds the officer remained with his company holding on until, on September 30, he was again severely wounded while leading his men in attack.

Extraordinary valour marked the conduct of Sergeant Cairns, and before he gloriously fell he inflicted the severest punishment on the Germans before Valenciennes on November 1. A machine-gun opened on his platoon, whereupon Cairns instantly seized a Lewis gun and, single-handed, in the face of direct fire, he rushed the hostile post, killed the crew of five and seized the weapon. At a

later stage, when the line was held up by machine-gun fire, the sergeant again rushed forward and killed 12 Germans and captured 18 and two guns. Once more the advance was stopped by field guns and machine-guns. Cairns was now wounded, but he led a small party to outflank the Germans, of whom he killed many and forced about 50 to surrender, adding to the splendour of the deed by capturing all the guns. Having consolidated, the sergeant went with a battle-patrol to exploit Marly, and he compelled 60 Germans to surrender. He was severely wounded whilst disarming this party of captives, but he opened fire and inflicted heavy losses. In the end he was rushed by a score of Germans. He collapsed from weakness and loss of blood and died, a truly gallant soldier, on November 2.

Privates Rayfield and Young gained their Crosses during the operations on September 2, 3 and 4, Rayfield by his "indomitable courage, cool foresight and daring reconnoissance," and Young because of the bravery he consistently showed as a stretcher-bearer. During the operations east of Arras, Rayfield, ahead of his company, rushed a trench which was occupied by a large party of Germans, of whom he personally bayoneted two and took 10 prisoners. He afterwards located an enemy sniper who was causing many casualties, and, under constant rifle fire, engaged this marksman "with great skill;" then he rushed the section of trench from which the sniper had been operating, and his daring and coolness so demoralized the Germans that "30 others surrendered to him." Having done these things Rayfield, giving no thought to his own safety, left cover under heavy machine-gun fire and carried in a badly wounded comrade.

"In the open fire-swept ground" Young dressed the wounded, and more than once, having exhausted his stock of dressings, he returned, under intense fire, to his company headquarters for a further supply. For more than an hour, in spite of the total absence of cover, Private Young continued his noble work, showing the "most absolute fearlessness," and saving many of his comrade's lives. When the fire had somewhat slackened he organized and led stretcher parties to bring in the wounded whom he had dressed. This valour and devotion to duty were shown all through the operations of September 2, 3 and 4.

Private Ricketts was an admirable illustration of divination of a German intention and

taking prompt means to nullify it. There had been a number of such cases in the war records of the Cross, and that of Private Ricketts ranked amongst the best of them. On October 14, during the advance from Ledeghem, heavy German fire held up the attack, and the private's platoon suffered severe casualties from a battery which was firing at point-blank range. Ricketts instantly volunteered to go forward with his section commander and a Lewis gun to try to outflank the battery. He advanced by short rushes under heavy fire from machine-guns which were with the battery; but when still 300 yards from the



SERGEANT H. CAIRNS,
Late Saskatchewan Regiment.

guns the courageous couple found themselves in the perilous position of having exhausted their ammunition. The Germans now saw a chance to get their field guns away, and began to bring up their gun teams. The private at once divined the intention, and doubled back 100 yards under the heaviest machine-gun fire. Procuring further ammunition, he again dashed back to the Lewis gun, and by very accurate fire drove the "enemy and the gun teams" into a farm where, bottled up, they were helpless; and the platoon then advancing, without casualties, captured four field guns, four machine-guns and eight prisoners. Subsequently a fifth field gun was intercepted by fire and captured. These important captures and the saving of many lives were directly attributable to Private Ricketts grasping the

German intention and securing, utterly regardless of personal safety, the further supply of ammunition for the Lewis gun which was used with such complete success.

Eleven months after the attack on Zeebrugge on the night of April 22-23, 1918, two Crosses were posthumously awarded to officers of the Royal Navy who had shown supreme heroism in that immortal exploit. These recipients were Lieutenant-Commander George Nicholson Bradford and Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Leyland Harrison, Bradford being a brother of the truly gallant Brigadier-General Bradford,



PRIVATE J. F. YOUNG,
Quebec Regiment.

who won the Cross in the war* and was killed in action in France on November 30, 1917. When the announcement of these two awards was made from the Admiralty on March 17, 1919, the story of Zeebrugge had been fully told and there was but little to learn concerning that great incident in naval history, yet the records of the deeds of these two naval officers emphasized once more the desperate nature of the April night enterprise and the great skill and inflexible determination with which it was carried out.

Bradford was in command of the naval storming parties embarked in the *Iris II*. Owing to the motion of this vessel when she proceeded alongside the Mole there was great difficulty in placing the parapet anchors, and before she was secured an attempt was made to land by the scaling ladders. A brave young officer of the *Erin*, Lieutenant Claude E. K. Hawkings, succeeded in getting a ladder in

position and actually reached the parapet. The ladder was crashed to pieces just as the lieutenant stepped off it and he was killed on the parapet, defending himself to the last with his revolver. It was no part of Bradford's duty to secure the ship, but at such a crisis in battle no British naval officer had stopped to analyse the exactness of his position—if he saw a breach he flung himself into it, for the good and glory of the common cause. "The ship was surging up and down," and a derrick which carried a large parapet anchor and was rigged out over the port side was crashing on the Mole. Bradford climbed up this dizzy and dangerous projection, and waiting his opportunity he jumped with the parapet anchor on to the Mole and placed it in position; but no sooner had he hooked on the anchor than he was riddled with bullets from machine-guns and fell into the sea between the Mole and the ship. His body was not recovered. "Lieutenant-Commander Bradford's action," said the official record, "was one of absolute self-sacrifice; without a moment's hesitation he went to certain death, recognizing that in such action lay the only possible chance of securing *Iris II*. and enabling her storming parties to land."

Lieutenant-Commander Harrison's conduct differed only in detail from that of Bradford. He was in immediate command of the naval storming parties embarked in the *Vindictive*. Just before coming alongside the Mole Harrison was struck on the head by a fragment of shell which broke his jaw. This severe wound knocked him senseless, but when he recovered consciousness his unconquerable spirit impelled him to proceed on to the Mole; where he took over command of his party, who were attacking the seaward end of it. The silencing of the guns on the Mole-head was of the first importance, and though the officer was in a position which was fully exposed to the machine-gun fire of the Germans he collected his men and led them to the attack. This he did although he was severely wounded and undoubtedly in great pain. The undertaking was one in which there was but the slightest chance of surviving, and Harrison must have known it, yet his spirit never faltered. All the men he had gathered together were either killed or wounded, and he himself was killed at their head. He fell when he was indomitably pressing his attacks, "knowing as he did that any delay in silencing the guns might jeopardize

* Part 148, p. 174.

the main object of the expedition," which was the blocking of the Zeebrugge-Bruges Canal.

So died Lieutenant-Commanders Bradford and Harrison on that memorable night which inevitably suggested comparison with the storming of Badajoz—"Ridge fell, and no man died that night with more glory—yet many died and there was much glory."

Looking upon Victoria Crosses as a barometer which indicated the rise and fall in the intensity of the fighting during the weeks immediately preceding the armistice, it was seen that on certain days in September, October and November there were amazing exhibitions of acts of courage. For these three months the Crosses awarded formed a considerable proportion of the whole of the Crosses given for the war. August had a good record, for it provided more than half-a-dozen days on which at least one Cross was won. September was gloriously heralded by no fewer than five Crosses for the first day of the month, followed by four for the second, and the high



PRIVATE THOMAS RICKETTS,
Royal Newfoundland Regiment.

number of six each for the 18th and the 27th. That month, indeed, stood prominently out in all the months of the war, for it could claim an average of one Cross for each of the 30 days which composed it, with a Cross or two to spare. October, too, was notable, there being three Crosses won on the 1st and five on the 14th. The fierce nature of much of the fighting at the very end of the operations was indicated by the award of six Crosses for deeds of valour on November 4, the last Cross to be won, as announced in the published awards, being on November 6. British airmen had so fully proved their immeasurable superiority over

the Germans that they were not able in the last days of all to perform those special acts for which alone the Cross could be given, and the determination of the men of the German Fleet not to put to sea made it impossible for the vast majority of the officers and men of the Royal Navy to find opportunities to secure the honour



PRIVATE W. L. RAYFIELD,
British Columbia Regiment.

With regard to individual regiments, the Lancashire Fusiliers at an early stage took the lead and maintained it, the number of Crosses won by this famous old corps being remarkably high. Some of these honours were conferred on the principle of selection. Other regiments which added greatly to their renown by the number of Crosses won were the Royal Fusiliers, the Yorkshire Regiment and the Rifle Brigade—to name only two or three outstanding cases. The extraordinary courage and resourcefulness of the oversea troops was clearly proved by the large number of Crosses given to Canadians and Australians.

A remarkable instance of the non-award of the Cross was mentioned in the House of Commons on March 12, 1919, when Dr. Macnamara, replying to a question, said the Admiralty were informed that at the battle of Jutland Lieutenant Maurice J. Bethel sacrificed his life by staying on board a sinking ship, which had been deserted and was being hit by salvo after salvo, to attend to a dying signalman. It was a fact that the only recognition of the deed was publicity of the death of the officer in the *London Gazette* as mentioned in dispatches. The rule against the post-



THE FIGHT ON THE MOLE AT ZEEBRUGGE, IN WHICH LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER HARRISON WON HIS CROSS.

humorous award of honours prohibited the award of any other honour than the Victoria Cross, and the Board did not consider that Lieut. Bothel's conduct, gallant as it was, reached the high standard for which the Victoria Cross was awarded.

During the whole of the period between August, 1914 and February 28, 1919, the total number of Crosses awarded to officers and men of the Regular Forces, Territorial Forces and New Armies was only 569, and two Bars. Of the Crosses one was given for "services in connexion with the war," the explanation of this description being "Air raids, coastal bombardments, etc.," this instance being clearly that of Lieutenant Leeke Robinson, on whom it was conferred for his skill and courage in destroying the German airship which fell in flames at Cuffley, on September 3, 1916. This was the only Cross ever awarded for an act of valour in England.

The limited extent of the award of the Cross during the long period mentioned was shown by the fact that for services in the field there were distributed the following honours: D.S.O., 8,435; M.C., 35,802; D.C.M., 22,800; Military Medal, 91,721.

An impressive illustration of the small proportion of Crosses awarded to casualties sustained was given by the figures officially published in March, 1919, of the losses of the Foot Guards. No fewer than 616 officers and 13,053 other ranks were killed and 746 officers and 22,256 other ranks wounded. The figures for the regiments and the details of decorations awarded were:—

GRENADIER GUARDS.

Killed, 203 officers, 4,436 other ranks.
Wounded, 242 officers, 6,934 other ranks.
Missing, two officers, 85 other ranks.
Decorations won—V.C., 7; D.S.O., 51;
Military Cross, 137; D.C.M., 152; Military Medal, 607.

COLDSTREAM GUARDS.

Killed, 158 officers, 3,448 other ranks.
Wounded, 324 officers, 9,435 other ranks.
Missing, three officers, 110 other ranks.
Decorations won—V.C., 7; D.S.O., 40;
Military Cross, 121; D.C.M., 152; Military Medal, 426.

SCOTS GUARDS.

Killed, 108 officers, 2,026 other ranks.
Wounded, 149 officers, 4,002 other ranks.
Missing, 595 N.C.O.'s and men. No officers.

Decorations won—V.C., 5; D.S.O., 24;
Military Cross, 97; D.C.M., 89; Military Medal, 332.

IRISH GUARDS.

Killed, 108 officers, 2,149 other ranks.
Wounded, 199 officers, 5,540 other ranks.
Missing, seven officers, 100 other ranks.
Decorations won—V.C., 4; D.S.O., 15;
Military Cross, 63; D.C.M., 75; Military Medal, 195.

WELSH GUARDS.

Killed, 33 officers, 820 other ranks.



LIEUT.-COMMANDER A. L. HARRISON,
R.N.

Wounded, 55 officers, 1,700 other ranks.
Missing, no officers, two other ranks.
Decorations won—V.C., 1; D.S.O., 10;
Military Cross, 30; D.C.M., 20; Military Medal, 147.

GUARDS MACHINE GUN REGIMENT (4TH Bn.).

Killed, six officers, 174 other ranks.
Wounded, 19 officers, 1,579 other ranks.
Missing, one officer.
Decorations won—D.S.O., 2; Military Cross, 25; D.C.M., 23; Military Medal, 67.

Many of the Crosses were posthumously awarded; not a few of the recipients subsequently fell in action, and others died of disease, leaving but a shrunken band to live

and enjoy the honour which attended their achievement of heroic deeds.

The following officers, non-commissioned officers and men complete the list of recipients of the Victoria Cross :

ALGIE, Lieut. Wallace Lloyd, late 20th Bn., 1st Central Ontario Regt.

AMEY, Lee.-Cpl. Wm., 1/8th Bn., R. War. Regt. (T.F.) (Birmingham).



MRS. BRADFORD, THE MOTHER OF TWO V.C.'S SHOWING THE CROSS OF LIEUT.-COMMANDER G. N. BRADFORD, R.N.

ARCHIBALD, Sapper Adam, 218th Field Co., R.F. (Leith).

BEATHAM, Pte. Robert Matthew, late 8th Bn., A.I.F.

BISSETT, Lieut. Wm. Davidson, 1/6th Bn., Arg. and Suthd Highls. (T.F.).

BRADFORD, Lieut.-Com. George Nicholson, R.N.

BUCKLEY, Pte. (T.-Cpl.) Alexander Hy.; late 54th Bn., A.I.F.

CAIRNS, Sergt. Hugh, D.C.M., late 46th Bn., Saskatchewan Regt.

CALDWELL, Sergt. Thos., 12th Bn., R. Scot. Fus. (Carlisle).

CARTWRIGHT, Pte. Geo., 33rd Bn., A.I.F.

CLARK-KENNEDY, Lieut.-Colonel Wm. Hew. C.M.G., D.S.O., 24th Bn., Quebec Regt.

CLARKE, Sergt. James, 15th Bn., Lancashire Fus. (Rochdale).

CLOUTMAN, Lieut. (Act. Maj.) Brett Mackay, M.C., 59th Field Co., R.E. (T.F.).

COLTMAN, Pte. (Lee.-Cpl.) Wm. Harold, D.C.M., M.M., 1/6th Bn., N. Staff. Regt. (T.F.) (Winhill, Burton-on-Trent).

CURREY, Pte. Wm. Matthew, 53rd Bn., A.I.F.
CURTIS, Sergt. Horace Augustus, 2nd Bn., R. Dublin Fus. (Newlyn East, Cornwall).

DAYKINS, Cpl. (Act. Sergt.) John Brunton, 2/4th Bn., York and Lanc. Regt. (T.F.) (Jedburgh, Scotland).

DOYLE, Co.-Sergt.-Major Martin, M.M., 1st Bn., R. Munster Fus. (New Ross, Co. Wexford).

ELCOCK, Lee.-Cpl. (Act. Cpl.) Roland Edward, M.M., 11th Bn., R. Scots. (Wolverhampton).

GORDON, Lee.-Cpl. Bernard Sidney, M.M., 41st Bn., A.I.F.

GREENWOOD, T.-Major (Act. Lieut.-Colonel) Harry, D.S.O., M.C., 9th Bn., K.O.Y.L.I.

GREGG, Lieut. Milton Fowler, M.C., R. Can. Regt., Nova Scotia Regt.

HALL, Cpl. Arthur Chas., 54th Bn., A.I.F.

HARRISON, Lieut.-Com. Arthur Layland, R.N.

HARVEY, Pte. Norman, 1st Bn., R. Innis. Fus. (Newton-le-Willows).

HEDGES, T.-Lieut. Fk. Wm., Bedfordshire Regt., attd. 6th Bn., Northamptonshire Regt.

HOLMES, Pte. Wm. Edgar, late 2nd Bn., Gren. Gds. (Didbrook, nr. Winchmere, Glouce.).

HONEY, Lieut. Saml. Lewis, D.C.M., M.M., late 78th Bn., Manitoba Regt.

HUTCHISON, Capt. Ballenden Seymour, Can. A. Med. Corps., attd. 75th Bn., 1st Central Ontario Regt.

INGRAM, Lieut. Geo. Morby, M.M., 24th Bn., A.I.F.

JOHNSON, Major (Act. Lieut.-Colonel) Dudley Graham, D.S.O., M.C., S. W. Bord., attd. 2nd Bn., R. Suss. Regt.

JOHNSON, 2nd Lieut. James, 2nd Bn., Northd. Fus., attd. 36th Bn.

KERR, Lieut. Geo. Fraser, M.C., M.M., 3rd Bn., 1st Central Ontario Regt.

KIRK, 2nd Lieut. James, late 10th, attd. 2nd Bn., Manchester Regt.

LEWIS, Lee.-Cpl. Allan Leonard, late 6th Bn., Northamptonshire Regt. (Whitney, Hereford).

LOWERSON, Sergt. Albert David, 21st Bn., A.I.F.

- LYALL, Lieut. Graham Thomson, 102nd Bn., 2nd Central Ontario Regt.
- MCCARTHY, Lieut. Lawrence Dominic, 16th Bn., A.I.F.
- MACGREGOR, T.-Capt. John, M.C., D.C.M., 2nd C. M. R. Bn., 1st Central Ontario Regt.
- MCPIE, Cpl. James, late 416th (Edinburgh) Field Co., R.E. (T.F.) (Edinburgh).
- MACTIER, Pte. Robt., late 23rd Bn., A.I.F.
- MARSHALL, Lieut. (Aet. Lieut.-Colonel) John Neville, M.C., late Irish Gds. (S. R.), attd. 16th Bn., Lancashire Fus.
- MAXWELL, Lieut. Joseph, M.C., D.C.M., 18th Bn., A.I.F.
- MERRIFIELD, Sergt. Wm., 4th Bn., Central Ontario Regt.
- MILES, Pte. Francis George, 1/5th Bn., Glouc. Regt. (T.F.) (Coleford, Glouc.).
- MITCHELL, Capt. Coulson Norman, M.C., 4th Bn., Can. Engineers.
- MOFFATT, Pte. Martin, 2nd Bn., Leins. Regt. (Sligo).
- NUNNEY, Pte. Claude Joseph Patrick, D.C.M., M.M., 38th Bn., Eastern Ontario Regt.
- O'NEILL, Sergt. John, M.M., 2nd Bn., Leins. Regt. (Glenboig).
- RAYFIELD, Pte. Walter Leigh, 7th Bn., British Columbia Regt.
- RICKETTS, Pte. Thomas, 1st Bn., R. Newfoundland Regt.
- RIGGS, Sergt. Fk. Chas., M.M., late 6th Bn., York. and Lane. Regt. (Bournemouth).
- RYAN, Pte. John, 55th Bn., A.I.F.
- SEXTON, Sergt. Gerald, 13th Bn., A.I.F.
- TOWERS, Pte. James, 2nd Bn., Scottish Rifles (Preston).
- TOWNES, Lieut. Edgar Thos., M.C., 2nd Bn. Aus. M.G. Corps.
- WARING, Cpl. (Lee.-Sergt.) William, M.M., late 25th Bn., R. Welsh Fus. (T.F.) (Welshpool).
- WARK, Major Blair Anderson, D.S.O., 32nd Bn., A.I.F.
- WATERS, Temp. Capt. (Aet. Major) Arnold Horae Sawto, D.S.O., M.C., 218th Field Co., R.E.
- WEATHERS, Lee.-Cpl. (Temp. Cpl.) Lawrence Carthage, 43rd Bn., A.I.F.
- WILKINSON, Pte. Alfd., 1/5th Bn., Manch. Regt. (T.F.) (Leigh).
- WOODS, Pte. James Park, 48th Bn., A.I.F.
- YOUNG, Pte. John Francis, 87th Bn., Quebec Regt.



A GAP IN THE WIRE.

[Illustration of a photograph.]

A *London Gazette* Supplement of March 31, 1919, contained a War Office list of places and dates concerning awards of the Cross to officers, non-commissioned officers, and men which had not been previously published. These important details, which related to more than half the Crosses given during the war, are as follows:—

Name and Regiment.	Theatre of War.	Date of Deed.	Gazette Date.
ACKROYD, T./Capt. H., M.C., M.D., late R.A.M.C., attd. 6th Bn., R. Berks. R.	Ypres, France	31.7.17	6.9.17
ADDISON, The Rev. W. R. F., T./C.F., 4th Cl., A. Chapl. Dept.	Sannaiyal, Mesopotamia	to 1.8.17 9.4.16	26.9.16
ADLAM, T./2nd Lt. T. E., 7th Bn., Bedf. R.	Thiepval, France	27/28.9.16	25.11.16
ALLEN, Capt. W. B., M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C.	Nr. Meonil, France	3.9.16	26.10.16
ANDERSON, T./Maj. (A./Lt.-Col.) W. H., 12th (S.) Bn., High. I.I.	Bois Favieres, nr. Maricourt, France	25.3.18	3.5.18
ANDREW, Cpl. L. W., 2nd Wellington R., N.Z.F.	La Basse Ville, France	31.7.17	6.9.17
ANFORD, L./Cpl. T. L., M.M., 16th Bn., A.I.F.	Valre and Hamel Woods, France	4.7.18	17.8.18
BALL, Lt. (T./Capt.) A., D.S.O., M.C., late 7th Bn., Notts & Derby. R., & R.F.C.	France (distinguished flying servs.)	—	8.6.17
BARRATT, Pte. T., late 7th Bn., S. Staffs. R.	N. of Ypres, Belgium	27.7.17	6.9.17
BARRON, Cpl. C., 3rd Can. Bn., 1st Cent. Ontario R.	Paschendale Ridge, France	6.11.17	11.1.18
BATTEN-POOL, Lt. A. H., R. Mnns. Fus.	Nr. Calonne, France	25.6.16	5.8.16
BAXTER, 2nd Lt. Edward Felix, 1/8th Bn., L'pool R. (T.F.).	Nr. Blairville, France	17/18.4.16	26.9.16
BEAR, T./Comdr. D. M. W., D.S.O., M.C., Drake Bn., R.N.V.R.	Logcast Wood, France	21/25.8.18/ 4.9.18	15.11.18
BEAL, T./2nd Lt. E. F., 13th (S.) Bn., York. R.	St. Ledger, France	21/22.3.18	4.6.18
BREESLEY, Pte. W., 13th Bn., Rif. Brig.	Bucquoy, France	8.5.18	28.6.18
BELL, T./2nd Lt. D. S., 9th Bn., York. R.	Horseshoe Trench, France	5.7.16	9.9.16
BELL, T./Capt. E. N. F., late 9th Bn., R. Innis. Fus., attd. L.T.M. Bty.	Thiepval, France	1.7.16	26.9.16
BENNETT, T./Lt. E. P., 2nd Bn., Worc. R.	Nr. Le Transloy, France	5.11.16	30.12.16
BENT, 2nd Lt. (T./Lt.-Col.) P. E., D.S.O., late Leic. R., Commdg. 9th Bn.	E. of Polygon Wood, France	1.10.17	11.1.18
BEST-DUNKLEY, Capt. (T./Lt.-Col.) B., late Lan. Fus., attd. 2/5th Bn., Lan. Fus., T.F.	Wieltje, Flanders	31.7.17	6.9.17
BIRKS, 2nd Lt. F., late 6th Bn., A.I.F.	Glencorse Wood, E. of Ypres, France	20.9.17	8.11.17
BISHOP, Capt. W. A., D.S.O., M.C., Can. Cav. and R.F.C.	Nr. Cambrai, France (distinguished flying servs.)	—	11.8.17
BLACKBURN, 2nd Lt. A. S., 10th Bn., Aust. Inf.	Pozieres, France	23.7.16	9.9.16
BLOOMFIELD, Capt. W. A., Scouts Corps, S.A. Mtd. Bde.	Mlali, E. Africa	21.8.16	29.12.16
BOOTH, Sgt. F. C., B.S.A. Police, attd. Rhode-ia Native R.	Johannesbruck, nr. Songea, E. Africa	12.2.17	8.6.17
BORELLA, Lt. A. C., M.M., 26th Bn., A.I.F.	Villers Bretonneux, France	17/18.7.18	16.9.18
BORTON, Lt.-Col. A. D., D.S.O., 2/22nd Bn. Lond. R.	Sheria, Palestine	7.11.17	18.12.17
BOUGHEY, 2nd Lt. S. H. P., late 1/4th Bn., R. Sco. Fus., T.F.	El Burf, Palestine	1.12.17	13.2.18
BOULTER, Sgt. W. E., 6th Bn., North'n R.	Trones Wood, France	14.7.16	26.10.16
BRADFORD, Lt. (T./Lt.-Col.) R. B., M.C., 9th Bn., Durh. L.I.	Eaucourt l'Abbay, France	1.10.16	25.11.16
BRERETON, Pte. (A./Cpl.) A., 9th Bn., Manitoba R.	E. of Amiens, France	9.8.18	27.9.18
BRIILLANT, Lt. J., M.C., late 22nd Bn., Quebec R.	E. of Mcharicourt, France	8/9.8.18	27.9.18
BROOKS, C.S.M. E., 2/4th Bn., Oxf. & Bucks. L.I., T.F.	Fayes, France	28.4.17	27.6.17
BROWN, Sgt. D. F., 2nd Inf. Bn., N.Z.F.	S.E. of High Wood, France	15.9.17	14.6.17
BROWN, Pte. H., late 10th Bn., Can. Inf.	Hill 70, nr. Loos, France	16.8.17	17.10.17
BROWN, Cpl. W. E., D.C.M., 29th Bn., A.I.F.	Villers Bretonneux, France	6.7.18	17.8.18
BRYAN, L./Cpl. T., 25th (S.) Bn., North'd Fus.	Nr. Arras, France	9.4.17	8.6.17
BUCHAN, 2nd Lt. J. C., Arg. & Suth'd Hghrs.	E. of Marteville, France	21.3.18	25.5.18
BUCHANAN, Lt. (T./Capt.) A., 4th Bn., S.W. Bord.	Falautiyah Lines, Mesopotamia	5.4.16	26.9.16
BUGDEN, Pte. P., late 31st Bn., A.I.F.	Polygon Wood, nr. Ypres, France	26/28.0.17	26.11.17
BERMAN, Sgt. W. F., 16th Bn., Rif. Brig.	S.E. of Ypres, France	20.9.17	26.11.17
BUSHELL, Capt. (T./Lt.-Col.) C., D.S.O., late R.W. Surr. R. (S.R.), Comdg. 7th (S.) Bn.	W. of St. Quentin Canal, and N. of Tergnier, France	23.3.18	3.5.18
BUTLER, Pte. W. B., 17th Bn., W. York. R., attd. 106th T.M. Bty.	E. of Lempire, France	6.8.17	17.10.17
BYE, Sgt. R., 1st Bn., Welsh Gds.	Yser Canal, Flanders	31.7.17	6.9.17
CALVERT, Sgt. L., M.M., 5th Bn., K.O. Yorks. L.I.	Havrincourt, France	12.9.18	15.11.18
CAMPBELL, Maj. & Bt. Lt.-Col. (T./Lt. Col.) J. V., D.S.O., C. Gds.	Oinchy, France	15.9.16	26.10.16
CARMICHAEL, Sgt. J., 9th Bn., S. Staff. R.	Nr. Hill 60 (Zwarteleen, France)	8.9.17	17.10.17
CARROLL, Pte. J., 33rd Bn., A.I.F.	St. Yves, France	7/12.6.17	2.8.17
CARTER, C.S.M. N. V., late 12th Bn., R. Suss. R.	Boars Head, Richebourg l'Avoué, France	30.6.16	9.9.16
CARTON DE WIART, Capt. (T./Lt.-Col.) A., D.S.O., 4th Bn. Gds.	La Boiselle, France	2/3.7.16	9.9.16
CASTLETON, Sgt. C. C., late 5th Bn., Aust. M.G. Corps	Nr. Pozieres, France	28.7.16	26.9.16
CASSIDY, 2nd Lt. B. M., late 2nd Bn., Lanc. Fus.	Arras, France	28.3.18	3.5.18
CATES, 2nd Lt. G. E., late 2nd Bn., Rif. Bde.	E. of Bouchevignes, France	8.3.17	11.5.17
CATHER, T./Lt. G. St. O. S., late 9th Bn., R. Ir. Rif.	Nr. Hamel, France	1.7.16	9.9.16
CATOR, Sgt. H., 7th Bn., E. Surr. R.	Nr. Arras, France	9.4.17	8.6.17
CHAFER, Pte. G. W., E. York. R.	E. of Meaulte, France	3/4.6.16	5.8.16
CHATTER SINOH, Sepoy, 9th Bhopal Inf., Ind. Army	Wadi, Mesopotamia	13.1.16	21.6.16
CHAVASSE, Capt. N. O., M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C.	Gulleimont, France	9.8.16	26.10.16
	Wieltje, Flanders	31.7/2.8.17	14.9.17 (Bar)
CHERRY, Capt. P. H., M.C., late 26th Bn., A.I.F.	Lagnicourt, France	26.3.17	11.5.17
CHRISTIAN, Pte. H., 2nd Bn., R. Lan. R.	Gulnichy, France	18.10.15	3.3.16
CHRISTIE, Rfmin. (L./Cpl.) J. A., 1/4th Bn., Lond. R.	Felja, Palestine	21/22.12.17	27.2.18
CLAMP, Cpl. W., late 6th Bn., York. R.	Poelcapelle, France	9.10.17	18.12.17
CLARE, Pte. G. W., late 5th Lrs.	Bonrlon Wood, France	28/29.11.17	11.1.18
CLARKE, Pte. (A./Cpl.) L., 2nd Bn., Can. Inf.	Nr. Pozieres, France	9.9.16	26.10.16
COFFIN, Lt.-Col. (T./Brig.-Gen.) C., D.S.O. R.E., Commdg. 25th Inf. Bde.	Westhoek, Flanders	31.7.17	14.9.17
COLLEY, Pte. (A./Sgt.) H. J., M.M., late 10th Bn., Lan. Fus.	Martinpulch, France	25.8.18	22.10.18
COLLYN, 2nd Lt. J. H., 1/4th Bn., R. Lan. R., T.F.	Givenchy, France	9.4.18	28.6.18
COLLINS, A./Cpl. J., 25th Bn., R.W. Fus.	Palentine	31.10.17	18.12.17
COLLING-WELLS, Capt. (A./Lt.-Col.) J. S., D.S.O., late 4th Bn., Bedf. R.	Marcoing to Albert, France	22/27.3.18	21.4.18
COLUMBINZ, Pte. H. O., late 9th Sqdn., M.G. Corps	Hervilly Wood, France	22.3.18	3.5.18
COLVIN, 2nd Lt. H., Ches. R., attd. 9th Bn.	E. of Ypres, France	20.9.17	8.11.17
COLYER-FRUSSESON, 2nd Lt. (A./Capt.) T. R., late 2nd Bn., North'n R.	Bellewaarde, Flanders	31.7.17	6.9.17
COMBE, Lt. R. G., late 27th Can. Inf. Bn.	S. of Acheville, France	3.5.17	27.6.17

Name and Regiment.	Theatre of War.	Date of Deed.	Gazette Date.
CONGREVE, Bt. Maj. W. La T., D.S.O., M.C., late Rif. Bde.	France	6/29.7.16	26.10.16
COOKE, Pte. T., late 8th Bn., Aust. Inf., A.I.F.	Pozieres, France	21/25.7.16	9.9.16
COOPER, Sgt. E., 12th Bn., K.R. Rif. C.	Langemarck, Flanders	16.8.17	14.9.17
COPPINS, Cpl. F. G., 8th Bn., Manitoba R.	Hackett Woods, France	9.8.18	27.9.18
COTTER, L./Cpl. (A./Cpl.) W. R., late 6th Bn., E. Kent R. Counter, Pte. J. T., King's L'pool R.	Nr. Hohenzollern Redoubt, France	6.3.16	30.3.16
COURY, 2nd Lt. G. G., S. Lan. R. (3rd, attd. 1/4th, Bn.).	Nr. Boisieux St. Marc, France	16.4.18	22.5.18
COVERDALE, Sgt. H., 11th Bn., Manch. R.	Nr. Arrow Head Copse, France	8.8.16	26.10.16
COX, Pte. C., 7th Bn., Bedf. R.	S.W. of Poelcapelle, France	—	18.12.17
CRAIG, 2nd Lt. J. M., 1/4th Bn., attd. 1/5th Bn. R. Sco. Fus.	Achit-le-Grand, France	13/17.3.17	11.5.17
CRICHTON, Pte. J., 2nd Bn., Auck. R., N.Z.F.	Egypt	5.6.17	2.1.17
CROAK, Pte. J. B., late Quebec R.	Crevecoeur, France	30.9.18	15.11.18
CROSS, Pte. (A./L./Cpl.) A. H., 40th Bn., M.G. Corps	Amiens, France	8.8.18	27.9.18
CROWE, 2nd Lt. J., 2nd Bn., Worc. R.	Ervillers, France	25.3.18	4.6.18
CRUCKSHANK, Pte. R. E., 2/4th Bn., Lond. R. (Lond. Sco.).	Neuve Eglise, France	14.4.18	28.6.18
CUNNINGHAM, Cpl. J., late 2nd Bn., Lein. R.	E. of Jordan, Egypt	1.5.18	21.6.18
CUNNINGHAM, Pte. J., E. York. R.	Bois-en-Hache, France	12.4.17	8.6.17
DALZIEL, Dvr. H., 15th Bn., A.I.F.	Opposite Hebuterne Sector, France	13.11.16	13.1.17
DANCOX, Pte. F. G., late 4th Bn., Worc. R.	Iiamel Wood, France	4.7.18	17.8.18
DAVEY, Cpl. P., M.M., 10th Bn., A.I.F.	Boesinghe Sector, France	9.10.17	26.11.17
DAVIES, Cpl. J. L., late 13th Bn., R. Welsh Fus.	Merris, France	28.6.18	17.8.18
DAVIES, Cpl. J. T., S. Lan. R.	Pillecom, Flanders	31.7.17	6.9.17
DAVIES, Cpl. J., 10th Bn., R. Welsh Fus.	Nr. Eppéville, France	21.3.18	22.5.18
DAY, Cpl. S. J., 11th Bn., Suff. R.	Delville Wood, France	20.7.16	26.9.16
DEBENSEN, Pte. T., 42nd Bn., Quebec R.	E. of Hargicourt, France	26.8.17	17.10.17
DOUGALL, Lt. (A./Capt.) E. S., late S.R., attd. "A" Bty., 88th Bde.	Parvillers, France	12.8.18	26.10.18
DRESSER, Pte. T., 7th Bn., York R.	Messines, France	10.4.18	4.6.18
DUFFY, Pte. J., 6th Bn., R. Innis. Fus.	Gun pits E. of Les Boeufs, France	23.10.16	25.11.16
DUNVILLE, 2nd Lt. J. S., late 1st R. Dns.	Nr. Rocux, France	12.5.17	27.6.17
DWYER, Sgt. J. J., 4th Aust. M.G. Coy., Aust. M.G. Corps	Kereina Peak, Palestine	27.12.17	27.2.18
EDWARDS, Sgt. A., 1/6th Bn., Sea. Highrs.	Nr. Epéhy, France	24/25.6.17	2.8.17
EDWARDS, Pte. F. J., 12th Bn., Midd'x R.	Zonnebeke, France	26.9.17	26.11.17
EDWARDS, Pte. W., 7th Bn., K.O. Yorks. L.I.	N. of Ypres, France	31.7.17/1.8.17	14.9.17
EOERTON, Cpl. E. A., 16th Bn., Notts & Derby. R.	Thiepval, France	26.9.16	25.11.16
ELLIOTT-COOPER, Capt. (T./Lt.-Col.) N. B., D.S.O., M.C., 8th Bn., R. Fus.	Langemarck, Flanders	16.8.17	14.9.17
EMERSON, T./2nd Lt. J. S., late 9th Bn., R. Innis. Fus.	S.E. of Ypres, France	20.9.17	26.11.17
ERSKINE, A./Sgt. J., late Sco. Rif. T.F.	E. La Vacquerie, nr. Cambrai, France	30.11.17	13.2.18
EVANS, Maj. (A./Lt.-Col.) L. P., D.S.O., R. Highrs.	Hindenburg Line, N. of La Vacquerie, France	6.12.17	13.2.16
FACLES, Pte. W. F., 1st Bn., S. Afr. Inf.	Givency, France	22.6.16	5.8.16
FLOWERDEW, Lt. G. M., late Lord Strathcona's Horse	Nr. Zonnebeke, France	4.10.17	26.11.16
FORBES-ROBERTSON, Capt. (A./Lt.-Col.) J., D.S.O., M.C., Bord. R.	Delville Wood, France	18.7.16	9.9.16
FORSYTH, Sgt. S., late N.Z. Engrs., attd. 2nd Bn., Auck'd R.	N.E. of Bois de Moreuil, France	30.3.18	24.4.18
FOSTER, Cpl. E., 13th Bn., E. Surr. R.	Nr. Vieux Berquin, France	11/12.4.18	22.5.18
FREYBERG, Capt. (T./Lt.-Col.) B. C., D.S.O., R.W. Surr. R. & R.N.D.	Grevillers, France	24.8.18	22.10.19
FRICKLETON, L./Cpl. S., 3rd Bn., N.Z. Rif. Bde.	Villers Plovich, France	24.4.17	27.6.17
FYNN, Pte. J. H., late 4th Bn., S. Wales Bord.	N. of Ancre, France	13.11.16	15.12.16
GABY, Lt. A. E., late 28th Bn., A.I.F.	Messines, France	7.6.17	2.8.17
GEE, Lt. (T./Capt.) R., M.C., 2nd Bn., R. Fus.	Sannaiyat, Mesopotamia	9.4.16	26.9.16
GILL, Sgt. A., late 1st Bn., K.R. Rif. C.	Villers Bretonneux, France	8.8.18	30.10.18
GORIND SINGH, L./Dafadar, 28th Light Cav., I.A., attd. 2nd Lrs., I.A.	Masnere and Les Ruces Vertes, France	30.11.17	11.1.18
GOOD, Cpl. H. J., 13th Bn., Quebec R.	Delville Wood, France	27.7.16	26.10.16
GOSLING, Sgt. W., R.F.A., 3rd Wessex Bde., T.F.	E. of Pozieres, France	1.2.17	11.1.18
GOURLAY, Sgt. C. E., M.M., "D" Bty., 276th W. Lancs. Bde., R.F.A., T.F.	Hanguard Wood, France	8.8.18	27.9.18
GRAHAM, Lt. J. R. N., Arg. & Suth'd Highrs., attd. M.O.C.	Nr. Arras, France	5.4.17	14.6.17
GREAVES, A./Cpl. F., 9th Bn., Notts & Derby. R.	Little Priel Farm, E. of Epéhy, France	30.11.17	13.2.18
GREEN, Capt. J. L., late R.A.M.C.	Istabulat, Mesopotamia	22.4.17	14.7.17
GREGO, Sgt. W., D.C.M., M.M., 13th Bn., Rif. Bde.	Poelcapelle, N. of Ypres, France	4.10.17	26.11.17
GRIERRE, L./Capt. J. R., 10th (S.) Bn., R. War. R.	Fonquevillers, France	1.7.16	5.8.16
GRIEVE, Capt. R. C., 37th Bn., Aus. Inf., A.I.F.	Buequoy, France	8.5.18	28.6.18
GRIMBALDESTON, Sgt. (A./C.Q.M.S.) W. H., 1st Bn., K.O. Sco. Bord.	Beaumontz, Harmies Ridge, France	23.3.18	28.6.18
GROGAN, Bt. Lt.-Col. (I./Brig.-Gen.) G. W. St. G., C.M.G., D.S.O., Worc. R., Comdg. 23rd. Inf. Bde.	Messines, France	7.6.17	2.8.17
HACKETT, Spr. W., late R.E.	Wijdendrift, Flanders	16.8.17	14.9.17
HAINES, 2nd Lt. R. L., 1st Bn., H.A.C.	River Aisne, France	27.5.18	25.7.18
HALLIWELL, L./Cpl. J., 11th Bn., Lan. Fus.	Shaftesbury Avenue Mine, nr. Givency, France	22/23.6.16	5.8.16
HALTON, Pte. A., 1st Bn., K.O.R. Lanc. R.	Nr. Gavrelle, France	28/29.4.17	8.6.17
HAMILTON, Pte. (A. L./Cpl.) J. B., 1/9th Bn., High L.I.	Musecourt, France	27.5.18	25.7.18
HANNA, C.S.M. R., 29th Bn., Can. Inf.	Nr. Poelcapelle, France	12.10.17	26.11.17
HARDY, Rev. T. B., D.S.O., M.C., A. Chapl. Dept., attd. 8th Bn., Linc. R.	N. of Ypres-Menin Road, France	25/26.9.17	26.11.17
HARRIS, Sgt. T. J., M.M., late 6th Bn., R.W. Kent. R.	Lens, France	21.8.17	8.11.17
HARRISON, T./2nd Lt. J. M.C., 11th (S.) Bn., E. York. R.	Nr. Bucquoy and E. of Gommecourt, France	5.4.18	11.7.18
HARVEY, Lt. F. M. W., Lord Strathcona's Horse	—	25/26.4.18	—
HARVEY, Pte. J., 1/22nd Bde., Lond. R.	Morlaucourt, France	9.8.18	22.10.18
HAYWARD, Lt. (A./Capt.) R. F. J., 1st Bn. Wilts. R.	Oppy, France	3.5.17	14.6.17
HAYVISE, Pte. M., 15th Bn., Dur. L.I.	Gyencourt, France	27.3.17	8.6.17
HENDERSON, 2nd Lt. (A./Capt.) A., M.C., late 4th, attd. 2nd, Bn., Arg. & Suth'd Highrs.	N. of Peronne, France	2.9.18	15.11.18
HENDERSON, Major (T./Lt.-Col.) E. E. D., late 2nd Bn., N. Staffs. R., attd. 9th R. War. R.	Nr. Fremicourt, France	21/22.3.18	24.4.18
HERRING, T./2nd Lt. A. C., North'n R.	Nr. Fontaine-les-Croiselles, France	6.5.17	8.6.17
HEWITSON, L./Cpl. J., 1/4th Bn., R. Lancs. R., T.F.	Nr. Fontaine-les-Croiselles, France	23.4.17	4.7.17
HEWITT, 2nd Lt. D.G.W., late 14th Bn. Hamps. R.	West Bank of the Hal, Mesopotamia	25.1.17	8.6.17
HEWITT, L./Cpl. W. H., 2nd Bn., S.A. Infy. R.	Montague Bridge, France	23/24.3.18	7.6.18
HILL, Pte. A., 10th Bn., R.W. Fus.	Nr. Givency, France	26.4.17	3.6.18
HIRSCH, 2nd Lt. (A./Capt.) D. P., late 4th Bn., York. R.	N.E. of Ypres, Flanders	31.7.17	14.9.17
HOBSON, Sgt. F., late 20th Bn., Can. Inf.	E. of Ypres, France	20.9.17	26.11.17
	Delville Wood, France	20.7.16	26.9.16
	Nr. Wancourt, France	20.3.17	14.6.17
	N.W. Lens, France	15.8.17	17.10.17

Name and Regiment.	Theatre of War.	Date of Deed.	Gazette Date.
HOLLAND, Lt. J. V., 3rd Bn., Leins. R., attd. 7th Bn. . .	Gullemont, France	3.9.16	26.10.16
HOLMES, Pte. T. W., 4th Bn., Can. Mtd. Rif.	Nr. Passchendaele, France	26.10.17	11.1.18
HORSFALL, 2nd Lt. B. A., late E. Lanc. R.	Between Moyenville and Blainzeville, France	27.3.18	22.5.18
HOWELL, Cpl. G. J., 1st Bn., A.I.F.	Nr. Bullecourt, France	6.5.17	26.6.17
HUDSON, Capt. (T./Lt.-Col.) C. E., D.S.O., M.C., 11th Bn., Notts & Derby R.	Nr. Asiago, Italy	15.6.18	11.7.18
HUGHES, Pte. T., 6th Bn., Conn. Rang.	Gullemont, France	3.9.16	26.10.16
HULL, Pte. (Shoeling Smith) C., 21st Lrs.	Haiz Kor, India	5.9.15	3.3.16
HUNTER, Cpl. D. F., 1/5th Bn., High. L.I.	N.W. of Mœuvres	16/17.9.18	23.10.18
HUTCHINSON, Pte. J., 2/5th Bn., Lan. F.A.	Opposite Flecheux, France	28.6.16	9.9.16
HUTT, Pte. A., 1/7th Bn., R. War. R.	Terrier Farm, S.E. of Poelcapelle, France	4.10.17	26.11.17
INWOOD, Pte. R. R., 10th Bn., A.I.F.	Polygon Wood, E. of Ypres, France	19/22.9.17	26.11.17
JACKSON, Sgt. H., 7th (S.) Bn., E. Yorks. R.	Hermies, France	22.3.18	8.5.18
JACKSON, Pte. W., 17th Bn., A.I.F.	Nr. Armentieres, France	25/26.6.16	9.9.16
JAMES, T./Capt. M. A., M.C., 8th (S.) Bn., Glouc. R.	Nr. Velu Wood, France	21.3.18	28.6.18
JARRATT, Cpl. G., late 8th Bn., R. Fus.	Nr. Pelvès, France	3.5.17	8.6.17
JEFFRIES, Capt. C. S., late 34th Bn., A.I.F.	Passchendaele, France	12.10.17	18.12.17
JENSEN, Pte. J. C., 50th Bn., A.I.F.	Noreuil, France	2.4.17	8.6.17
JONES, Sgt. D., 12th Bn., L'pool R.	Gullemont, France	3.9.16	26.10.16
JONES, T./Lt. R. B. B., late N. Lan. R.	Broadmarsh Crater, France	21.5.16	5.8.16
JONES, Pte. T. A., 1st Bn., Ches. R.	Morval, France	25.9.16	26.10.16
JUDSON, Sgt. R. S., D.C.M., M.M., 1st Auck. R., N.Z.F.	South of Bapaume, France	26.8.18	30.10.18
KAEBLE, Cpl. J., M.M., late 22nd (French Can.) Bn., Quebec R.	Neuville-Vitasse, France	8/9.6.18	16.9.18
KARANBAHADUR RANA, Riflman, 2/3rd G.A.O. Gurkha Rif.	El Kefr, Egypt	10.4.18	21.6.18
KELLY, T./2nd Lt. H., 10th Bn., W. Rid. R.	Le Sars, France	4.19.16	25.11.16
KENNY, Pte. H., 1st Bn., L.N.Lan. R.	Nr. Loos, France	25.9.15	30.3.16
KENNY, Pte. T. J. B., 2nd Bn., A.I.F.	Hermies, France	9.4.17	8.6.17
KFRR, Pte. J. C., 49th Bn. Can. Inf.	Concelette, France	16.9.16	26.10.16
KILBY, Capt. A. F. G., late 2nd Bn., S. Staff. R.	Nr. Guinechy, France	25.9.15	30.3.16
KIXROSS, Pte. C. J., 49th Bn., Can. Inf. (Alberta) R.	Passchendaele Ridge, France	28/29.10.17	11.1.18
KNIGHT, Sgt. A. G., late 10th Bn., Alberta R., Can. Inf.	Villers-les-Cagnenurt, France	31.10/1.11.17	15.11.18
KNIGHT, Sgt. A. J., 2/8th Bn., Lond. R.	Alberta Section, Ypres, France	20.9.17	8.11.17
KNOX, T./2nd Lt. C. L., 150th Fld. Coy. R.E.	Tugny, France	22.3.18	4.6.18
KONOWAL, A./Cpl. F., 47th Bn., Can. Inf.	Leuz, France	22/24.8.17	26.11.17
LAPONE, Maj. A. M., late 1/1st County of Lond. Yeo.	Beersheba, Palestine	27.10.17	18.12.17
LALA, Lance Nalk, late 41st Dogras, Ind. Army	El Grah, Mesopotamia	21.1.16	13.5.16
LASCELLES, 2nd Lt. (A./Capt.) A. M., 3rd, attd. 14th Bn., Duh. L.I.	Masnieres, France	3.12.17	11.1.18
LAUDER, Pte. D. R., R. Scot. Fus.	Cape Helles, Dardanelles	13.8.15	13.1.17
LAURENT, Sgt. H. J., 22nd Bn., N.Z. Rif. Bde., N.Z.F.	E. of Gouzeacourt Wood, France	12.9.18	15.11.18
LEAK, Pte. J., 9th Bn., A.I.F.	Pozieres, France	23.7.16	9.9.16
LEARMOUTH, Capt. (A./Maj.) G. M., M.C., late 2nd Bn., Can. Inf.	E. of Loos, France	18.8.17	8.11.17
LEWIS, Pte. H. W., 11th Bn., Welsh R.	Salonika	22/23.10.16	15.12.16
LISTER, Sgt. J., 1st Bn., Lan. Fus.	E. of Ypres, France	9.10.17	26.11.17
LOOSEMORE, Pte. A., 8th Bn., W. Rid. R.	S. of Langemarck, Flanders	11.8.17	14.9.17
LOUDON-SHAND, T./Maj. S. W., late 10th Bn., Yorks. R.	Nr. Fricourt, France	1.7.16	9.9.16
LUMSDEN, Maj. F. W., D.S.O., R.M.A.	Franclly, France	3/4.4.17	8.6.17
MACDOWELL, Capt. T. W., D.S.O., 38th Bn., Can. Inf.	Vimy Ridge, France	9/13.4.17	8.6.17
MACINTYRE, T./Lt. D. L., Arg. & Suth'd Highrs., attd. 1/8th Bn., High. L.I., T. F.	Nr. Hanin Fontaine, Croisilles, France	24.8.18	26.10.18
MACINTOSH, Lt. D., late 3rd Bn., Sea. Highrs.	N. of Farnpoux, France	11.4.17	8.7.16
MASTERS, Pte. R. G., R.A.S.C., T.F., attd. 141st Fld. Amb.	Nr. Bethune, France	9.4.18	8.5.18
MACFEE, 2nd Lt. H. B., 124th Sgc. Bty., R.G.A.	Feuchy, France	4.6.17	2.8.17
MAYSON, Cpl. (L./Sjt.) T. F., 1/4th Bn., R. Lan. R., T.F.	Wieltje, Flanders	31.7.17	14.9.17
MCALULY, Sgt. J., D.C.M., 1st Bn., Scots Gds	Fontaine Notre Dame, France	27.11.17	11.1.18
MCBRATH, L./Cpl. R., 1/5th Bn., Sea. Highrs., T.F.	W. of Cambrai, France	20.11.17	11.1.18
MCCORDEN, 2nd Lt. (T./Capt.) J. B., D.S.O., M.C., M.M., Gen. List, and No. 56th Sqdn., R.F.C.	Distinguished Flying Services, France	23.12.17	2.4.18
MCDONNELL, Sgt. S. H., 47th Bn., A.I.F.	Dernancourt, France	30.1.18	3.5.18
MACFADZEAN, Pte. W. F., late 11th Bn., R. Ir. Rif.	Nr. Thiencourt Wood, France	1.7.16	9.9.16
MCGEE, Sgt. L., late 40th Bn., A.I.F.	E. of Ypres, France	4.10.17	26.11.17
MCGINTOSH, Pte. G., 1/8th Bn., Gord. Highrs.	Ypres, Belgium	31.7.17	6.9.17
MCLIVER, Pte. H., M.M., late 2nd Bn., R. Scots	E. of Courcelles-le-Comte, France	23.8.18	15.11.18
MCKEAN, Lt. G. B., M.M., 14th Can. Inf. Bn., Quebec R.	Garvraux Sector, France	27/28.4.18	28.6.18
MACKENZIE, Lt. H., D.C.M., late Can. M.G. Corps, 7th Can. M.G. Coy.	Meetscheele Spur, nr. Passchendaele, France	30.11.17	13.2.18
MCMUR, T./Lt. E. A., 9th (S.) Bn., R. Subs. R.	Nr. Hooga, France	14.2.16	30.3.16
MCNAMARA, Lt. E. H., No. 67 Aust. Sqdn., R.F.C.	Egypt	20.3.17	8.6.17
MCNAMARA, Cpl. J. E., Surr. R.	N.W. Lens, France	3.9.18	15.11.15
MCESS, L./Sgt. F., 1st Bn., Scots Gds.	Nr. Glincy, France	15.9.16	26.10.16
MCREADY-DIARMID, T./Lt. (A./Capt.) A. M. C., late 17th (S.) Bn., Midd'x R.	Mœuvres Sector, France	30.11.17	15.3.18
MEIKLE, Sgt. J., M.M., late 1th Bn., Sea. Highrs.	Nr. Marfaux, France	to 1.12.17	20.7.18
MELISH, The Rev. E. N., T./C.F., A. Chapt. Dept.	St. Eloi, France	27/29.3.16	20.4.16
MELVIN, Pte. C., 2nd Bn., R. Highrs.	Istanbul, Mesopotamia	21.4.17	26.11.17
METCALF, L./Cpl. W. H., M.M., 16th Bn., Manitoba R., Can. Inf.	Arras, France	2.9.18	15.11.18
MILLER, Pte. J., late 7th Bn., R. Lan. R.	Bazentin-le-Petit, France	39/31.7.16	9.9.16
MILLS, Pte. W. J., late 10th Bn., Manch. R., T.F.	Givency, France	10/11.12.17	13.2.18
MILNE, Pte. W. J., late 16th Bn., Can. Inf.	Nr. Thelus, France	9.4.17	8.6.17
MILNER, Cpl. H. G. B., late 58th Bn., 2nd Cent. Ontario R.	Demutin, France	8.8.15	26.10.18
MOLYNEUX, Sgt. J., 2nd Bn., R. Fus.	E. of Langemarck, France	9.10.17	26.11.17
MOON, Lt. R. V., 53th Bn., A.I.F.	Nr. Bullecourt, France	12.5.17	14.6.17
MORE, 2nd Lt. M. S. S., 15th Bn., Hampt. R.	Nr. Tower Hamlets, E. of Ypres, France	20.8.17	8.11.17
MOTT, Sgt. E. J., 1st Bn., Bord. R.	S. of le Transloy, France	27.1.17	10.3.17
MOTTERHEAD, Sgt. T., late 20th Sqdn., R.F.C.	Nr. Ploegsteert Wood, France	7.1.17	12.2.17
MOUNTAIN, Sgt. A., 15/17th Bn., W. Yorks. R.	Hameleincourt, France	26.3.18	7.6.18
MOYFORD, L./Sgt. J., 2nd Bn., Ir. Gds.	N. of the Broenbeck, France	12/13.9.17	17.10.17
MCOPIN, L./Cpl. H., 8th Sqdn., M.C. Corps	Monchy-le-Preux, France	11.4.17	26.11.17
MCLLIS, Sgt. G. H., M.M., Can. Inf., P.P.C.L.I.	Passchendaele, France	30.10.17	11.1.18
MURRAY, Capt. H. W., D.S.O., D.C.M., 15th Bn., A.I.F.	Stormy Trench, N.E. of Guedecourt, France	4/5.2.17	10.3.17
MYLES, 2nd Lt. E. K., Welsh R.	Sagalayal, Mesopotamia	9.4.16	26.9.16
NEEDHAM, Pte. S., 1/5th Bn., Bedf. Rgt.	Kefr Kasim, Palestine	10/11.9.18	30.10.18
NEWLANDS, Capt. J. E., 12th Bn., A.I.F.	Bapaume, Cambrai Rd., W. of Boursies	7/9.4.17	8.6.17
NICHOLAS, Pte. H. J., 1st Bn., N.Z. Inf. Cant. R.	N.E. of Lagnicourt, France	15.4.17	15.1.18
	Poldencock, France	3.12.17	11.1.18

Name and Regiment.	Theatre of War.	Date of Deed.	Gazette Date.
OCKENDEN, Sergt. J., 1st Bn., R. Dub. Fus.	E. of Langemarck, France	1.10.17	8.11.17
O'KELLY, Lt. (A./Capt.) C. P. J., M.C., 52nd Bn., Can. Inf.	S.W. of Passchendaele, France	26.10.17	11.1.18
O'MEARA, Pte. M., 16th Bn., A.I.F.	Pozieres, France	9/12.8.16	9.9.16
ORMSBY, Sgt. J., 2nd Bn., K.O. York. L.I.	Fayet, France	14.4.17	8.6.17
O'ROURKE, Pte. M. J., 7th Bn., Can. Inf.	Hill 60, nr. Lens, France	15/17.8.17	8.11.17
PALMER, L./Sgt. (now 2nd Lt.) F. W., R. Fus.	N. of Courcette, France	16 & 17.2.17	3.4.17
PARSONS, T./2nd Lt. H. F., late Gloucs. R., attd. 14th (S.) Bn.	Nr. Epchy, France	20/21.8.17	17.10.17
PATON, Lt. (A./Capt.) G. H. T., M.C., late 4th Bn., G. Gds.	Gonnelleu, France	1.12.17	13.2.18
PATTISON, Pte. J. G., 50th Bn., Can. Infy.	Vimy Ridge, France	10.4.17	2.8.17
PEARRES, Capt. (A./Maj.) G. R., D.S.O., M.C., 5th Bn., Can. Mtd. Rif.	Nr. Passchendaele, France	30/31.10.17	11.1.18
PECK, Lt.-Col. C. W., D.S.O., 16th Bn., Manitoba R.	Cagnicourt, France	2.9.18	15.11.18
PEELER, L./Cpl. W., 3rd Aust. Pnr. Bn., A.I.F.	E. of Ypres, France	20.9.17	26.11.17
PHILLIPS, T./Lt. & Adjt. R. E., 13th Bn., R. War. R., attd. 9th (S.) Bn.	Nr. Kut, Mesopotamia	25.1.17	8.6.17
POLLARD, 2nd Lt. A. O., M.C., 1st Bn., H.A.C.	Gavrelle, France	29.4.17	8.6.17
POPE, Lt. C., late 11th Bn., A.I.F.	Louveral, France	15.4.17	8.6.17
POULTER, Pte. A., 1/4th Bn., W. Rid. R., T.F.	Erquinghem, Lys, France	10.4.18	28.6.18
PROCTOR, Pte. A. H., 1 st Pol R., T.F.	Nr. Fuceux, France	4.6.16	5.8.16
PROWSE, Chief Petty Officer G., Drake Bn., R.N.V.R.	Pronville, France	2.9.18	30.10.18
PRYCE, Lt. (A./Capt.) T. T., M.C., G. Gds.	Nr. Vieux Berquin, France	11.4.18	22.5.18
QUIBO, Pte. R., 12th Bn., Ir. Rif.	Hamel, France	1.7.16	9.9.16
RATCLIFFE, Pte. W., 2nd Bn., S. Lan. R.	Messines, France	14.4.17	2.8.17
READITT, Pte. J., 6th Bn., S. Lan. R.	Alzayat-al-Gaharbigah Bend, Mesopotamia	25.2.17	4.7.17
REES, Sgt. L., 11th Bn., S. Wales Bord.	Pillekem, Flanders	31.7.17	14.9.17
REES, Capt. (T./Maj.) L. W. B., R.A. & R.F.C.	Double Craissieus, France	1.7.16	5.8.16
REID, Capt. O. A., 2nd Bn., L'pool R., attd. 6th Bn., L.N. Lan. R.	Dialah River, Mesopotamia	8/10.3.17	8.6.17
REYNOLDS, T./Capt. H., M.C., 12th Bn., R. Scots	Nr. Frozenberg, France	20.9.17	8.11.17
RHODES, L./Sgt. J. H., 3rd Bn., G. Gds.	Nr. Houthulst Forest, E. of Ypres, France	9.10.17	26.11.17
RICHARDSON, Pte. (Piper) J., late 16th Bn., Manitoba R., Can. Inf.	Reglia Trench, France	8.10.16	22.10.18
RITCHE, Drummer W., 2nd Bn., Sea. Highrs.	N. of Beaumont Hamel	1.7.16	9.9.16
ROBERTS, Capt. (A./Lt.-Col.) F. C., D.S.O., M.C., 1st Bn., Worc. R.	W. of Somme and at Pargny, France	22.3.18	8.5.18
ROBERTSON, L., Cpl. C. G., M.M., 10th Bn., R. Fus.	W. of Polderhoek Chateau, France	8/9.3.18	9.4.18
ROBERTSON, 2nd Lt. C., late R.W. Surr. R., S.R. (T./Lt. (A./Capt.) Tank Corps).	Ypres, France	30.9.17	18.12.17
ROBERTSON, Pte. J. P., late 27th Bn., Can. Inf.	Passchendaele, France	6.11.17	11.1.18
ROBINSON, Lt. W. L., Worc. R. & R.F.C.	Cutley, Hertfordshire, England	2/3.9.16	5.9.16
ROOM, Pte. (A./L./Cpl.) F. G., 2nd Bn., R. Ir. R.	Frozenberg, France	16.8.17	17.10.17
RUSSELL, Capt. J. E., M.C., late R.A.M.C., T.F., attd. 1.6th Bn., R.W. Fus., T.F.	Tel-el-Khuweifeh, Palestine	6.11.17	11.1.18
RUTHVEN, Sgt. W., 22nd Bn., A.I.F.	Ville-sur-Ancre, France	19.5.18	11.7.18
RUTHERFORD, Lt. C. S., M.M., 6th C.M.R. Bn., Quebec R.	Monchy, France	26.8.18	15.11.18
RYDER, Pte. R., 12th Bn., Midd'n R.	Thiepval, France	26.9.16	25.11.16
SADLER, Lt. C. W. K., 51st Bn., A.I.F.	Villes Bretonneux, France	24/25.4.18	11.7.18
SAGE, Pte. F. H., 8th Bn., Som. L.I.	Tower Hamlets Spur, E. of Ypres	4.10.17	18.12.17
SAUNDERS, Cpl. G., 1/7th Bn., W. York. R., T.F.	Nr. Thiepval, France	1.7.16	9.9.16
SAUNDERS, Sgt. A. F., 9th (S.) Bn., Suff. R.	Nr. Loos, France	26.9.15	30.3.16
SCHOFFELD, T./2nd Lt. J., late Lau. Fus., attd. 2/5th Bn., T.F.	Givency	9.4.18	28.6.18
SEAMAN, L./Cpl. E., late 2nd Bn., R. Innis. Fus.	Terhand, France	29.9.18	15.11.18
SEWELL, Lt. C. H. late R.W. Kent. R., attd. 3rd (Light) Bn., Tank Corps.	Premicourt, France	29.8.18	30.10.18
SHAHAMAD KHAN, Naik, 89th Punjabis	Nr. Belt Ayessa, Mesopotamia	12.4.16	26.9.16
SHANKLAND, Lt. R., 43rd Bn., Can. Inf.	Passchendaele, France	26.10.17	18.12.17
SHEPHERD, Rifleman A. E., 12th (S.) Bn., K.R.Rif. Corps.	Villers Plonchie, France	20.11.17	13.1.18
SHERWOOD-KELLY, Maj. (A./Lt.-Col.) J., C.M.G., D.S.O., Norf. R., Comdg. 1st Bn., R. Innis. Fus.	Marcoing, France	20.11.17	11.1.18
SHORT, Pte. W., late 8th Bn., Yorks. R.	Munster Alley, France	6.8.16	9.9.16
SIFTON, L./Sgt. E. W., late 18th Bn., Can. Inf.	Neuville-St.-Vaast, France	9.4.17	8.6.17
SIMPSON, Cpl. (L./Sgt.) W., 6th Bn., Linc. R.	S.W. of Etaing, France	2.9.18	30.10.18
SINTON, Capt. J. A., M.B., Ind. Med. Serv.	Orah Rulms, Mesopotamia	21.1.16	21.6.16
SKINNER, Sgt. (A./C.S.M.) J., 1st Bn., K.O.S. Bord.	Wijdenrif, Flanders	16.8.17	14.9.17
SMITH, 2nd Lt. A. V., late 1/5th Bn., E. Lan. R., T.F.	Helles, Gallipoli	23.12.15	3.3.16
SMITH, Cpl. (L./Sgt.) E., D.C.M., 1/5th Bn., Lan. Fus., T.F.	E. of Serre, France	21/22/23.8.18	22.10.18
SPACKMAN, Sgt. C. E., 1st Bn., Bord. R.	Marcoing, France	20.11.17	11.1.18
SPALL, Sgt. R., late E. Ont., R., P.P.C.L.I.	Nr. Parvillers, France	12/13.8.18	28.10.18
STATTON, Sgt. P. C., M.M., 40th Bn., A.I.F.	Nr. Proyart, France	12.8.18	27.9.18
STEELE, Sgt. T., 1st Bn., Sea. Highrs.	Nr. Sannaiyat, Mesopotamia	22.2.17	8.6.17
STONE, Gnr. C. E., M.M., R.F.A.	Caponne Farm, France	21.3.18	22.5.18
STONE, Lt. (A./Capt.) W. N., late 3rd Bn., attd. 17th (S.) Bn., R. Fus.	Cambrai Sector, France	30.11.17	13.2.18
STOREY, Lt. P. V., A.I.F.	Bois de Hangard, France	7.4.18	7.6.18
STRACHAN, Lt. H., M.C., Fort Garry Horse	Masniers, France	20.11.17	18.12.17
STRINGER, Pte. G., Manch. R.	Es Sinn, Mesopotamia	8.3.16	5.8.16
SYRES, Pte. E., 27th (S.) Bn., North'd Fus.	Nr. Arras, France	19.4.17	8.6.17
TAIT, Lt. J. E., M.C., late 78th Bn., Manitoba R.	Amiens, France	8/12.8.18	27.9.18
THOMAS, Pte. (L./Cpl.) J., N. Staffs. R., attd. 2/5th Bn., T.F.	Pontaine, France	30.11.17	13.2.18
TOYE, 2nd Lt. (A./Capt.) A. M., M.C., 2nd Bn., Midd'n R.	Eterpigoy Ridge, France	25.3.18	8.5.18
TRAIN, Cpl. C. W., 2/14th Bn., Lond. R.	Palestine	8.12.17	27.2.18
TRAVIS, Sgt. R. C., D.C.M., M.M., late 2nd Bn., Otago R.	N. of Hebuterne, France	24.7.18	27.9.18
TURNBULL, Sgt. J. V., late 17th Bn., High. L.I.	leipsig Salient, Authville, France	1.7.16	25.11.16
TURBALL, Pte. T. G., 10th Bn., Worc. R.	La Boisselle, France	3.7.16	9.9.16
VEALE, Pte. T. W. H., 8th Bn., Devon R.	E. of Highwood, France	20.7.16	9.9.16
WAIN, T./Lt. (A./Capt.) R. W. L., late "A" Bn., Tank Corps.	Marcoing, France	20.11.17	13.2.18
WALLACE, F./Lt. S. T. D., "C" Bty., 63rd Bde., R.F.A.	Gonnelleu, France	30.11.17	13.2.18
WALLER, Pte. H., late 10th (S.) Bn., K.O. York. L.I.	S. of Henin, France	10.4.17	8.6.17
WARE, Cpl. S. W., late 1st Bn., Sea. Highrs.	Sannaiyat, Mesopotamia	6.4.16	26.9.16
WATSON, Maj. (T./Lt.-Col.) O. C. S., D.S.O., R. of O., 5th Bn., K.O. York. L.I.	Rossignol Wood, France	28.3.18	8.5.18
WEALE, L./Cpl. H., 14th Bn., R. Welsh Fus.	Bazentin-le-Grand, France	26.8.18	15.11.18

Name and Regiment.	Theatre of War.	Date of Deed.	Gazette Date.
WEARNE, 2nd Lt. F. B., late 3rd Bn., Essex R., att'd. 11th Bn.	E. of Loos, France	28.6.17	2.8.17
WELCH, L./Cpl. J., 1st Bn., R. Berks. R.	Nr. Oppy, France	29.4.17	27.6.17
WEST, Capt. (A./Lt.-Col.) R. A., D.S.O., M.C., late N. Ir. Horse, S.R., seed., 6th Bn., Tank Corps.	Courcelles and Vaulx Vraucourt, France	21.8.18 and 2.9.18	30.10.18
WHEELER, Maj. G. C., 2/9th Gurkha Rif., Ind. Army	Tigris at Shumran, Mesopotamia	23.2.17	8.6.17
WHITE, Sgt. A., late 2nd Bn., S. Wales Bord.	Monchy, France	19.4.17	27.6.17
WHITE, T./Capt A. C. T., 6th Bn., York. R.	Stuff Redoubt, France	27.9.16 1.10.16	26.10.16
WHITE, Pte. J., 6th Bn., R. Lan. R.	Dialah River, Mesopotamia	7/8.3.17	27.6.17
WHITE, T./2nd Lt. W. A., 33rd Bn., M.G. Corps	Gouzeaucourt, France	18.9.18	15.11.18
WHITFIELD, Pte. H., 10th (Yeo. Bn.), King's Shrop. L.I.	Bury El Lisaneh, Egypt	10.3.18	8.5.18
WHITHAM, Pte. T., 1st Bn., C. Gds.	Plickem Rldgs, Flanders	31.7.17	6.9.17
WHITTLE, Sgt. J. W., 12th Bn., A.I.F.	Nr. Boursies, France	9.1.17	8.6.17
WILCOX, Pte. (L./Cpl.) A., 2/4th Bn., Oxli. & Bucks. L.I.	Nr. Laventille, France	12.9.18	15.11.18
WILKINSON, T./Lt. T.O.L., late 7th Bn., N. Lan. R.	La Boisselle, France	5.7.16	26.9.16
WOODALL, Cpl. (A./Sgt.) J. E., 1st Bn., Rif. Bde.	La Pannerie, France	22.4.18	28.6.18
WOODCOCK, Pte. T., 2nd Bn., Ir. Gds.	Ney Copse, N. of Broenbeek, France	12/13.9.17	17.10.17
YOUENS, T./2nd Lt. F., late 13th Bn., Durh. L.I.	Nr. Hill 60, France	7.7.17	2.8.17
YOULL, T./2nd Lt. J. S., 1/2nd Bn., att'd. 11th (S.) Bn., North'd Fus.	S.W. of Asiago, Italy	15.6.18	25.7.18
YOUNG, Pte. T., 9th Bn., Durh. L.I.	Bucquoy, France	25/31.3.18	4.6.18
YOUNG, Pte. W., late 8th (S.) Bn., E. Lan. R.	Trench 51, E. of Fonquevillers, France	22.12.15	30.3.16
ZENGEL, Sgt. R. L., M.M., 5th Bn., Saskatchewan R.	E. of Warvillers, France	9.8.18	27.9.18

CORRECTIONS.

The notification of the award of the Victoria Cross to No. 37,721, Sgt. John Clarke, 15th Bn., Lan. Fus., as announced in the *London Gazette* dated 6-1-19, should be read as awarded to No. 37,721 Sgt. (A./C.S.M.) James Clarke, 15th Bn., Lan. Fus., the latter being the correct description of this Warrant Officer.

The notification of the award of the Victoria Cross to No. 41,788 Cpl. (L./Sgt.) Walter Simpson, 6th Bn., Linc. R., as announced in the *London Gazette* dated 3-10-1918, should be read as awarded to No. 41,788 Cpl. (L./Sgt.) Arthur Evans, 6th Bn., Linc. Regt., the latter being the correct Christian and Surname of this N.C.O., which he has been permitted to reassume.



[Official photograph.]

AN OBSERVATION POST.

CHAPTER CCLXXXV.

BRITISH POLITICS: 1917-18.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S GOVERNMENT—THE WAR CABINET—ELECTORAL REFORM—THE IRISH CONVENTION—THE DARDANELLES AND MESOPOTAMIA COMMISSIONS—THE INDIAN COTTON DUTIES—INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS—THE CORN PRODUCTION ACT—THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE—THE LANSDOWNE LETTER—WAR AIMS—UNITY OF COMMAND—THE "SNIPING" DEBATES—THE LAST MILITARY SERVICE ACT—THE IRISH CONSCRIPTION CLAUSE—THE MAURICE LETTER AND DEBATE—THE EDUCATION ACT—THE BIGGEST BUDGET—THE GENERAL ELECTION—THE RE-CONSTRUCTED GOVERNMENT.

THERE were three clearly-marked periods in the political history of the war for Britain. The three Governments to which the affairs of the nation were entrusted between August, 1914, and November, 1918, were so strongly contrasted both in method and in achievement that there is no need to look for less obvious lines of divisions. The first period was short and on the whole uneventful. It comprised the time between the opening of hostilities and May, 1915, when Mr. Asquith's purely Liberal Government conducted the war in accordance with the ideas, formed in the long years of peace, of the old school of British policy. That was the period of the party truce, when the Government governed and the Opposition ceased to oppose. The second period was concerned with the chequered career of the complete Coalition of the three British parties, which, under Mr. Asquith's leadership, continued from May, 1915, until December, 1916. That was chiefly a story of attempts to graft the new ideas which were being thrown up by the war on to the old stock in the time-honoured British spirit of compromise, nicely adjusted to the separate interests of the three parties. When this elaborate system of give and take, which had

the chronic defect of producing a Cabinet crisis once a month, collapsed under the stress of a conflict which relentlessly exposed weakness wherever it existed, Mr. Lloyd George opened the third and last chapter in December, 1916, and was still engaged on it when hostilities ceased in November, 1918.

The story of this final period, the longest, most various, and far the most productive of the three, whether judged by the measure of national effort to which it contributed or by the satisfaction of national aims which it achieved, must now be told. The singular circumstances which attended the formation of the second Coalition, with Mr. Lloyd George at its head, have already been narrated. Recognizing that the old system of government by a large Cabinet of Ministers responsible for important Departments of State had failed to stand the stern test of modern war, Mr. Lloyd George at once put a bold and original plan into execution. The whole of his period of office was noteworthy for vast constitutional developments, but the first and most urgent task before the new Government was that of reorganization and expansion in the sphere of home affairs. They began with the reconstruction of the administrative machinery at the centre. The old-style Cabinet, which had

become a by-word for indecision, with its membership of a score or more, was abandoned, and the supreme direction of the war was entrusted to a small War Cabinet freed from all administrative duties and yet in close touch with all Departmental Ministers. Administrative responsibility was placed in the hands of Ministers, who were left free to devote their whole time to this sufficiently absorbing aspect of the work of government. By this arrangement the War Cabinet was able to give all its attention to the task of initiating policy and to the work of co-ordinating the great Departments.

The method of working the new system was described in a Report issued by the War Cabinet for the year 1917—in itself an indication of the new spirit which had begun to permeate Downing Street:

At each meeting the Cabinet begins by hearing reports as to the progress of the war since the preceding day.



[Elliott & Fry.]

LIEUT.-COL. SIR MAURICE HANKEY,
K.C.B.,

Secretary to the War Cabinet.

Unless it wishes to confine its deliberations to general questions of policy, it then proceeds to deal with questions awaiting its decision. As these questions in the vast majority of cases affect one or more of the administrative Departments, almost all its meetings are attended by the Ministers and their chief Departmental officials concerned. The majority of the sittings of the War Cabinet consist, therefore, of a series of meetings between members of the War Cabinet and those responsible for executive action, at which questions of policy concerning those Departments are discussed and settled. Questions of overlapping or conflict between Departments are determined, and the general lines of policy throughout every branch of the Administration co-

ordinated so as to form part of a consistent war plan. Ministers have full discretion to bring with them any experts either from their own Departments or from outside, whose advice they consider would be useful. . . . The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the First Sea



[Vandyk.]

VISCOUNT MILNER, G.C.B.,

Member of the War Cabinet without portfolio,
1916-18; Secretary of State for War, 1918.

Lord of the Admiralty, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff attend every meeting to communicate the latest intelligence in regard to the war and to consult with the War Cabinet on questions that arise from day to day.

In practice a considerable number of less important but often highly complex questions are referred to individual members of the War Cabinet, or to Committees of Ministers or others. In some cases the Minister or Committee has power to decide; in others the instruction is to carry out a detailed investigation such as the War Cabinet itself could not usefully undertake and submit a report for final decision to the Cabinet. By this means the War Cabinet is enabled to carry out exhaustive investigations without the whole of its members being overburdened with the details of every question.

Another innovation of far-reaching importance was the creation of a secretariat to the War Cabinet, with Sir Maurice Hankey at its head, to discharge various functions, and chiefly to ensure that the Government Departments were kept in close touch with the policy of the Cabinet, and conversely that the members of the War Cabinet were kept in touch with the policy and action of the various Departments. To this end, the rule, which had persisted through centuries of change, that no minutes should be taken of Cabinet meetings, was abandoned, and the Prime Minister instructed the secretariat that its first duty was to record the proceedings of the War Cabinet. Secondly,

it had to transmit the decisions of the War Cabinet to those Departments which were concerned in giving effect to them or were otherwise interested. The introduction of the War Cabinet system made possible a large increase in the number of Ministerial offices intended to effect a better distribution of functions. The new Departments created between the end of 1916 and the close of hostilities included the Ministries of Labour, Shipping, Food, Air, National Service, Pensions, and Reconstruction.

This new machine, improvised for the purpose of adapting the Government to the imperious and ever-changing needs of war, was driven with such energy that the War Cabinet was actually able to claim that it had held more than 300 meetings in 1917. Much of the credit for its inception was due to the fertile administrative resource of Lord Milner, one of the five original members of the War Cabinet, and later Secretary of State for War. Judged by results, there can be no doubt that the experiment was a success. It had admittedly a good many loose ends and rough edges. There was apparently little congestion of business, but in practice the co-ordination of the work of the different Departments was not so convincing as it might have been. Cases of wrangling between one Department and another and even of open antagonism afforded openings for Parliamentary criticism. It was not, however, until the War Cabinet had been in existence for more than a year that, on the debate on the Address at the beginning of the session of 1918, the first serious attack was made upon it. Mr. Herbert Samuel, speaking for the Opposition, which was then coming out into the open under Mr. Asquith, reviewed its domestic policy in a critical spirit. He denied that the new system had proved successful, but was not prepared to say that the old system was right. He suggested the formation of a Home Committee, consisting of Ministers dealing with home problems, to do for domestic questions what the War Cabinet did for strategy and foreign policy. Mr. Bonar Law, now as during the whole of the period under review, Leader of the House, replied to the challenge by confronting Mr. Samuel with the actual record of the War Cabinet. Although nothing was done at that time, later developments showed that there was some foundation for the criticism. The War Cabinet system was adapted to meet the new conditions in the

middle of June by the appointment of a Committee on Home Affairs, consisting of the principal Home Ministers. Sir George Cave, the Home Secretary, became Chairman of this Committee, and it met at least once a week. All domestic questions requiring the cooperation of two or more Departments and calling for Cabinet decision were referred to it. It had



[Russell.]

MR. HERBERT SAMUEL,

President of the Local Government Board, 1914-15; Postmaster-General, 1915-16; Home Secretary, 1916; Chairman of Select Committee on National Expenditure, 1917-18.

the power of decision on behalf of the Cabinet, but larger questions of policy were referred at the discretion of the Chairman to the War Cabinet. At this period some of the critics of the Government were returning to the charge and propounding an alternative solution which would have amounted in practice to the setting up of two Cabinets, one to conduct the war and the other to deal with Home Affairs. The Government dismissed this as impracticable, and Lord Curzon, in announcing their decision, made a striking comparison between the old system and the new. He depicted the old Cabinet as a sort of Star Chamber sitting with closed doors which no one was allowed to penetrate. Now, with the opening of the doors of the Cabinet room, the meetings bore a certain resemblance to an Oriental Durbar. "But,"

he hastened to add, "there is no ceremonial in either our conference or our conduct." Compare Mr. Lloyd George's phrase about the old Cabinet: "You cannot conduct a war with a Sanhedrin."

It was not only in the reform of the Executive that Mr. Lloyd George's Government showed their readiness to make constitutional changes



[Swaine.]

LORD JUSTICE CAVE,
Home Secretary in 1916.

where the case for them had been proved. They gave every possible encouragement to three attempts, to which men of all parties set their hands in the new atmosphere of domestic concord which was the chief political asset of the war, to settle problems which had lately been the subject of acute party controversy. The extension of the franchise, the reform of the House of Lords, and the question of the future government of Ireland were all tackled in a determined fashion in the first Session of Parliament under the second Coalition Government which was opened on February 7, 1917. If only one of the three attempts was crowned with success, the blame could not fairly be laid at the door of the Ministry. This Session was chiefly memorable for the passing of a great electoral charter. Early in the year the Speaker's Conference presented about thirty agreed resolutions, dealing with the reform of the franchise, a redistribution of seats, the registration of electors, and the method and costs of elections. It was clearly a golden opportunity for securing a settlement

of the old controversy, and only 62 members of the House of Commons voted against a resolution moved by Mr. Asquith for prompt legislation on the lines suggested by the Conference.

The Government lost no time in acting upon this mandate by introducing the most comprehensive Reform Bill which had ever been presented to Parliament. The Bill occupied a great deal of Parliamentary time, but it was discussed in an excellent atmosphere. The principle of woman suffrage was accepted by the overwhelming majority of 330, only 55 members voting against it. The Commons rejected proportional representation, except for a limited experiment in University constituencies, and in the closing stages there was a keen struggle on this matter between the two Houses, in which the Lords gained a Pyrrhic victory. The Bill, which eventually became law in February, 1918, made far-reaching changes. The extension of the franchise to women was qualified by an age-limit of 30 years. The qualification for men was fixed at six months' residence or occupation of business premises. The qualifying age for soldiers who had served in the war was reduced to nineteen years. Conscientious objectors were disfranchised for five years after the war. Plural voting was limited to two votes. The machinery of registration was simplified, and half-yearly revisions of the register were introduced. Our electioneering practice was revolutionized by a provision that all polls at a General Election should be held on the same day. The Act effected a general redistribution of seats on a population basis of 70,000 for each member; reduced the costs of elections; and provided that returning officers' expenses should be paid by the Treasury. Most important of all, for the unique circumstances in which it was to be first put into operation, the measure was specially designed to fit in with war conditions. Soldiers, whose names were to be registered separately in an absent voters' list, were enabled to vote by post. Voting by proxy was introduced for soldiers in distant areas, and sailors, merchant seamen, and fishermen at sea. One effect of the redistribution proposals was to increase the membership of the House of Commons by 37—from 670 to 707. When the Bill was passing through Parliament it was officially estimated that the effect of the extension of the franchise would be to double the last Register of 8,000,000

names. When the new Register was completed in October, 1918, it was found that the number of electors was over 21,000,000, or nearly one in two of the entire population. There had been a shifting of political power to new classes, of which no one could foresee the issue.

The Conference on Electoral Reform had been so strikingly successful in its main object—the securing of an agreed scheme among men of the most diverse opinions—that the Government decided in August, 1917, to appoint a similar Conference, under the chairmanship of Lord Bryce, to examine and report on the reform of the House of Lords. By the following April this Conference had succeeded in producing a scheme of reform, to which the large majority of its members gave support. They recommended the creation of a Second Chamber consisting of two sections. One section was to have 246 members, elected by panels of members of the House of Commons distributed in thirteen geographical groups. The other section (to constitute about one-fourth of the whole Chamber) was to be chosen by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses. The Conference

resorted to the same dependence upon Joint Committees to solve two other difficulties. Thus a Joint Committee was to decide what was and what was not a financial Bill. Another Joint Committee, on which the Report conferred what it called “the old name of free conference,” was to adjudicate upon obstinate differences about legislative proposals between the House of Commons and the new Second Chamber. In the press of the great events which made the spring of 1918 such a momentous season in the history of the war, the Bryce Report scarcely attracted the attention it deserved. The scheme was too elaborate and complex to secure the instant approval which was the lot of the Report of the Electoral Reform Conference. There was no marked public demand for the Government to introduce legislation based on the recommendations of the Conference, and no further attempt was made to secure a final solution of this extremely difficult constitutional problem in the life-time of the Parliament.

Lord Bryce's Report followed within a few days the publication of a much more remark-



A WOMAN RECORDING HER VOTE IN THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT OF 1918.

Women supervisors and clerks were also employed for the first time.

able document, the Report of the Irish Convention, which was the direct outcome of the Government's third attempt at constitutional revision. Ireland was the least promising field of the three, but the new Government did not shrink from facing even that problem. With the passing of the Home Rule Bill into law under the terms of the Parliament Act in



Russell.

VISCOUNT BRYCE, G.C.V.O., O.M.,
British Ambassador in Washington, 1907-13;
Chairman of the Conference on the Reform of
the House of Lords.

the opening weeks of the war, the Irish question was dormant for a considerable time. But the rising of Easter week, 1916, brought it once again into the forefront of home politics, and British statesmen found themselves compelled to attempt a settlement amid the anxieties of war of a question which had baffled them in the previous 30 years of peace. There seemed to be a moment soon after the tragic events of Easter week when a solution might have been found, but after the failure of the negotiations which Mr. Lloyd George then set on foot at the request of Mr. Asquith, it was almost hopeless to expect another attempt to be made during the war.

The pressure of events decided their conduct. No sooner had the new Government met Parliament than the Nationalist Party brought the Irish question into the foreground. An organized "scene," in which Mr. Redmond walked out of the House of Commons at the head of his

followers, was followed by the issue of a manifesto, addressed directly to the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions. This appeal from the High Court of Parliament to a vague international tribunal might have had a rasping effect on British opinion but for the recollection of previous essays in the same direction. Nobody underestimated the difficulties of Mr. Redmond's position in Ireland, and the manifesto was regarded, in the main, as an attempt to recapture the lost section of Irish opinion for the constitutional movement. Everybody rejoiced when the Government announced their intention to make a serious attempt to find a remedy for the discontent, which the Sinn Fein party, rapidly growing in numbers and influence on the memories of the Easter rising, were fanning into open sedition. In May, Mr. Lloyd George suggested plans for an immediate settlement on the twin bases of Home Rule and no coercion for Ulster, or alternatively the summoning of a representative Convention of Irishmen to consider the future constitution of their country. The second proposal found more general favour than the first, and the Convention came into existence in the summer with the good-will of all parties in the United Kingdom except the Sinn Feiners, who maintained their attitude of bitter hostility. In announcing the decision of the Government to summon the Convention, Mr. Lloyd George had declared that, if substantial agreement should be reached on the character of a constitution, the Government would accept responsibility for taking all the necessary steps to enable Parliament to give legislative effect to its conclusions. A very popular choice as chairman was made in Sir Horace Plunkett. The urgency of a decision was emphasized by Sinn Fein victories on a revolutionary programme at by-elections in several constituencies, including East Clare, where a vacancy had been caused by the death in action of Major William Redmond. The Government gave the best possible earnest of the spirit in which they approached the Convention by releasing without reservation all prisoners in confinement in connexion with the Easter Rebellion.

The Convention held its sittings behind closed doors, and months passed before the public heard anything but the pessimistic rumours which are the commonplaces of such conclaves. It became known early in 1918 that the pros-

pects within the Convention were not specially hopeful, and a breakdown seemed imminent. The Convention wisely sent a delegation to interview the War Cabinet, and the immediate difficulty was passed. In the end the Con-



(Russell.)

THE LATE MR. JOHN REDMOND,
Leader of the Irish Nationalist Party.

vention succeeded in issuing a Report, by a strange chance, on the very day on which a proposal by the Government to extend conscription to Ireland was debated in the House of Commons. Sir Horace Plunkett, in presenting the Report, declared, in a message to the Prime Minister, that the Convention had laid a foundation of Irish agreement unprecedented in history. "The Report," he said, "shows that in the Convention, whilst it was not found possible to overcome the objections of the Ulster Unionists, a majority of Nationalists, the Southern Unionists, and five out of the seven Labour representatives were agreed that the scheme of Irish self-government set out in paragraph 42 of the Report should be immediately passed into law." The scheme thus approved by the majority of the Convention contemplated the setting-up of an Irish Parliament of two Houses, a Senate of 64 members, and a House of Commons of 160 ordinary elected members, 20 additional members elected by Ulster constituencies, and 20 members nominated by the Lord Lieutenant to represent Southern Unionists. Forty per cent. of the total membership was to be guaranteed to Unionists. Forty-two Irish representatives

at Westminster were to be elected by members of the Irish House of Commons, and they were to have the right of deliberating and voting on all matters. The scheme provided for several limitations and safeguards. The supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament was to remain undiminished. The Irish Parliament was not to legislate on the Crown, peace and war, the Army and Navy, treaties and foreign relations, and Naval harbours. Police and postal services were to pass automatically to Irish control after the war. Laws interfering with religious equality were to be prohibited. The most important financial proposal was that the control of Customs and Excise by the Irish Parliament should be postponed for further consideration after the war, but should be decided within seven years of peace. This, the Majority Report, had been carried by 44 votes to 29. Minority Reports were presented by 19 Ulster Unionists and 22 extreme Nation-



(Elliott & Fry.)

SIR HORACE PLUNKETT, K.C.V.O.,
Chairman of the Irish Convention, 1917-18.

alists, the latter demanding the form of constitution enjoyed by the self-governing Dominions. The fate of the Report was so closely bound up with the conscription controversy of the spring of 1918 that it would be better not to anticipate events farther at this stage.

Concurrently with these purely political transactions, which could have no more than an indirect influence on the march of events in the field, the House of Commons was engaging



A SITTING OF THE IRISH CONVENTION, 1918, IN THE CITY HALL, BELFAST.
Sir Horace Plunkett in the Chair.

in a remarkable series of war debates. A notable feature of the first two Sessions under Mr. Lloyd George's Premiership was the increasing influence which Parliament sought to exercise upon war administration, and the many debates which arose on high questions of policy, and even of strategy, were of the stuff of which drama is made. They occurred in times of grave crisis, and were concerned with the supreme issue of national existence. For a time, ironically enough for Mr. Asquith and his colleagues in Opposition, they turned mainly on past mistakes and the placing of responsibility on the right shoulders. In the summer of 1916, when the stock of the first Coalition was beginning to fall, Mr. Asquith had bowed to the strong desire of the House of Commons that Statutory Commissions should be set up to inquire into the inception and conduct of the operations in the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia.

Mr. Asquith had hardly had time to find his feet as Leader of the Opposition when in March, 1917, the Dardanelles Commissioners submitted an interim Report on the origin of the campaign two years before. The new Government stood aside while Mr. Asquith felt it necessary to reply in the House of Commons to the Commissioners' criticism of the Liberal Government of which he was the head. The debate had no political consequences, but it was of considerable importance in enabling a correct appreciation to be made of the interplay of politics and strategy in the early part of the war. Mr. Asquith gave a detailed explanation of the war organization which existed when the Dardanelles operations were begun. He dismissed as a mere *obiter dictum* the Commissioners' opinion that for the first few months of the war the machinery was most clumsy and inefficient. As for the position of the experts on the War Council, he declared that the only reason for their being there was to give the lay members the benefit of their advice, adding with decision that he had never known them to show the least reluctance to give their opinion, invited or uninvited. The Cabinet, he stated emphatically, had never abdicated its ultimate authority in his time, though it was content normally to delegate the active conduct of the war to the War Council. Mr. Asquith passed from these political reflections, which were of special interest at a time when his successor was perfecting a new constitutional instrument in the shape of a small War Cabinet, to a

resounding defence of Lord Kitchener against the criticism which the Commissioners had made upon his administration of the War Office. He denied that Lord Kitchener lived in isolation, but conceded that Lord Kitchener acted during the early months of the war as Chief of his own Staff. Further, he argued, the Government were bound in purely military matters to defer to his authority. Finally, he insisted that to describe the Dardanelles expedition as a catastrophe was a complete perversion of the case. Mr. Churchill intervened later with a detailed reply to the Commissioners' criticism, which was crystallized in the charge that he failed to present fully to the War Council the opinions of his naval advisers. In general, he argued that no operation had ever been more carefully planned. Lord Cromer, who had acted as chairman of the Commission, had died in the interval between the completion of the Report, for which he was largely responsible, and the debate in the House of Commons. Mr. Clyde, one of the four Commissioners who were members of the House of Commons, replied to the two ex-Ministers, and the Government were not challenged in any way except for agreeing to the publication of the Report without the evidence on which it was based.

Very different was the effect of the publication at the end of June of the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission, of which Lord George Hamilton was Chairman. The chief actors in the Dardanelles drama were either dead or out of office when the Report of the first Commission was presented. The Mesopotamia Commissioners, however, found it necessary to criticize not merely military officers of high rank, but Lord Hardinge, who had lately returned from his Indian Viceroyalty to become Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, who was still, as at the time of the breakdown which led to the surrender of Kut, Secretary of State for India. Accordingly, the Government had a very direct interest in the debates which took place in both Houses on the second Report. First, Lord Hardinge replied in the House of Lords to the criticism which the Commissioners had passed upon him. He expressed regret that the evidence had not been published, and complained that adequate weight had not been given in the Report to the risks and preoccupations of the Government of India during 1914 and 1915 in connexion with

internal and frontier affairs. The crux of the matter was, of course, the medical breakdown after General Townshend's retreat from Ctesiphon. On this he could only confess to having been completely deceived by misleading reports received from the front, and to that extent he accepted full responsibility, but he insisted that, the moment the truth dawned upon him, he



MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL,
First Lord of the Admiralty, 1911-15; Minister
of Munitions, 1917.

made every effort within his power to remedy the situation. Summing up, Lord Hardinge pointed to his 37 years of honourable service under the Crown, and insisted that, if he had failed in his duty, such a verdict could only be given in the light of India's effort taken as a whole, and should be re-enforced by his fellow-subjects in India, to whose continued confidence and good opinion he attached the highest value. Three times Lord Hardinge offered his resignation to his chief. Mr. Balfour, however, refused to accept it, and warmly defended his action in retaining Lord Hardinge in the public service, amid some manifestations of public hostility.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain, on the other hand, not only resigned, but insisted on his resignation being regarded as final. He made this announcement during a two days' debate in the House of Commons in a vigorous speech in vindication of the part he had played in the events on which

the Commissioners had pronounced judgment. At the same time, he warmly defended several of his colleagues, both in India and at home, whose conduct had been criticized in the Report. Earlier in the debate the Attorney-General had explained why the Government could not take punitive action on the Report, and had decided to set up a Court of Inquiry to investigate the allegations adversely reflecting on the conduct of any military officer. "What about the civilians?" several members at once asked. The Attorney-General replied that, if the proposal was not acceptable to the House, the Government would be willing to set up by statute a tribunal to deal with both sets of cases. Mr. Chamberlain now stated that he did not dispute the decision to appoint a judicial tribunal to try the charges in the Report. He



[Russell.]

MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN,
Secretary of State for India, 1915-17; Member
of War Cabinet, 1918.

declared, however, that it was not possible that he should continue to be the head of an office in which his conduct had been censured, while it might at any moment be called in question by that tribunal. He proceeded to give a detailed account of the part which he had played in the control of operations in Mesopotamia. He repeated his declaration of 18 months before that the collapse of the hospital arrangements was most lamentable and inexcusable. His personal plea was that he was entirely

ignorant of it until the damage had been done.

The debate was maintained on a very high level with speeches from Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Asquith had some reflections to make, not altogether favourable, on the decision to set up a statutory tribunal to deal with the cases of those who had been censured by the Commission. To his mind, it was absurd to submit to two or three Judges the question whether this or that statesman, soldier or sailor had formed or acted upon a mistaken judgment of policy. He knew of only one tribunal suited to try a question of that kind, and it was the House of Commons. Turning to the decision of the Government of which he was the head to sanction the advance on Baghdad, he declared emphatically that he could not recall any step taken in the war which was more completely warranted by every relevant consideration of policy and of strategy, and which was more strongly fortified in advance by an absolute concurrence of expert authority. His final point was that all this retrospection was apt to have an injurious effect on the conduct of the war. He made the same appeal to the House as Burke made to the electors of Bristol in 1780: "Applaud us when we run. Console us when we fall. Cheer us when we recover. But let us pass on. For God's sake, let us pass on." Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that there had been undoubted mismanagement, and that as a result thousands of gallant lives had been lost under conditions of unspeakable torture. Whatever tribunal was set up, he made it clear that the Government had no desire to shield anyone who was to blame for the catastrophe. In the spirit of Mr. Asquith's appeal, Mr. Lloyd George asked whether the House was not losing its sense of proportion. With the prospect of the issue of another such report in a few days, he earnestly begged the House to rise above these things and say to the Government: "Get on with the war." The Government's proposal of a judicial investigation presented such difficulties that in the end it was dropped in favour of the usual procedure, by which the Army Council applied to the soldiers such disciplinary action as was thought necessary. Mr. Chamberlain was succeeded by Mr. Montagu, but he returned to the Government in the following year as a member of the War Cabinet. It was significant that, when later on the Dardanelles Commission presented their second and final Report on the

conduct of the military operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Government decided that it should not be published during the period of the war.

India had been to the fore in a Commons debate earlier in the Session. On March 14 the Government had asked the House to pass a resolution accepting, with gratitude, India's war contribution of £100,000,000 and authorizing an increase in the cotton duties. Many Lancashire and Free Trade members made a protest of exceptional vehemence against the change in the duties. Mr. Austen Chamberlain's



[Lafayette.]

LORD HARDINGE, G.C.B.,
Viceroy of India, 1910-16; Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

appeal to Lancashire to rise superior to her fears in order that Britain might be set right with Indian opinion was not responded to, and 125 members voted against the Government. The opposition, however, was somewhat mollified by the addition to the resolution of words making it clear that the changes in the cotton duties would be considered afresh when the fiscal relationship of the Empire was reviewed at the end of the war.

India came into the Parliamentary picture again on August 20, when Mr. Montagu, the new Secretary of State, made a momentous pronouncement about the political future of our Eastern Dependency. He read a solemn declaration that the policy of the Government was that "of the increasing association of

Indians in every branch of the Administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." Shortly afterwards, Mr. Montagu proceeded to India on the invitation of the Government of India and with the concurrence of the War Cabinet, in order to discuss with those on the



MR. E. S. MONTAGU,
Minister of Munitions, 1916; Secretary of
State for India, 1917.

spot the best method of giving effect to this policy. The Secretary of State returned to this country in the spring of 1918, bringing with him a draft of proposed Indian constitutional reforms, which was incorporated in the Montagu-Chemsford Report. The scheme was so heartily welcomed in the Commons that Mr. Montagu was able to claim, at the end of a debate which took place on August 6, 1918, as "a remarkable fact" the acceptance by all speakers of the principle of self-government for India. The Lords were inclined to be more critical, but their verdict was, on the whole, a favourable one. The Report was not put forward as a finished document which it was sought to translate unaltered into an Act of Parliament. To complete the scheme, the Government appointed two Committees to examine on the spot technical questions of a detailed kind, such as the difficult one of the

constitution of the new Indian electorate. As had been expected, it was not found possible to introduce legislation before the Parliament ended.

Parliament was much occupied in the first half of the 1917 Session with legislation and finance. A great achievement was the passing of a measure which restored agriculture to its proper position in the national economy. After long years of neglect, its vital importance not only for the production of food, but for the healthy balance of the life of the nation, was at last recognized, and the result was the very substantial advance which the Government made in the Corn Production Act. This measure, which formed an essential part of the anti-submarine policy for securing a greatly increased production of food at home, was passed through a not too friendly House of Commons, and became law before the summer recess. Some of its provisions were treated as controversial by a strong Liberal element, but the Government stuck to their guns and had their way. The provisions of the Bill included the fixing of minimum prices for wheat and oats for six years; the guaranteeing of a minimum wage for agricultural workmen; and the granting of power to the Board of Agriculture to enforce proper cultivation.

The chief financial achievement of 1917 was the raising, by the second War Loan, of the unprecedented sum of over £1,000,000,000. Mr. Bonar Law's first Budget, although providing for the largest income and expenditure in the history of the nation up to that time, contained no sensations. No new taxes were imposed, and additions were made to only three of the existing duties—those on excess profits (increased to its war maximum of 80 per cent.), tobacco, and entertainments. The Commons scored a substantial point about this time by securing from the Government the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into national expenditure, which, as the war went on, seemed to get farther and farther beyond the control of Parliament. Mr. Herbert Samuel was appointed Chairman, and a large number of valuable reports, pointing out concrete instances of extravagance and suggesting specific economies, were presented by the Committee. It was reappointed in the Session of 1918, and continued its work until the end of the war and of the Parliament.

Of more immediate interest to the nation than

any of the subjects hitherto touched upon was the controversy which arose in the summer of 1917 over the proposal to hold an International Socialist Conference on war and peace at Stockholm. This was the first of the political reactions which the Russian Revolution of March had exercised upon British politics. It was announced during the Whitsun recess that Mr. Arthur Henderson, the Labour member of the War Cabinet, had gone to Russia on a special mission, and that his place would be filled temporarily by Mr. George Barnes, the Pensions Minister. Towards the end of July, Mr. Henderson returned to London, and it was announced immediately afterwards that a conference of the Labour Party had been summoned to decide whether delegates should be sent to a conference of enemy and Allied Socialists at Stockholm. The project caused grave differences of opinion in the Labour Party, as it was thought that the proposal that British Labour men should meet German Socialists in conference during the war had been decided once for all by a resolution passed at the annual conference of the party in Manchester in January, 1917. Mr. Bruce Glasier had moved, for the I.L.P., a resolution demanding the calling together of an International Socialist Congress simultaneously with the Peace Congress. That was defeated by 1,498,000 votes to 696,000. Mr. Will Thorne had then moved a resolution agreeing that the Socialist and trade union organizations of the Allied Powers should meet simultaneously with the Peace Congress. That was adopted by 1,036,000 votes to 464,000. With this double mandate to follow, the Executive of the Labour Party had decided on May 9, on the eve of Mr. Henderson's departure for Russia, not to associate itself in any way with the International Conference at Stockholm which a Dutch-Scandinavian committee were then proposing to hold.

Now Mr. Henderson pleaded the admittedly difficult position in which our Russian Allies found themselves in explanation of his changed attitude. In a speech to which his critics in the House of Commons challenged him on August 1, he explained that his stay in Russia had forced him to the conclusion that the Stockholm Conference was inevitable, and that, if it consisted only of neutral and enemy countries, the position of Great Britain would be very seriously prejudiced. He suggested that British participation in the conference would minimize the difficulties of Russia, where

our aims were altogether misunderstood. In fact, in his view, it would be good propaganda work to have our aims clearly and unmistakably stated to those who were nearest to us, especially the German Minority Socialists. At the same time, he denied that he had modified his view about the prosecution of the war to victory in the slightest degree. Mr. Henderson used much the same arguments with the Labour Conference on August 10, and the party was largely



MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON,
Chairman of Parliamentary Labour Party, 1914-17,
and Member of War Cabinet, December 1916-
August 1917.

swayed by his statement in deciding by an overwhelming majority to make a complete reversal of its declared attitude. Even then the party qualified its acceptance of the invitation by the condition that the conference should be consultative and not mandatory.

It was recognized at once that Mr. Henderson's proceedings had made it impossible for him to remain a Cabinet Minister. On the evening of the day on which the conference was held an interview took place between Mr. Henderson and Mr. Lloyd George. The next morning Mr. Henderson sent his resignation to Mr. Lloyd George, who accepted it in a letter in which some very plain language was used. In effect, he charged Mr. Henderson with failing to inform the Labour Conference that the British Government were unanimously opposed to the Stockholm Conference and that M. Kerensky's Government were taking up a neutral attitude. Mr. Henderson took the first opportunity of making a statement on his resignation in the House of Commons. He made a bitter complaint of the way in which he had been treated, and explained that on one occasion he had been kept waiting outside the Cabinet room for an hour, while his colleagues

were investigating his conduct. He asked the House to believe that no request was made that he should state the decision of the Government at the Labour Party Conference. Mr. Lloyd George, in reply, insisted that nothing could be more fatal than to hold conferences with the enemy, when the first step in the restoration of discipline was to prevent fraternization with the enemy on the Russian front. That was the conclusion, he stated, that had been come to by the Governments of the United States, France, Italy, and this country. The four Allied countries, in fact, had come definitely to the conclusion that, if peace terms were to be discussed, they must be discussed by the representatives of the whole nation.

The incident showed one thing clearly, and that was the inconvenience attaching to the dual personality of Mr. Henderson, whose position as secretary to the Labour party had been proved to be inconsistent with the holding of office in the War Cabinet. These events caused a considerable storm, but in the end the Labour Party, finding it impossible to secure agreement on war aims among the Allied Socialists, abandoned the whole project. Mr. Henderson's place in the Cabinet was now taken permanently



LABOUR CONFERENCE AT THE CENTRAL HALL, WESTMINSTER. AUGUST 1917.

A Miners' delegate speaking.

by Mr. Barnes, and he was succeeded as chairman of the Labour Party in Parliament by Mr. Adamson. The other Labour Ministers remained at their posts, and the party continued to be an integral part of the Coalition until after the armistice had been signed.

The question of war aims, which the Stockholm controversy had brought definitely into the forefront of British politics, became a world issue of the first importance in the next few months. Even before Mr. Henderson's resignation, the need for organized propaganda at home had been met by the formation of a National War Aims Committee, with Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Barnes as joint Presidents. The committee held its first meeting on August 4, the third anniversary of the declaration of war, and during the autumn it was responsible for the delivery of many stirring speeches in the country by General Smuts (whose inclusion in the War Cabinet greatly strengthened it at a critical time) and other national leaders. A fresh controversy was provoked towards the end of November by the publication in the *Daily Telegraph* of a remarkable letter which *The Times* had declined: Lord Lansdowne called for a restatement of the Allies' war aims, and sought a way to a negotiated peace on the plea of urgency. Neither the Government nor Mr. Asquith had any knowledge of the letter before its publication, but the fact that the writer had been Foreign Secretary and a Unionist party leader inevitably led to its being widely discussed.

Ever since the new orientation given to the war by the Russian Revolution and the Stockholm business a great deal more had been heard of the question of war aims and peace aspirations than in the earlier stages of the conflict. The disappointing results of the campaign in the West, too, were having their effect. Although the Labour Party eventually found it impossible to join in the Stockholm Conference, they produced a considered and comprehensive memorandum on war aims, which was finally adopted in the closing days of the year. The Lansdowne letter, however, was at once placed by public opinion in a different category. In effect a plea for peace by negotiation with a more than usually vigorous enemy, it was deliberately launched at a moment when the heads of the Government were in Paris, discussing with their Allies the most effective measures for the victorious

prosecution of the war in what was very nearly the nation's darkest hour. This untimely stroke was at once repudiated by the Government. President Wilson and Mr. Asquith helped to restore the balance by a firm repetition of the declared aims of the Allies. In a considered review of the position of the war, when the House of Commons was on the point of adjourning for the Christmas recess, Mr. Lloyd George reaffirmed his explicit declara-



MR. W. ADAMSON,
Chairman Parliamentary Labour Party.

tion, made at Glasgow in June, of the war aims of the British Government, and defined the national attitude in the words, "Victory is the only thing that will give reality to peace terms."

Finally, Mr. Lloyd George clinched the matter in a detailed restatement of the Allied war aims to a great meeting of trade union delegates at the Central Hall, Westminster, on January 5, 1918. His chief declarations were as follows:

Complete restoration of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania, together with reparation for damage done.

Reconsideration of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871.

An independent Poland.

Genuine self-government for the nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

Satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians and Rumanians for reunion.

Passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea to be internationalized.

Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine entitled to recognition of their separate national conditions.

German Colonies to be held at the disposal of the Peace Conference.

Re-establishment by some international organization of an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes.

The importance of this statement was under-

stood when Mr. Lloyd George explained that he had made it after considering the Labour Party's memorandum and after consultation with the Labour leaders, with Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey, and with representatives of the Dominions oversea. There had been nothing in our war politics comparable with this demonstration of national unity since the memorable speech in which Sir Edward Grey defined the issues of peace and war on August 3, 1914. Never before had a British statesman been able to seal a declaration of policy with so complete an endorsement of Imperial and national approval. It was instantly recognized as the



[Elliott & Fry.]

LORD LANSDOWNE, K.G.,
Foreign Secretary, 1900-5. Minister, without
portfolio, 1915-1916.

most important State document which had appeared since the outbreak of the war, and it remained the British charter of war aims until the close of hostilities. It provided a fresh rallying point, and the unanimity of the response was a remarkable tribute to the essential unity of the nation after three and a half years of war, and on the eve of a campaign fraught with such obvious danger that none dared to foretell the issue.

Before the question of war aims had been finally disposed of, a new controversy had arisen over the means of attaining them. The lack of success which had attended the efforts of the Allies in the West in the

summer had produced a crisis in their affairs, which, the wiser heads among them contended, could only be resolved by the adoption of unity of command in the field. The accomplishment of this supremely difficult task, in the face of military jealousies and national prejudices, formed one of the most fascinating chapters in the political history of the war. The episode was yet another illustration of the astonishing rapidity with which the political situation at home reacted to the pressure of events in the field. The superficiality of the widely-held view that political thought bears little relation to action which ultimately decides the fate of nations was exposed time after time during the four years of conflict. The cause of every political crisis which occurred in Great Britain between August, 1914, and November, 1918, can with a certainty which is often far to seek in normal times be assigned to turning-points in the clash of arms. The substitution of the first Coalition Government for Mr. Asquith's purely Liberal Government was directly attributable to the failure of the offensive on the Western front which the British Army had begun with such high hopes in the spring of 1915. The memorable crisis at the end of that year, which was resolved by the adoption of the principle of compulsory military service, could be no less directly ascribed to the military disasters of the autumn, in which the failure to relieve Serbia and the evacuation of the Dardanelles were superimposed on the crushing disappointment of the Russian retreat. Similarly, if there was one single factor more than another which brought about the fall of Mr. Asquith's three-party Government and led to the rise of a new Coalition under Mr. Lloyd George at the end of 1916, it was the failure of the Allies to save Rumania from invasion. Again, the two most difficult phases through which the Lloyd George Government passed were the immediate reflection of storms without. The last and greatest Military Service Act was passed in reply to the terrific challenge which the Germans threw down in the West with the March offensive of 1918. A second and even more important consequence of the final onslaught of the German Army was the appointment of Marshal Foch to take supreme direction of the strategy of all the Allied Armies on the Western front. This again could not have been achieved with such rapidity and with so little friction at that time if it had not been for the

spade work which the French and British Governments had put in during the preceding three or four months, and which had only been made possible by the overwhelming disaster which befell the Italian Army at Caporetto in the autumn of 1917.

It took a long time for British politicians to recognize that strategic unity was a fundamental condition of victory, and the controversy which raged around the question in the latter part of 1917 and the first months of 1918 gave rise to a remarkable series of discussions in the House of Commons which came to be known as "sniping" debates. The question first arose in an acute form as the result of an unusually outspoken speech which Mr. Lloyd George made in Paris on his way home from the Rapallo Conference, at which the Allies had taken measures to repair the disaster of Caporetto. In that speech Mr. Lloyd George announced that it had been decided to create a new Allied War Council, representing the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, with a view to a better co-ordination of military action. In a vindication of this first tentative measure of unified control, he recalled the Serbian débacle of 1915, the tragedy of Rumania in 1916, and the Italian disaster of 1917. He exonerated the soldiers from blame, and attributed the blunders to the fact that there was no one responsible authority to give unity to the efforts of the Allies. He even went so far as to declare that the invasion of Italy might in the end prove a blessing, as it had taught the great lesson without which the Allies might never have been able to achieve real unity.

The Paris speech caused an immediate repercussion at Westminster. Mr. Asquith adopted a challenging tone; a political crisis seemed to be brewing; and when Mr. Lloyd George arrived in London he was called upon to defend the Paris speech before the House of Commons. In the event, he enjoyed the greatest Parliamentary triumph of the war. His speech in justification of his policy swept the House off its feet. He explained how he had taken risks to get public sentiment behind the new document for Allied co-ordination, not in Great Britain merely, but in France, Italy, and America. So he determined to deliver a disagreeable speech that would force everybody to talk about the scheme. He told the House how previous resolutions for Allied co-ordination had all come to naught. What could be

more natural than his fear that the plan approved at Rapallo would end in the same sort of way. But now two or three Continents were talking about it, with the result that America, Italy, France, and Great Britain were in, and that was all he wanted. It was an audacious passage, but the whole speech was full of the audacity of the born fighter. Mr. Asquith had not joined issue with the Government on any broad question of principle, but had confined his criticism to the difficulties that might arise



MR. LLOYD GEORGE IN WALES,
AUGUST, 1918,
Walking with Colonel Amery.

between the military advisers of the Allied Council and the existing General Staffs. The cry of "Hands off the Army" had been raised outside the House, and Mr. Lloyd George met it by laying down two propositions which passed without challenge. The first was that no soldiers in any war had had their strategical dispositions less interfered with by politicians. The second was that never in the whole history of war in this country had soldiers got more consistent and more substantial backing than

they had had in 1917. He pleaded justification for the two occasions during the war on which he had acted against the advice of soldiers. He had laid down a gun programme which the soldiers had said at the time would not be necessary, and he had appointed a civilian, Sir Eric Geddes, to reorganize the railways behind the lines.

The upshot was that the threatened crisis fizzled out. The campaign against the Government, which had been so zealously stoked up for a week by the extremists in all camps over the Rapallo resolutions, badly missed fire. It was clear that public opinion had accepted the principles underlying the creation of the Allied Council, and was only too anxious to be convinced of the soundness of the scheme in detail. There could be no doubt that Mr. Lloyd George's vindication had given the country what it wanted.

The Allied Council was set up at Versailles, and for a month or two the Government were spared Parliamentary criticism on the subject of unity of command. But the controversy was only smouldering. No sooner had the Parliamentary Session of 1918 been opened in February than it burst into flame, and the business of the nation in the critical weeks immediately preceding the opening of the German offensive was conducted in an atmosphere of contention in which the higher strategy of the war no less than its higher politics was subjected to the keenest scrutiny. These weeks of Parliamentary controversy, while the storm clouds were gathering in the West, formed one of the most singular chapters in the political history of the war. They had their origin in suspicion no less than in disappointment, and, as might have been expected with such parentage, they were absolutely barren of result. But they must have a permanent interest for the political student, as beyond question they established Mr. Lloyd George firmly in the saddle and finally disposed of the possibility of the setting up of an alternative Government during the last stages of the war with Mr. Asquith or any statesman of his school of thought at its head.

Unity of command, of course, was amply vindicated by the successful issue of the campaign, but the Rapallo Conference had done no more than make the first move towards achieving it. Early in 1918 the Allied Governments took a further step in advance by agreeing to a substantial enlargement of the

functions of the Supreme Council, which now took on an executive as well as an advisory character. This at once involved the British Government in difficulties with some of their Generals, and the debates which arose in the House of Commons were complicated by the introduction of this personal factor. Public discussion, in fact, was directed almost more to the relations between the Government and the Generals than to the far larger question of the principles underlying the conception of unity of command which Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were resolved to carry into effect. In the debate on the Address, Mr. Asquith adopted a critical attitude towards the Government on the strengthening of the Versailles organization. This attitude was intensified when Sir William Robertson ceased to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff for reasons connected with this development of the Government's policy, and Mr. Lloyd George found it necessary to make one of his periodical restatements of the case for Versailles in the House of Commons. After his speech, which convinced the majority of the House, the talk of a probable Vote of Censure and a possible crisis, which had been going on for some days, was forgotten. Still certain elements in the House of Commons continued restless and suspicious. They quickly found another bone of contention in the supposed connexion between the Government and the Press, but this proved to be an even more impossible line of attack. One short debate and a witty speech from Mr. S. L. Hughes reduced it to its true proportions.

This "sniping" at the Government was temporarily suspended on March 21, when the great blow fell in France. The German offensive and the British retreat across the old Somme battlefield had important reactions at home. News of the opening of the final phase of the great struggle reached the House of Commons on the evening of March 21, when it was on the point of adjourning for the Easter recess. Before members separated, Mr. Bonar Law made a grave, though, on the whole, reassuring statement on the battle position. Members, however, had not been away from Westminster many hours before the situation developed in such a way as to leave no room for doubt that the nation was face to face with the most dangerous crisis of the war. In this, the darkest hour of all, there was an instinctive closing of



[M. Olive Edis. photo.]

MR. LLOYD GEORGE IN 1918.

the ranks such as had only been seen once before in the war, and the nation with one voice demanded that all measures, however drastic, should be taken to make good the losses incurred in the retreat. The most urgent need now, as so often during the war, was of men, and the Government at once set about the task of framing a new Military Service Bill, which was destined to be the last of the series.

The evolution of a complete system of compulsory military service was probably the most effective contribution to victory which Parliament made. The foundations were laid by the first Coalition Government in January,

1916. The pioneer Service Act, passed at that time to fulfil the famous pledge to married men who had attested under the Derby scheme, confined the obligation to single men up to 40 years of age in Great Britain. The second Service Act, passed in May of the same year, extended the obligation to married men up to 40 years of age in Great Britain and strengthened the first Act in other ways. Mr. Lloyd George's Government found it necessary to pass a third Service Act in April, 1917. By it the Army Council were given power to call up for examination three classes of men previously excepted: Home service Territorials,

men discharged in consequence of disablement or ill-health, and men rejected on any ground. The Government justified these new and, it must be confessed, unpopular measures on grounds of urgent military necessity, Mr. Bonar Law informing the House of Commons that the recruits obtained for the first quarter of the year had fallen short of the estimated number by 100,000. The working of the Act was not



[Lafayette.]

LORD DERBY, K.G.,
Secretary of State for War, 1916-18.
British Ambassador in Paris.

free from friction, and the Government appointed a Select Committee to inquire into the whole question of medical re-examination. Lord Derby, who was then Secretary of State for War, in giving evidence before this Committee, suggested that the best method of restoring public confidence would be to take recruiting out of the hands of the War Office and entrust it to a civilian Department. The Government accepted this proposal and the resignation was announced of Mr Neville Chamberlain, whose appointment as Minister of National Service had been one of Mr. Lloyd George's first acts on becoming Prime Minister, and whose powers had been limited to the organization of the civilian side of the man-power problem. He gave place in August, 1917, to Sir Auckland Geddes, who brought with him from the War Office control of the whole business of the recruiting of the Army. The result was that for the last and most critical year of the war the whole machinery of national

service, military and civilian, was in the hands of one Minister.

Public attention was again drawn to the man-power question in the autumn of 1917 by some notable speeches in the country by Sir Auckland Geddes, followed by the announcement that he would hold conferences with the trade unions on the subject of a new Service Bill for the purpose of securing some of the necessary reinforcements for the 1918 campaign by combing out young and fit men from munition works and other establishments of a national character. This, the fourth Service Act, became law in the first weeks of the new year. It was designed to secure a clean cut of the younger men remaining in civil life. This policy was made practicable by the abolition of the automatic addition of two months' exemption enjoyed by certain classes of workmen, and



[Bassano.]

SIR AUCKLAND GEDDES, K.C.B.,
Minister of National Service, 1917.

by the concentration into the hands of the Minister of National Service of the power to withdraw any certificate of exemption granted on occupational grounds. It was obvious, even after full use had been made of these powers, notwithstanding some trade union opposition, notably from the engineers, that the country still possessed a considerable reserve of man-power for a grave emergency.

None could doubt the extreme gravity of the position caused by the British retreat with heavy losses in men and material in the last



INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE QUESTION OF MAN-POWER.

Trade Union delegates at the Central Hall, Westminster, February, 1918.

days of March, and the passing of the fifth and final Service Act was the measure of the national determination to press forward unflinchingly until present defeat had been turned into future victory. The nation faced its ordeal with exemplary calmness and fortitude, and members came back from their constituencies to voice an overwhelming demand for immediate action to the extreme limit of the national capacity. The nation had grimly set its teeth, and without faltering it accepted the drastic proposals which the Government submitted to Parliament on April 9, the day of reassembling after the Easter recess. The Bill proposed to extend the military age to 50 years, and, in a national emergency—such as invasion—to 55 years. Doctors up to the age of 55 years were made immediately liable to military service. The exception in favour of released or exchanged prisoners of war was abolished. Provision was made for the recall of time-expired men. Ireland was at last brought within the ambit of compulsory service. The Government took power, by Order in Council, to extend the Service Acts to Ireland, with the necessary modifications and adaptations. The Government were further given authority, in a national emergency, to direct, by Proclamation, that any certificates of exemption other than those granted on the grounds of ill-health or of conscientious objec-

tion should cease to have effect. The tribunal system was recast, and the powers of these bodies in the granting of certificates of exemption were greatly curtailed. Any man holding an exemption certificate or applying for its renewal was made liable to medical re-examination. Finally, to secure the necessities of home defence, the obligation was placed on every man who had been granted an exemption certificate to join the Volunteer Force for the period of the war, unless a tribunal ordered to the contrary. It was the most drastic and comprehensive measure of national defence ever submitted to the Imperial Parliament. There was no emergency for which provision was not made, and it completed the structure of compulsory military service which had been begun over two years before.

Mr. Lloyd George made an impressive speech in submitting the Government proposals to the House of Commons. Apart from the new legislative proposals, he indicated what was being done by administrative action to meet the emergency. He stated that the Government had raised, during the first quarter of the year, more than the number of men estimated as the minimum required. Something like 100,000 men in Grade 1 were being combed out from munition works. A demand for 50,000 men had been made on the coal mines, and now another 50,000 were to be called up. The



MR. JOHN DILLON,
Elected leader of the Irish Nationalist Party after
the death of Mr. Redmond.

transport services were to be directed to release the greatest possible number of men. No fit man below the age of 25 was to be retained in the Civil Service, and there would be a combat beyond that. Orders were being issued under the last Act, cancelling occupational exemptions in selected industries by age blocks. Finally, the calling-up period was to be shortened from 14 days to 7. As for the most striking provision in the Bill, the raising of the military age to 50 years, Mr. Lloyd George gave it as the official estimate that only 7 per cent. of the men, who would by that means be qualified for national service for the first time, would be available for fighting.

The Government had no difficulty in carrying their proposals, with only slight amendments, into law. The only substantial change in the Bill as introduced was the dropping of a clause making clergymen and ministers of religion liable to combatant service. If there had been any who doubted the urgency of the need after the German tide had spent itself before Amiens, their illusion was dispelled by the news of a second offensive and a second break-through in the Armentières region, which spread through the lobbies an hour or two after the Prime Minister had laid his proposals before the House. Though there was criticism in detail of the proposals for raising the military age and otherwise tightening up the application of the Service Acts to Great Britain, the main principles were freely accepted. The only clause which excited any real controversy was that which extended conscription to Ireland. The Nationalists made the most of their opportunity. It was the first appearance of the party at Westminster under Mr. Dillon, who had been elected leader on the death of Mr. Redmond a few weeks before. They fought the Bill as far as they could, and, though they played their part vigorously, they kept strictly to the constitutional rules. The second reading of the Bill was carried by a majority of three to one. The debate on the Irish clause in committee passed off fairly quietly, and the Government carried their point by 283 votes to 118. The only other serious division on the Bill was on an amendment to reduce the age limit from 50 years to 47. The Government refused to accept this, and the House vindicated their decision by 264 to 154. The third reading went through by a majority of three to one, the Nationalists proving to the end the mainstay of the opposition. Mr. Asquith and his immediate following abstained from voting one way or the other throughout. The Lords made no difficulty about the Bill, and it received the Royal Assent on April 18. It had actually become the law of the land within ten days of its introduction.

With the passing of the Service Act the Irish question once more reared its head, and in a more menacing form than ever. It has been said that, by a strange chance, the Report of the Irish Convention was published on the very day on which the clause extending conscription to Ireland was debated in the House of Commons. It will be further recalled that Mr. Lloyd George, in announcing the decision of the Government to summon the Convention nearly

a year before, had declared that, if substantial agreement should be reached as to the character of a constitution, the Government would accept responsibility for taking all the necessary steps to enable Parliament to give legislative effect to the conclusions of the Convention. Now, in the speech in which Mr. Lloyd George submitted the man-power proposals of the Government for Ireland as well as for Great Britain, he reviewed the new situation caused

fail to have an important bearing on the debates on the Man-Power Bill, there was never any question of the striking of a bargain. Neither plan was conditional on the other. Each was pressed as a serious contribution to our war efficiency. But, if it was a coincidence, it was also a golden opportunity of the sort rarely given to statesmanship. So at least it seemed in those April days.

Unhappily, disillusion came quickly. Nation-



A PARADE OF THE 5TH BATTALION CITY OF LONDON VOLUNTEER REGIMENT (NATIONAL GUARD) AT THE GUILDHALL.

by the completion of the work of the Convention. It had reported by a majority, but he feared that it was not such as to justify the Government in saying that it represented substantial agreement. That meant, in his judgment, that the Government must accept the responsibility of submitting to Parliament, with such guidance as the Report of the Convention afforded, such proposals for the establishment of self-government in Ireland as were just and could be carried without violent controversy. He accordingly announced that it was proposed at an early date to invite the House of Commons to pass such a measure with the least possible delay. Although the imminence of measures for the future government of Ireland could not

alist Ireland flatly refused to accept the obligation of national service which England, Scotland, and Wales had been manfully discharging for over two years. Mr Dillon told Mr. Lloyd George, in the debate on the introduction of the Bill, that he would get no recruits from Ireland. The rival Nationalist leader, Mr. William O'Brien, contended that the proposals were a declaration of war against Ireland. Mr. Devlin charged the Government with ignoring a sub-committee of the Irish Convention, which had reported that, assuming that a scheme of Irish self-government was adopted, it would in practice be impossible to impose compulsory service on Ireland without the assent and co-operation of the Irish Parliament. The Service

Act was passed in the teeth of these protests, and Mr. Dillon carried his party into the extreme camp by withdrawing it from the House of Commons for three months. The interval was spent in the organization, in association with Sinn Fein and the Roman Catholic priesthood, of an anti-conscription movement designed to resist any attempt to enforce the new Law. In the end, the Irish clause became a dead letter, and the Government never issued the Order in Council which was necessary to put the conscription machinery in motion.

It was in these unfavourable circumstances that the Government set about the preparation of the measure of Home Rule which they had promised. A few weeks before, Sir Edward Carson, who had been succeeded at the Admiralty by Sir Eric Geddes in the previous summer, resigned from the War Cabinet to give the Government a free hand. A committee of Ministers was appointed to draft a Bill, but it failed in its task. The Bill was never even introduced. The plain fact was that neither in Great Britain nor in Ireland was the atmosphere favourable to a policy of conciliation. British opinion was angered by the refusal of the Irish people to make the sacrifice

asked of them in the hour of the Empire's greatest peril. The state of Ireland was sufficiently indicated by the discovery of a German plot for another rising, and by the deportation of the leading Sinn Feiners by Lord French and Mr. Shortt, who had recently been entrusted with the administration of the country in succession to Lord Wimborne and Mr. Duke. In the summer, when the conscription crisis had passed, the Nationalists returned to the House of Commons, only to find that they had almost ceased to count in British politics. The disintegration which had set in with the death of Mr. Redmond proceeded at such a rate that the party fell to pieces in a few months, and their virtual extinction at the General Election was a foregone conclusion. No further step was taken during the war to arrive at a solution of the most obstinate problem of our domestic politics.

These were some of the tremendous burdens which the Government were bearing at home and abroad when, with the passing of the immediate crisis for the British Armies in France, there was a revival of "sniping" in the House of Commons. The military situation as a whole was still full of anxiety when faction



AN ANTI-CONSCRIPTION DEMONSTRATION IN DUBLIN.

came on for its final fling. This time it was not the question of unity of command which provoked criticism, but that of the relations between the Government and the Generals, from which somehow it seemed impossible to dis-



[Vandyk.]

GENERAL SIR F. B. MAURICE, K.C.M.G.,
Director of Military Operations. Imperial
General Staff, 1915-18.

sociate the larger problem. Trouble at the Air Ministry had led to the resignation first of Major-General Sir Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Staff, and then of Lord Rothermere, the Secretary of State, who was succeeded by Sir William Weir. The inevitable debate on the affair showed once more how ill-equipped the House of Commons was to intervene effectively between the Government and their expert advisers. Indeed, until Mr. Lloyd George's Government came into power, this was never regarded as one of the functions of Parliament. Although the Government, by common consent, had made a reasonable case for the changes at the Air Ministry, a division was challenged, and for the first time during the war a responsible Opposition vote was cast. The minority was small in number, 37, but significant in composition. With the exception of Mr. Asquith, who abstained, Liberal ex-Ministers voted against the Government in a body. Even so there were more Liberal members voting with the Government than against them. This was an omen which it would have been wiser not to ignore.

When this hurdle had been cleared, *The Times* remarked in its "Political Notes" that

perhaps, now that the critics had tried their hand for the third time on a perilous extension of the right of the control of administration, in each case with singularly little profit, they would realize the futility of such attempts no less than the positive harm which they did to the Services. But the lesson had even yet not been learnt, as was shown a week later in the curious affair of General Maurice. The Opposition then boldly came out into the open in full strength against the Government, and, with the House of Commons debate on May 9, these extraordinary transactions reached their climax, and, as it turned out, their nadir. Soldiers and politicians alike were startled to read in *The Times* of May 7 a letter from Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, lately Director of Military Operations, charging Ministers with



[Russell.]

MR. WILLIAM O'BRIEN,
An Irish Political Leader.

making certain misstatements which in sum gave a totally misleading impression of military events. Mr. Bonar Law had stated, in answer to a question on April 23, that the extension of the British front in France, which had had an obvious bearing on the British retreat from St. Quentin, had not been dealt with at all by the Versailles Council. General Maurice now stated categorically that he was at Versailles when the question was decided by the Supreme War Council, to whom it had been referred. He also directly challenged two statements which Mr. Lloyd George had made in his speech of April 9, in which he took stock of the military position before and after the opening of the

German offensive. The Prime Minister had stated that, notwithstanding the heavy casualties in 1917, the Army in France was considerably stronger on January 1, 1918, than on January 1, 1917. General Maurice took this statement to imply that Sir Douglas Haig's fighting strength on the eve of the great battle, which began on March 21, had not been diminished. "That is not correct," he wrote. Again, in the



[Lafayette.]

LORD WEIR,
Secretary of State for Air.

same speech, Mr. Lloyd George had said that there was only one white division in Mesopotamia, and that there were only three white divisions in Egypt and Palestine, the rest being Indians or mixed with a very small proportion of British troops. Again General Maurice said bluntly, "This is not correct."

This extraordinary letter ended with the following passage :

Now, Sir, this letter is not the result of a military conspiracy. It has been seen by no soldier. I am by descent and conviction as sincere a democrat as the Prime Minister, and the last thing I want to do is to see the Government of our country in the hands of soldiers. My reason for taking the very grave step of writing this letter is that the statements quoted above are known to a large number of soldiers to be incorrect, and this knowledge is breeding such distrust of the Government as can only end in impairing the splendid moral of our troops at a time when everything possible should be done to raise it. I have, therefore, decided, fully realizing the consequences to myself, that my duty as a citizen must override my duty as a soldier, and I ask

you to publish this letter in the hope that Parliament may see fit to order an investigation into the statements I have made

The same afternoon Mr. Asquith, with some asperity, questioned the Government on the matter in the House of Commons. He followed up his questions by giving notice of a motion for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into General Maurice's allegations. This was a direct challenge to the Government which they were bound to take up at the earliest opportunity. They proposed at the outset that the matter should be investigated by two Judges. Mr. Asquith rejected this plan, and persisted with his alternative of a Select Committee. The Government made it plain that they had no intention of withdrawing from their position. It was their considered view that a judicial investigation was the best method of dealing with the matter, and that a Parliamentary Committee would be the worst. The analogy of the Roebuck Committee at the height of the Crimean War was not encouraging, and, when members began to think the matter out seriously, they were appalled at the prospect of anything in the nature of a prolonged political wrangle in the then dangerous position on the Western front. In the circumstances, Ministers had no option but to treat Mr. Asquith's motion as a Vote of Censure. In order to resist it with all the strength at their command, they sent out urgent telegraphic "whips" to all their supporters, except those on active service, for the coming debate.

The debate took place on May 9, and it attracted as great a degree of public interest as any Parliamentary event during the war period. In submitting his demand for a Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Asquith denied that his motion was either in intention or in effect a Vote of Censure upon the Government. He said little about General Maurice's letter beyond declaring emphatically that neither he nor, so far as his knowledge went, any of his political friends had any privity in its composition or publication. He devoted the greater part of his speech to an argument, directed first to the need of an inquiry into General Maurice's charges, and secondly to the advantages of a Select Committee of five members over a tribunal of two judges. Defending his choice on the ground that this was a matter which peculiarly concerned the House of Commons, he asked what was the alternative "Get on with the war," cried Mr. Stanton, the Labour member.

Mr. Lloyd George's speech in reply was a great Parliamentary effort. Facing straight-way the issues raised by General Maurice, he complained that he had been unfairly treated. He declared categorically that, while he was in daily contact with General Maurice, whom he regarded as a great friend, he had never challenged the statements to which he took exception in his letter. Proceeding to a detailed examination of the charges, Mr. Lloyd George explained that the figures on which he had based his statement that the fighting strength of the British forces in France was greater on January 1, 1918, than on January 1, 1917, were taken from the official records of the War Office. Next, he had been charged with misleading the public as to the comparative strength of the Allied and enemy forces when the offensive began. He stated that the whole of the figures on which he had based that statement had come from General Maurice. The figures, too, which he had given of white divisions in the East were official. The particular statement about there being three British divisions in Egypt, he explained, was made at a Cabinet meeting at which General Maurice was present. As for the most serious charge relating to the extension of the British front in France, he explained the whole transaction in detail, and declared that not a single yard was taken over as a result of the Versailles Council. Finally, Mr. Lloyd George, speaking with great earnestness, pointed the moral of the whole affair. He insisted that the letter was a flagrant breach of discipline, and respectfully suggested that Mr. Asquith ought to have deprecated it. He made another appeal to all sections to end these distracting controversies, which threatened the unity of the Army and the nation. With the fate of the country in the balance in the weeks ahead, he demanded an end of "this sniping."

The general feeling was that Mr. Lloyd George had successfully vindicated the Government, and strong appeals were made to Mr. Asquith not to press his motion to a division. He insisted, however, on letting matters take their course. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the Opposition Whips acted as tellers in a division against the Government. For the first time, too, the Leader of the Opposition and the whole of his Front Bench lieutenants voted against the Government on a question of confidence. When the result of the division was announced, it was

found that 108 members had voted for Mr. Asquith's motion, and 295 against it. Mr. Asquith only succeeded in getting 99 out of the 260 Liberal Members of the House into his lobby. Not only did he fail to command half the votes of the party, but, with 72 Liberals definitely throwing in their lot with the Government, he only had a majority of 27 of the Liberals voting. By putting on the Opposition



MR. ASQUITH.

Whips he had forced the whole body of Liberals whom he formerly led to make their choice between him and Mr. Lloyd George's Government, and the results, permanent as well as temporary, were of the first political importance.

At the time it seemed as if the division must mark a turning-point in the war relations between the two Front Benches. A permanent Opposition, prepared to criticize and challenge the Government in the old pre-war way, seemed to have come into existence. As a matter of fact, it was the first and last time on which Mr. Asquith took to open warfare. The Opposition Whips were never called upon again to tell in a division against the Government, and the whole affair had proved to be such a fiasco that no further attempt was made to embarrass the Government by these methods. It was the last of the "sniping" debates, and the voice of controversy was stilled during the epic chapter which culminated in the signing of the armistice. The net result of the incident was that

General Maurice was placed on half pay; that the Government dropped their proposal of a judicial investigation into his charges; and that it was a chief cause of the disaster which overwhelmed Mr. Asquith and his wing of the Liberal Party at the General Election.

At last, with the final campaign in the West moving by giant strides to its tremendous climax, the Government were able to give their undivided attention to the conduct of the war, and Parliament was in a position to concentrate its energies on great problems of legislation and finance. Before the summer recess Mr. Fisher scored a personal triumph by securing the passing of a great Education Act. This measure raised the elementary school age to 14 years, provided for the introduction of a system of compulsory day continuation schools for adolescents, imposed drastic restrictions on the employment of children, and raised the standard of physical welfare in schools. By these and other valuable reforms it assured a real educational advance after the war.

The financial operations of the House of Commons were on a more enormous scale than ever. Mr. Bonar Law's second Budget, the biggest in our financial history, allowing for an estimated expenditure of £2,972,197,000 and a revenue of £842,050,000, leaving an estimated deficit to be met by loans of £2,130,147,000, was passed without difficulty. The income-tax was raised to the unprecedented figure of 6s. in the £. The taxation of farmers was doubled. The limit of super-tax exemption was lowered to £2,500, and the rates of super-tax under the graduated scale were increased up to a maximum of 4s. 6d. in the £. The stamp duty on cheques was increased from 1d. to 2d., the beer and spirit duties were doubled, and the sugar, tobacco, and match duties were raised. Penny postage was abolished, the letter rate being raised to 1½d., while the halfpenny postage on postcards was doubled. A project for the imposition of a luxury tax of 2d. in the shilling was referred to a Select Committee. A schedule of luxuries to be taxed was framed, but the Government did not act upon the Committee's report, and nothing more was heard of the matter. During the last year of war, Votes of Credit were sanctioned to the aggregate amount of £2,500,000,000. Two of these Votes were for £700,000,000 each—the largest sum ever asked from the House of Commons at a single sitting.

Before adjourning for a ten weeks' recess in

the summer the two Houses went to St. Margaret's, Westminster, on Sunday, August 4, the fourth anniversary of the declaration of war, and invoked the Divine blessing on the national cause. A month after its reassembling Parliament was again to repair to St. Margaret's, this time to give thanks to Almighty God for the signing of the armistice with Germany. The adjournment had taken place on August 8, the historic date on which the British Armies launched their last and greatest offensive, which was to smash the Hindenburg Line and to set the crown upon the stupendous military effort of four arduous years. To this effort Parliament had made, in its own sphere, a decisive contribution, and it was a breathless and buoyant House of Commons which reassembled on October 15. It met with Bulgaria out of the war, with a complete victory in prospect, and with its task almost done. There were no more heroic measures to be passed. The surrender of Turkey and Austria was announced in turn, and when the Prime Minister read to the House the terms of the armistice with Germany on November 11 it was fully realized that, as this was the last scene in the Parliamentary drama of the war, the curtain was also about to fall on the Parliament which had weathered the storm.

No sooner had the armistice been signed than preparations were set on foot for a General Election. The War Parliament had already outlived all its predecessors since the Long Parliament and Pensionary Parliament of Stuart times. It had passed five separate Acts for extensions of its life, and was now in the last quarter of its eighth year. The passing of the Reform Act had cleared away the last obstacle to a dissolution, as the Register of the new electorate, the first of any kind prepared during the war, was ready by October 1. There had been a widespread feeling even in July, when Parliament prolonged its life for a further term of six months, that this was likely to be the last extension of the series. On the 18th of that month *The Times* gave the first hint of the probable dissolution of Parliament in November. The end of the war was not then in sight, but political plans were quietly laid on the assumption that, in the entirely new situation created by the passing of the Reform Act, the demand for a General Election before many months had passed would be almost irresistible. The

favourable progress of the war in the wonderful summer campaigns in East and West brought an election well within the range of practical politics, and the signing of the last armistice clinched the matter

Accordingly, there was little surprise when on the day following the cessation of hostilities Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law summoned their Liberal and Unionist supporters to separate meetings and outlined a policy for the

labour and of wages and of a reduction of hours. "Bolshevism," he declared, "I am not afraid of. It is reaction that I am afraid of; yes, reaction and disunion."

The chief event of the Unionist meeting was the reading of a letter from Mr. Lloyd George by Mr. Bonar Law. In it the Prime Minister expressed the opinion that, if there was to be an election, it should be a Coalition election—"that is to say that the country should be



MR. LLOYD GEORGE CHEERED ON HIS WAY TO THE HOUSE, MAY 9, 1918.

continuance of the Coalition Government during the peace negotiations and the period of reconstruction. These were the first moves, and the fact that both meetings were held in private led to some preliminary complications. Mr. Lloyd George made a declaration of policy at the Liberal meeting, and *The Times* was able to publish the essential passages from it on the following day. He argued that with the end of the war there could be no possible justification for prolonging the life of a moribund Parliament. After insisting upon the need of a just peace and a guarantee that the League of Nations was a reality, he made a radical pronouncement on the need of reform at home. He outlined a great housing programme, and spoke of the need of an improvement of the conditions of

definitely invited to return candidates who undertake to support the present Government not only to prosecute the war to its final end and negotiate the peace, but to deal with the problems of reconstruction which must immediately arise directly an armistice is signed." (The letter was dated November 2.) "In other words," Mr. Lloyd George continued, "the test which in future must decide whether individual candidates will be sustained at the polls by your supporters and mine must be not, as in the past, a pledge to support the Government in the prosecution of the war, but a definite pledge to support this Government." Mr. Lloyd George submitted a statement of policy on questions with which the Unionist Party had chiefly identified itself. In the sphere of



THE PEERS ON THE WAY TO THE SERVICE AT ST. MARGARET'S,
AUGUST 4, 1918.

The Lord Chancellor and the bearer of the Great Seal.

economic policy he accepted Imperial preference, to be given on existing duties and on any duties which might afterwards be imposed, but eliminated the possibility of a tax on food. He insisted that key industries must be preserved, and that security should be given against dumping. On the subject of Ireland, he claimed the right to bring into effect a settlement based on Home Rule, but refused to contemplate the forcible coercion of the six northern counties of Ulster. As for the Church in Wales, he found no evidence of a general desire that the Act should be repealed, but recognized that the long continuance of the war had created financial problems which must be taken into account.

This letter was not made public for some days. As at the meeting of his own supporters the Prime Minister had emphasised more particularly his Liberalism and had eloquently appealed for the support of his old party, many of Mr. Bonar Law's supporters found some difficulty in reconciling the tone of that pronouncement with the terms of the letter, which was intended to meet the special case presented by the need for Unionist support.

The position was pulled round at the end of the week at a meeting at the Central Hall, Westminster, which Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Barnes addressed in turn. A common Coalition platform for the Unionist, Liberal, and Labour sections had been found, and the mysterious letter was there published to the world. This was the formal opening of the election campaign.

Two days before, on November 14, Mr. Bonar Law had announced in the House of Commons that Parliament would be dissolved on the 25th of that month, and that the nominations and polls for the General Election would be held on December 4 and 14 respectively. The business of the Session was quickly wound up, and the Parliament which had seen the war through came to a quiet end. It had been beyond question one of the most memorable Parliaments in our long political history. No Parliament in modern times had been the theatre of such dramatic events or the witness of such complete changes of fortune. Elected in time of peace in December, 1910, on purely domestic questions, it found itself three and a half years later suddenly transformed into a

War Parliament, faced with the supreme issues of national existence. It adapted itself slowly to the new conditions, but it could not fairly be said that it ever made a serious mistake in the second and most important chapter of its history. Circumstances beyond its control forced it to revise its view of national policy and to undo in four and a half years of war much of the work it had accomplished in three and a half years of peace. It was fated hardly to take a step, either before or after August, 1914, which in the light of our present knowledge was without a touch of irony. It lived under a Party Government and two Coalition Ministries, and under two Prime Ministers, Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George. It passed Acts which became a dead letter and others which effected the most extensive constitutional and social reforms in our history, and its war emergency Statutes surpassed in originality and thoroughness anything that any politician of the old school had ever dreamt of.

Although it was generally recognized that a definite chapter in our political history had closed with the signing of the armistice with Germany, and that another must open immediately, the holding of the General Election at this time was by no means universally welcomed. Mr. Asquith and the Liberals who recognized him as their leader still maintained their position as a separate entity outside the Coalition on which the Government was based, and nothing came of various movements which were set on foot during the autumn to secure an accommodation between the old Prime Minister and the new. The Asquith Liberals entered strong objections to the policy of the Government in appealing to the country before peace had been signed. Their attitude was shared by the Labour Party, though Mr. Henderson's preparations for an election campaign were so well advanced that they did not express their opinion with quite the same intensity of feeling. For one thing, the Labour Party had anticipated the event by terminating the party truce for by-elections in the summer. A conference of the Labour Party now decided by an overwhelming majority to resume its complete independence by the withdrawal of the Labour Ministers from the Government. Mr. Clynes, who had succeeded to the office of Food Controller on the death of Lord Rhondda, acted upon this decision almost immediately. In the next few weeks three other Labour Ministers, Mr. Hodge, Mr. Brace,

and Mr. Walsh, followed Mr. Clynes's example. The other four, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Wardle, and Mr. Parker, remained at their posts. They were, however, no longer the direct representatives of the Labour Party, and the three-party Coalition ceased to exist with the dissolution of Parliament. The election campaign was fought by a Coalition consisting of the whole Unionist Party, an important section of the Liberal Party, and individual Labour men acting in defiance of the decision of their party. Accordingly, when the Coalition came to issue a manifesto to the electors, it was signed only by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law.

The election campaign was the quietest on



MR. BONAR LAW,
In Palace Yard, Westminster.

record. The appeal which Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law made to the electors was briefly for support of the Coalition Government in the achievement of a peace settlement commensurate with the greatness of the national sacrifice and in the prosecution of a radical policy of reform in the period of reconstruction. Special emphasis was laid in the Coalition manifesto on the determination of the

started election cries of its own. The transition from the absorbing interests of the war to the consideration of reconstruction problems pure and simple was too abrupt for its liking. The peace was not yet made and the election campaign had not been long in progress before every candidate was made aware of the very strong opinions which prevailed in the constituencies on some essential factors of the



MR. LLOYD GEORGE SPEAKING AT THE CENTRAL HALL, WESTMINSTER, NOVEMBER 16, 1918.

new combination to provide land for soldiers, to secure an improvement in housing conditions, and to raise the standard of living of the working classes. These broad aims, which were crystallized into a national ambition to secure a better England for the heroes of the war to live in, figured no less prominently in the programmes of the Asquith Liberals and of the Labour Party, who actually, if not technically, followed the lead of Mr. Arthur Henderson. Both groups put forward schemes of industrial amelioration and social reform, but there was no opposition to the war and peace aims of the Government, except from the small "pacifist" minority in each camp.

There seemed to be such general agreement on the "New England" policy of the Government that the electorate not unnaturally

problem. There was a widespread determination, to which virtually every Coalition candidate gave his support, to ensure that Germany should pay the cost of the war, that the Kaiser should be brought to trial, and that no opportunity should be afforded for any future penetration of this country by potential enemy agents. After some hesitation, the Government adapted themselves to the prevailing temper. Mr. Lloyd George made several vigorous speeches in different parts of the country, and pledged himself and his Government up to the hilt to make a strong peace along the lines indicated by public opinion. His election programme at the end of the campaign was summarized in a foreword to a list of Coalition candidates issued from the Whips' office on the eve of the poll.

The following six points were there set out as the main heads of the Prime Minister's election programme:

- Trial of the Kaiser.
- Punishment of those responsible for atrocities.
- Fullest indemnities from Germany.
- Britain for the British, socially and industrially.
- Rehabilitation of those broken in the war.
- A happier country for all.

Although nobody doubted for a moment that the Coalition would obtain a majority at the polls, some resentment was shown at one of the instruments which their organizers used to obtain their object. This was the method of certificating candidates known as the Coalition "coupon." Every candidate who was accepted as satisfactory by the Whips in Downing Street received a letter from Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law formally recognizing him as the Coalition candidate, and expressing the hope that the electors would return him as their representative in Parliament to support the Government in the great task before it. When the Whips published their official list of Coalition candidates it was found that 364 were Unionists, 158 Liberals, and 18 members of the National Democratic Party, which formed a sort of patriotic Labour wing of the new combination. Well aware that the Unionist strength in the old Parliament was under 300, Liberals were doubtful of the wisdom of the appearance in the field of nearly 400 Unionist candidates, as compared with a bare 150 representing the Liberal wing. The suggestion was freely made that Sir George Younger, the head of the Unionist organization, had got the better of the bargain with the Coalition Liberal Whips. Sir George Younger not only staked out claims in many of the new seats created by the Reform Act, but also took full advantage of the split in the Liberal Party by bringing out Unionist candidates against Liberals who clung to Mr. Asquith's leadership. Labour also had a grievance in the number of Coalition candidates who received official endorsement in industrial constituencies for which the party had put forward candidates who had played a patriotic part during the war. In a few cases, notably in South Wales, Labour candidates were allowed an unopposed return, and there was a widespread feeling, which was greatly intensified when the results of the election were known, that the Coalition organizers would have been wiser if they had adopted a less rigid system in their choice of candidates.

These were the main tendencies of the most

orderly election campaign on record. Quiet the contest might have been, but it was certainly not dull and uninteresting. It was in the main conducted in a spirit of national solidarity and good comradeship, and with a commendable absence of personal rancour. Some called it a "freak" election; others compared it to the so-called "khaki" election of 1900. Actually it was an election without parallel, both in the temper in which it was conducted and in the method of collecting the voices of the nation which was now employed for the first time.

Nominations were taken on December 4, and 107 members were returned unopposed. There was an extraordinary multiplicity of candidates for the remaining 600 seats. Over 1,500 candidates were nominated, and there were more three-cornered contests than at any previous election. The Labour Party made the biggest effort in its history, and put into the field 362 candidates. Labour had only recently appeared in the political field as an integral fighting force in full battle array. It was the old Labour Party reconstituted and enlarged by the recognition of the interests of all producers "by hand or by brain" without distinction of class or occupation. This was the principal change made in the new constitution adopted by the party earlier in the year. Another innovation which was now brought into operation for the first time was a provision that before every General Election the party programme should be laid down by the National Executive and that every candidate must adopt it.

The polls were held on December 14, and there was a larger vote in the aggregate than had been expected. Nearly 11,000,000 votes were recorded and quite 60 per cent. of those qualified to vote exercised the franchise. The new women voters polled in great strength, and 17 women took advantage of an Act passed in the closing days of the Session to stand as candidates. The votes were not counted until December 28, as time had to be allowed for the collection of ballot papers from soldiers on the Western front who had voted by post. There was a fairly heavy soldiers' vote, but, although possibly representative, it was far from being exhaustive. No fewer than 2,400,000 ballot-papers were issued to absent voters, but only 830,000 were included in the count of votes. Very few proxies for soldiers in distant theatres of war and sailors at sea appeared at the polling

booths. The military and naval vote, in fact, was the least satisfactory feature of the election.



THE SPEAKER.
Mr. J. W. Lowther, M.P.

When the results of the poll were declared, it was found that the Coalition had swept the country and scored the most remarkable triumph ever recorded in our political annals. Mr. Lloyd George was confirmed in power with a majority of 249 over all the non-Coalition members. No fewer than 478 official Coalition candidates, 334 Unionists, 134 Liberals, and 10 members of the National Democratic Party, were elected for the 602 seats in Great Britain. Every Minister who had to face a contest was returned, in almost every case by a sweeping majority. Mr. Lloyd George defeated an independent candidate at Carnarvon by over 12,000 votes. Mr. Bonar Law had a five-figure majority in Glasgow. Mr. Churchill, in Dundee, had the largest majority, over 15,000, given to a Minister. London and the Home Counties went almost solid for the Coalition. Scotland and Wales came down heavily on Mr. Lloyd George's side, and the Coalition polled far more strongly in the industrial Midlands and North than had been expected.

Very different was the experience of Mr. Asquith and the Liberal Opposition. Mr. Asquith, all his Front Bench lieutenants, and

all his Whips, were defeated, and, where they were engaged in three-cornered contests, they were usually found at the bottom of the poll. Two ex-Ministers (Sir Charles Hobhouse and Mr. McKinnon Wood) actually polled less than one-eighth of the total number of votes recorded and forfeited the deposit of £150 made by each candidate on nomination in accordance with a provision of the Reform Act designed to discourage freak candidatures. Mr. Asquith's defeat in East Fife, which first returned him to Parliament in 1886 and had remained faithful to him at every election in the intervening thirty-two years, provided the greatest sensation in a day of surprises. Other ex-Ministers who failed to secure re-election were Mr. Asquith's Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. McKenna), two of his Home Secretaries (Mr. Herbert Samuel and Sir John Simon), his President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Runciman), his Secretary for Scotland (Mr. Tennant), and his Chief Whip (Mr. Gulland).

Labour polled in the aggregate nearly 2,500,000 votes, but failed to secure a proportionate number of seats in the new Parliament. Still, it succeeded in strengthening its representation by securing the return of 63 of its



MR. EDWARD SHORTT.
Chief Secretary for Ireland 1918.

candidates. As only 28 non-Coalition Liberals were returned, Labour became, next to the Coalition, the strongest British combination in

the House of Commons. Mr. Barnes, Mr. Hodge, Mr. Roberts, and the other Labour Ministers who stood by the Coalition in the most critical phases of the war were elected by huge majorities. Defeat, however, was the portion of Mr. Arthur Henderson, who had left the Coalition as the result of the Stockholm controversy, and of the five acknowledged "pacifists" among the Labour members of the last Parliament, including Mr. Snowden and Mr. Ramsay Maedonald. Their rejection

Party, standing on a separatist and Republican programme, swept the Roman Catholic parts of Ireland, and left the Nationalists with only six seats in the whole country, of which five were in Ulster. Mr. Dillon was defeated by Mr. de Valera, and Sinn Fein obtained 73 of the 105 Irish seats. Sir Edward Carson and his followers strengthened their position in Ulster, and secured 25 seats. Only one of the 17 women candidates was elected—Madame Markiewicz, the Sinn Feiner. There was a



COUNTING VOTES AT THE TOWN HALL, CHELSEA,

In the first Election open to women voters and officials.

was decisive, and their fate was shared by all the Liberal members of the "pacifist" group who ventured to submit their record to the constituencies. The net result of the election for Labour, however, was a considerable gain of ground in the industrial districts generally. Seats were captured in the Midlands, in the Yorkshire coalfield, in Lancashire, in the Scottish Lowlands, and in South Wales. The miners' candidates did particularly well, 25 being returned.

The Irish contests were fought on quite different issues from those in Great Britain, but the results were equally significant. The Sinn Fein

much larger number of independent candidates than at any previous election, but only four were returned. Lloyd George, no weakness in the making of the peace, an end of party divisions, and no Bolshevism—these were accepted as the chief verdicts of the General Election.

No sooner had Mr. Lloyd George returned from his successful appeal to the country than he set about reconstructing his Government. When the official list of appointments appeared, early in the New Year, there was keen disappointment among those who had hoped for a

drastic overhauling of the Ministry to adapt it to the new phase of the national effort which had set in with the close of hostilities. It was found that little had been attempted beyond a redistribution of the *personnel* of the old Ministry. Very little new blood was introduced. A newcomer to the House of Commons, Sir Robert Horne, was appointed Minister of Labour. He had a distinguished record as a war administrator; after serving as Director of the Admiralty Labour Department, he became Third Civil Lord of the Admiralty in the closing months of the war. Mr. Andrew Weir, who took over the Ministry of Munitions with a view to merging it into a new Ministry of Supply, was one of the Glasgow business men who made their mark in Whitehall during the war; he did valuable work at the War Office as Surveyor-General of Supply. He became a peer under the title of Lord Inverforth. The most striking extra-Parliamentary appointment was that of Sir S. P. Sinha as Under-Secretary for India. The first Indian to become a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, he was a member of the first Imperial War Cabinet, and was the first Indian to become a member of the Imperial Government. His appointment at this stage was a peculiarly significant step. It was clearly intended to be an earnest of the determination of the Imperial Government to build a permanent structure of Indian constitutional reform upon the proposals of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The new Under-Secretary was made a peer under the title of Lord Sinha.

Of the more strictly political appointments, the most widely discussed were the transference of Mr. Churchill to the War Office and the elevation of Sir F. E. Smith to the Wool-sack. Some controversy was aroused by the decision that Mr. Churchill should be Secretary of State for Air as well as Secretary of State for

War. He took with him as Under-Secretary for Air Major-General Seely, one of Mr. Asquith's War Ministers, who had an honourable record of fighting service in France. The appointment of so young a man as Sir F. E. Smith to the great office of Lord Chancellor was criticized both on political and legal grounds. He was succeeded as Attorney-General by Sir Gordon Hewart. Sir Ernest Pollock, who had rendered good service to the Government during the war in unravelling the technicalities of the blockade as Chairman of the Contraband Committee, became Solicitor-General. Mr. Bonar Law ceased to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was succeeded by Mr. Austen Chamberlain. Mr. Walter Long became First Lord of the Admiralty in succession to Sir Eric Geddes, who was designated as first Minister of Ways and Communications. Mr. Shortt, a good House of Commons man, was the new Home Secretary, and his place as Chief Secretary for Ireland was taken by Mr. Ian Macpherson, probably the most industrious Under-Secretary the War Office ever had. There could have been no more correct appointment than that of Lord Milner as Colonial Secretary; it was one of the clear cases of the right man in the right place. Sir Auckland Geddes and Dr. Addison exchanged offices, the former becoming Minister of Reconstruction and the latter President of the Local Government Board. There was a new Minister of Pensions in Sir L. Worthington Evans, who did well in the old Parliament as Minister of Blockade. Of the four Labour members of the old Government who remained, Mr. Barnes kept his seat in the War Cabinet and Mr. George Roberts took charge of the Food Ministry. The War Cabinet system was continued a little longer, and the view was widely held that the arrangements generally would have to be reviewed and revised after the signing of the Treaty of Peace.



CHAPTER CCLXXXVI.

THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE (AUGUST, 1914—DECEMBER, 1917).

THE CAUSES OF OUR UNPREPAREDNESS—OUR ORIGINAL PLANS OF CAMPAIGN—HOW THEY MIS CARRIED—THE BATTLES OF LE CATEAU AND THE MARNE—THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES—THE PREMATURE OFFENSIVES OF 1915—THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME—EAST AND WEST—THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF 1917—ATTACKS ON PASSCHENDAELE CRITICIZED—THE PLACE OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI IN THE WAR—SUMMARY.

IN former chapters of this History the story of the British campaigns in France up to the spring of 1918 has been told in their detail. It may now be helpful to omit the detail and to review these campaigns in perspective one with the other and with the general course of the war, to attempt a general estimate of the military situation from time to time, and while indicating faults to appreciate the magnitude of the achievement. The subject is a vast one, equal in its complication and its scope to the sum total of all the campaigns ever waged by the British Army before this war, and, however general the treatment, the whole ground cannot be covered in a single chapter. In this chapter it is proposed to carry the review down to December, 1917—to the eve of our greatest trial which was, later in the year, to become the high noon-tide of our triumph.

The future historian, when he surveys the military organization of this country just before the outbreak of the war, will wonder at the confidence, not to say temerity, with which the country entered on the stupendous struggle. The war did not come upon the Government as a surprise, for its possibility had been foreseen since 1906, when the first military conversations took place between French and British representatives. How

came it, then, that our preparations were so wildly inadequate to the task? What were our calculations that we should think that an army of 400,000 men—150,000 Regulars and 250,000 Territorials, and these last not ready to take the field until six months after their embodiment—would be competent to a task for which six million men barely sufficed? And what was the nature of the plans that were discussed in the Anglo-French military conversations that failed by so much to come near to the military realities?

The reasons for preparations so inadequate were, as was to be expected, mainly political. The Government which came into power in 1906 was not a homogeneous political body, but an uneasy fit-together of the Whig and the Radical elements of the Liberal Party. The issue of Free Trade and Protection had arrested the development of Liberalism and had produced a political throw-back to mid-Victorian politics and to the old Manchester school of non-intervention in European wars, and of reduction in our military and naval armaments. But the Whig element in the Cabinet had no prejudice now, any more than in the past, against intervention in Europe. It was convinced, and rightly, that under certain circumstances intervention would be necessary in our national interests, but, conscious of its com-



MR. ASQUITH'S CALL TO DUTY AT THE GUILDHALL, SEPTEMBER, 5, 1914.
The scene at the close of his speech.

parative weakness in the Cabinet, and also at that time in the constituencies, which had been swept by a reaction against the Imperialism of Mr. Chamberlain, it never revealed the whole of its mind to the country, but on the contrary tried to minimize its differences with the preponderating partner in the Whig-Radical coalition. The proposal to hold military conversations in view of the contingency of war was first made by the French just before the General Election of 1906, and the only members of the Cabinet who were privy to these conversations (besides the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary)

were Lord Haldane and Mr. Asquith. The Cabinet as a whole remained in ignorance of them for four years, and the House of Commons heard of them for the first time on August 3, 1914. With all this artificial ignorance of the real state of our military obligations, it was impossible that there should be any rational public discussion of how they were to be met when the time came, or any real preparation of the public mind for the dangers that lay ahead. The Whig members of the Cabinet who began and maintained this policy of secrecy took a heavy responsibility upon themselves—a responsibility to which they

were not equal, and since the war Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith have all suffered loss of reputation in consequence of this ambiguity of their position. The ablest defence put forward of their policy was that made by Lord Haldane. His view was that at any rate up to 1912 or 1913 there was a chance of maintaining friendly relations with Germany, or at any rate of avoiding war, and he maintained that publicity would have wrecked this chance and played into the hands of the war party. But it might have had the opposite effect of deterring the enemy from beginning war; for what decided the enemy to strike was his belief, first, that we should not come into the war; and secondly, that even if we did, our military preparations were so backward that we could not develop them in time to exercise any real effect on the war. The first belief was encouraged by the manifest reluctance of the Government to enlighten the people on the real drift of our foreign policy; the second, by the grossly inadequate military preparations that we were making to play our part in a great war.

These political causes of our unpreparedness cannot be omitted from the survey because they had a direct effect on our military preparations. It would seem almost a commonplace that, if we were to play a worthy part in a war on the continent of Europe, we must ourselves, like our enemies, enlist the whole manhood of the country. That was the real motive of the agitation for universal service headed by Lord Roberts, though even he did not avow it so clearly as he might have done. But Lord Haldane, being ostensibly committed to a policy of friendship with Germany, not only could not admit the necessity of universal service but was driven to argue against it. What preparations, then, did he make against a danger which no one realized more clearly than himself? In the first place, he did a very valuable work of reorganization at the War Office. It was he who gave us for the first time in our history a real General Staff on the continental model. When everything has been said against the British conduct of the war, it must be admitted that the War Office, on the whole, did its work more efficiently than any other Department of State; and if the best brains of the Staff had not been taken away at the outbreak of war to commands in the field, this superiority would have been even more manifest than it was. In the second

place, Lord Haldane transformed the old Volunteer Force into the Territorial Force. It was a great addition to our military strength, but it was based on the fallacy that the war would stand still for six or more months until the Territorials had completed their training on embodiment. Yet, if there is one principle to which the continental system was more attached than another, it was precisely this—that wars must be short. Germany believed in wars that paid; and wars under a system of universal service that were to pay must be short. Waiting was what she could not afford; and yet the British preparations for war were



VISCOUNT HALDANE K.T.
Secretary of State for War, 1905-12; originator of
the Territorial Force.

based on the theory that she would, or, at any rate, could, be kept waiting. In fact, she was kept waiting, but at a cost to the Allies in life and treasure vastly greater than it need have been had our preparations been adequate. In his last dispatch Field-Marshal Haig discusses the causes which led to the ruinous prolongation of the war, and he gives a prominent place to the fact that "our armies were unable to intervene, either at the outset of the war or until nearly two years had elapsed, in sufficient strength adequately to assist our Allies." He continues:—

"The enemy was able to gain a notable initial advantage by establishing himself in Belgium and Northern France, and throughout the war was free to concentrate an undue proportion of his effectives against France and Russia. The excessive burden thrown upon the gallant army of France during this period caused them heavy losses, the effect of which has been felt all through the war, and directly influenced its length. Just as at no time were we as an Empire able to put our own full strength into the field, so at no time were the Allies as a whole able completely to develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly superior man power. What might have been the effect of British intervention on a larger scale in the earlier stages of the war is shown by what was actually achieved by our original Expeditionary Force."

Throughout the whole of this chapter we shall constantly be running against confirmation and illustration of these words. And the main cause of this insufficient preparation, which was responsible for the prolongation of the war, was the ambiguity of our political position in the eight years that preceded the war. And, it may be added, the chief support of that ambiguity was the secrecy maintained for two years from the outer Cabinet and for nearly eight years from Parliament, and all the time from the people.

But what were the military calculations which induced Lord Haldane and his advisers to think that the preparations that were made might be adequate to the task? The subject matter of the early military conversations with France is not likely to be revealed in detail, and for our knowledge of them we must use the reflected light of subsequent events. One prime cause of error on our side was an over-estimate of the strength and efficiency of the French Army compared with the German. The

view was widely held amongst those who were studying Continental military developments that the German Army was suffering from the effects of over-training, that it lacked originality, and that in conflict with the French it might succumb as the post-Frederician army did to Napoleon. And, indeed, had the French Army been organized on genuinely national ideas and given free play to the genius of the nation, it is possible that these calculations might have been justified early in the war, as they were to some extent later. Unfortunately, the French, instead of developing what Jaurès (no bad critic of military matters) called the national French school of strategy and tactics, were content to borrow German ideas. They adapted the German cult of the initial offensive and in their strategical plans staked too much on the success of an offensive in Lorraine, for which their resources and organization at the beginning of the war were wholly inadequate. But an even more potent source of error was the British belief before the war that we could engage in continental war on what may be called the "colonial" scale, and that we could limit our liability to what our professional army (backed by reserves of Territorials) could cope with. This idea governed the British preparations before the war, persisted after the war, and led to the postponement of the compulsory service which was really inevitable from the first if the war was to be ended in a reasonable time.

What the exact plan of operations was at the beginning of the war has not been divulged, but it may be presumed to have been on some such lines as these: (1) The Germans were expected to invade Belgium and to enter France by the valley of the Meuse; to this the main reply was to be a French offensive into Lorraine. (2) The French Army in the north was to contain the Germans until the effects of the offensive in Lorraine had manifested themselves. (3) The Belgians were to delay the German advance as long as possible but to decline a general engagement, and to maintain their armies intact at Namur and in advance of Antwerp. (4) The British Army was to supply the link between the Belgians based on Antwerp and the French in the Meuse Valley. Each section of this general plan miscarried. The Germans invading Belgium made a wider sweep to the west than was thought likely, and severed the link between the Belgian Army of the coast and the British. The French offensive into



FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT FRENCH.

Commanded the British Forces in France from the outbreak of war until December, 1915.

Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces stationed in the United Kingdom, 1915-18.

Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1918.

Lorraine was a disastrous failure; and owing to this failure, and to the unexpectedly rapid fall of Namur, the French on the Belgian frontier had to retreat to the south and the British Army to retreat with it and become an army for the defence of Paris and its approaches, not, as had been planned, the link between the French and the Belgians and the centre of an Allied army operating from Flanders and

threatening the flank of the German communications.

The part played by the British Army in these early days was a very honourable one, but not so decisive as the British people fondly imagined. Its solid contribution to the war was that it prevented the French left from being rolled up as it would otherwise certainly have been. It did for the west end



RETURN OF THE FIRST SEVEN DIVISIONS: THE CROWD AT CHARING CROSS WAITING TO WELCOME THE MEN OF MONS.

of the French front what the French defence of the Grand Couronné de Nancy did for the eastern end. When it is considered that its total strength did not exceed, if it reached, 60,000 combatants, this was a very notable achievement. Still more notable was the fact that it survived an attack and a retreat that would have destroyed any other army. Defeated though it was, it was, for its size, the best, most highly disciplined and, in some respects, the most modern and advanced in its military ideas of all the armies engaged. Stretched over a wide front, thanks to the lessons learned in the Boer War, it still maintained its front on the first day of the fighting, and its fire-tactics were superior to those of any of the Allies or of the enemy. Our victories in the Peninsula War over the French Armies are commonly said to have been due to the fire-formation of two-deep, learned in the American War of Independence, and introduced into the training of British infantry by Sir John Moore. Against any but overwhelming odds, and under reasonable strategic conditions, it would have repeated against the Germans, thanks to the same superiority of its fire-formation and musketry training, the victories over the French gained in the Peninsula War. Again, had it grasped the fact that in continental war the machine-gun was the real repository of all the military virtues of the rifle as revealed in the Boer War, its superiority

would have been still more conspicuous. In Belgium such an army, if relieved of anxiety for the safety of its flanks, could have neutralized a German Army five or even ten times its size. The opening of the war, though it was a time of great trial, certainly exhibited the virtues of a long service army at their best, and confirmed the English ideas of tactics as unmistakably as the fall of the Belgian strong places confirmed the contentions of the English school of fortification represented by writers like Lord Sydenham. Only in their artillery and air service and in the combination of both did the Germans show any superiority in military thinking. In everything else the chief fault of the English school of tactics was that it had not carried its conclusions sufficiently far.

It was largely owing to the British Army and its power of rapid recovery that Marshal Joffre was able to bring about the favourable situation for his counter-attack on the Marne. Yet the Marne was not one of the great English battles, and the part played by our army in it was less important than seems to have been expected. The Order of the Day issued by the British Commander-in-Chief before the Marne avowed our hopes quite clearly. In this Order Sir John French, after explaining the movements of the enemy, continued: "In this operation they are exposing their right flank and their line of communications to an attack by the combined French 6th Army and the

British forces. I call upon the British Army in France to show now to the enemy its power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the French 6th Army." What actually followed hardly fulfilled the hopes here expressed. The advance of the British Army was slow, although it was opposed by enemy forces that had been greatly weakened by the withdrawal of units to meet the attack of the French 6th Army, and there was no very hard fighting.

German criticism of the British Army in these opening days was very severe. "If French and his subordinates had only shown a little spirit of enterprise, Kluck's situation would have been very critical." And again: "Kluck and Bülow had a very easy task with the English. Keeping at a very respectful distance the English Army advanced only to the banks of the Grand Morin, while Kluck's corps were moving back over the Marne. On the evening of the 7th the distance between the English troops and the German cavalry was fully 20 kilometres." These enemy criticisms, as will be seen presently, were not just.

Nor does the common Allied criticism of the battle that either the French 6th Army

attacked too soon or the British Army too late quite hit the situation, for it would appear that General Joffre's idea was that the British Army should not attack until the 6th Army had crossed the Oureq, and in fact it did not cross the Oureq until September 10, four days after the battle had been opened. The slowness in the development of the British advance against the slight German operation, however regrettable, was therefore in accordance with Marshal Joffre's general instructions. It is equally clear that in attacking at dawn on the 6th, Maunoury with the 6th Army was following General Joffre's Operation Orders. The likeliest explanation would seem to be that suggested by Major Whitton in his study of the Marne Battle, that the topographical data on which Joffre's instructions were based were out of date by the time the battle was opened. Von Kluck's tactics were very masterly, but his was one mind against two minds—Maunoury's and French's—and these working on instructions rendered out of date by the enemy's movements. One subordinate command may know when to disregard orders, but not two commands imperfectly co-ordinated one with the other.



RETURN OF THE FIRST SEVEN DIVISIONS.

The men of Mons on their way to the Albert Hall, where they were entertained, December 15, 1917.

The plain fact is that, apart from faults that lay rather with the Generalissimo and his staff, the Allied attack suffered from the defects inseparable from a military coalition before it has been hammered into unity. Sir John French was operating under wholly different conditions from any which he had conceived as likely; and, as was only to be expected



[Russell.]

GENERAL SIR HENRY RAWLINSON,
K.C.B.

Commanded the 7th Division in 1914.

under these conditions, he felt it his duty to follow instructions more closely than he would otherwise have done. He is certainly not lacking in initiative, and under normal circumstances no one could be trusted to know better when to disregard orders in order to attain the desired end. It is possible, too, that the British Army, though it had recovered rapidly from the retreat, was still somewhat shaken, and lacked its normal self-confidence; and for that the battle of Le Cateau on the third day of the retreat from Mons was chiefly responsible. It need not, and should not, have been fought, for after the decision to evacuate the Mons position the one essential was to withdraw the army intact until the opportunity presented itself of renewing the fighting under more favourable conditions. In attempting to stand at Le Cateau, General Smith-Dorrien was not only acting against the orders of Sir John French, but impairing the offensive power

of the army for the decisive action that was to come later. If, therefore, the British Army did not take a decisive part in the battle of the Marne, some part of the blame must be shared by General Smith-Dorrien for fighting at Le Cateau instead of retreating as Sir Douglas Haig so successfully did on the other flank. Another criticism of the British Army on the Marne that would appear to be justified is that the cavalry played a smaller part than one would have expected in a battle fought in comparatively open country still untrenched.

The Aisne battle, admirably fought by the British Army, was really the first battle of the trench war, and it might have been better if this battle, too, had never been fought, for its chief positive result was to show that the Allied Armies, and especially the British, which was so much the smaller and therefore for the time being the more precious to us, would only be wasted in attacks on entrenched positions. Sir John French realized that, and his natural instinct was for an open war of manoeuvre. The German system of trenches was at present only local; not only did they not extend to the sea, but in Belgium the Belgian Army was still in being. After the failure to accomplish on the Marne all that had been hoped for from the attack on the German flank, the natural sequel would have been to attempt a similar movement farther back on the German flank where the circumstances might be expected to be more favourable. Sir John French had other reasons, too, for wanting to transfer his army into Flanders. He would there be in a position of greater independence and free to develop his military ideas. Further, there was a chance by this means of reverting to the original plan of campaign under which the British Army was to serve as the link between the French and the Belgians, and to develop an attack on the communications of the invading army. And lastly, only so was there any chance of saving the Belgian coast from German occupation and of taking advantage of the obvious blunder of the enemy in not occupying the Belgian and French coasts before. Sir John French foresaw that the enemy would attempt to rectify this mistake, and he was anxious to forestall him.

Such were the simple military motives which led to the transference of the British Army from the Aisne to Flanders and to the first battle of Ypres—the most momentous in the whole of the war until the renewal of the



GENERAL JOSEPH JACQUES CÉSAIRE JOFFRE, MARSHAL OF FRANCE, G.C.B.
Chief of the French General Staff, 1914; Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, 1915-17.



THE DEFENCE OF LOUVAIN.

Belgian Infantry awaiting the approach of the enemy.

German offensive on the western front in the spring of 1918. They were, in a sentence, an attempt to exploit the German defeat on the Marne by restoring the ruins of the original plan of operations which, as already explained, had been laid down in the military conversations between England and France that had begun in 1906. Unfortunately, the delay caused by the battle of the Aisne had injured the chances of success, and already the Germans were making preparations for occupying Antwerp and the Belgian coast. There was no time to be lost if the Belgian Army was to be preserved and contact established between it and the British Army in Flanders. A scratch army was flung into Antwerp to assist in the defence, and at the same time General Rawlinson with the 7th Division was landed on the coast of Belgium to help fill up the gap between the army of Antwerp and the British Army under Sir Douglas Haig advancing towards Ypres.

The Germans, too, were hurried in their preparations. Their troops were badly trained, and at no time in the war was their tactical handling so bad as in these early operations in Flanders—in the “Battle of Calais,” as the Germans called them. The first battle of Ypres

was the last and greatest of the victories won by the “Old Contemptibles,” and it was a victory for the rifle, and like all rifle victories was very costly in life to the defeated. Artillery victories break down the *moral* of an enemy, but there is no destruction of an army so deadly as that done by well-directed rifle fire. In other arms the Germans were then our superiors, but the rifle won against them all and against overwhelming numerical odds. But the strategic results of the first campaign in Flanders were not what either side had hoped for. The Germans failed to gain possession of the Narrows and we retained possession of the shortest sea-route between England and France. On the other hand our expedition to Antwerp paid the penalty for the insufficient training and equipment of the troops engaged, and General Rawlinson’s army which was intended to fill up the gap between Sir Douglas Haig’s army and the Belgians at Antwerp had to be content with covering the retreat of the remnants of the Belgian Army to the Yser. The whole of the Belgian coast to a point between Ostend and Nicuport was lost. We established a continuous Allied line running from the Aisne to

the coast but, on the other hand, failed to gain a position on the flank of the enemy in Belgium and menacing his communications. The man in the street saw very clearly that in winning some such flanking position as this lay our best chance of defeating the enemy soon in the west, and that is why the legend of the Russian Army passing through England on the way to Belgium gained such amazingly wide acceptance. These mythical Russians were a pathetic popular substitution for an army of our own, which might have existed if we had made proper preparations in peace time, but in fact did not. At no time in the war did British interests suffer so much from our army's lack of numbers as in the months between the battle of the Marne and the end of 1914. A well-equipped army of 250,000 men landed on the coast of Belgium at this time would have brought the end of the war within sight. The enemy knew that such an army did not and could not exist, but for all that the bare thought of it seems to have troubled his dreams. At the beginning of the disgraceful sack of Louvain there were German soldiers running panic-stricken through the streets crying, "Die Engländer kommen."

These rumours were phantom fears, but it must be remembered that at this time the German hold on Belgium was exceedingly insecure, and the danger may have seemed real enough.

At the end of 1914, it was obvious that the whole plan of campaign with which the war had begun was in ruins and past restoration. The trench war had begun to be systematized, and victory was only to be had in it by the expenditure of effort which hitherto had been undreamt of. Up to now we had disguised in various ways from ourselves the fact that if we were to take part in a continental war we should have to adopt continental methods, raise men by compulsion, and give the whole energy and resources of the nation to the prosecution of the war. We had exaggerated the military strength of France and Russia; but the hope based on those false estimates had disappeared with the failure of the French offensive into Lorraine and with Tannenberg. Then we had hoped to gain such a strong strategic position on the German flank in Belgium that we could make a small army cooperating with the Belgians do the work of an army many times its size; and that hope,



THE BRITISH LANDING IN BELGIUM: MARINES MARCHING THROUGH OSTEND

too, disappeared with the fall of Antwerp and the battle of Ypres. Further, the German trench system was obviously of enormous strength, and it now extended from the sea to the Alps, and did not admit of being turned from the land. By the end of 1914, what Sir Douglas Haig calls in his last dispatch the "preliminary stage" of the western campaign was now over. In this stage the "opposing forces seek to deploy and manœuvre for position, endeavouring while doing so to gain some early advantage, which might be pushed home to quick decision." In this preliminary stage neither side won; the result was a strategic deadlock on the western front, to endure until means were found for breaking through the lines of continuous fortification which now extended from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Two alternatives now began to present themselves with unmistakable clearness. Did we wish to maintain the old idea with which we started the war, of waging it with a comparatively small army as our ancestors had fought with Napoleon? In that case it was obvious that there was no hope for us in France and Belgium. The only possible war on the

familiar old "colonial" model would be combined military and naval operations which should avoid the frontal attacks on the German flanks in France and Belgium and find a "way round" either by an expedition to the Prussian coast in the Baltic or by the capture of Constantinople. Did we, on the other hand, insist on defeating the Germans on ground of their own choosing and fortifying in France and Belgium? In that case, having gone to the continent we must do as the continent did. We must turn ourselves into a continental military power, adopt compulsion, and apply not only our whole fighting material but our whole industrial resources to the prosecution of the war. These alternatives were never clearly faced, and the refusal to act wholeheartedly on one or other of them led to much waste of life, energy and time. Let us examine the alternatives a little more closely.

Of the two ways round, that by the Baltic had the support of Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord. He proposed to enter the Baltic, drive the German fleet off the seas and, landing an expeditionary force of British and Russians, to force the Germans to fight on a new northern



RECRUITING UNDER THE VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT SYSTEM.
Swearing-in a Recruit in Trafalgar Square.



[Official British Film.]

TRENCH WARFARE: ROUTING GERMANS FROM DUG-OUTS.

front, thus bringing about the withdrawal of the German troops then attacking Poland, and also reducing the strength of the German invading armies in occupation of France. The general strategic ideas were simple, but its execution presented great difficulties, mainly of a naval order. Moreover, it was objected that if we could land on the north coast of Germany we could land on the coast of Belgium, and thus in effect turn the sea end of the German lines in Flanders. The plan was accordingly dropped.

For the other plan, of attacking Constantinople, there was much to be said. Not only, if it were successful, would it cut off the whole of Asiatic Turkey from support, render it an easy prey to our attacks, and remove the pressure on Egypt; but it would rally the whole of South-Eastern Europe to our side, and by bringing our sea power to the help of Russia enable her to redouble her efforts against Austria and force Germany to draw men off from France to protect her threatened southern front. The attractions of this idea were very great, and once conceived it could not be left alone. But it was taken up in a half-hearted way, which not only gave no help, but led to our worst single failure in the whole war.

The opposition to the Dardanelles enterprise arose out of two causes. Lord Kitchener felt uncertain of our ability to hold our positions

in Flanders and he was most reluctant to spare troops for an enterprise which, however attractive, might expose us to the risk of losing the Narrows. Further, the army in France, which could find so much use for men, grudged them to enterprises which, though they might be attractive, were not in its opinion relevant to the chief business in hand. And thus began the rivalry between the Easterners and the Westerners, which in one form or another persisted down to the last year of the war. Broadly speaking, we may say that the eastern school represented what may be called the "colonial" tradition in our military ideas—the tradition, first solidified by the elder Pitt, which insisted that the proper sphere for our army was in enterprises of limited military liability based on the possession of naval power. The western school represented the new continental idea. Between these two schools Mr. Asquith's Government hesitated, straddled, and finally fell.

The rivalry between the two schools might, however, have been adjusted earlier than it was, for there was one obvious way in which they could be reconciled. The preparation of the army in France for its great task of forcing the enemy's entrenched positions was, clearly, one that would take a long time. Why, then, should the period of waiting not be filled with a campaign against the Turk, who was less



LILLE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR.

well organized for war and held a key-position in the enemy's system of defence against which our sea power could be employed with advantage? A formal campaign against the heart of the Ottoman Empire postulated that we could sustain a defensive policy in France and Belgium for a couple of years until we were ready to take the offensive in the west. Let it be granted that victory in the west was only to be attained by the offensive. We clearly were not in a position to maintain an offensive both on the eastern and the western fronts, but had to choose between one and the other. Was not our best policy to lie low on the west until we had brought our army from an insular to a continental standard alike in numbers and equipment, and to concentrate whatever offensive energy we had to spare against Turkey, or rather (for this was what an offensive against Constantinople really meant) against Austria, the weaker member of the hostile alliance, and in support of Russia which was suffering through not enjoying, as France did, the assistance of our sea power? From that point of view there was no real opposition between the Eastern and Western strategy except in times. Both schools might be right, but each in its own time—the eastern strategy earlier because in Turkey defeat of

the enemy was well within our compass; the western policy later, when we had brought our numbers up to the continental standard. Why was this obvious compromise missed? The answer is that the army in France did not realize that the war at the end of 1914 had entered on an entirely new phase, and that victory was only to be had by our revising all our military ideas and embarking on a continental system of warfare with all that that implied, but thought that it was still possible to break through the enemy's lines in France without conscription of man-power and of industrial power. For this blunder the politicians who were reluctant to acknowledge the breakdown of the calculations with which they had begun the war were mainly responsible. But military miscalculations also contributed to it.

Sir John French believed in 1915 that it was still possible to break through the enemy's lines by manoeuvre. The key of the whole enemy position in Flanders was still, to his mind, Lille, and the key of Lille was the crossing of the Lys at Menin. He had been bitterly disappointed that General Rawlinson and the 7th Division had not occupied Menin during the retreat from the Belgian coast to Ypres, and he still thought that a comparatively small advance on our part might put us in a position from

which we might recover the possession of the Belgian coast and outflank the enemy's lines of communication. Hence the offensives of 1915 and the battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos. Both battles had the same object, though they sought to attain it in different ways. Neuve Chapelle, had it developed as was intended, would have turned the German positions at Lille from the Aubers Ridge on the north side; Loos would have turned them from the south side. Neither battle attained its object. Both underestimated the power of resistance of a heavily entrenched position backed by well disposed reserves of troops, and the ability of well-placed machine-gun emplacements to hold up an attack made even in overwhelming numbers until the counter-attack could develop, and (what was still more important) both underestimated the time that was required to make a modern army, and forgot that it was easier to develop the muscle than the brain-power of an army. Our army at this time was like a man with a sound constitution who had lived a sedentary life and wished for good reasons to get rapidly into training so as to meet and defeat the local bruiser. Such a man finds it an easy matter to add to his biceps and to increase the pound-pressure per square inch that

he can put into a blow. But there is all the difference between the physical products of such concentrated training and of natural growth. Such a man is likely to develop a weak heart, because his circulatory system does not keep pace with his muscular development as is the case when growth is natural and not forced. So it was with the British Army in 1915. It was growing in size the whole time; but its staff organization was still faulty and it was not able to make the best use of its new physical strength. Neuve Chapelle made a great noise at the time, but it was, judged by later standards, very little more than an exaggerated raid, a short-winded affair which broke down early from sheer inexperience on the part of the General Staff in the art of exploiting an initial success. Loos was a much more ambitious effort, and had the energy of the Scottish Territorial regiments against Hill 60 been properly supported it might have yielded very important strategic results. But the British Army at this time had neither the material nor the intellectual equipment to sustain a successful offensive against German entrenched positions which every day saw made stronger. The tactics of both offensives would have been suited to the preliminary stages of



CONSTANTINOPLE.

the war in which defensive positions were fluid, or to a period in which the enemy had used up all his reserves, but that stage had now been passed and been succeeded by a war of fortified positions with elaborately organized reserves to stop any local breach. The characteristics of this second stage are well described by Sir Douglas Haig in his last dispatch. After describing how the preliminary stage came to an end with the creation of a continuous trench system from the Swiss frontier to the sea, he continues: "Battle having been joined, there follows the period of real struggle in which the main armies of the two belligerents are pitted against each other in close and costly combat. Each commander seeks to wear down the power of resistance of his opponent, and to pin him to his position, while preserving or accumulating in his own hands a powerful reserve force with which he can manœuvre, and when signs of the enemy becoming morally and physically weakened are observed, deliver the decisive blow." There were no such signs as yet. How came Sir John French to think that he saw them, and even to encourage hopes, which undoubtedly influenced the Prime Minister, that the enemy's lines might be broken and the war over before the end of 1915?

Sir John French was not alone in this error,

for the French were attacking all through the year, and though the scale of their attacks round Arras and in Champagne was greater than ours their success was not, proportionately to their losses, any greater. The truth would seem to be that the French were impatient—naturally impatient—seeing that it was their land that was invaded—and wished to hurry the ejection of the enemy. This impatience also infected our own leaders, the more so as there was a tendency amongst the French to reproach us with excessive deliberation. "They make war as men who do not know what it is to have the enemy in their own country," was the burden of many French comments on our efforts at this time. But the main reason for the hurry in advance of our real capacity was that neither statesmen nor soldiers in England quite understood all that was implied by the task of making ourselves a continental military power. It meant something more even than enlisting the whole adult manhood of the country. It meant the complete disappearance of the old distinction between civilian and soldier, and the conversion of the whole industrial resources of the country to military uses. After the failure of the attack on the Aubers Ridge an agitation was raised against the Government for its neglect to provide our army with high-explosive shells;



INTERIOR OF A FRENCH SHELL FACTORY.



MEN OF THE LATER DERBY GROUPS LEARNING MUNITION-MAKING IN A LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL MUNITIONS SCHOOL.

but the provision of shells, though of the utmost importance, was only part of the problem. Nothing less was required than the complete mobilization of the industry of the country for the purpose of the war, and this was the object that was sought to be attained by the creation of the Munitions Ministry under Mr. Lloyd George. The formula now adopted for victory was that we should "blast our way through" the enemy's lines. It was not until the following year that approximate equality over the enemy in weight of artillery was established, and, though there was no one military prescription that could ensure victory, it was useless our tackling the problem of breaking the enemy's lines with the marked inferiority in artillery under which our army laboured during 1915. The Germans used to maintain that it took a generation to create a real General Staff, but though we did it in less than that time the brain of the army could not be forced in its development beyond a certain pace. On the other hand, the mechanical side of military efficiency was mainly a question of machinery, and in 1915, largely as a result

of the agitation of the spring, the conditions were established under which superiority could be looked forward to as likely in the future.

Apart from the munitions agitation and the offensives of Neuve Chapelle and Loos—both premature and in some respects mismanaged—this second year of the war was notable for the preliminary success gained by the enemy's use of gas against the Ypres salient, for the crushing defeats suffered by the Russians in Galicia, for the complete breakdown of our military and diplomatic policy in the East, and for the retirement of Sir John French from the position of Commander-in-Chief in favour of Sir Douglas Haig, who held it until the end of the war. Our reverses in South-eastern Europe and the defeats of the Russians went far to justify the contention of the Easterners that for the present, until we could establish a real superiority over the enemy in France, our best policy was to concentrate our efforts in Eastern Europe, and there are very few people now who would maintain that Neuve Chapelle and Loos were any compensation for the defeats suffered by



THE DIVISION ON THE THIRD READING OF THE MILITARY SERVICE BILL (KNOWN AS THE COMPULSION BILL).
January 24, 1916.

our arms in Gallipoli—defeats that might very easily have been victories if our army in France had been content to postpone its offensive until there was a reasonable prospect of success, and which would have assisted the Russians far more than anything that we were able at this time to do in France. Sir John French made way for Sir Douglas Haig not so much on account of faults in leadership—Loos was in many respects one of the worst of our battles in its Staff work though one of the finest in the conduct of the rank and file—as because he failed to see that the war had entered on a new stage, that the days of victory by manœuvre were past, and that victory in the West was only to be had by entirely new methods, by the patient accumulation of an army comparable in numbers and in mechanical equipment to those of the enemy, and by improvement in the Staff work. The methods of colonial war were now an anachronism. We had to become a great military power in the continental sense or lose the war. A great victory in the East and the opening of the Dardanelles might conceivably have saved us from this necessity by enabling Russia to arm her millions and make more effectual use of their undoubted zeal and devotion. But after the evacuation of Gallipoli and the over-running of Serbia, conscription alike of human and industrial energy became clearly inevitable.

With the accession of Sir Douglas Haig to the command our military activities in the West took a new direction. After helping to save Paris and to defeat the German ambition of overwhelming the French field armies by a super-Sedan, Sir John French had devoted most of his energy to Flanders. He recognized that Lille was the key of the German hold on Belgian Flanders and the coast, and he thought that by sudden concentration at one point he might gain positions from which he could manœuvre the enemy out of his defences and so gain the coveted position on his flank. These efforts failed, as did the French attacks in Champagne. The new policy was quite different. Instead of attacking separately and independently, the French and British Armies were to attack side by side, and the centre of the new attack was to be made at the point of juncture between the two armies on the Somme. It was further decided that this attack should not be delivered until the new British Armies had reached their full strength, no matter how great the temptation might be to move before.

Enough losses had been incurred already by premature attack; this time we should wait till we were ready. This resolve was, rightly, steadily adhered to in spite of the desperate character of the German attacks at Verdun and the alarming progress that they made. But the attack once begun was to be continued remorselessly in the hope that the cumulative losses of the enemy would exhaust his endurance and give us the chance of effecting a real rupture in his lines. Strategic manœuvre, it was recognized, was out of the question, but great reliance was placed on the quality of the new army, which was composed of the flower of the country's young manhood. Moreover, our early deficiencies in artillery had been made good, and on the front chosen for attack we were perhaps the enemy's superior in the weight of metal. Our air service, too, had been improved, and when the attack was opened—in July, 1916—and until the end of the year it was much better than the enemy's. The measures of compulsion were about to take effect, and the second of those measures, extending compulsion to married men, was passed in May, and came into operation on June 24. We had ceased to fight the war with our professional military arm only, and were at last working with both hands for victory.

The Somme battle was the greatest effort that our army had ever made in its history, and the longest continued offensive that any army had ever attempted even in this war. The first German offensive in France had exhausted itself in three months, and though the German attacks on Russia lasted longer they were spread over a much wider area and encountered nothing like the same resistance. Moreover, there the warfare was open. This Somme battle lasted almost continuously, except for a break at the end of July, for seven months, and it was confined within an area of not more than 20 miles square. As a sheer display of elemental energy it had never been equalled in history, and it would, one is proud to think, have been possible for no army in the world but ours. Yet in the main object for which it was fought the battle was a failure. We did not break the German lines, and never looked like breaking them; and except on the Ancre in the closing stages of the battle there was at no time any evidence of demoralization in the enemy. His losses were heavy, but ours were in all probability heavier; and though a considerable amount of ground was

gained in the battle it was not ground that jeopardized the enemy's system of defence; indeed, he was able at the end of the battle to present us with a great deal more ground by his so-called "voluntary" retreat in the spring of 1917, and to boast that his new positions were stronger than the old. That was not a voluntary retreat, but a reluctant admission of his heavy losses. None the less, even the payment of his "deferred dividend," as it was called, on the Somme battle did not make it anything but an indecisive victory. If this was the way of victory, it was far more costly than anyone had expected. Nor were the results of the Somme battle surveyed with any more satisfaction when it was remembered what this comparatively small progress in the western theatre had cost in other parts of the world. In the autumn of 1916 Rumania entered the war was left without effectual support both by Russia and by the Allied Armies at Salonika, and was in consequence overrun by the Germans. In 1915 the attacks on the western front had given the small and unimportant successes of Neuve Chapelle and Loos; while on the debit side there were the defeats of Russia in Galicia, the disaster of the Gallipoli Expedition, and the ruin of Serbia. In 1916, the West had more to show, and the Somme, when all is said, was the first battle in France in which this country pulled its own weight. But the growing weakness of Russia and the downfall of Rumania were formidable offsets to our successes on the Somme. How far people were from being satisfied was shown by the fact that Mr. Asquith had to resign after the collapse of Rumania; and in spite of the success in the Somme battle—perhaps in consequence of the cost—people began to say that we had set ourselves an impossible task in trying to defeat the enemy on ground of his own choosing. The Eastern school distinctly gained ground in the course of the year, and the new Premier was believed by many to belong to it. At any rate he was known to be more than sceptical about our tactics in France, and to take the liveliest interest in the projects so often mooted of finding a "way round" through an attack on Austria by way of Italy or from the direction of Salonika. Also, he fully realized the importance of Turkey in the German military scheme.


On the other hand there were others who insisted that there was nothing wrong with our policy of attacking in France but only

with its methods, that we could not expect to solve at a first attempt a problem which baffled the French, with their longer military experience, no less than ourselves, and the Germans no less than the French, and that the only thing for us to do was to make good our losses, to pile up our munitions, and to improve our methods of attack. The defects in our plan of attack on the Somme were indeed obvious. In the first place, the plan of attack was on much too narrow a front. Sir Douglas Haig had planned a battle on a much wider front, and the attack on July 1 had included a great sector north of the Ancre. He had, however, been badly defeated here on the opening day of the attack, and he never renewed his efforts there. The narrowness of the battlefield, so restricted, left no room for manœuvre on a large scale, and though our minor tactics were often extremely ingenious, it was inevitable that attacks delivered within such a narrow compass should become frontal and our losses were proportionately heavy. Moreover, there was very little room for surprise. Haig might attack with his left or his right, but as the distance between them was not more than 20 miles, the chances of taking the enemy unawares were proportionately small. The Somme was in fact a soldiers' battle, and, it should be added, a mechanics' battle, for it was in this fighting that the "tanks" were first employed. No battle showed up the quality of the troops employed in so favourable a light as this seven months' struggle on the Somme.

The downfall of Rumania was the real, if not the ostensible, cause of Mr. Asquith's resignation, and it might have been expected that Mr. Lloyd George, having come into power through the failure of the western front to provide any adequate compensation for our losses on the east, would have begun by correcting the bias of our strategy. For it was no secret that Mr. Lloyd George was an Easterner of sorts, that he was appalled at the losses already suffered in the attempt to break through the German lines in France, and the still heavier losses that were in prospect if these attempts were continued, and that he would have preferred to these frontal attacks on the enemy's strong places a "way round." But circumstances were too strong for him. With the evacuation of Gallipoli, the ruin of Serbia, and the over-running of Rumania, the best chances of reaching decisive results in



IN THE SOMME BATTLE: THE ATTACK, UNDER HEAVY BOMBARDMENT, ON THE SCHWABEN REDOUBT,
OCTOBER 12, 1916.



A TANK IN THE MAKING.
Women painting the interior.

the East had disappeared. Only Italy and Salonika remained, and in both places there were great difficulties in the way of a serious expedition that would influence the course of the war.

To wait until Rumania had been overwhelmed and then begin to attack Bulgaria from Salonika would have been a military perversity difficult to explain, even if the shortage of shipping had not put serious obstacles in the way of fresh overseas expeditions. The Italian plan had great attractions for the new Premier, and he is believed at one time to have suggested that General Nivelle, the new French Commander-in-Chief, should assume command of all the Allied forces in France. In that case it is probable that the command of any Anglo-French expedition from Italy into Austria would have been given to Sir Douglas Haig. Mr. Lloyd George was in very close sympathy with the French school of strategy. He was afraid that the Germans might attack Italy in strength at the beginning of 1917 (as they in fact did at the end of 1917), and he coquetted with the idea of anticipating such an offensive by a bold

movement along Napoleon's route to Vienna across the Carnic Alps and through Laibach. None of these projects, however, could be carried against the determined opposition of his military advisers in England, and their chief interest is as a commentary and explanation of the undoubted fact that the new Government in England was in very imperfect sympathy with the British military plans on the western front in 1917. What Mr Lloyd George did do, however, was to push forward our attacks on the Asiatic front. Baghdad fell in the autumn of 1917, and Jerusalem would have fallen at the same time if Sir Archibald Murray had insisted on the reinforcements that were required for successful operations in Judæa. These eastern campaigns, however, lie outside the survey of this chapter.

The grounds of Sir Douglas Haig's confident expectations of success in 1917 do not seem to have been very clearly defined. Undoubtedly, however, the success of the tanks in the Somme battle contributed to his hopes. In his last dispatch Sir Douglas Haig rather minimizes the importance of tanks and other mechanical contrivances. The belligerent, he writes, pos-



EVACUATION OF GALLIPOLI: THE BURNING OF STORES AT SUVLA.

As seen from H.M.S. Cornwallis.

sessing a preponderance of such mechanical contrivances has found himself in a very favourable position as compared with his less well-provided opponent, and he acknowledges the army's debt to science and to the distinguished scientific men who placed their learning and their skill at the disposal of their country. "But," he continues, "immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot by themselves decide a campaign. Their true rôle is that of assisting the infantryman, which they have done in a most admirable manner. They cannot replace him. Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won." That is the considered opinion of Sir Douglas Haig after the fighting had ceased, yet there is no doubt that the invention of the tanks must, and quite rightly, have been one of the principal causes of his confidence at the beginning of 1917. He had, moreover, great hopes of the effect of a simultaneous offensive on all the fronts by all the Allies. If Russia, Italy, France and England all attacked at once, he was convinced—and such success as he had

had on the Somme confirmed him—the German lines must break somewhere. He had discussed the plans for 1917 with General Foch, and the agreement reached was that the Anglo-French Armies should continue their attacks on the Somme until a rupture was effected, after which Sir Douglas Haig was to be free to undertake an offensive in Flanders, an enterprise which he, like Sir John French before him, regarded as the natural rôle of the British Army, and the one that promised the most far-reaching results. His mind, it will be noticed, was always harking back to the original plan of an offensive in Belgium which would put him on the German lines of communication.

It is impossible not to admire the tremendous resolution shown by Sir Douglas Haig in continuing the offensive in France after the hard six months' fighting on the Somme, or to withhold sympathy with him in the bitter disappointments of 1917. Rarely has a general had such hard luck. To begin with, General Joffre was removed from the active command of the French Army and replaced by General Nivelle, who did not share his views. Nivelle was



[Canadian War Records.]

CANADIANS ADVANCING ON VIMY RIDGE.

against the continuance of an offensive on the Somme, especially after the retreat of the enemy to the Hindenburg line in the early spring of 1917. He thought his best chance of effecting the rupture lay in the hills behind the Aisne and along the Chemin des Dames. The hinge of the whole German position in France was the mass of hills between Laon and La Fère, with their great natural glacis of the St. Gobain Forest, and he hoped, by establishing himself on the Chemin des Dames and attacking from there, to reach a position which would take this pivot of the German line from the rear. Nivelle was an ingenious soldier, and his calculations were very carefully arranged, but the substitution of this new plan for the old one arranged with Joffre was exceedingly inconvenient to Sir Douglas Haig. It meant that the British had to take over part of the lines south of the Somme hitherto held by the French. That was not all. It meant further the postponement of the offensive in Flanders on which Sir Douglas Haig had set his mind. The British attack on the Vimy Ridge, which was one of the most brilliant in the whole war, was made on April 9, and the French attack on the Aisne began a week later. The French attack was too costly to be persisted in, nor was it any part of Sir Douglas Haig's intention, after capturing the Ridge, to press his advance in that region of the Arras sector. His idea had been, after capturing the

Ridge, to begin his Flanders campaign with an assault on Messines Ridge, and afterwards to work towards the Belgian Coast from Ypres. But the breakdown of the French attacks compelled Sir Douglas Haig to persist in the assaults east of Vimy in order to give assistance to the French. The result was some of the most terrible fighting of the war and the least conclusive. "I did not consider," Sir Douglas Haig writes, "that any great strategical results were likely to be gained by following up on the front about Arras and to the south of it." Yet he was compelled to persist against his better judgment by the events on the Chemin des Dames. That was not the end of the mischief. Messines Ridge was captured on June 9 by the most gigantic and successful mining operation ever recorded in history, but it was not possible to begin the attack east of Ypres until July 31. By that time, the good weather of the year had all been used up. Sir Douglas Haig's misfortunes did not end even here. Russia, who was to have delivered simultaneous offensives against Austria, made peace instead. Nor did Italy come up to expectations. Worse still, General Nivelle, who believed in the offensive on the west, was succeeded, in consequence of the failure on the Chemin des Dames, by General Pétain, who did not. It was not that Pétain believed that the problem of breaking the German line on the west was insoluble. The time would

come, especially when America entered the war, when an attack could be delivered with better prospects of success. He could see no reason for hoping that what had failed in 1915 and 1916, when the French Army was much stronger and fresher, would have any better chance now, and his policy was to fall back on a strategical defensive until such time as there was a prospect of real superiority over the enemy. France's losses had been frightful, and, however keen the offensive spirit of her soldiers might be, there is a limit to powers of endurance beyond which it is unwise to burden the most willing horse. Thus, just at the moment when the British Army was reaching its full strength, and cooperation with the French would have given the best results, that cooperation became impossible because of the growing exhaustion of the French Army. That was a direct consequence, as Sir Douglas Haig has pointed out, of our original unpreparedness. While we were weak, the enemy was free to concentrate his efforts against France and Russia, and "the excessive burden thrown upon the gallant army of France during this period caused them losses the effect of which has been felt all through the war and directly influenced its length." At the same time Russia dropped out of the war. Thus no sooner had we become fit to take our position in continental land warfare side by side with our Allies, than our Allies, exhausted by their losses during the period of waiting, became incapable of effective cooperation with us.


What was Sir Douglas Haig to do in these circumstances? Was he to abandon his hopes for the year and wait for the next year in the hope that something better would turn up then? Was he to admit that he had been wrong—through no fault of his own—in his expectations, and that perhaps they were right who had urged that for the present at any rate the East presented the best prospects of a successful offensive, and that the western offensive was an asset that could not be realized yet? Or was he, on the contrary, to prosecute his own plans despite the fact that the French could render him no assistance in offense that counted for very much, and despite the fact that Russia had seceded from the war? It was a difficult choice, but Sir Douglas Haig made the decision that was to be expected of him, namely, to go on with his projected campaign in Flanders, even though all the French were able to do was to send a small

contingent to support him. That was the origin of the campaign east of Ypres which began on July 31, 1917.

Thus the campaign of 1917, from which so much had been hoped, resolved itself into three several and disconnected parts. The first was the capture of the Vinny Ridge and the operations to the east of it. The result of these was to bring us into touch with the Hindenburg line, or rather with the switch line running from Drocourt to Quéant.

They were important operations, all attended with exceedingly hard fighting, but, as Sir Douglas Haig feared, they carried with them no strategic rewards, but merely brought us up on the north to the Hindenburg line which we had reached on the south. The second campaign was the capture of the Messines Ridge, which again carried with it no strategic consequences. The third was the Battle of Passchendaele Ridge, east of Ypres, perhaps the hardest fighting in the whole war, and again, as it turned out, unrewarded by decisive results. "When I read of the conditions under which they fought," said the Prime Minister of this operation, "I marvel that the delicate and sensitive instrument of the human nerve and the human mind can endure them without derangement. The campaigns of Stonewall Jackson fill us with admiration and wonder, as we read how that man of iron led his troops through the mire and swamps of Virginia; but his troops were never called upon to live for days and nights in morasses under ceaseless thunderbolts from a powerful artillery, and then march into battle through an engulfing quagmire under a hail-storm of machine-gun fire."

Human beings ought not to have been put through such an ordeal, and a policy that placed such a frightful strain on the quality of the troops cannot have been the right one. It could only be justified, if at all, by success. And yet the military motives of Sir Douglas Haig are not only intelligible, but such as have every right to our sympathy. It has already been pointed out how constantly both Sir Douglas Haig and Sir John French harked back to that original plan with which the First Expeditionary Force set out; it was a magnet that was always deflecting judgment. It has been shown further that it was not the fault of the British Army that this Flanders offensive was delayed to so late in the year, or that the weather in the late summer and autumn of 1917 was almost the worst recorded. The



GENERAL PÉTAÏN.

Chief of the French General Staff, May, 1917.

water is never far below the surface of the soil in Flanders, and the bombardment of the whole countryside had made craters which joined the waters of the subsoil with the rains from the skies. Yet a further reason why Sir Douglas Haig clung with such obstinacy to this perhaps the costliest (in proportion to the results) set of operations in the whole war was that he understood it as the most promising measure of relief from the perils of the German submarine campaign, then almost at its worst.

It was thought that if we could only get command of the Belgian coast not only should we win great military advantage, such as we had coveted from the very beginning of the war, but we should make easier the task of the navy in coping with the German submarines which made use of the Belgian ports. The real answer to the German use of these ports for their submarines was from the sea, as Sir Roger Keyes showed later; but it was not for a soldier to suggest plans of action at sea

which did not occur even to naval men until comparatively late in the war. Moreover, desperate as the whole enterprise seems to us now, in the light of what is known about the state of the ground, it may well have seemed feasible at the time. The fighting on the Somme began only a month earlier than the attacks east of Ypres and they were interrupted by an interval of nearly six weeks between the end of July and the resumption of the operations in September. Yet they gave us in the end a gain of territory nearly 30 miles across. A very much smaller gain would have given us everything that we wanted in Belgium. Seen from Ypres, the Passchendaele Ridge of which we heard so much is no more than a slight undulation of the ground; yet under normal conditions of weather it would have enabled us to make the coast plain untenable by the enemy. Even as it was, the progress of our advance and the furious determination with which it was pressed caused the Germans grave anxiety. In the middle of the attacks, von Kùhnnann was at pains publicly to renounce German political ambitions in Belgium, and politicians do not talk in that strain in Germany except after consultation with the soldiers and in order to prepare the way for a military retreat which has begun to appear likely. As an English writer put it at the time, the speeches in the Reichstag were only the shadows on the blinds that concealed the deliberations of the General Staff. Nothing but the most unequivocal success could have justified these operations. They were clearly wrong. Yet they were intelligible, not a mere exhibition of obstinacy as some critics have apparently thought. And they were defeated not so much by the enemy as by the weather.

In his last dispatch Sir Douglas Haig makes a very elaborate defence of these operations. He compares the period of trench warfare which set in after the first Battle of Ypres in 1914 to the opening phases of a battle in which either side is seeking for the enemy's weak spot, and at the same time accumulating reserves to strike there as soon as he shows signs of yielding. In this stage of the struggle, the losses, he points out, will necessarily be heavy on both sides; and if the forces are approximately equal there is no way of avoiding them. "In former battles," he continues, "this stage of the conflict has rarely lasted more than a few days, and has often been completed in a

few hours. When armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of Europe behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include violent crises of fighting which, when viewed separately and apart from their general perspective, will appear individually as great indecisive battles. To this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917, which wore down the strength of the German Armies." But is it quite clear that the process of attrition was so much in our favour? Already, by the middle of 1917, Russia had been attrited out of the war, and France to a condition in which she was compelled to discontinue her offensive and economize her man-power. Our own army, which began serious fighting much later, was able from the middle of 1916 to keep on attacking almost without intermission to the end of the following year, but at the beginning of 1918 our strength had, in consequence, been dangerously reduced by the heavy casualties of the previous 18 months, and when the German offensive began the Allies on the western front were at a disadvantage in effective strength compared with the enemy. What won the victory, one would have thought, was not attrition (which indeed at one time in 1918 looked as though it might lose us the war), but the breakdown of Austria (which so far as it went was rather an argument against the western strategy of 1915-16); the heavy losses incurred by the enemy, not in our offensive of those years, but in their own offensive of 1918; the enemy's conviction, made certain by the evidence that America meant to put her whole resources of man-power at our disposal, that he could not win; the brilliant leading of the Allied Armies in 1918; the unity of command, and lastly the steady pressure of our sea power. All these causes would have worked even if the Somme and the Passchendaele battles had never been fought. One of them—the downfall of Austria—would have worked sooner if we had transferred some of the energy spent on the battles of 1915 and 1916 to assisting Russia, or, later, Italy against Austria; and had we given more men to the Eastern campaigns Russia might never have fallen out, nor Bulgaria have come in against us. Both these grave happenings, by adding to the enemy's strength, more than wiped out any problematical advantage that we might have gained by the processes of attrition on the west.

A further argument for the persistence in the attacks during 1915, 1916, and 1917, was

that a purely defensive policy may be as costly in men as one of vigorous offence. Sir Douglas Haig urges that a defensive rôle lowers the *moral* of the troops, that it involves the loss of the initiative, thereby enabling the enemy to choose his own point of attack, that victory can only be won by the offensive, never by passive defence, and that our geographical position in France was unfavourable to a defensive policy, because we had been driven so far back that we could not afford to give any more ground. Further, it is not true (he argues) without qualification that attack is more costly than the defence. "Unsuccessful attack is generally more expensive than the defence, particularly if the attack is pressed home with courage and resolution. On the other hand, attack so pressed home, if skilfully conducted is rarely unsuccessful, whereas, in its later stages especially, unsuccessful defence is far more costly than attack." The whole of this argument is directed against the contention that until the Allies had obtained the requisite supremacy on the west they would have done better to remain on the defensive there, and give their aggressive energies to other theatres of war where the conditions were more equal, and where more immediate and better results could be obtained than on the west. That the last word must be spoken on the west was never in any doubt, nor yet that a purely defensive policy could not by itself give us the desired victory. But that a strategical defensive policy was impossible under the circumstances, and was no more economical of men, seems to be disproved by the policy of Pétain after the failure of Nivelle on the Aisne. If a strategical defensive used up as many men as the attack there would seem to be no reason why the French should not have gone on attacking throughout the summer of 1917. Sir Douglas Haig estimates the British casualties from the beginning of the Somme battle to the conclusion of the armistice as 2,140,000. (Up to the Somme battle our casualties had been about 450,000.) The German casualties inflicted by British troops in the same period (July, 1916–November, 1918) are estimated at two and a half millions. This period includes the German débâcle which ended the war, in which their casualties were exceptionally heavy—probably heavier than ours in the five months fighting from March to July, 1918. It would seem to follow that the margin of attrition in our favour during the campaigns from

1915 to 1917, must have been exceedingly small, if it existed at all. For it is clear that the French losses in attrition were very much heavier than the Germans. Sir Douglas Haig estimates them at four millions, and this number added to our own is very little short of the total German casualties in the whole war. When it is remembered that Germany had very heavy fighting in Poland, and from time to time contributed strong contingents to the war in Turkey, Serbia and Italy, the conclusion seems irresistible that the process of attrition was not in the Allied favour, but against us.

In the third week of November, 1917, there was fought at Cambrai a battle which was in some ways the most interesting of the whole series of Sir Douglas Haig's battles. Cambrai was an afterthought and formed no part of his plans for the year. The Battle of Passchendaele had ended with the disappointment of our hopes in spite of very heavy expenditure of life and suffering. It seemed as though the campaign had finished for the year. The British troops were exhausted and needed rest, and their reserves had been used up in the fighting east of Ypres and of Arras. A formal offensive therefore was quite out of the question. Under these circumstances, the attack at Cambrai, which began on November 20, was admittedly in the nature of an experiment, for even if it met with the success that was hoped for, there was no possibility of following it up in the exhausted state of the British Army. The plans of General Byng, whose sector faced the German lines at Cambrai, were bold and original, and were based on a belief that the offensive capacities of the tanks had not yet been fully exploited. Unlike Flanders, which was waterlogged and unfavourable to the movement of heavy tanks, which east of Ypres were usually swallowed up in mud before they could reach their objective, the country near Cambrai was rolling downland, dry and still hard. Havrincourt Wood, just behind the British line, is eight miles from Cambrai, and between them the Scheldt Canal runs in a deep cutting obliquely across the intervening ground. Overlooking the canal from the west is Flesquières Ridge, running north and south, and at the extreme end of it, on the north side of the Bapaume Road, is Beurlon Wood, the most conspicuous object in the landscape. General Byng's plan was to collect great numbers of tanks under cover of the Havrincourt Wood and to launch them unexpectedly on the enemy. He had reason

to think that the enemy's lines opposite him were weakly held, owing to the heavy transfers of troops to meet our attacks east of Ypres, and excellently as the Germans were served by their system of railways, it would be two days before they could bring up reinforcements. General Byng, therefore, had hopes of capturing Cambrai, or failing that, of obtaining a position on the Bourlon Ridge which would take the Hindenburg line between Mœuvres and the Scarpe in reverse. "My intentions," writes Sir Douglas Haig, "as regards subsequent exploitation were to push west and north-west,

battles in which the bombardments were very prolonged, it was several days' notice—but by forming great craters made for the enemy new defences as fast as it destroyed his old ones, and also increased the difficulties of rapid advance over the ground. The crude idea of "blasting our way through," which had carried us through most of our offensives hitherto had thus undergone a considerable refinement. Our artillery did excellent work after the attack had been launched at Cambrai, but most of it was at unregistered targets. When it is remembered how implicit had been the con-



THE WAY UP TO PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, AND SOME OF THE GERMAN DEFENCES.

taking the Hindenburg line in reverse from Mœuvres to the River Scarpe, and capturing all the enemy's defensive positions and probably most of his garrisons, lying westward of a line from Cambrai northwards to the Sensée and south of that river and the Scarpe," and these successes would have been more valuable even than the capture of Cambrai itself. The key to the whole enterprise was surprise, and in order to make this more certain, General Byng even decided to dispense with a preliminary bombardment. This was a striking innovation for an attack on this scale, although General Nivelle, earlier in the year, had recognised the grave disadvantages of a heavy bombardment, which not only gave the enemy notice of our intention—in some of the early

confidence reposed in our previous offensives in the effects of heavy devastating bombardment, the originality of the tactics at Cambrai becomes the more striking. In the opening attack at Ypres on July 31 our artillery *personnel* amounted to over 80 per cent. of the infantry engaged, and something like 23,000 tons of ammunition were discharged on that day. This expenditure of ammunition was kept up in all the preliminary bombardments of the Ypres fighting. On September 20 and 21, for example, 42,000 tons of ammunition was expended, and at the Battle of Broodseinde, on October 4, the artillery *personnel* amounted to 85 per cent. of the infantry engaged in the attack. These figures, which are those of Sir Douglas Haig, show how revolutionary was

the break with the past made by General Byng in his plans for the Battle of Cambrai.

The surprise was completely successful. On the left, the whole of the German trench system between the canal and the Bapaune Road was carried. Flesquières Ridge was stormed in the centre and on the right the canal was crossed at Masnières. The success was continued on the following day, when Bourlon Wood was reached on the left and the 29th Division pushed towards Rumilly on the right. But here our successes ended. After days of desperate in and out fighting, we were compelled to fall back from Bourlon Wood, and on the right we never really made good our footing across the canal in the direction of Rumilly. The enemy had managed to destroy the bridge over the canal at Masnières on the first day, and in consequence our tanks never got across. But in spite of these later disappointments the battle in its opening stages was one of the most brilliant of the British victories. Further, it showed that incomparably the most valuable of all weapons against the German trench system was surprise. Up to now we had chosen our sector of attack and persisted long after all chance of taking the enemy at a disadvantage had disappeared. The fighting in the Somme Battle continued for six months on a field not more than 20 miles from end to end. The fighting in the Scarpe and Sensée river sectors in the spring had been little more extended, and the attacks east of Ypres had been on a much narrower front. The British success at Cambrai showed for the first time what might be possible by varying the front, by surprise, and by what amounted to the same thing, by rapidity of lateral movement.

The sequel to the battle drove home the same points, for the Germans later in the month were able to effect a complete surprise on our right flank and to recover all and more of the ground that we had won there. For a time our centre and left made so sharp a salient that there was even some danger of their being surrounded and cut off, and it needed all the skill of the generals and all the endurance of the troops to avoid a catastrophe. A catastrophe was avoided, but the warning was clear and unmistakable. The second half of the battle had enforced the moral of the first half, that no positions, however strong, were proof against surprise and rapid movement. After the Somme, and still more after the battles east of Arras and Ypres, the opinion had been very

widely held that the defence had definitely beaten the attack, and that there was no means of restoring the balance between them. The easy initial British success at Cambrai showed that our tactical ideas in the earlier battles had been faulty, and that the problem of a breakthrough was by no means insoluble. The later stages of the battle showed us that the Germans, too, were convinced that the offensive had not lost its power, and were a clear warning that it would be revived in a more dangerous and deadly form in the following spring.

Cambrai was in the nature of a footnote to the main events of the year, and while it strengthened confidence that we could win, there was at the end of 1917 a very general doubt whether we could win in the following year. It was recognized that the Germans would probably attack in the following year, and that this attack would be formidable; but subject to their military policy and its event, which could not be foreseen, opinion was hardening against a repetition in 1918 of the continuous offensives of 1917. The arguments for a change of policy were much strengthened by the great Italian defeat at Caporetto, which at one time threatened the complete ruin of our Ally. After Neuve Chapelle and Loos, Suvla Bay, the evacuation of Gallipoli, the overrunning of Serbia and the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers; after the Somme, the ruin of Rumania; and after Passchendaele, Caporetto. Some of the troops engaged in the later stages of the battle of Cambrai were on their way to Italy when they were temporarily diverted, and the adoption of the principle of the united front (on which more will be said in a later chapter continuing this description of the anatomy of the war down to the final triumph) was a rebuke to the local "particularism" of our military policy. It is fairly certain that if the Germans had not attacked with a violence and recklessness that did them fatal injury, neither should we have attacked. Instead, our policy would have been one of free manœuvre in which all the fronts were treated as parts of a single campaign. We should (as indeed we did) have given particular attention to the military defeat of Austria and of Turkey. On the west we should have economized man-power until the arrival of the American Army had given us decisive numerical superiority. We should have developed by every means in our power the mechanical aids to victory and in particular the air arm and the tanks. We should have



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FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K.T.

cultivated mobility and everything that favoured the chances of surprise. These were the dominating ideas in men's minds at the end of 1917. Happily, thanks to the mistakes of the enemy, and in particular to the squandering of his resources in the offensive that began in March, 1918, and to the institution of the single command, events were better than our hopes, and the victory came six months or a year before it had been expected.

The analysis of the causes which led to this

final and unexpectedly early triumph must be reserved to another chapter. It may be convenient to epitomize the anatomy of the British Army's operations in France during the years covered by this chapter; and here attention may be drawn to the diagram published with this chapter, which illustrates graphically from the beginning of the war to the end of 1917 the gradual extension of the British front, the rise and fall in the number of British troops, and the British casualties in



HOUSE-TO-HOUSE FIGHTING IN THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES.

the principal actions. The great difficulty in reading the history of a war so vast and complicated as this is to keep a sense of the general plan through the multiplicity of the details; and this the graph may help the reader to do.

The anatomy of the war down to December, 1917, may be thus conveniently summarized.

First, (1), there is a period of open warfare in which both sides are manoeuvring for position. The main brunt of this opening struggle was

of Neuve Chapelle and Loos, which demonstrated the quality of the British Army but showed how much progress had still to be made before our army was fit to undertake the major operations of continental warfare. The British offensives at this time were premature (as indeed were those of the French), but the zeal with which the country threw itself into the problem of munitions was an excellent augury for the future. We were beginning to



EARLY TRENCH FIGHTING IN BELGIUM: SEARCHLIGHT AND SHRAPNEL.

borne by the French, but the British Army, small though it was, was able to give invaluable assistance on the western, which was our own, flank. The chief battles in this period were Namur and Mons, Morhange (where the French offensive in Lorraine came to grief), the Marne, and the first battle of Ypres. Then there followed and lasted until the last months of the war the trench warfare, in which the operations resembled those of a siege, with frequent raids and sallies on either side.

Secondly, (2), for the first 18 months of this trench warfare, the brunt of the work still continued to fall on the French, though the British Army was steadily growing stronger. The French offensives, notably in Champagne, in 1914, and in the Arras region, were very obstinate, and great losses were incurred. The chief British contributions were the defence of Ypres in the spring of 1915 (in which the French gave assistance), and the two battles

understand that there was no such thing as limited liability in war, and no real distinction between civilian and soldier.

Thirdly, (3), for the last six months of 1916, the French and English were straining in conjunction to effect a breach in the enemy's defences. The battle of this period is the long struggle on the Somme. This is also the period of Verdun.

Fourthly, (4), there was a whole year of hard fighting in which the British Army, gaining in confidence and experience every day, carried the main burden of the offensive against the enemy. After the early battles north of the Aisne the French abstained from the formal offensive, though they gave us assistance in our attacks, notably north of Ypres. The fighting was continuous throughout the year, and the wisdom of this persistence is still a subject of warm controversy, though opinion tends more and more to the



LORD FRENCH REVIEWING THE VOLUNTEER TRAINING CORPS, June 17, 1916. The corps consisted of men above military age, or exempted for other reasons from active service, who voluntarily placed themselves at the disposal of the military authorities for purposes of home defence.

views expressed in this chapter. The great battles in this period were those to the east of Ypres, in the Arras region, round Bullecourt, the Vimy Ridge and the Messines Ridge.

Finally, (5), towards the end of the year there was fought the battle of Cambrai, which

foreshadowed what was to come in the following year—both the offensive of the Germans that began in March and the final triumph, in which the British Army took a great, and towards the end of the year, a predominating part.



CHAPTER CCLXXXVII.

THE ALLIED ADVANCE CONTINUED: SEPTEMBER, 1918.


THE GREAT ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES—DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR PLAN—THE SIMULTANEOUS OFFENSIVES: BY THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS FROM REIMS TO THE MEUSE—BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ON THE CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN FRONT—BY THE BELGIANS, BRITISH AND FRENCH IN FLANDERS—GERMAN OPINION—THE WORK OF THE ALLIED AIR FORCES.

BY the middle of September, 1918, the war had entered on a new phase. The great Hindenburg Line had been broken through on September 2 (*see ante* p. 305 *et seq.*) at Quéant, and the supporting lines behind it were in imminent danger of being either penetrated or turned. Moreover, many of the positions in which the Germans were now attempting to stand were only half prepared for resistance, or consisted merely of natural positions hastily put in a state of defence. The task then before the Allies was to break the power of the enemy at all these points. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the main lateral lines of communication of the Germans extending from Thionville to Maubeuge (the latter an important centre for the whole of the lines of supply) were by the advance of the Allies becoming more and more threatened, and once these were captured, the eastern position of the German defences from the Alsace frontier westward would be cut off from any good supply line, leaving only communications back through Belgium or the Ardennes. To retire through the Eifel was almost impossible for large numbers. They were rapidly getting into the dangerous position in which every army is placed whose main line of communications is parallel to its front. Moreover, the German position on the Belgian coast and in Belgium was threatened by our progress and by our naval activity, and it was

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becoming plainer every day that only by a considerable retirement could the more exposed portions of the German forces be saved from disaster. There was yet another point to be considered. The Germans were getting to the end of their reserves of men. The Allies were daily becoming stronger.

Immediately facing the First and Third Armies were the highly developed series of defences spoken of generically as the Hindenburg Line—a complicated system of trenches extending one behind the other for miles, protected by innumerable wire entanglements strengthened with concrete pill-boxes, and by thousands of machine-gun and innumerable trench mortar positions. It was altogether the most formidable combination of military works that had ever been imagined and constructed by man, the result of over three years' work, in which the German military engineers had exhausted every resource of art known to them. Nor had they ceased from continually adding to and improving them in every way possible. They were quite untouched when they were finally and successfully attacked. The fact that they were all overpassed with comparative ease shows the high courage and tenacity of our troops, the admirable organization of our offensive forces, the co-ordination of all arms to the object aimed at, and the brilliant tactical leading conceived by the Higher Commanders and executed by those more imme-



THE ADVANCE ON CAMBRAI.

diately connected with the work of the various units.

In front of the First Army was that portion of the German position known as the Fresnes-Rouvroy system. This lay in front of the Drocourt-Quéant defences, which ran down to the main Hindenburg Line at Quéant. Some distance behind this was the Canal du Nord, to which allusion has already been made, and which proved another strong defensive position. Between St. Quentin and the village of Bantouzele, the upper defences of the Hindenburg system lie sometimes to the west but more

point the canal was dry. In the canal cuttings the Germans had constructed numerous tunneled dug-outs and shelters, and on the edges they had well-concealed concrete or armoured machine-gun emplacements. The tunnel itself was used to provide accommodation for troops and was connected with the defences above by numerous shafts. South of Bellicourt, on the western side of the canal, there were two lines of contiguous trench, running parallel to the canal: the front one distant from it about 2,000 yards, the rear one at an average distance of 1,000 yards.



[French official photograph.]

WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS ON THE HINDENBURG LINE.

generally to the east of the line of the Escaut Canal. The canal itself did not form the enemy's main line of resistance, but only an advanced part of a deep defensive system, of which the most notable feature was the skill with which it was placed so as to prevent our artillery occupying effective positions from which to attack it. The canal whenever suitable was used to afford cover to resting troops and to the garrisons of the main defensive trench lines during a bombardment. Between Bellicourt and the neighbourhood of Vendhuille the canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of 6,000 yards. South of Bellicourt, where the canal emerges from the tunnel, the cutting becomes shallow, till at Bellenglise the canal is almost at the ground level. South of this

Both of these were extremely strongly organized and covered in front with heavy wire entanglements. North of the tunnel the Hindenburg double trench line was immediately to the east of the canal and was linked up with the defences to the west of it. There were also many trenches at various points, placed to protect important local positions, or those from which fire could be brought to bear on an advancing enemy. The whole of these lines were connected up by numerous communication trenches. At a distance of 4,000 yards behind the most easterly of these there was a second double row of works known as the Beaufort-Fonsomme line, also a very complicated and strong construction with numerous concrete shelters and machine-gun emplacements, the

front covered by a deep wire entanglement. The whole belt of country thus converted into one gigantic fortress varied in depth from 7,000 to 10,000 yards, in which every point capable of being turned into a strong defensive post had been so organized.

An important feature of the country over which the First Army had to advance, and one which divided the operations into two, was the marshy water line known as the Sensée Canal and river, connected with the Searpe by the Trinquis river, which runs from Biache down to Etaing. This line of marsh and impracticable country ran back in an easterly direction until it met the Escaut Canal to the north-east of Cambrai, and then went farther east past Denain and Valenciennes, forming a large tract eminently unsuited for military operations. It could not be crossed except at the bridges. North and south of it the ground was more open—rolling bare downs intersected at intervals by narrow valleys with streams which ran down to the canal.

The Canal du Nord itself, which was dry, varied in depth below the surface from 50 to 100 feet, according to the lie of the ground through which it was cut. At the bottom, the canal sides were revetted with brickwork to a

height roughly of 14 feet. Above that, the earth was left at such a slope as the character of the chalk allowed, and this was a fairly steep one. It was evident that such an obstacle was easy to defend and should have been almost impossible to cross. It does not appear, however, that there were any arrangements for the actual flanking defence of the ditch. Possibly the opinion of the German engineers was that nothing in the nature of a caponnière would have been of any utility against bombing. Be that as it may, they appear to have relied more on the physical obstacle of the canal rather than on any actual defence of the ditch, and to have expended all their efforts on the works on the east and west side, chiefly on the former. At places the Germans, however, held a position on the western side of the canal as well as on the eastern, though the main position was always on the latter. In its northern portion it was too strong to be carried by direct attack, but it was considered possible to cross it near Mœuvres. South of the Bapaume-Cambrai line on the south of Mœuvres and on the western side of the canal, there were two lines of trenches protected with deep belts of wire entanglement, and these had to be carried before the passage



[French official photograph.]

DUG-OUTS AND GALLERY ON THE HINDENBURG LINE.



[Australian official photograph.]

INFANTRY ADVANCING DURING THE EARLY MORNING.

of the canal could be secured. But on the day of trial there happened here what has often happened before in similar situations, the troops in front of the formidable ditch made by the canal were not inclined to fight to the bitter end with such an obstacle behind them, and they appear to have given up these lines without much effort.

The Germans quickly realized that the position which our armies had won on September 18 between Gouzeaucourt and St. Quentin was a serious threat against the Hindenburg Line, and in the afternoon of that day they delivered an attack on a large scale and a wide front below the Arras-Cambrai road from Mœuvres down to Gouzeaucourt against the ground held by the Guards, the 3rd and 37th Divisions. It was preceded by a very heavy bombardment, but was completely unsuccessful, the Germans being repulsed with heavy loss. Another attack which was delivered north of Mœuvres was a failure, although at places the enemy succeeded in entering our trenches, from which he was driven back by counter-attacks. South of Gouzeaucourt, too, there was some fighting, but the German attempts were equally futile in this region. On the right of the Allied line in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin,

the French made progress after a severe struggle. Round Havrincourt a large amount of stores was captured in the shape of material evidently intended for the construction of winter residences; an immense quantity of luxuries in the shape of wines, liqueurs, cigarettes, etc.; and a considerable number of postal packets, among which were great quantities of cakes, fruit, sausages and other food-stuffs.

On September 19 the French, in the direction of St. Quentin, took the wood of Savy and Fontaine-le-Clercs; on September 20 Contescourt, Castres, and Essigny-le-Grand.

On September 19 the British made further progress north of Gauche Wood and re-established themselves firmly at Mœuvres, which had been the centre of fighting for the last two days, in the course of which our troops had more than once advanced across the canal there, only to be driven back to the western edge of the village. The place was awkwardly situated, for it lies in a dip of the ground, and the canal is immediately behind it. At this point there was a gallant feat well worthy of record. A small party, consisting of a corporal and six men of the 1/5th Highland Light Infantry, held a post in the northern corner of the village for 48 hours, until relieved by the final effort which won the village. The



[Australian official photograph]

THE BREAK IN THE HINDENBURG LINE, SEPTEMBER 18, 1918.
 Australians shooting at the fleeing Germans.

men had only their iron rations with them when they were besieged, and they suffered from hunger. Moreover, they were affected by the weather, which was exceedingly wet and trying. Yet, notwithstanding all the German efforts, they were able to hold out till rescued, and inflicted great loss on the enemy.

On September 20, though there was some minor fighting along the front, no counter-attack of any moment was delivered by the Germans, but in Epéhy there was very hard fighting. This was also captured and the area between Epéhy and Lempire completely cleared. The 8th and 49th Divisions attacked towards the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, and made considerable progress. With these exceptions there was a pause in the fighting on September 20, only actions of minor moment taking place, but the Canadian Corps extended its line southwards nearly down to Mœuvres, where it joined the left of the Third Army. It will be remembered that the advance of the latter had been covered by the right of the First Army, to which the Canadians belonged. Benay, south of St. Quentin, was taken by the French. The grip was now tightening round this town. In the north we were at Gricourt, and at the south by Benay, from whence the line extended round the front of Savy-Holnon-Fresnoy to Gricourt.

On September 20 our line was also advanced

in the north-west of La Bassée on a front of 2½ miles as far as the villages of Rue du Marais and La Tourelle. The Germans endeavoured to stop the advance of Mangin's troops on the north-east of Soissons, where the position that they occupied was very threatening to the western end of the Chemin-des-Dames. Five attacks were delivered on the night of September 19-20 to the north of Allemant and to the east of the farm of Moisy, but all were driven back with heavy loss.

On September 23 the French took the fort and village of Vendenil, so that their front was now on the Oise from Travecy.

On September 24 an attack was made by them on the south-west of St. Quentin in combination with the neighbouring British troops, and overcoming a strenuous resistance of the Germans they captured Dallon close to the Somme Canal and the spur known as L'Epine de Dallon. In this operation 500 prisoners were taken and a large number of machine-guns. The attack was extended over a front of four miles from the river Omignon east of Vermand southwards. The fighting, especially about Selency, which is on the main Amiens - St. Quentin road, and only two miles west of St. Quentin, was very severe.

On September 25 this operation was continued, and during the night progress was made, especially to the north-west of St. Quentin. Some further progress was made by English

troops to the north-west of La Bassée, which resulted in our line being somewhat advanced, and over 100 prisoners taken. During the night of September 25 a counter-attack was launched by the enemy, but was completely unsuccessful, several prisoners remaining in our hands. Further small successes were gained by us to the north-west of Armentières and in patrolling encounters near that point and Ypres.

The ground gained since September 18 had now brought our troops—the Fourth, Third, and First Armies—to a line on September 26 running from the village of Seleney to Gricourt and Pontruet, and thence east of Villoret and Lempire to Villers-Guislain and Gouzeaucourt. This continued northward to Havrincourt and Mœuvres along the west side of the Canal du Nord to the floods of the Sensée at Ecourt - St. Quentin. In front of the Third Army, the centre of our forces, and the First Army to the north of it, there were strong German positions which covered the approaches to Cambrai between the Canal du Nord and the Esaus Canal, which included the section of the Hindenburg Line itself north of Gouzeaucourt. The enemy's trenches


in this sector faced south-west, and it was necessary to take them as a preliminary to any further advance to enable the artillery of the Fourth Army to get into a position whence it could bombard the exceptionally strong portion of the enemy's line facing this part of our forces to prepare the way for the infantry assault. To deceive the enemy Field-Marshal Haig ordered a heavy artillery fire to be directed during the night of September 26-27 along the whole front of the three armies. Then the First and Third Armies were to advance and push nearer to their final objective, which would render easier the task of the Fourth Army's artillery.

September 26 saw a considerable enlargement of the operations against the Germans. The French, in conjunction with the American First Army, composed of their I., III and V. Corps, each of three divisions, attacked in the Champagne district on both sides of the Argonne, between the Meuse and the Suippes rivers, on a front which extended over 40 miles. On the 27th the Third and First British Armies attacked with the IV., VI., XVII., and the Canadian Corps, in the direction of Cambrai, on a front of about 13 miles from



[Australian official photograph.]

AUSTRALIANS IN THE HINDENBURG LINE, AFTER THE FIGHTING OF SEPTEMBER 18.



THE ARGONNE FRONT.

Gouzeaucourt to the neighbourhood of Sauchy-Lestrée. On September 28 an Anglo-Belgian force under King Albert advanced to the assault on a 23-mile front from near Dixmude to Ploegsteert. The Belgian coast was also heavily bombarded by our Navy.

Thus from the Meuse to the coast the whole German line was vigorously battered. It was the biggest battle which had been undertaken by the Allies since the beginning of the war. The object of the French and American attack on both sides of the Argonne was in the first place to penetrate and turn the enemy's defences in the Champagne with the intention of moving ultimately in the direction of Mézières. This would completely outflank the German defences which the British were attacking frontally, and would also, in combination with the American attack from the ground gained in the St. Mihiel salient, threaten the whole of the lines back into Germany south of Luxembourg and grasp the main lateral connexion running from Mézières-Sedan back to the east, and in addition the line which ran up from Mézières to Namur. Both the French and the American preparations for the attack had been made with the greatest secrecy. The enemy knew he was likely to be attacked, but could not determine which were the most threatened points.

The operations undertaken on the right flank of the Allied armies involved some changes in the disposition of the American Army. The Second American Army took over the country which had been won in the St. Mihiel salient, while the First Army was trans-

ferred to the immediate left of General Gouraud's force for the advance on both sides of the Argonne, and the French Fourth Army moved forward on their left. The French had been ready to advance since the middle of July, and Gouraud was only waiting for the completion of Marshal Foch's arrangements to thrust forward against the Germans. Every necessary step had been taken by General Pétain to ensure the success of the movement, which was a very important one, threatening important German communications, and a vast number of guns had been collected together to support the infantry. The task of the Second American Army was to feint with gun-fire against the German positions about Briey and thence towards Metz so as to make the enemy believe that an advance in continuation of the St. Mihiel battle was to be made in that direction. It succeeded, for the German commanders collected a considerable reserve, numbering about 15 divisions, in the neighbourhood of Briey—an important coal-mining centre which they hoped to hold—to oppose any attempt to break through at this point. But the real intention of the Allied commanders aimed at a much more important objective for the time—the railway line which ran east and west through Grand Pré. This was of vast importance to the German communications. Interrupted, it would leave only circuitous lines available to connect the eastern extremity of the German defences with those to the west.

It seems probable that the Germans totally misapprehended the direction from which the

attack was to take place; possibly this was due to the defensive attitude which the French Fourth Army had maintained for some time past. They thought it was to be a continuation of the advance from the St. Mihiel salient, whereas it was really on both sides of the Argonne from Reims to Verdun. It is a great tribute to the air service of the Allies that the German aviators should have been kept so far back as not to have observed the movements of the American troops to the right of Gouraud.

The Germans had an important line of fortifi-

At 11 p.m. on September 25, between the Suippes and the Aisne, a distance of some 16 miles, the artillery preparation was commenced with great intensity, and at 5.25 a.m. on September 26 the Fourth French Army, under General Gouraud, and the First American Army, under General Liggett, began their forward movement; the French on the west of the Argonne, the Americans on the east. The French troops advanced to the assault at a pace which was regulated at about 25 yards to the minute. The front consisted of a comparatively thin line of sufficient strength to



A GERMAN MILITARY ROAD AND DUG-OUTS IN THE FOREST OF ARGONNE.

cations running from Raineville along the Forges Brook by Béthincourt - Malincourt, whence it went back through the Argonne Forest ridge, which was itself rendered practically impassable by obstructions both of an active and passive nature. This stretch of country, some four miles wide, divided the French from the American line of advance. Varennes was held as an important strong post by the Prussian Guards at a point where the natural defences were less formidable. Vauquois was held in the same way. Four lines of defences faced the Americans, composed of the Hindenburg Line and then in succession minor defences known locally as the Hagen Line, then the Volker Line, and lastly the Kriemhilde.

carry the machine-gun positions covering the German first line. The attack was successful from the very commencement, and while this advanced position was being carried, an overwhelming bombardment was carried on against the first main line of the Germans, to which many of their troops in the advanced posts had fallen back. By 8.25 the first wave of infantry had accomplished its task, and then, reinforced, the French went on against the main line of resistance, which ran along the series of heights—the farm of Navarin, the hill of Souain, the elevations of Muret, Tahure, Mesnil, and the ground to the north of the Main de Massiges. These, all strongly fortified, formed an excellent line of observation over the country in front of

them, and constituted a formidable combination of trenches covered by wired entanglement, to a depth of over three miles on the whole front of the attack. Between the Snippe and the Argonne the villages of Tahure, Ripont, Rouvroy, Cernay-en-Dormois, Servon, which formed supporting points to the defences, were all taken after some strenuous fighting, although



GENERAL LIGGETT.

Commanded the First American Army.

other places, such as the farm of Navarin, the elevations of Souain, of Tahure and Mesnil, were taken at the first rush. The general line was carried somewhere between noon and one o'clock. This success was very largely due to the French artillery barrage, which, moving in front of the advancing troops, had facilitated their advance and had prevented to a great extent the arrival of reinforcements to the German front line.

The German artillery does not seem to have played a great part in the action, and was, compared with the French, comparatively ineffective. The barrage was chiefly the work of the French 75's and had been limited to the front line of German heights. Over this the heavy guns did the work, while the field guns were brought up to nearer positions. At some points on the line of the Dormoise, especially at Ripont, a strong resistance was put up, but was overcome eventually.

There was no doubt that the Germans had expected the French attack. For a fortnight

before it was actually launched, numerous raids had been made on the German front along the whole line, which naturally attracted their attention. These, combined with observation from the air, had placed the French commanders in full possession of the dispositions of the German forces. The position attacked was an extremely strong one with a good command of view over the position from which the French took off, and the ground itself was extremely difficult: the irregular alternating ravines and the heights well covered with numerous small woods, all of which had been turned into strong points, were formidable objects to overcome. The soil was easily turned by wet into a very slippery form of mud. The country over which the attack was at first delivered was so much cut up that it was almost impossible to use tanks. Altogether, the depth of the German lines here was over three miles, a continuous series of trenches equipped with all the resources of military art. Both sides possessed in the lines which they held very strong positions, although, from its command of the ground



[French official photograph.]

CONCRETE BLOCKS BUILT BY THE GERMANS TO OBSTRUCT A ROAD IN THE MEUSE SECTOR.

in front of it, the German was the stronger. The point which troubled the German Supreme Command was that the whole line of attack was so long that it was difficult to know where penetration would be attempted and where it would be necessary to throw in reserves. This was even more important because the number of reserve divisions available was rapidly diminishing. In the middle of the month they had had 71 available, but the



PRISONERS TAKEN BY GOURAUD'S ARMY MARCHING THROUGH CHALONS.

day after the battle commenced—on September 28—21 of these had been used up at the front and only 50 were now remaining, of which not more than 20 were fresh troops.

The general outcome of the first day of the French attack was that they captured about 14 miles of the old Hindenburg Line on the Buttes or heights between Souain-Somme Py and the Argonne forest. The depth taken was between two and three miles, and in many points they were in a position in advance of what they had held before the German offensive.

The first objective of the Americans was Montfaucon, a dominating position in front of the well-known Mort Homme, between the Mouse and the Aire. Held by Americans, it would seriously compromise the railway line coming up through the Grand Pré gap to Dun and Stenay, two important passages over the Meuse, which Moltke had seized in August, 1870, when pursuing Macmahon's army, so as to prevent it crossing the Meuse at these points and marching down on Metz.

The advance of the Americans was as successful as that of the French. Their artillery was more powerful than that of their opponents, and the poison gas shells which they employed seem to have produced great effects. The front of the infantry advance was about 20 miles, and was covered to some extent by the early morning mist. Forges

was completely surprised, and once they got the Germans on the run they kept them at it, pressing forward after severe fighting, and taking Gercourt and then Dannevaux, some five miles in advance of their starting point. The American troops on the left of this particular advance had a more difficult task. Montfaucon was very strongly fortified, and bristled with machine-guns. The disposition of the trenches gave no particular advantage to the attacking force from their forward point towards Dannevaux, especially as the field artillery was quite unable to accompany the advance owing to the enormous difficulties offered by the ground, which was a mass of craters, most of them half-full of water. The artillery fire, therefore, was limited to the long-range guns from positions farther back, and it was not till the next day, when by great exertions the lighter guns had been brought forward to an effective range, that the garrison at this point was compelled to retire or surrender.

Farther to the west, on the 26th, the Americans were more successful. Vauquois was taken, and Varennes. From Varennes the enemy succeeded in moving back most of his artillery, after destroying the bridges over the Aire at Cheppy and Varennes, preventing the advance of the American artillery and slowing down their attack. At Montblainville, where the third line of German trenches

(the Volker Line) ran eastwards towards Montfaucon, the Germans were enabled to hold out until the next day. During the night, however, the American engineers bridged the Aire at several points, making a way for the field artillery to advance in the early morning of September 27.

Our Allies then went on with a rush, again covered to some extent by the morning mist. Charpentry was quickly taken and the Volker Line stormed, the troops moving further on and taking the villages of Ivoiry, Epinonville, and Nantillois. By this success the Montfaucon position was gained, with a wide range of view over the neighbouring country.

On the first day of the advance alone the French and Americans between them took 12,000 prisoners.

On September 27 the French under Gouraud and Americans under Liggett, besides consolidating the positions they had won, pushed forward beyond them. They were subject to many severe counter-attacks executed by 12 new divisions, but, these notwithstanding, made considerable progress. They reached within a mile of Somme Py and crossed the railway to Challerange east of that village.

Cernay was taken and the troops reached to Gratreuil and Fontaine-en-Dormais and the western bank of the Aisne.

On the east of the Argonne the Americans made some further progress in spite of German counter-attacks. In both cases the advance was now facilitated by armoured cars.

The French Fifth Army, under General Berthelot, which, with some Italian troops, occupied the ground between Gouraud, east of Reims, and Mangin to the north of the Aisne, had been for some time awaiting events on the Vesle, but on September 30 they went forward to attack the German position on the north side of the river. The fighting was obstinate, but the villages of Revillon, Romain, and Montigny were captured and the French forces pushed on ahead. The result of this advance was that the next day the enemy abandoned the plateau between the Aisne and the Reims region. The banks of the Aisne were reached, and in front of Reims the French lines were advanced to the outskirts of Fort St. Thierry. Between the Argonne and the Meuse the Americans had also made progress, as had Gouraud's troops on their left. St. Marie-à-Py, Aure, and Marvaux were captured, and they reached the borders of Monthois some six



[American official photograph.]

A WRECKED AMERICAN TANK ABANDONED ON THE ROAD TO VARENNES.



ST. MIHIEL: A TEMPORARY BRIDGE ACROSS THE MEUSE.

miles from Vouziers, but the Germans still held on to Bouconville.

On September 28 the front of attack was prolonged by the Anglo-Belgian forces under King Albert attacking on a line of 23 miles from Dixmude to Ploegsteert. The details of the advance had been settled at a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies at Cassel on September 9. The force available consisted of the Belgian Army; some French Divisions; all the artillery, and a certain number of infantry divisions of the Second British Army, commanded by General Sir H. Plumer. Once more the British section of the attack was begun without preliminary bombardment. At 5.30 a.m. the XIX. and II. Corps of the Second Army attacked on a front of some $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of the Ypres-Zonnebeke road. The assault was commenced by the 14th Division, under Major-General P. C. B. Skinner, the 35th Division, under Major-General A. H. Marindin, aided by the 29th and 9th Divisions. Later in the battle these were supported by the 41st Division, commanded by Major-General S. T. B. Lawford, and the 36th Division, under Major-General C. Coffin. On the left of the II. Corps the Belgian Army prolonged the line of attack as far as Dixmude. Just before the Belgians attacked, King Albert issued his Order of the Day:

Soldiers, go forward and make a powerful assault on the enemy positions by the side of your heroic British and French comrades. It is your duty to drive back the invader, who has been oppressing your brethren for the past four years. The hour is decisive. The Germans are retiring everywhere.

Soldiers, show yourselves worthy of the sacred cause of our independence, worthy of our traditions, worthy of our race. Forward for right, for freedom, for glorious and immortal Belgium.

Both the British and Belgian attacks were

brilliantly successful. The Germans, who had five divisions of Sixt von Arnim's army to hold their line—an insufficient force—were driven rapidly back from the high ground east of Ypres, and by the end of the day the British had passed far beyond the extreme limits of the 1917 battles and had captured Kortewilde, Zandvoorde, Kruiseecke and Beelaere, while on the left the Belgian troops had taken Zonnebeke, Poelcapelle and Schaapbaillie, and completely cleared the Houthulst forest. Large numbers of guns were captured by the Belgians, of which a good proportion were taken in the forest, and altogether they captured some 300 pieces. The British took about 150 guns, and the two forces between them appear to have made some 5,000 prisoners. The weather was misty, and it seems probable that, as the attack was made without preliminary bombardment, the Germans were more or less surprised. Where the Belgians attacked there was still some wire left, but it had been largely destroyed by recent artillery fire, a four hours' bombardment having been devoted to this purpose; but on the British front the entanglements were fewer, and there was no attempt until the actual attack to destroy them with shell fire. It was ground over which there had been a considerable amount of fighting, as has been described in previous chapters. The country itself was the most formidable obstacle, with its water-logged soil and shell-holes full of water, and the rapidity with which the Allied troops swept the enemy before them shows that the latter had greatly lost heart.

On the next day, the advance was continued, and by night the line had advanced to a position running from Dixmude by the forest of Houthulst, Stadenberg, Westroosebeke, Passchen-

daele, Moorslede, Beeelaere, Gheluveld and Messines, an advance of from four to six miles. This was some distance in front of the positions we had won in the previous autumn, but had subsequently to give up. The Allied troops were threatening Roulers and had reached the Roulers-Menin road, while the Belgians were within 20 miles of Bruges. The attack had been supplemented by coastal action by our Navy, which had bombarded severely the German positions on the coast-line.

On September 30 our troops reached the Roulers-Menin road, and were within two miles of Menin. This pronounced advance threatened the whole of the Germans on the coast, and was a serious threat to their position at Lille, from which they were beginning to withdraw some of their stores and troops. They also ordered a number of the inhabitants to accompany them



[Official photograph.]

IN THE CANAL DU NORD.

After capturing the line known as the Flanders ridge, the left Allied attack under King Albert, which was now supported by General Degoutte's French Army, was continued. Degoutte, it will be remembered, had previously fought on the Marne.

On September 30 four of General Plumer's divisions, the 9th, the 29th, the 14th and 35th,

continued their advance against the Germans towards Ledeghem. The 9th Division pressed forward across the road and railway between Menin and Roulers towards Ledeghem, while the 29th Division advanced on Gheluveld assisted by the 35th Division. These two divisions were supported by the 41st and 36th Divisions, while the 31st, 30th and 34th Divisions operated towards Wytchaete, and drove back the enemy from the ridge there and



GENERAL SIR H. PLUMER, G.C.B.
Commanded the British Forces on the Belgian Front, September, 1918.

from Ploegsteert Wood. In spite of the weather, which was incessant rain, the British troops on October 2 crossed the Lys river between Werwicq and Comines and also took Ledeghem.

The new French force came into action on September 30, deployed about Staden, and with the Belgians went on north of Roulers in the direction of Thourout. The Germans now withdrew from Armentières, La Bassée and Lille, and the British took Fleurbaix. Franco-Belgian troops pushed on on October 2 towards Hooglede. The German line of withdrawal in Flanders now extended from Armentières to the south towards Lens, the enemy being closely followed by our troops.

The advance of our First and Third Armies commenced on the 27th against the formidable obstacle of the Canal du Nord. This in

its northern portion was too formidable an obstacle to be carried by direct attack. It was therefore determined to pass it in the neighbourhood of Mouvres, to burst through the German line, and deploy to the north against the rear of the canal defences. The northern part of the attack was covered by a thick smoke screen.

The troops on the north of the Sensée made a big demonstration with much artillery fire so as to hold the enemy and prevent him moving across the Sensée against the flank of the English rear assaulting troops.

The passage of the Canal du Nord was an extremely well-managed manoeuvre. The whole front was engaged by fire, but the real attack was delivered south of the Arras-Cambrai road by the Canadians, supported by the 11th Division and with the 56th behind the latter, and aided by 65 tanks. The Canadians, when they crossed, spread out towards the Bournon direction, whilst the 11th Division coming after them turned northward with its left flank 300 yards from the barrage put down by our guns along the foot of the high ground behind the enemy in the canal defences and marshes. The 56th, when it got across the canal, went up between the 11th and the canal, clearing out

the German defences, the advance being protected by a rolling barrage.

Every preparation had been made for the attack, and our men were well provided with scaling ladders, but the larger portion of the troops appear to have made their way down on the counterscarp side, and then to have clambered up on the escarp side, by their own efforts. The rain on the preceding night made the ground slippery, but hardly hindered the progress of the assault. Here the disadvantage of the absence of actual flank defence of the canal was clearly shown. Our troops could not have crossed it had there been any defence of this kind until it had been absolutely silenced.

Immediately behind the canal line and at varying distances from close to some 300 yards behind it was a line of strong trenches covered by wire entanglements. This was abandoned by the enemy with very little resistance. About 700 yards farther back there was another trench line known to us as the Sow trench, and here rather more resistance was met with, but even in this instance the resistance was patchy: here and there portions held out well, but generally speaking the line was abandoned without any great resistance. A thousand yards farther to the rear was



[Belgian official photograph.]

BIG GERMAN HOWITZER CAPTURED IN THE FOREST OF HOUTHULST.



(Belgian official photograph.)

EMPLACEMENT OF A GERMAN BIG GUN INTENDED FOR BOMBARDING DUNKIRK.

the Hindenburg Support Line covered by deep belts of wire entanglements, but here again the formidable nature of the defences seems to have given very little heart to the men who occupied them, because they were driven out after a very inadequate resistance.

By these operations a considerable length of the Canal du Nord had fallen into our hands, and the engineers at once proceeded to make bridges over it to facilitate the passage of troops and guns. The bridging material had been carefully prepared beforehand, was laid down with the greatest celerity despite the artillery fire of the Germans, and was most gallantly placed in position. As soon as the German defences had been carried, light guns were over and went forward at a rapid pace to support the infantry; medium and heavy guns followed rapidly. Three trestle and pontoon bridges were in position by 6.30 in the morning, and four two-way crossings for horse traffic, guns, ammunition and mobiles by 9 o'clock. To these were quickly added more light bridges and others for the heavy artillery. Their medium and heavy guns followed up the advance rapidly.

It went forward almost without a check, and so rapidly, that many hostile batteries

were taken before they could get into position. Graincourt was the only point at which any great resistance was offered, and it was not till late in the day that it was surrounded and captured by the 63rd Division. Meanwhile the 57th Division, under Major-General W. R. Barnes, had pushed forward to the east beyond Anneux and Fontaine-notre-Dame, thus turning the southern side of the Bourlon Wood.

The objective of the Canadians, when they had passed the canal, was Bourlon village and wood. The wood had been heavily bombed by gas shells captured from the Germans, and fired from their guns which our men had taken. It was completely filled with gas and could not be entered, but the village was carried by the 4th Canadian Division, while the 3rd Canadian Division, under Major-General F. O. W. Loomis, passed through the southern outskirts of Bourlon Wood before 11 a.m. The wood was thus surrounded, and was completely abandoned by the enemy. Thus once more this formidable position, the capture of which had cost so much blood in the previous year, was wholly in our possession. On the left of our advance, the 1st Canadian Division captured early in the day Sains-lez-Marquion to the north of Mœuvres, midway between the

roads to Arras and Bapaume, and then advanced with the 11th Division (under Major-General H. R. Davies) on its left and took Hayneecourt. The 11th Division then assaulted and secured Epinoy and Oisy-le-Verger. The 5th Division of the XXII. Corps, which was on the left of our line, crossed the canal and cleared the Germans out of Sauchy-Cauchy and Sauchy-Lestréc, and then, inclining to its left, captured Palluel on the southern bank of the Sensée river, thus securing the left flank. At the end of the day our troops had reached the line Beaucamp—Ribécourt—Fontaine - notre - Dame — east of Hayneecourt—Epinoy—Oisy-le-Verger, and had taken over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns.

To the right of the main attack the Third Army also crossed the canal. At Beaucamp the Germans resisted strenuously and made several strong counter-attacks to stop the progress of our troops, but in spite of all their efforts the 5th and 42nd Divisions firmly established their position on the right flank between Beaucamp and Ribécourt. The 3rd Division and the Guards also forced a passage across the canal in spite of very heavy fire from machine-guns and artillery and captured Ribécourt and Flesquières. The Guards Division under Major-General T. G. Matheson

then took Orival Wood and made good up to Prémy Chapel. Here the 2nd Division, under Major-General C. E. Pereira, continued the movement. In the centre of the attack the 57th Division had already prepared bridge-heads which enabled the passage over the canal to be made securely, and by these the 52nd Division, under Major-General F. G. Marshall, passed. Going on, they carried the German defences east of the canal and gained the higher ground overlooking Graineourt. On the left of the 52nd was the 62nd Division, with the 4th and 1st Canadian Divisions, under the command of Major-General Sir D. Watson and Major-General A. C. MacDonell. These three divisions advanced while it was still dark down the western bank of the canal between Mœuvres and Sains-lez-Marquion. In the grey light of dawn they carried the canal with a rush and advanced on Graineourt, Anneux, Bourlon and the slopes to the north of the latter village.

The whole manœuvre was an excellent example of tactics. Troops on the north of the Sensée guarded the flank of those to the south of it. The canal was passed on a narrow front and the troops then spread out to a wide one—proof of great technical ability on the part of all concerned.



Official photograph.

A BRIDGE OVER THE CANAL 'DU NORD, BUILT IN $4\frac{1}{2}$ HOURS.



C. W. de C. S. NEAU.
1918.

ACROSS THE CANAL DU NORD: THE 2nd DIVISION TAKING THE SLAG HEAP BETWEEN BOURLON WOOD AND HAVRINCOURT.

Although we had employed no preliminary bombardment to speak of, our barrage was so devastating that it completely kept under the fire of the garrisons and absolutely disheartened them. The German artillery seems to have been especially affected, for its reply to our guns was feeble.

The result of the day's fighting was very striking. The Hindenburg Line of defence was completely broken through, the high ground in front of Cambrai was captured, thousands of prisoners had been taken and a large number of German guns. The whole British line had been pushed forward 7,000 yards.

On September 28 the British advance was continued, and Gouzeaucourt, Noyelles-sur-l'Escaut, Fontaine-notre-Dame and Sailly were taken. Marcoing was an important point, as here our troops secured the passage over the Escaut Canal, and this facilitated the advance on Cambrai. On the Sensée Aubencheul-au-Bac was captured, insuring against any enemy reaction over the Sensée Canal at this point.

On the same date the First Army again pushed forward against the Germans who were covering the high ground between Cambrai and the Sensée marshes, which was necessary so long as he determined to hold on to Cambrai. The defence was stubborn, but the Hindenburg Line about Marcoing was definitely broken.

The Fourth Army began a heavy bombardment of the German lines opposed to them on the morning of September 27, and continued it the whole of that day and the next. So heavy was our fire that the enemy's troops practically abandoned the front line of trenches and took refuge in their dug-outs and tunnels, while the barrage, which extended back behind these, was of so intense a character that it completely stopped ammunition and food being brought up to the Germans thus cut off.

On September 29 came the turn of the infantry of the British Fourth Army, which advanced to the attack on a front of 12 miles between Holnon and Vendhuile, covered by a very heavy artillery barrage. The troops employed were the II. American Corps with the IX. British under General G. W. Read, and the III. Corps with a strong force of tanks provided by the British and Americans. It will be remembered that the right of the Fourth Army was in connexion with the French First Army, and this too continued the line of attack in

the neighbourhood of St. Quentin. On the left of the Fourth Army the V. and IV. Corps of the Third Army attacked at an early hour between Vendhuile and Marcoing and had heavy fighting at Villers-Guislain, Gonnelleu and Welsh Ridge.


On the Fourth Army front the 46th Division, under Major-General G. F. Boyd, displayed great gallantry in the direction of Bellenglise—a very difficult position to take. It lay in the bend of the Escaut Canal, which after running south from Belliecourt turns sharply to the east towards the Le Tronquoy tunnel. Some of the troops were equipped with life-belts, others passed on rafts and crossed the western arm of the canal at Bellenglise and to the north of it. Others went over the canal by foot-bridges which the enemy had had no time to destroy, while many, dropping down the sheer side of the canal wall and swimming or wading to the far side, climbed up to assault the German trenches on the eastern bank. Such troops as these were not easy to stop. Overrunning the front line of these trenches, they swung to the right and took the German defences along the eastern arm of the canal and on the high ground to the south of it, in flank and rear.

The direction of attack was quite unexpected by the Germans, who lost many batteries of artillery which could not be withdrawn before the British infantry were on them, and large numbers of prisoners as well. So well was the attack designed and carried out and so gallant were the troops, that this one division alone took 4,000 prisoners and 70 guns.

Farther south, the Fourth Army was equally successful. The 1st Division, under Major-General E. P. Strickland, with the 6th Division covering their flank, crossed the ridge north-west of Thorigny and reached the southern end of the Le Tronquoy tunnel. Here they gained touch with the 32nd Division, which had passed through the 46th Division after it had taken Bellenglise and took Lehaucourt and Magny-la-Fosse, thus gaining important high ground on the eastern side of the St. Quentin Canal, which was important for further progress.* North of Bellenglise, the American 30th Division, under Major-General E. M. Lewis, having broken through the deep defences of the Hindenburg Line, stormed Belliecourt and seized Nauroy. On their left the

* The Escaut Canal is called the St. Quentin Canal to the south of Bantouzelle.

27th American Division, under Major-General J. F. O'Ryan, pressed on as far as Bony. They met on their way with severe enfilade fire from the high ground, but in spite of it pressed steadily on. The fighting on the whole front of the II. American Corps was



[Official photograph.]

WHERE THE MEN OF THE 46th DIVISION SWAM THE CANAL.

very severe, and at many points in the Hindenburg defences strong bodies of the enemy held out with great obstinacy for many hours, but these were gradually overcome either by the support troops of the American divisions or by the 5th and 3rd Australian Divisions under Major-General J. J. T. Hobbs and J. Gellibrand, which came up behind the American troops, who passed over the top of the tunnel and went on farther.

On the left of the attack the 12th and 18th Divisions were employed against the slopes above Vendhuille, from which they completely cleared the enemy. Meanwhile the Third Army, on the left of the Fourth Army, captured Masnières and the crossings there over the Eseau Canal, and then pressed on towards the outskirts of Cambrai, while north-west of that town the Canadian Corps progressed on the north-west, taking St. Olle on the road from Arras to Cambrai and Sancourt on the road from Douai to Cambrai. The British attacks were continued without intermission during the next two days.

On September 30, the capture of Thorigny

and Le Tronquoy by the 1st and 32nd Divisions completed the possession of the Le Tronquoy tunnel and enlarged the gap in the Hindenburg Line. The Germans then retired from Villers-Guislain and Gonnelleu on the west bank of the Eseau Canal, the retreat from which across the canal was now threatened by the passage of our troops at Vendhuille, and they retired behind it.

After the Americans on September 28 had passed over the Tronquoy tunnel and taken Nauroy and Bellicourt, it was necessary to clear out the Germans who had been passed over and had remained behind in the tunnel.

The latter was one of the most remarkable engineering works in this part of France. It had been opened by the great Napoleon in 1802. There were wide roadways on either side of the canal itself capable of accommodating several thousand men, and the Germans had dug galleries into the trench work from the east which were nearly as wide and were comfortably arranged for shelter. Beneath the overhead cover of earth, the Germans in this shelter had been safe from the heaviest bombardment, and there were only one or two places where a chance heavy shell had managed to penetrate.

The clearing out was done on September 30 by the Australians, who had very hard fighting and very strenuous work to complete this very necessary operation, for the tunnel had extremely strong defences and many ramifications both east and west back to the German lines, giving opportunities both for escape and reinforcements. In the trenches and down in the tunnel, fighting of the most determined character went on while the Australians slowly pressed their way onward, clearing out the various points. Live prisoners to the number of 150 were taken, and an immense number of dead Germans were left in the tunnel.

The tunnel was prepared for blowing up at the proper time, but happily our infantry managed to capture the German pioneers who were in charge of this business. They had already commenced to cut some of the leads, but were told that if they did not disconnect the whole of them, and so make the place comparatively safe, our troops would leave them in the tunnel while our men watched carefully outside. This was sufficient, and the whole of the mines were disconnected.

On October 1 and 2 the fighting round Cambrai was extraordinarily severe. General

von Below had issued an order, "Cambrai must not fall." At daybreak on October 1 the Canadians went forward to dispute this dictum. Covered by a vigorous barrage, to which the Germans replied five minutes later, they moved towards the Escaut Canal north of the town so as to take the bridge-heads over the canal north-east of Cambrai, and to push back the enemy beyond it. This would have placed in their possession all the high ground extending between the Sensée and the town, the capture of which would have greatly affected the German position at Cambrai itself. For if the canal were passed, the advance to the Selle over open ground was easy and would threaten the retreat of the Germans from the town.

The line to which the Germans clung was roughly that of the Douai-Cambrai road south of the Sensée; to the north of the river it had been cut by our troops on the 29th. The German Supreme Command also attached great importance to restraining our advance to the north of this town on both sides of the Sensée, which formed, indeed, the key of that portion of the German lines which extended from this town to the north. If it should fall, retreat from the front of Lens to the south

became a necessity, for otherwise the troops there would be liable to be cut off. The advance of our troops south of the Sensée had been covered by the VIII. and the XXII. Corps, which had moved forward somewhat in echelon and behind the Canadian troops.

The whole of the area over which the advance was made had been well organized for defence, and the Germans fought desperately to stop our troops. Against the Canadians with the 11th British Division on their left, and the British divisions which were fighting from the Sensée river to the south, there had been led to the attack since September 27 some 12 divisions. There were still six left for counter-attack, viz., the 1st Guard Reserve Division, the 220th, the 234th, the 26th, 207th and the 22nd, with a large number of guns to support them. The first line of German defence was, as has been said, the Cambrai-Douai road; then behind it came the line of railroad leading from Cambrai to the same town, which runs in an irregular curve at a distance varying from 200 to 1,500 yards from it. Division after division was sent up against our attacking troops only to be smashed back by our overwhelming artillery fire, supplemented by machine-gun and rifle fire from



[French official photograph.]

THE BRIDGE OVER THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL WHICH WAS SAVED BY THE
46th DIVISION.

our infantry. More than once our men were compelled to retire before the vigour of the counter-attacks. This occurred at Blécourt and Thillois and Bantigny. Still our men, though occasionally driven back, returned to the attack and consistently pushed the enemy before them. Particularly severe were the German counter-strokes made up along the depression through which the Bantigny brook ran, which afforded considerable cover to the attacking columns. Some idea of the intensity of the struggle may be gained from the fact that one heavy battery fired on October 1 1,600 shells. At Blécourt the Germans had many well covered machine-gun nests, but these were carried in succession, while the masses of the enemy were torn to pieces by our artillery fire. The attack was pressed with such vigour that by 9 o'clock in the morning the line of the Escaut Canal was reached from the outskirts of Cambrai through Morenchiés, the Pont d'Aire and Ramillies, while the 11th Division continued the line to the north, stormed Epinoy and made their way along the railway and the Sensée river east of Oisy-le-Verge to Aubencheul-en-Bac.

On October 1 the IX. and the Australian Corps, acting in conjunction with the First French Army under General Debeney, went forward, and Levergies, to the east of Lechaucourt, was taken by the 32nd Division.

The success to the north of St. Quentin rendered the position of the Germans there dangerous, and this was accentuated by the capture of Joncourt, Estrées and Bony by the Australians. The enemy therefore began to abandon the town during the night, and Debeney's troops, which were acting on the right of the Australians, pushed on on the heels of the retreating Germans and then, wheeling up, occupied the edge of the canal beyond the town, between Rouvrois and Le Tronquoy. Small parties of the enemy clung to the eastern edge of St. Quentin, but were driven out during the night and the town completely occupied. In the south the Hindenburg position was penetrated up to a mile and a half to the south of Gauchy, and this line was now broken on a front extending from Bellenglise up to Estrées, and our troops were advancing beyond it. The fall of St. Quentin was an important gain for the Allies. Coupled with that of Cambrai, which was now imminent, it compelled the Germans to continue their retreat.

St. Quentin had suffered a great deal from the bombardment and from German treatment. The beautiful church was very severely damaged, and so were many other prominent edifices in the town, as, for example, the 13th century Hôtel de Ville on the Grande Place. A great deal of the destruction was, of course, wanton, and the day on which the Allies occupied the town fires were lit by the Germans in many parts of it.

In the Cambrai region the New Zealand and 3rd Divisions took Crèvecourt and Rumilly on the south of Cambrai, while north of that town the Canadian Corps took the high ground west of Ramillies and cleared Blécourt.

Pressed in front, whilst their retreat was threatened by the advance of the Third Army from the south, the Germans began gradually to withdraw. The high ground was won and the capture of Cambrai was only a question of time. Patrols, indeed, had already penetrated into the outskirts.

The defeat of the German attacks was very largely due to the magnificent shooting of our artillery, who poured an unceasing fire on the advancing troops.

On October 1 fires were seen burning in Cambrai, which looked as if it was about to be abandoned.

In the fighting of the last five days the 11th and 56th Divisions, fighting with the Canadians, had taken 150 guns and 5,000 prisoners.

On October 2 the Rumilly-Beaurevoir line was burst on a length of eight miles by the North Midland and American Divisions. The villages of Preselles and Sequchart were captured, but the last was subsequently re-taken by the Germans. Close behind this line and to the east of St. Quentin, which was now quite clear of Germans, lay the valley of the Oise, through which ran the German lines of communication with La Fère, Laon and the St. Gobain Forest, which were also threatened by the advance of the French Fifth Army, now under Guillaumat.

German views on the situation are as usual interesting if not informing reading.

Major Endres, in the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, admitted that the situation had not been so serious since the Battle of the Marne in 1914.

The German wireless of September 14 stated that the

English in spite of their gains of territory on September 2

north of Quéant, for which the Scots and the Canadians were sacrificed, could not cross beyond the line drawn for them by the Germans which ran from Arleux to Mœuvres. Behind this there was the Wotan position and a still further defensive system, and the German Army is still strong enough to stop in the open field the British assault.

However, while some German authorities engaged in pointing out the great numerical superiority of the Entente, others were more concerned with consoling the German people by painting in the blackest colours "the appalling losses suffered by the Entente during the last six months."

neither our losses in material nor in man-power were anything like what the Germans had suffered since the offensive return of August 8. Gädke was bold enough to place the losses of the French, English and Americans, "inclusive," he adds, "of their coloured brethren, during the last six months at from 1,500,000 to 1,750,000 men, which ought to bring near to every human heart the desire to bring the wholesale slaughter to an end." There was a constant harping in the German Press on this question of black troops. Now it is perfectly



TUNNEL ON THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL.

[Official photograph.]

Gädke, in the *Vorwaerts* of September 17, took this line.

The weakening of the Entente war-power has taken place to a very large extent. Foch's counter-thrusts would have been much more dangerous if the attacking strength of his French and English Armies had not been lessened. All their glorious reports do not mislead their adversaries as to the fact that they had reached nothing decisive, but, on the contrary, the rightly timed withdrawal of the German Army has deprived them of their banty. Even if one believed their statements concerning the number of prisoners and captured guns, the fact remains that the booty in prisoners and war material which we secured in the last six months exceeds theirs by more than double.

This, of course, is an absolutely ridiculous travesty of fact. We did lose heavily, very heavily, in the retreat from the Marne and to a less extent in the northern withdrawal, but

well known to the whole world that, with the exception of French African troops and a certain number of negroes in the American Army, there were no black troops in the Entente fighting line.

It was, of course, very difficult for the German authorities to be continually preparing antidotes with a view to overcoming the effect of the continued Allied successes against their troops. Reference to any map must have shown the average German that without ceasing for a month and a half the Germans had been driven back; and moreover, these authorities themselves must have known that they had been forced to retire, abandoning a large amount of material, great numbers of weapons



SOME OF THE GERMAN PRISONERS.

Ministry of Information.

and many thousands of unwounded prisoners.

With regard to the fighting against the Americans, we are at one moment told that the St. Mihiel retirement had been carried out in accordance with plan and was quite successful. No admissions were made as to the number of prisoners taken or material captured, and then, a few days afterwards, they were compelled to admit that the St. Mihiel salient had been completely abandoned!

Writing after the fighting of St. Mihiel, von Ardenne points out, what was the case, that the salient was a dangerous one and could scarcely be held when attacked on all sides.

An interesting contribution to the tactics of the War was made by Fabius in the *Neue Freie Presse* of September 15, in which he deals with the tank question. He points out "how important have been the results obtained by this new weapon." Animadverting on the first type employed by the British, for instance, at Cambrai, he points out that these were slow and somewhat clumsy, and the consequence was that large numbers of them were put out of action, but the type was improved and the tank became more mobile and more rapid. Then greater results were obtained. He endorses the statement of the *New Statesman*

which wrote on August 17: "The Franco-British victory on August 8 and the French victory on August 10 were undoubtedly the most successful offensive operations of the Allies on the Western Front. They were obtained by the latest strategic method—complete surprise—and a new method in tactics, the improved use of an improved type of tank." He then goes on to point out why the new arm was so effective.

Tanks can be massed in a very short time behind any given section and can therefore operate with the maximum of surprise. Bad visibility is no obstacle (i.e., mist or fog), but rather an advantage. They can attack one point to-day and be elsewhere to-morrow, ready for another attack without prolonged preparation. All these point to their great advantage over the artillery, whereas artillery can only cut wire and blot out trenches with an enormous expenditure of ammunition, the tank takes all these obstacles with the greatest ease and makes broad paths along which the advancing infantry can follow. They are the most dangerous foe to machine-guns; they can approach machine-gun nests and destroy them at close range. The great danger of the tank is obvious when one considers that the defence of the front battle zone generally relies on the defensive value of the machine-gun, and the armour of the tank renders it invulnerable to rifle-fire and only seldom and in exceptional cases is machine-gun fire effective. The infantry is therefore opposed to an enemy to whom it can do little or no harm. The tank also plays the chief part when the front lines have once been broken through, as owing to its mobility and speed it forms the best means of following up a success. Here it plays the part which was formerly allotted to the Cavalry, although only up to a certain

point, as the tank is not able to rely entirely on itself. . . The tank is of all arms the most suitable for obtaining a break-through. But this is only true of it in a ground suited for manœuvre. . . . It is not a complete substitute for artillery. It is a new arm which, cooperating with the other arms, enormously increases the strength of the attack. . . . A considerable number of tanks have been partly shot to pieces, but evidently not in sufficient numbers to stop their effective use.

The author appears to think that the best means of combating tanks is to use tanks which have a small gun firing with a kind of case-shot or a small shell which would destroy a tank at short range. He also points out the value of water as a defence, and this seems to have been used to some extent, at any rate, on the German front.

Towards the end of the month, the German critics in the face of the continuous successes were getting very angry. In the *Tägliche Rundschau* General von Liebert exclaims, "Lying has become a national characteristic of the British. They seem no longer able to tell the truth." Colonel Gädke, on the other hand, in the *Vorwärts*, takes a more rational view. "The enemy is seeking to crush the military forces of the Central Powers by a simultaneous mighty joint exertion of his numerical superiority and technical fighting means." He admits that success is on the side of the Entente, and that the point of the Franco-American offensive at St. Mihiel was very well chosen and had been begun with great energy and that the Allies had gained the first success. On the other hand, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 22 was convinced that the Siegfried position was quite capable of resisting the most violent assaults, and would remain impregnable so long as the German trenches and batteries were occupied by men who were convinced of the absolute necessity of holding out. As they yielded to the Allied attacks the deduction is obvious.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 29 had the following remarks on the situation:—

At the moment when we seemed to be climbing to the summit of martial success, a reverse overtook us. A few weeks ago it still seemed as if our armies were very near to their final goal, crushing the enemy's armies and the winning of Peace, and now what a turn of the tide. Threatened on all sides, our armies are fighting with their utmost strength to avert defeat, the tragic character of which is unparalleled. The view that the Western war theatre was the main theatre has, despite events in the Balkans, not proved incorrect, and the foiling of the tremendous break-through blow has hitherto been marked by the best success and is still the sure basis of our entire position. But the assumption that our arms in the West crossed the limits which, in the course of the four years of War, have so manifestly been drawn for us has proved false. Necessarily that is the decisive factor. What shall our objects be based

on? On necessity unanswerable necessity, on the greatness of the danger, on the fearful burden of historic responsibilities which rests on our people in this fateful hour of German and of European history. We must get through or we are lost.

But after all this comparatively lucid appreciation of the situation, the old leaven still working in the writer leads him to wind up with the following statement:—

The great battle in France is taking a favourable course for us. The enemy's efforts are absolutely tremendous and our military burden quite unparalleled; nevertheless, the assailants' success in the present double battle is for the present quite slight. East of the Argonne the Americans have created a pronounced indentation, but in consequence of our elastic defence and the timely barring of the way they have been unable to derive any further advantage from this. The penetration of our position zone before Cambrai is only so far a partial success. The Cambrai sector is a part of the front the defence of which demands great care.

Lieut.-Colonel von Ostensacken in the *Rheinisch Westfälische Zeitung* of September 27



IN THE HINDENBURG LINE.

puts the matter very squarely: "We must fight until we have gained victory or suffered defeat."

The work done by the British aviators during the period of fighting just described had been very important. They had worked in close

contact with the advancing infantry and had given the greatest assistance to them. An instance may be given of the accurate way in which the British airmen carrying out the contact work rendered assistance to the advancing troops. A two-seater machine while engaged in observing the enemy noted a British field battery galloping up to take post in an advanced position. They had also observed right in the path of the advancing battery a German machine-gun nest. Realizing the imminent danger to the British guns, the aeroplane dived down and the airmen signalled to the battery, directing it to turn back. This it was just able to do as the German machine-guns began to open fire. This action of the British aviators naturally attracted the German aeroplanes, which were determined to punish them for robbing the machine-guns of their prey. No fewer than seven of their machines attacked ours. One of these was promptly shot down. At this moment another German aviator was seen to be attacking a British artillery machine from behind and below it. The pilot of the British attacking aeroplane at once dived down to the rescue and succeeded in driving off the attacking German; then, his ammunition being exhausted, he managed to shake himself clear of his assailant and to return safely to the British lines.

On another occasion a British pilot was attacked by several hostile machines. To deceive the enemy he put his machine into a spin as if he had involuntarily lost control over it. The Germans followed, diving after the scout, who allowed his machine to fall several thousand feet. Apparently this deceived most of the Germans, who all gave up the pursuit except one, thinking the machine must be vitally damaged. The British airman noticing this, suddenly pulled his machine out of the spin, flattened out and banking steeply, turned on his assailant. The German, unable to pull up sufficiently quickly, crossed right in front of the British pilot, who poured in a burst of machine-gun fire which sent the German machine crashing to the earth, where it was observed to burst into flames. On his way home, the British pilot, flying just above the hedges, devoted the remainder of his ammunition to scattering several bodies of enemy troops and transports by his machine-gun fire.

September 16 was a notable day in aerial fighting. Our aviators brought down 65 hostile machines and one was shot down by anti-

aircraft guns, in addition to which one hostile balloon was destroyed. This great success was attained at an expenditure of only 16 of our machines; the fighting was intense all along the whole front throughout the day, combats taking place at a considerable distance behind the enemy's lines. Nearly 24 tons of bombs were dropped during the day and 15 tons during the ensuing night. The photographic reconnaissance was carried out with great completeness, and observation for artillery fire was very successful; much damage was reported on hostile battery positions and many fires and explosions were observed.

On the afternoon of this day, the Independent Air Force made two separate attacks on the aeroplane works and Chemical Factory at Mannheim with excellent results. The enemy attacked with great vigour and we lost three machines. A German aerodrome near Hagenau was attacked by a squadron and bursts were observed on and near the hangars, one of which was seen in flames.

On the night of September 16-17, three hostile aerodromes were attacked and good results obtained. Once more the railways at Metz-Sablons and Treves were heavily attacked, and fires were started at the former place. The station at Frankfort was also heavily attacked. The night at first was calm, but later high winds got up and seven of our machines failed to turn up. Aix-la-Chapelle was also bombed during the night.

The Naval Air Force contingents during September 17-18 also did good work, bombing Bruges Docks and doing other damage.

The enemy aircraft were less active on September 17, having been so severely handled the day before; the weather continued fine, and our men carried out their usual routine duties very fully. In the fighting which ensued, 16 hostile machines were driven down. We lost ten. At night we bombed three German aerodromes where hostile squadrons who were working in the battle-area were housed. During the night three large hostile night-bombing machines which came over our lines were detected by our search-lights and attacked from the air and brought down. One of our night-flying machines was missing. According to the German reports, our men dropped a good many bombs on the Rhine area, at Mainz, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Rastatt, etc. The amount of damage done was reported as being small.

September 18 was not remarkable for any special fighting in the air. Our machines kept touch with our advancing troops and assisted the attacks by bombing and machine-gun fire as well as by reporting targets to our artillery. There was a certain amount of fighting in the air, in which seven enemy machines were driven down with a loss of four of our own.

About this time some long range guns on the French side appear to have reached Metz with their projectiles. The bombardment does not seem to have been of a very important or

The Lanz Works at Mannheim and the wharves and factories west of Karlsruhe were all successfully attacked. Blast furnaces at the Buhrbach Works were bombed and attacks were made on the aerodromes at Boulay, Frescaty and Morhanges.

During the same night, the French night-fliers were also active, dropping 18 tons of bombs on various aerodromes, particularly those belonging to the night bombarding squadrons, and on the junction of important railway lines. The aerodromes of Stenay and



TANKS IN THE CANAL DU NORD.

[Official photograph.]

continuous character and had little material, though German accounts show that it had some moral, effect.

On September 19 the weather was too bad for very much work in the air, but still the aeroplanes, working in close contact with the troops of the Third and Fourth Armies, managed to report a good many of the positions of enemy batteries, and they also delivered ammunition to our machine-gunners in the forward area. No flying was possible at night.

During the night of September 20/21 the Independent Air Force did very good work, dropping 17 tons of bombs on various points.

Marville were attacked, and the railway stations at Etain, Buzancourt and Jainville.

On September 21 cloudy and windy weather continued to prevail on the British front, but in spite of this, a large amount of reconnoitring and photographic work was done and many artillery patrols were successfully carried out. Ten enemy machines were driven down, and during the night of September 21/22 three enemy bombing machines which had been detected by our searchlights were engaged from the air and brought down.

September 22 was again unfavourable for work in the air; still our men contrived to do



CAMBRAI FROM THE AIR.

a good deal of useful work and brought down eight of the enemy's machines with a loss of four to ourselves.

During the night to September 23 one of our night-flying squadrons successfully attacked an enemy aerodrome near Valenciennes, dropped over four tons of bombs, and returned without casualty.

Late in the day of September 23 the weather cleared up, and although the enemy's activity was slight and intermittent, our squadrons persisted throughout the day and evening in their various tasks; they drove down 11 hostile machines, while two more were brought down by our anti-aircraft batteries. After the moon rose our night-flying squadrons attacked enemy aerodromes, railheads and hutments with vigour and effect, dropping $17\frac{1}{2}$ tons of bombs without losing a single machine.

Nothing can give a better idea of the superiority gained by our airmen than the fact that they had now begun to take prisoners. A British aeroplane was fired on from a trench and a sunken road close by it. The pilot dived and fired on the hostile battery with his fixed machine-gun, killing one man and wound-

ing three others. The whole German battery, to the number of 65, at once hoisted a white handkerchief in token of surrender. The pilot descended to within 50 feet and ordered the Germans out of the trench. They obeyed, and then, making them fall in, he drove them off in the direction of the British lines. Flying low and circling round them, he carefully shepherded the party across No Man's Land and handed them over to the nearest British troops.

Among other instances in which during the German retreat the British machines played havoc amongst the hostile infantry, a British two-seater whilst on patrol observed a party of 50 German infantry. Diving swiftly the pilot dropped two bombs before the Germans had time to disperse, knocking over about 30 of the party, the survivors scattering wildly in all directions; continuing the patrol and flying very low, the British plane sighted an ammunition column, into which the observer and pilot fired 200 rounds from their machine-guns, causing many casualties and stampeding the remainder. They next dispersed another party of infantry and finally a machine-gun post. Then, with their ammunition practically exhausted, they returned home.

Two other flying officers who had before distinguished themselves had a series of exciting adventures during the course of one flight. Observing German guns and limbers on the march, they called up a British battery by wireless and directed its fire upon the columns. A gun and limber were destroyed. Next they perceived some more German guns in action and, again communicating with the battery, they secured the destruction of another gun. Then they dived and opened fire with their machine-guns, inflicted many casualties on the gun crew, and forced the remainder of them to seek safety in flight. Once more they called up a British battery to fire on a German artillery column consisting of five guns, and, directing the British gunners where to fire, the latter knocked out one gun. The German gunners then sought safety in a hurried flight, the remainder galloping away furiously. The British aeroplane now swooping down opened fire on the leaders. The rest of the column piled itself up on the leading gun into a struggling mass. Again the British guns were called up and a shell was landed plumb on the confused heap, completing the destruction.

Four British machines returning from a bombing expedition behind the German lines

saw a line of four enemy observation balloons. The leader took advantage of the opportunity and communicated his intentions to the other three pilots. They arranged themselves in line, each pilot selecting his own sausage as a target, and bore down on them in a headlong dive. The Germans were quite unable to haul down their balloons in time and each pilot secured his prey, the whole four German balloons falling to the earth in flames.

September 25 was fine, but cloudy; a large number of photographs were taken; 12½ tons of bombs were dropped; two German aerodromes and several railway junctions being heavily dosed. There was also much fighting in the air, in which 53 German aviators were driven down and also eight balloons. We lost 10 machines. The French were equally active, and in addition to dropping five tons of bombs on various points behind the line, brought down nine German aeroplanes and one captive balloon.

In the next few days the weather was good, and our men persistently bombed the enemy's lines and also destroyed several aeroplanes.

The Independent Air Force on September 25 again attacked Buhl with good results; one



[Official photograph.]

GERMAN CONCRETE MACHINE-GUN POST BUILT TO LOOK LIKE A COTTAGE.

squadron attacked Kaiserslautern with success. Our machines were attacked by a large number of enemy aircraft on the return journey and severe fighting took place, as the result of which four enemy machines were shot down. Four of ours also failed to return.

Our aeroplanes also attacked the factories at Frankfort with good results. Large numbers of enemy aircraft were encountered and heavy fighting took place, resulting in five of the enemy's machines being shot down, against which we had to set off four. It will be noticed in these accounts of the I.A.F. work that all the fighting took place behind the German lines, thus proving clearly that they dared not meet our men at their front line of defence, but had to wait until they got them behind in the hope of having a superiority of number over our aviators.

The fine weather which now obtained was greatly in favour of our Air Force. The French too, on September 26 did extremely good work keeping their headquarters accurately informed of all movements of German troops and convoys and of the activity on his principal lines of railroad.

On September 26 they dropped 26 tons of bombs in the rear zone of the battle area, and

in particular on the river crossings north of Tahure and in the regions of the Somme-Py. The activity was kept up during the night, and 23½ tons of bombs were dropped on German cantonments and bivouacs and other important points, particularly on Laon, Longuyon, Le Chatelet and Amagne. The German aerial observation was completely kept under. Of their machines 42 were put out of action, and seven captive balloons were set on fire in the course of the day.

The Independent Air Force, acting in conjunction with the French and American troops and our machines, in the afternoon attacked the railways at Metz Sablons and Audun-le-Roman, north of Briey, and during the ensuing night the railroads at Mezières; Thionville, Ars and Frescaty aerodromes were also heavily attacked without any casualties to our machines.

On September 27 great activity was displayed by our men, with special success at an immense aerodrome, where several hangars were set on fire; a machine on the ground was destroyed and seven more who attempted to repel the attacking squadrons were shot down.

During all this day our machines were very active on every part of the front and kept close watch on the course of the various operations.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH OBSERVATION BALLOONS PROTECTED BY CAMOUFLAGE.

Flying low, they did great damage to the enemy with their machine-gun fire, besides directing our artillery on a great number of targets with subsequent success to our guns, and taking over 1,000 photographs. German aeroplanes to the number of 42 were accounted for, and eight hostile balloons, but the loss to ourselves amounted to 19 machines.

The French, too, were very active both by day and night. They continued to harass the enemy's troop transports and to attack his convoys without cessation, and also to bomb important points such as the Somme-Py-

troops, transport trains and gun columns. Notwithstanding the bad weather, our night bombers distributed 34 tons of projectiles over various parts of the enemy's lines and communications.

The Americans, too, on the Argonne kept the command of the air. They brought down 12 balloons and more than 60 enemy planes with a loss of less than a third of that number of their machines.

On September 29, although the weather was still bad, a great deal of work was done in the air; 15 hostile balloons were sent down in flames



[Canadian War Records.]

METAL COLLECTED BY THE GERMANS, WHICH THEY HAD TO ABANDON.

Challerange railroad, etc. The well-known French aviator Fonck brought down six enemy machines during September 26. This was the second time that this airman accounted for six of the enemy's aviators in one day. The previous occasion was on May 9, 1918.

On September 28, the same process was carried out in spite of clouds and rains, and above all was to be noted the accurate way in which the position of our advancing troops was reported to the headquarters of formations and the large number of casualties inflicted by bombs and machine-gun fire on the enemy's

by our airmen and many more were compelled to descend to avoid destruction. Twenty-seven aeroplanes were brought down in the air and another by anti-aircraft fire. Nine others were also driven down out of control. Nineteen of our machines were reported as missing.

The French also did good work on this day, bringing down 25 German machines and destroying two captive balloons, besides dosing the rear of the enemy's front with bombs and machine-gun fire.

The weather was worse on September 30 and our machines could do little more than



[Belgian official photograph.]

BELGIAN AMMUNITION COLUMN ADVANCING TOWARDS ROULERS.

keep in touch with our advancing lines of infantry. The enemy displayed no activity in the air and our work cost us only two machines.

During the month of September, British airmen and gunners destroyed 383 German aeroplanes and drove down 199 out of control, making a total of 582; 62 balloons were also destroyed. The French destroyed or put out of action 181 German aeroplanes and 57 balloons. The Americans reported that they

destroyed over 100 machines and 21 balloons, and the Belgians one.

The month of September had seen the enemy driven back along his whole line from the Yser to the Meuse; his losses in men had been extremely heavy and in material even more serious. Plainly, the end of his fighting power was drawing near, though it was not yet absolutely reached.

END OF VOLUME NINETEEN.

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
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